

# AMPO

Nos. 3-4 March, 1970



Young and old participate in the struggle together. These elderly farm women are members of the "Old People's Action Unit."

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# AMPO

Nos. 3-4 March. 1970

# AMPO 70

## Part 3 : SOUTH KOREA IN THE AMPO SYSTEM



South Korean riot police mobilized to repress students  
Seoul in March, 1969.

Japan's relations with her neighbor South Korea since 1965 provide an excellent object lesson pointing up the re-emergence of Japan as an imperialist power in Asia. They also illustrate, with textbook accuracy, a few simple maxims of economics: monopoly's incessant drive to export surplus capital, its constant quest for cheap labor, extensive markets, and raw materials in the underdeveloped countries, and the tendency towards political and military dominance by the powerful imperialist state. In Korea, we can see how much "foreign aid" provided by an imperialist power really "aids" its own monopoly capital; the "aid"-receiving nation is integrated into the imperialist world system and inevitably becomes more and more a satellite. Temporary "booms" do occur,

and some industries are established in the underdeveloped nation with capital exported by the advanced imperialist power, but these local industries do not and cannot conflict in any way with the interests of the aid-giver. The economic and political interests of the satellite state are subordinated to those of its imperialist "benefactor."

## JAPAN: SECOND LARGEST "AID"-GIVER TO ASIA

Before 1961, most of Japan's "foreign aid" was in the form of reparations paid to Southeast Asia. During this period, South Korea received no reparations because the negotiators of both countries could not reach an agreement in the normalization talks, which dragged on from 1952 until 1965 -- thirteen years! Finally, the United States pressured Japan and South Korea into signing a normalization treaty in 1965. From 1965, reversing a declining trend in foreign aid during the years 1961-64, Japan embarked on a far-reaching and rapidly increasing aid program. The 1965 figure was \$490 million; in 1966, this increased to \$540 million. In 1967, Japan's total overseas aid, including both governmental ~~gra~~ and private investments, amounted to \$850 million. Even if we exclude from this total the deferred payments for ships exported, we still have a total of \$660 million, amounting to an increase of 23% over the previous year. Japan thus emerged as one of the five or six biggest "aid"-giving nations in the "Free World."

However, there is an important difference between Japan and the other imperialist nations. While the other powers tend to scatter their aid over various continents, Japan's foreign aid program is almost entirely concentrated in Asia. Asian countries receive 73.6% of the entire foreign aid disbursed by Japan, and the percentage is even higher for government aid. In 1967, 99.4% of governmental aid, chiefly yen loans, was given to Asian countries. This was even higher than the comparable percentage for 1966, which was 92.1%. Although Japan still lags far behind the United States in the monetary value of its "aid" to Asian countries, Japan has now become the second largest "aid"-giving nation to Asia. This reveals quite clearly that Japan is interested in carving out for herself a sizable sphere of influence in Asia within the over-all framework of the U.S.-dominated system of imperialist control.

## SOUTH KOREA: FIRST STOP ON THE ROAD TO OVERSEAS EXPANSION

The year 1965 was a crucial turning point in the history of Japan's economic expansion in Asia. During 1965, the United States became inextricably involved in the war in Vietnam and began to search for ways of defending its dollar currency. Rumblings were heard to the effect that American economic aid to South Korea would have to be drastically curtailed. Japan also would have to shoulder its part of the "burden." For Japan also, 1965 was a crucial moment. Newly adopted liberalization measures made it easier for foreign investment capital to make inroads into the Japanese domestic economy, and Japan and the U.S. began their discussions about the future of Okinawa. The basic instability of the entire postwar system of imperialist world domination was beginning to reveal itself with alarming clarity.

The Japan-ROK talks about "normalization" of diplomatic relations suddenly went into high gear and rushed to an agreement. Quite obviously, America was busy elsewhere and was grooming Japan to play the leading role in South Korean affairs in the years to come.

This was the opportunity the Japanese ruling class had been waiting for. It was only too glad to have a chance to penetrate into the South Korean economy. This breakthrough would open up further chances of exporting surplus Japanese capital to other nations of Asia.

However, the Korean people, who remembered with horror their 35 years of enslavement to Japanese imperialism (Korea was annexed to Japan in 1910 and remained a part of the Japanese Empire until 1945), reacted angrily to the prospect of renewed Japanese penetration into their nation. The struggle mounted by Korean students and citizens in opposition to the Japan-ROK talks was so intense that the Park regime was forced to declare martial law in May, 1965. In Japan, too, the two years of struggles against the Japan-ROK talks culminated in September and October, 1965. These struggles marked a new upsurge in the Japanese New Left movement, which had been relatively quiescent since the defeat of the Ampo struggles of 1960.

The treaty between Japan and South Korea was finally signed and ratified late in 1965. It stipulated that Japan would furnish South Korea with government grants in response to Korean "claims" (in lieu of "reparations"). \$300 million would be given gratis, and another \$200 million would be repayable. The export of government capital, in the form of credits and reparations, is invariably followed by an onrush of private investment. As of August, 1968, deferred payment exports of Japanese private capital to South Korea had exceeded \$300 million. By this time, private capital had also begun to conclude "technical co-operation" agreements and to make direct investments in South Korean industries. In 1968 and 1969, Japanese capital had already begun to challenge the predominant position previously enjoyed by American capital in South Korea, and today it is said to have gained the ascendancy. Thus, Japan today ranks first among exporters to South Korea. However, Japan imports very little from South Korea, and the extreme imbalance of the export-import trade reveals only too clearly the dominant position attained by Japan over the South Korean economy. Specifically, Japan's exports to South Korea amounted to \$409,959,000 in 1967 (Japan exported more to South Korea than to any other Asian country); but Japan's imports from South Korea were valued at only \$92,382,000!

As for Japan's total exports of capital, the South Korean Economic Planning Agency reported that the Japanese capital influx completed or already approved by the end of 1968 amounted to \$408 million. This represented 21.7% of the total foreign capital (\$1,880 million) being invested in South Korea. The Japanese share, amassed in just three years, was second only to that of the U.S., which had invested a total of \$719 million.

## GOVERNMENTAL "AID" ASSISTS THE GIVER, NOT THE RECEIVER

How does Japanese imperialism transfer capital to South Korea? There are four possible routes. First, the Japanese government provides "gratis" payments under the "claims" clause of the Japan-ROK Treaty. Second, capital loans are made through commercial channels. Third, Japanese enterprises conclude "technical co-operation" agreements with Korean companies. Fourth, Japanese Big Business makes direct investments in South Korean industry.

Governmental assistance by Japan to South Korea from 1966 until the end of April, 1969, amounted to \$872,020,000. \$101,460,000 of

this was in the form of "gratis" payments according to the treaty. These funds enable South Korea to import commodities -- from Japan, of course! -- which are then sold. The funds realized through the sales are then kept in reserve as a yen counterpart fund, similar to the dollar counterpart fund. These counterpart funds are sources of revenue for South Korea's military expenditures. Thus, foreign "aid" is geared to military spending.

Although these grants are called "gratis," this euphemism does not mean that Japan, in a sudden fit of altruism, simply gave away all this money with no strings attached. Far from it. Japan retains the right to decide what commodities are to be purchased with these funds. This allows Japan to force South Korea to purchase only those commodities which are advantageous to the Japanese side. Thus, Japanese tax-payers' money is paid "gratis" to the South Korean government, which is then required to buy products of, say, Mitsubishi. Big Business rakes in the profit. Instead of directly subsidizing the zaibatsu (which would hardly please the Japanese tax-payers), the Japanese government adopts the round-about approach of giving "gratis" aid to the South Korean regime, which then pays the money back into the coffers of Japanese monopoly capital. Obviously, the "assistance" granted by an imperialist power benefits, not the underdeveloped country, but rather Big Business in the imperialist nation itself.

A good example of this type of deal is the plan to build a massive steel works at Pohang, South Korea. This steel works will cost an estimated \$128,600,000, and some \$73,700,000 of this will be supplied by the Japanese government as "aid." This money will eventually find its way back into the zaibatsu coffers. In the meantime, the new steel works will give a big boost to the Park regime. First, it will be a shot in the arm for the near-bankrupt South Korean economy. Second, it will greatly enhance the personal prestige of General Park himself. Park is a big land-owner in the Pohang area. It is no coincidence that among Park's most ardent supporters in his recent (successful) bid for re-election to a third term (the Constitution had to be amended to allow his re-election) was none other than Mitsubishi Shoji, the Japanese trading company handling the purchase of the plant equipment for this steel mill. Politics and economics go hand in hand.

## LOANS AND INVESTMENTS INCREASE JAPANESE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY

Another type of Japanese capital penetration into South Korea is the private loan through commercial channels. As of the end of April, 1969, 55 such loans in various stages of implementation totaled \$284,515,000. Including other loans already approved but still awaiting implementation, the total rises to \$582,880,000.

These figures mean, in plain language, that Japan occupies the top position among nations granting private commercial loans to South Korea. The biggest loans were granted to the textile, electric power, cement, fertilizer, and shipbuilding industries. Obviously, these loans have already given Japanese Big Business a strong, and in many cases a controlling interest over key sectors of the South Korean economy, particularly those branches providing the basic raw materials for South Korean industry. For instance, available information indicates that by early 1967 Japanese

capital already controlled 80% of the shipbuilding and repairing industry, 100% of the PVC (polyvinyl chloride) industry, and 30% of the textile industry. It had also made extensive inroads into the power, machine building, and chemical industries.

Furthermore, late in 1968, Japan began to make direct investments in South Korea. For example, in March, 1969, Toyota Motor Co. decided to invest \$2,800,000 directly in the Sinsin Motor Co. of South Korea. Besides manufacturing automobile accessories, this Korean company also makes parts for various weapons. The first direct Japanese investment in the South Korean machine building industry was that made by Dainichi Kinzoku Kōgyō, a Japanese company specializing in making automated machine tools for manufacturing artillery shells. Thus, these investments have a deeply military coloring.

Another case in point is one now awaiting Japanese government approval. Three Japanese companies (Sanyō Electric, Nippon Electric, and Sumitomo Shōji) want to join with native South Korean Big Business to establish large Japan-Korean joint enterprises in the electronics industry. When we recall that Nippon Electric manufactures equipment for BADGE, a nuclear defense system, we begin to realize how directly these investments are tied up with the Japan-U.S.-ROK military set-up, the new AMPO system.

## SOUTH KOREA PLAGUED BY CHRONIC ECONOMIC ILLS

There is today, at least to the superficial observer, what appears to be an economic boom in South Korea. Building goes on everywhere, and the dispatch of 55,000 South Korean soldiers to Vietnam has, of course, brought about an increase in American economic assistance. Korea's exports have increased considerably in recent years, thanks largely to American spending connected with the Vietnam war. This "prosperity" is quite similar to that which Japan enjoyed during the Korean War. However, experience shows that this sort of "boom and bust" prosperity, linked closely with wartime spending, is illusory and temporary.

The South Korean economy, chronically tottering on the verge of collapse, has been propped up thus far by the massive loans and foreign aid which the country has received. But even South Korea must some day face up to the necessity of repaying its debts. In fact, it must begin repayment of its immense loan obligations in 1970. This explains the ruling clique's desperate search for ways of hurriedly modernizing the country before it goes utterly bankrupt. South Korea's chronic unemployment is still unsolved, and the people are burdened by heavy taxes and military conscription. The decision to send Korean mercenaries to fight in Vietnam came as a response to dire economic needs.

But from the vantage point of the Japanese ruling class, the situation in South Korea looks somewhat different. Japanese industry suffers from an acute shortage of manpower and would leap at the opportunity to tap the rich supply of cheap labor available in South Korea. One way of doing this would, of course, be to import South Korean laborers and put them to work in Japan. Economic necessity already drives thousands of South Koreans into Japan illegally to seek employment. Migratory labor is a system which has been put into practice widely in the European Common Market. However, such a solution would be rather awkward for Japan, since everyone still remembers the system of forced labor during World War II, when Koreans were abducted and brought to

Japan to work as slave labor in the Japanese coal mines. Therefore, Japanese Big Business has decided instead on the second-best solution. It will go to South Korea itself and hire Korean labor there for low wages. South Korea as a whole will gradually be converted into a subcontractor to Japan, manufacturing those goods which cannot be produced at a profit inside Japan, with its higher wage scale and its labor shortage. Capital's ceaseless drive for bigger and bigger profits has brought Japan back to the path it traveled once before, 60 years ago.

## RULING CLASSES HAVE A COMMON ENEMY

Now that Japan has invested so much capital in Japan -- and all indications are that more and more Japanese capital will continue to be poured steadily into the country -- how is Japan to keep her investments safe? What would happen, let us suppose, if there were strikes or civil disturbances inside South Korea? If the Park regime were to be overthrown, would the Japanese capitalists resign themselves with a sigh to the loss of their money? The answer is No. They would fight to protect their investments, using their own Self-Defense Forces if necessary. In the Sato-Nixon joint communique, Sato stated unequivocally that "the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security." Japan's business leaders have been even more explicit. They leave no doubt at all about what Sato *really* meant. "If an unfortunate situation should occur in South Korea," stated one, "Japan ought to fight, together with America and South Korea, to protect its invested interests." Another said: "In making inroads into South Korea, we must always be prepared to pass through the fiery trials of war." This is what Japanese leaders mean when they talk about "shouldering their burdens."

It is no secret that officers of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces are familiarizing themselves with Korea in the minutest detail. They are given courses in the Korean language and are making thorough investigations of Korean geographical terminology. A high-ranking officer of the SDF has been stationed in the Japanese Embassy in Seoul ever since the embassy was established. In September, 1967, the post of military attaché in the Seoul Embassy was assigned to Tsukamoto Shōichi, a ranking SDF officer, who had no trouble at all establishing close relations with the highest ranking officers in the South Korean Army and Navy. This was easy for him because many of South Korea's top military officials were the products of Tsukamoto's alma mater, the Military Academy of the old Japanese Imperial Army. Some of them were even his classmates there. In fact, Park Chung-hee, President of South Korea, was formerly a lieutenant-general in the old Japanese Imperialist Army. During his "Japanese" period, General Park went under the name of Okamoto.

Ever since the Pueblo incident, visits of high-ranking Self-Defense Force generals to South Korea have become more and more frequent. What do these comings and goings mean? We would presume that the Japanese brass discuss with their Korean counterparts their joint maneuvers under the American High Command, their state of preparedness, and their contingency planning in case of war. However, probably their most immediate common interest today is the maintenance of "public order," that is, action to put down popular uprisings and revolutions. Both Japan and South



Korea are integrated into a single world system of imperialist domination, headed by American imperialism. For the ruling classes of both countries, Japan and South Korea are one country. Their common enemy is the people of both countries.

## JAPAN TO FINANCE A STEEL WORKS IN SOUTH KOREA

Japanese economic penetration of South Korea reached a new stage on November 21, 1969, when an agreement was signed between the Japanese and South Korean governments concerning Japanese technical and financial assistance in the building of a steel works at Pohang, South Korea.

The total costs for building the steel works, which upon completion will have an annual production of 1,300,000 tons of crude steel, are estimated at \$138,600,000. \$123,700,000 of this will be supplied by Japan. Of this total, \$73,700,000 will be supplied by the Japanese government as part of its funds for economic co-operation to South Korea. In addition, grants will be supplied by the Japanese Export-Import Bank to the amount of \$50,000,000 for exports by the deferred payment system.

Construction is scheduled to begin on April 1, 1970, and the new steel works will be completed at the end of July, 1973. The steel works will be built according to the findings of a commission dispatched by the Japanese government, and Japanese specialists will be sent to South Korea during the coming months to determine exactly what types of equipment will be needed in building the steel works.

## HISTORIC STRIKE-- U.S. OKINAWAN BASES SHAKEN BY JAPANESE WORKERS

The current campaign of strikes by the All-Okinawa Military Workers' Union (Zengunrō) began with a 48-hour strike on January 8-9. This was followed by a second wave, a five-day strike from January 19 to 23. This 120-hour strike was a strike of unprecedented magnitude, not only in the history of American military bases, but also in that of the entire Japanese labor movement.

A total of 35,000 participated in the strikes. The strikers included 95% of the members of the Zengunrō (total membership about 20,000) as well as a large number of sympathizers. Picket lines sprang up in 105 places all over the island, plunging many of the most strategic U.S. bases into a state of paralysis. Some of the military bases hardest hit by the strikes were the Kadena and Naha bases (U.S. Air Force), the Second Logistic Unit Base (U.S. Army), the Zukeran base (where the headquarters of the U.S. Army Command is located), and the Futenma base (U.S. Marine Corps).

These two waves of strikes are not merely struggles in defense of the livelihood of the Zengunrō workers, who are demanding the revocation of large-scale dismissals of base workers. Their struggles also represent the first counterattack of the working masses aimed at the U.S.-Japan Joint Communique, which lays the groundwork for renewed aggression against Asia. The strikes deeply shook the bases on Okinawa, the "keystone of the Pacific" and the largest base in the Far East for aggression in Vietnam. They were a serious blow administered against the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance itself, which makes the Okinawa bases necessary.

Putting up barricades and picket lines in a frontal confrontation with the U.S. Armed Forces, the Zengunrō workers are literally standing in the front lines of the Japanese class struggle aiming at removal of military bases in Okinawa, smashing the Ampo system, and overthrow of Japanese imperialism.

The demands of the Zengunrō are: (1) Cancel, defer, or postpone the dismissals; (2) Provide a six-months adjustment period for dismissals (this is allowed in bases in the main Japanese islands); (3) Large-scale hikes in severance pay (the same amount as allowed in the main islands); and (4) Cancel the down-rating of the exchange workers (456 are affected).

What are the dismissals against which the Zengunrō is protesting? On December 5, 1969, 426 base workers were notified that they were being dismissed. The second wave of dismissals affected 758 workers. How serious is this massive dismissal of 1,200 workers? According to Uehara Kōsuke, chairman of the Zengunrō, if it were translated into terms of the population of the main Japanese islands, it would be equivalent to the firing of 240,000 workers! Simultaneously with these dismissals, another 1,043 base workers were transferred, and all hiring of new workers and hiring to fill openings was completely stopped. Working hours are being shortened (to cut down costs), the work is being intensified, and many jobs are being changed to a contract system giving only temporary employment and subject to unfavorable conditions.

These large-scale staff cuts do not in any way mean a reduction of military bases or a cut in the numerical strength of the troops stationed on Okinawa. One aim of the dismissals is to prevent further outflow of dollars. Probably the most important aim, however, is to weaken the Zengunrō. Together with the Teachers' Association, this union has stood in the forefront of the movement demanding Okinawa's reversion to Japan. In fact, the Zengunrō has been the most influential element in bringing about the highly significant shift of emphasis in this movement away from mere "reversion to Japan" and towards "anti-war reversion." Because of this role, the Zengunrō has grown into Okinawa's strongest force against the military bases, and this militant stand undoubtedly was the main reason behind the dismissals.

The main Japanese islands, with their acute labor shortage, are waiting to absorb the workers deprived of jobs by the dismissals. The Defense Agency early in February officially stated that the dismissed Okinawan workers ought to be brought to the mainland and reemployed in those branches of the "defense" industry which it would designate. A similar plan had been proposed to absorb the 3,400 Japanese employed in U.S. bases in the main islands, who also are scheduled to be dismissed. However, it is quite certain that the dismissed workers will reject any attempt to put them to work in war industries.

During the second wave of the strikes, the U.S. Forces in Okinawa went into Defense Condition Green (a warning condition equivalent to the first step from the transition from peacetime to wartime). This condition had not been adopted during the first wave of strikes. All troops were put in a state of readiness inside the bases, and troops armed with carbines went into direct action against the picket lines. American servicemen, civilian employees, and dependents were placed under restrictions not allowing them to leave the bases except in emergencies, and all American schools in Okinawa were closed. Ironically, the American forces had once boasted that the "presence of a docile native populace" was one of Okinawa's main advantages. Now these two waves of strikes, which had erupted in the very midst of the Okinawan bases themselves, were seriously impairing the stability of the American military presence on Okinawa.

The two waves of strikes, especially the second wave lasting for five days (since Saturday is a holiday for the U.S. Forces, the actual effects of the strike lasted for more than one week), revealed clearly how deep were the contradictions in Okinawa and how highly reliant Okinawa is on the base-centered economy. They also revealed clearly, before the entire Okinawan population, the real meaning of the 1972 reversion of Okinawa which is promised in the U.S.-Japan Joint Communiqué.

One incident pointed up the grotesque deformities of the base-centered economy. Since American troops were not allowed to leave their bases, there was no business in the bars with the A sign ("approved for U.S. Forces"). On January 20, the second day of the strike, a meeting was held in Koza, attended by bar proprietors and rightist thugs. The rally was in favor of the military bases and against the strike of the workers. After the rally, the bar proprietors and thugs attacked and stoned the demonstrating workers on the picket lines. They burned some of the tents used by the picketing workers and attempted to obstruct the strike. To protect themselves against these violent attacks, the striking workers began to wear helmets and carry wooden staves on the fourth day (January 22). Helmets and wooden staves had been used previously by militant students in Okinawa, but this was the first time that Okinawan workers had armed themselves in this manner for self-protection.

An atmosphere of high tension prevailed during the strikes. Shots were fired from inside a base at an Okinawan housewife, and picketing workers were run down by American military vehicles. However, many of the black servicemen inside the bases smiled approvingly at the picketing workers and gave them the V sign to indicate solidarity.

The U.S. Government has shown no response at all to these two waves of strikes. The Japanese Government, for its part, has only requested the U.S. to extend the period of advance notice before dismissal, to increase the amount of severance pay to the standards prevalent in the main islands, and to transfer workers to other jobs on the bases. It also advocates giving occupational training on the bases to facilitate reemployment elsewhere. The Japanese Government's attitude has consistently been one of disdain for Okinawa. "We cannot afford to coddle Okinawa." "If the Okinawans demand the same treatment as on the main islands, then we will respond by treating Chief Executive Yara on the same level as a prefectural governor." The financial authorities even

say: "Since the pattern of employment is a direct contract with the U.S. Forces, the affair has nothing to do with the Japanese Government."

The Japanese labor unions also have been less than enthusiastic. Sōhyō (the General Council of Japanese Labor Unions), in addition to the ¥20 million which it had laid aside for Okinawa, merely decided to collect another ¥100 million in donations. There was no mention of any sympathy strikes. This coolness of the main islands served to dispel the illusions of the Zengunrō workers about reversion to Japan. They were confirmed in the conviction that they had no one to rely upon but themselves. Representatives of local Zengunrō chapters said: "To fight to the end -- this is the only way for us to survive."

Dismissals of more than 10,000 more workers are now being planned by the U.S. Forces for the summer of 1970 and thereafter. Among the individual members of the Zengunrō there is a deepening sense of solidarity, as expressed in their slogan: "Do not think that you alone will be retained on the job!" Many felt: "Now that we know that we will all be fired sooner or later, before we leave we wish to deliver at least one parting blow against the adversary who has had his own way in everything for the past 25 years." Thus, it was decided to begin a third wave of struggles, possibly late in February. The Prefectural Labor Union Council (Kenrōkyō), the Okinawa Reversion Council (Fukkikyō), and other local organizations are responding by planning a general strike to coincide with this third wave.

## THE DECEMBER 1969 ELECTIONS : AN ANALYSIS - AMPO interviews Ichiyo Muto

AMPO: I want to ask some questions about the recent victory of the Liberal-Democratic Party in the elections, but before we get into this specific election, I think it's worth explaining some things about the power of the LDP in general. Since most of our readers have never lived under a one-party system, probably many of them don't know how a single party keeps itself in power in this way. For example, one thing that many people might not know is the fact that the LDP spends approximately 10 times as much in an election as its opposition parties.

MUTO: In fact the LDP has kept in power since 1955, after the different conservative parties were unified. You can understand what it is like when you think of the American two-party system. Either the Democratic or the Republican party is in power there, and they follow nearly the same policy on all issues. So in Japan, the Japanese "Republicans" and "Democrats" are unified. That's the basic thing. And you mentioned money spent for the elections. That is very important, but more important is the fact that the Liberal Democrats have been holding state power for a long time, and the money spent not specifically during the election campaign but all round the year, in the form, say, of subsidies, in the form of investment and loans from the government. ...these things consolidate the solid social base in support of the party. And all organizations thus created were mobilized in the recent election. For example there is the often-debated question of how officials become the leaders of private enterprises and public corporations such as the Monopoly Corporation (which monopolizes under government control the tobacco industry). The Monopoly Corporation

leaders were arrested some time ago for organizing within the Corporation supporters for the LDP during an election campaign. Well, that is the system of Bourgeois society itself, which has constantly, in day to day activities, been organized to support the LDP.

And so you could have the same picture if you put the two American parties together, and thought in terms of that. You will find that American voters, who theoretically have any option, and could have voted for Black Panthers or anybody, will always support . . . most of them, at least . . . either of the two major parties, which are the same thing.

AMPO: It's as if America had a single party called the "Democratic-Republican Party."

MUTO: Yes, exactly. There used to be a Liberal and a Democratic Party, and they merged, and they maintain slight differences. Not the original difference, but the party itself is a coalition of factions, each of which is in itself a small party representing different, slightly different, political tendencies.

AMPO: Well, lets move on to the recent election. Despite widespread protests, including even street fighting and strikes and other kinds of opposition to the LDP, the results of the election seemed disappointing. The LDP gained in seats, the Socialist Party seems to have suffered its worst defeat ever. How do you explain this election?

MUTO: Well, first of all, the election itself was a well planned tactic of the Liberal Democrats. The timing, and the way it was held, these things were completely coordinated by the Liberal Democrats, without the protest of any of the major opposition parties . . . without any of the opposition parties seeing through the design and trying seriously to prevent it. The election was held between Christmas and New Year, that means in the busiest time of the year. And in the preceding month, in November, Sato went to Washington and signed the joint statement. And the election was designed hastily and was held before the people had time to have doubts about the joint statement. And as you know there was great press propaganda, praising Sato and his great deed of bringing about the return of Okinawa to Japan. And as for the nature of the return of Okinawa to Japan, as explained in our preceding issues, it was something alien to the interests of the Japanese people, the Okinawan inhabitants, in particular. Still, it was bombastically played up in the press and TV that Sato did something very good for the Japanese people, and Sato chose the date of the election in consideration of this fact.

And . . . as we wrote in earlier issues . . . the Joint Statement was in fact the conclusion of the 1970 Security Treaty, a new Security Treaty. And we must remember that in 1960 the original Security Treaty was first signed, then put to the Diet for debate, and then demonstrations followed which led to the resignation of the Kishi cabinet. Knowing that, the Sato cabinet just reversed the order of the political process. They started with the Diet in August, through which the University Control Law was railroaded. And there was no debate at all about the treaty and the Sato visit. Only New Left forces stood up and protested and tried everything

to prevent him from going. Then the Joint Statement was signed, and it did not need to be put to any Diet debate. It was so designed. And then, after the administrative act of signing the treaty, the virtual treaty, the Diet was dissolved, without permitting the people to give any consideration to the significance of the treaty. And so the time was chosen, and the order of the political process was chosen...unilaterally by the Liberal Democrats. That partly explains the victory of the LDP.

In that respect we must note that the rate of abstention was very high--second highest since the war. Only sixty-odd percent of the eligible voters went to the polls... I'm sure that all the New Left Forces boycotted the elections. That means that in this election a new tendency among students and young workers has become clearly apparent...a change of political thinking. Formerly they voted for the Socialists as the opposition party number one. But now they're just despairing of all the parties and of the parliamentary system itself, because it is so completely manipulated by the Liberal Democrats. The high abstention rate shows partly the growth of that tendency. And under these circumstances the Liberal Democrats could win only thirty percent of the eligible voters. And the percentage of votes gained by the party to the total of the votes cast fell by more than one percent. Yet the party could increase its seats.

So the victory was a victory of political tactics, and doesn't indicate any stability under the new Liberal-Democratic government.

AMPO: One of the things that was also widely noted about the election was the shift in the opposition parties: the Socialist Party lost many, the Komeito gained, and the Communist Party made the greatest gains it has in recent years. Do you have any comments about that?

MUTO: The best way to approach that question is to ask, did the recent election represent any change in the political map of post-war Japan? I would say, yes. It is very important... not the election result itself, but the trend which has produced this election result. We are talking about the end of the post-war democracy period; that period was ended with the signing of the Joint Statement.

Well, this means that the traditional pattern of political antagonism between the LDP as the only government party and the JSP as, not the only, but almost the only significant opposition party...with these two forces split over the interpretation of "peace and democracy"...that pattern has ended.

The Socialist Party is a small party in terms of its membership; it has only thirty thousand members, according to today's newspaper. Yet it garners more than ten million votes. That is a strange party. It has been able to operate as the major opposition party because there was a widespread atmosphere of "peace and democracy" among the Japanese voters, which was the main ethos of the post-war Japanese population...workers and working people. "Peace and democracy"...that was the only criterion by which people passed judgement on the government policy. That "peace and democracy" was the slogan of the LDP too. The political struggle

in Japan has been fought around the issue of "peace and democracy." For example, the government pledges support for the prohibition of nuclear weapons, and the Socialist Party says the same thing. So basically they follow the same system of values, but have completely opposite opinions about concrete facts. For example the LDP says, "This is no introduction of nuclear weapons," while the JSP says, "That is the first step towards introduction of nuclear weapons." This style of antagonism lasted for nearly twenty years.

But that sentiment of the people has been undermined in the process of rapid economic expansion. People still say they are for peace and they are for democracy...everybody says so: Liberal Democrats, Socialists, Social Democrats, Communists, everybody. But the content of that has become so vague, has come to be so far from their daily lives that the "peace and democracy" slogan has ceased to be a mobilizing slogan, and instead has become a slogan for the maintenance of the status quo. And so since the JSP depended mainly on that sentiment of the people for votes, young people came to find no interest in the party, nothing attractive in the party because it is with the status quo that they are dissatisfied. Only people over the age of thirty five, who experienced the bitterness of the post-war period, remained as solid supporters for the party.

On the other hand, the JSP depended also on the organized votes of Sohyo\*, and Sohyo as a whole acted as the political branch of the Socialist party, \*(Sohyo: General Council of Trade Unions)

although the relationship is different from that existing between the British Labor Party and TUC. But a change has been taking place inside the Sohyo movement since 1960 or so in the wake of economic expansion. In the newly established industries, such as the chemical combines, electronics factories, there the workers came from rural areas, or workers who had no political experience, and Sohyo failed to organize them under their own wing. Domei\* organized them better than Sohyo, but most of these workers in key industries remain politically blank...or that is to say, politically subordinate to bourgeois influence. And their thinking is influenced primarily by the company. And in the major Sohyo-affiliated unions there are splits from the right wing, and labor control has been greatly strengthened. Sohyo has failed to combat effectively these offensives, which are connected mostly with technological innovation and so-called "rationalization" of industry. And so Sohyo strength and the independence of Sohyo workers from the enterprises has been weakened. It has lost its political grip even on its member workers; political influence of the Sohyo Socialist leadership has declined.

So the Socialists lost not only the vague public support, but also organized support because of the undermining of the position of Sohyo. That is what is reflected in the receding of the Socialist Party influence.

This is something which cannot be reversed as long as the JSP is essentially a party of "peace and democracy" which by its abstract nature has lost its support...has lost its attractive force...among the workers; -- on the one hand the workers who are being influenced by the management and on the other hand among the workers who are being radicalized.

The Communist Party is emerging basically as a substitute for the Socialist Party. The Communist Party gained in influence at the expense of the Socialist Party...it is clear everywhere. That means that in the process of increasing its influence the JCP became social-democratic so that it could base itself on the same constituency on which the JSP had been based for many years. The party has become bound and restricted by the atmosphere of its constituency, which is "peace and democracy" long emptied of its postwar contents. It is the decreased reproduction of the Socialist Party in the Communist Party, in the body of the Communist Party. The Socialists had 134 seats and the Communists only 4. Now the Communists have 14 seats, but this is still far smaller than the Socialists number. And now we can call the CP almost a Social Democratic party of the JSP pattern (if not of a German SPD pattern) with the difference that the JCP has a more solid organization and a far larger number of members, and more discipline,

AMPO: What about Komeito?

MUTO: Well, Komeito is organized on an entirely different political principle. As you know its political platform is enigmatically vague and allows various interpretations. Sometimes it is close to the Socialists and sometimes it resembles that of the Liberal Democrats. The identity of the party is not in its political posture but in its special way of organizing people. As you know it's a religious party, and its creation and development in itself

is a reflection of the confusion in the political thinking of the current stage of development. We are now in a transitional period, and many people who supported the LDP are now disappointed, as are many people who supported JSP, and yet they cannot find any political channel through which they can express themselves. Komeito gives a substitute...not a real political substitute, but a quasi-political entity. What I mean is this: Soka Gakkai and the Komeito are organized on the basis of human relations, bound with a belief in Buddhist teaching. In the...

AMPO: It's not quite fair to call it "Buddhist teaching" is it? Wouldn't you call it pseudo-Buddhist teaching?

MUTO: Well, it's a Buddhist teaching anyway.

AMPO: In the sense that their main principle is to get rich and get social success.

MUTO: Well, I have no interest in which is orthodox and which isn't. I think it's a Buddhist teaching...there are so many different Buddhist teachings, just like there are so many Christian teachings... All Religions have that aspect (promise of material and social success) if they become big and important. I don't believe in any "pure" Buddhist teaching.

AMPO: OK, OK.

MUTO: Well, in the organization (of Soka Gakkai) in a way people find their identity...that's a pseudo-emancipation from their secular troubles. At the same time it provides a powerful means of settling some of their secular troubles, such as illness, distress, and these things. Because that is an organization of mutual help to



a certain extent. And in that organization company executives and poor workers feel treated alike, and there is a rigid screening in the promotion from "layman" to "teacher" at different ranks. And anyone who wants to be a teacher, irrespective of social status, must take an examination. There is a complete hierarchy which is distinct...which has nothing to do with the hierarchy in the society. That provides a sense of pseudo-emancipation of the members who in the actual society have no chance for social promotion.

In a period of transition such an organization can take a pseudo-political form, can operate as a political party even without a clear political outlook. And since the Komeito and JCP share almost the same constituency, there is a great competition between them. That is, the great body of Komeito supporters are not rich people but proletarians, people who are not satisfied with the present society.

AMPO: Well, I saw on TV the other day some of the leaders of the Socialist Party speaking about the plight of their organization, and one of them was saying that he thought that JSP could help itself by learning from Shimin undo, citizens movements, by which I presume he meant Beheiren. Do you think that JSP could help itself by learning from Beheiren, and if so, what could it learn?

MUTO: Improbable. It would be a very shabby and impossible make-shift. The party apparently is surprised at the very rapid growth of the citizens' movement, without understanding why it has become so big and is developing so rapidly. The basic source of the party's decline concerns the labor movement situation. Without the Socialist party contributing toward the rebuilding of a real, militant, class natured working class movement, it can't hope to be strong again. But the party seems to be following just the opposite course.

There are two interpretations of the defeat of the party. One interpretation is that the party was not flexible enough to adapt itself to the "new realities." That opinion is advanced mainly by right wing elements in the party. What they mean is that the party should adapt itself to the development of technology, the development of industry -- in a word the developed capitalism of this country.

AMPO: That's kind of a "modernization" theory...the same sort of an opinion that says that Marxism is an "archaic 19th Century ideology" and so on?

MUTO: Yes, exactly. That is the way to repeat the post-war history of the German Social Democratic Party.

AMPO: Just exactly how...what kind of an adjustment do these people propose?

MUTO: Within the Socialist Party no consensus exists, but some important union leaders are advancing a specific proposal, and successfully. Well, I will explain that. Sohyo is in a very serious condition, and Domei is extending its influence rapidly. And there is a third sector of workers who are not unionized, or even if unionized have no workers consciousness. Those are the

three divisions of the Japanese working class. Domei is the traditional right wing union, just like AFL in America. Sohyo centers on government employees and public corporation employees, including National Railway workers. Domei operates mainly on the basis of textile workers, seamen and electrical industries. Most of the private enterprise workers, which are most important in the present Japanese class structure, are outside of either of the two trade union centers.

In this situation there is a proposal which has been put forward for several years by some of the Sohyo leaders and some of the independent trade union leaders, and supported by Domei and ICFTU, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. It is a sly way, a clever way, of swaying the whole Japanese labor movement to the right. Instead of emphasizing affiliation with Domei, or with ICFTU, they propose "unification of the labor front". And the first step toward that unification was achieved when IMF-JC, the International Metalworkers Federation, Japan Committee, was established by some of the Sohyo, Domei, and independent union leaders. They claim that it has nothing to do with politics, that it is an organization only for the achievement of the workers' economic demands. And by the bye, that movement is connected with the Labor Departments of the important workshops and enterprises.

In the case of the Steel Workers this is most conspicuous. Soon there will be a merger between Yawata and Fuji Iron and Steel companies, and Nippon Steel Corporation will be established as the second biggest giant company in the world, following U.S. Steel. Well, in the process of the growth of the steel industry, the union, which is affiliated with the Federation of Steel Workers Unions, which is again affiliated with Sohyo, has been completely, you know, emasculated from within. The company strengthened its attack on militant workers and completely isolated them. And the company managed to exclude even Socialists from the leadership. And now the Yawata leadership is held not even by Socialists, not basically by Social Democrats, but by representatives of the company. Well, the union organization was thus undermined. The steel Workers' Union and the Federation itself moved further and further to the right, without leaving Sohyo. This was all the worse. Within Sohyo, a powerful right-wing axis came to be formed around the Steel Workers Union and the Postal Workers Union.

Now they are again advocating strengthening the unification movement by calling various semi-private meetings for "promotion of productivity", participated in not only by union leaders from various union centers, but also by business representatives, and even government, you know. These are called kondankai, and there are various kondankai held. And now the split of the labor front, allegedly for the unification of the labor front...unification on the right-wing principle...is being prepared. And sooner or later the right-wing tendency of the JSP will have to choose whether or not to ally with part of this right-wing movement. And already Mr. Takaragi, a powerful advocate of the labor front unification proposed that there must be a Japan Labor Party, to replace the Japan Socialist Party.

Well, under these circumstances, the JSP will be split into three parts. One is that part, the right wing; the second is the middle-of-the road part, which is of the traditional mindō (League

for the Democratization of Unions) orientation. (Mindo has been the group which has led Sohyo since its establishment, and mino has now split, but the main current remain with Sohyo leader Iwai.) And the third group is the new movement of young new-left radical workers, represented by the Anti-War Youth Committee.

Well, the present scene is characterized by polarization between right and left, and assuming that the party should have remained a major political expression of the Japanese working class, the Socialists' failure in the elections represents the fact that the party was too conservative to depend on the resurgence of the consciously proletarian wing emerging from this polarization.

AMPO: This is the alternative explanation for the JSP failure; the first was that it hadn't caught up with realities. ...

MUTO: Yes...how to grasp that reality is the question. And our reality, reality for the left-wing factions of the Socialist Party ...that of New Left reality, because the growth of new left forces, the growth of radicals, and radicalization of workers, even though still comparatively small in numbers, that too is a current reality. On the one hand there is the undermining of the traditional unions, and on the other hand, there is the crystalization of the left wing

and radical workers, in the form of the Anti-War Youth Committee and in other forms, too. Police claim that there are about thirty thousand Anti-War Youth Committee members, all of them workers. And Sohyo last year was debating at its convention almost only the question of the Anti-War Youth Committee, whether to exclude it or whether to include it, what to do about the proposal to set up another organization antagonistic to the Anti-War Youth Committee, and these things. Well, the JSP and Sohyo decided not to depend on this radical force when it decided to exclude the Anti-War Youth Committee, when it decided to cut its ties with Beheiren, when it decided to cut any relations with what JCP called Trotskyist political organizations and so on. And now the development since 1965, and especially since 1967, shows that not only students but also workers are getting radicalized on a large scale.

For example there was a survey of the unionist opinion held last year. It shows that among the workers below the age of thirty, almost thirty percent have no faith in parliamentary democracy; instead they declare that they will choose direct action to achieve their demands. And Sohyo and its traditional leadership, just can't understand what is taking place among these workers, and have no words for dialogue with them. And so, theoretically there is a way of reorganizing the JSP, to organize on a class basis instead of a "peace and democracy" basis. But that would be impossible for the Socialist Party as a whole. If so, there is no rescue for the party as a whole.

AMPO: So the only thing is for it to split in some way or...some part of it could be saved, perhaps if it split.

MUTO: That's why I say that the elections showed that the period of reorganization of the political map is approaching. On the one hand the Liberal Democrats won, but its basis is not secure...it has no stability. Second, among the opposition parties, the Communist Party made a great advance, but there is an absolute limit

for the advance of the Party because it is stepping into the area evacuated by the Socialist Party. And third, there is a general polarization in the labor movement, and although under the present circumstances the forces of the right wing, the right wing polarization, is stronger, everywhere there will be reorganization around the pole of left wing radical ideology. And so there is a very clear task for all the New Left groups, and that is to find a real political expression, a radical political expression, for the Japanese working class, and to basically reconstruct the Japanese labor movement on a class basis. There is every possibility to do that.

#### December 27, 1969 General Elections

Parties	Number of Diet Seats			Changes in the Percentages of Popular Vote
	Before the Election		After the Election	
Liberal Democratic	271	+	300	48.8 + 47.6%
Socialist	140	+	90	27.9 + 21.5
Komeito	25	+	47	5.4 + 10.9
Democratic Socialist	30	+	31	7.4 + 7.7
Communist	5	+	14	4.8 + 6.8

The voting rate at the December 27 election was 68.51% of the eligible voters. The lowest record was attained in 1947, when only 67.95% of the electorate voted. Less than 50% of the registered voters voted in Tokyo, Osaka, Saitama, Kanagawa, and Kyoto. Therefore, 32.6% of the eligible voters cast their ballots in favor of the Liberal Democratic Party ( $47.6 \times 68.51 = 32.6\%$ ).

## A VISIT TO SANRIZUKA

Sanrizuka is a small farming village near the town of Narita. To get there you take the train from Tokyo's Ueno station and ride for about an hour and a half to the end of the line. From there you go by taxi, if you have the money. Two of us had been there before: "You shoulda seen the train the last time...jam packed with students and workers in helmets...wow!"

We had the money so we took a taxi. The country is rich farmland, green and well-tended. The first stop was an old farmhouse which since last January has been occupied by Ogawa Productions, a small radical movie company. Everyone there looked about student age except Ogawa himself, who is somewhat older, muscular-plump, a strong man with a very gentle voice. I had seen their film about the Sanrizuka farmers' struggle, called "Summer in Narita." It is a beautiful production, done with loving care. The only problem is that to an outsider it just seems too long. But I doubt if they will ever cut it. It is not just a

"documentary film" but a true document...an exact and careful record of historic events filmed over the years from the inside. Ogawa Productions has chosen to live with the farmers of Narita, to work with them in their fields, to share their food, to fight with them for their land.

On the wall of the farmhouse is a Huey Newton poster, and one of the girls is wearing a "Free Bobby" button. A Panther delegation had visited them a few months earlier: on another wall is an enlarged photograph of Ogawa standing between Big Man and Roberta from Oakland, the three of them with raised fists, smiling.

After giving us a meal, Ogawa drove us over to visit Tomura Issaku, one of the important figures in the Sanrizuka struggle. We pulled off the highway in front of a shop selling farm equipment. Right up next to the road in front of the shop is a huge board on which is a painting of a man being beaten by riot police...Tomura's self-portrait. All around the building are a number of impressive abstract welded iron sculptures. One of them, I was told, had been admired at an exhibition in Tokyo by the Prime Minister, until he noticed the title..."Sanrizuka Farmers' Struggle...at which point he became very embarrassed.

Tomura...painter, sculptor, and third-generation Sanrizuka farm implement manufacturer...met us in the living room of his home in back of the shop. We introduced ourselves, and then he proceeded to tell us the story he had no doubt told many times before. Since he quickly recognized that the interpreter (me) was of very limited ability, he spoke in a slow and measured pace, searching always for the simplest mode of expression. The result was a tale with many of the qualities of a parable. It is quite possible that it contains errors and mistranslations; I hope that it captures the substance and the spirit of what Tomura told us.

"The first thing you must understand about the Sanrizuka struggle is that it is a struggle for life. It is a fight for living.

"It is a fight by farmers to save their land, and to retrieve land which has been taken from them.

"After the Pacific War had ended, and after the democratic reforms, we believed that Japan had become a land of peace and democracy. We are no longer able to believe that.

"In 1966 the government decided to build an airport at Sanrizuka. Not a single word was ever said to the farmers here about the question; no one ever came from the government to discuss the matter with those who occupied the land. The Sato Government simply decided, and then announced its decision. Then it came to the hard-working farmers and told them: 'Get out!'

"For us there is no more democracy, no more Peace Constitution.

"On July 10 of that year we held a large general meeting. All the farmers attended, and all were opposed to the airport. We saw that the fight was a fight for our life. That is, from that time, to live and to fight became one thing. You must understand: our fight here is *not a demonstration*, it is *not a protest*. It is a fight for our life. Since the government wants to drive us from the land, the very act of continuing to farm is an act of struggle; to plant our crops each year...melons, barley, potatoes... is to defy the government and to fight.

"The central fact is that the government is searching for a way to destroy the lives of the farmers. I will explain what I mean.

"1,500 farm families were represented at the meeting on July 10, 1966. At that time all of the farmers were in the struggle. After that meeting things began to get worse. Representatives came from the Transportation Ministry, from the prefectural government, and from the public corporation which is to build the airport. They went to the farmers whose land is on the site, bringing them free train tickets to Kyoto, hotel reservations. They took them out and bought them big meals, got them drunk. [From a source other than Tomura: they bought them whores.] They said to the farmers: 'You should give up the life of a farmer and take up a better life. It is inevitable that the airport will be built. You have no choice but to sell: the government has the right to condemn the land and evict you by force. But after the airport is built you will be able to find jobs in it. Sanrizuka will become a huge modern city with international hotels and restaurants. There will be any number of ways to make money. For example, you could even print up English translations of the sacred scroll in the Narita temple and sell it to foreign tourists.'

"In this way, two thirds of the farmers were induced by the government to drop out of the movement, and thus the struggle was split.

"Then the banks came. The bankers would go to a farmer who seemed about to sell and say to him: 'If you sell your land you will get so many million yen; why not take out a mortgage with us and we can give you some of that money tomorrow?' The farmers of Sanrizuka have never had money. So many of them mortgaged their land and suddenly became rich.

"Those farmers who sold or mortgaged their land immediately stopped farming. Their fields became overgrown with weeds. They began buying cars and color television sets. Some started gambling and betting on the horse races. Their lives shattered and fell apart. The wife of one such farmer tried to commit suicide by turning on the gas. There

were such tragedies. You need only look at the fields. The fields of those who have sold out are covered with chest-high weeds. The fields of those who are fighting are in perfect condition, and bear rich crops. [We did go out and look; it was as Tomura described.]

"Thus we came to understand that in order to extract their land it was necessary for the government to smash and destroy the farmers' lives. Those who sold were ruined as men; even if they tried to go into business they would fail. The farmers realized that the government was not merely trying to take away their land: it was trying to take away their humanity.

"In February, 1967 the struggle was begun again on a new basis. We realized we could no longer rely on the parliamentary government, and we began *jitsuryoku tōsō*. [An important New Left expression, literally "struggling with one's actual strength."] It was at this point that we were joined by students of Zengakuren and laborers from Hansen Seinen Inkaï [Anti-War Youth Committees, the New Left organizations of young laborers].

"We held a large demonstration in front of the public corporation headquarters. There we were met by riot police brought in from Tokyo. We were beaten with clubs and knocked down by high-pressure water hoses. You can see this in Mr. Ogawa's film, through the water running down the lens of his camera. From this the farmers gained a better understanding of the Sato government. They became more skeptical, they gained class consciousness, they came to see who their oppressors are.

"Also the farmers' notion of private property has been shattered. They had always thought of their land as being their own. Now they have discovered that it can be taken away from them by force, without their consent. We have come to see that our ownership of property, our very life itself, exists within the structure of capitalism...is totally contained inside it. Thus in order for us to win this struggle to protect our lives the structure itself must be changed.

"Our original slogan was: 'We will die protecting our land.' That was very conservative, based on keeping what we already had. Now our slogan is: 'We will retrieve the land which has been taken from us.'

"The farmers who have remained in the struggle are very strong and will fight to the end. I will give you an example, the example of Old Man Sugasawa. Old Man Sugasawa is 78 and he is rich; he does not need to fight. But on the day when the surveyors came protected by many police, he prepared a large tub full of excrement and threw it at them with a long-handled dipper. The faces of the police were covered with yellow excrement. So they attacked him, beat him

with their clubs, forced him to the ground, put a club across his throat and tried to strangle him. Then they put him into a jeep and took him to the police station in Chiba city. At the police station he said, first that he was going on a hunger strike ("I will not eat police food!"); second, that he would answer no questions; and third, that he wanted no lawyer. The police chief then came and asked him why he didn't want a lawyer. He answered that it was because he didn't want to be released from jail. He told them that he thought that all the old people should get arrested and fill up the jail cells, so that the young people who were fighting could not be arrested. Thus he did not care how long they kept him in jail.

"The police chief immediately called a doctor, had his wounds dressed, and had him sent back to his home, where he arrived before 9 PM. Then the chief called in the riot police and reprimanded them for bringing in such an old man. And at the next fight Old Man Sugawara was right at the front, standing in front of the bulldozer and shouting insults at the riot police, but though the people around him were arrested, he was not arrested. Such is the strength of an old man.

"The government has told us that the Sanrizuka airport will be only a civil airport and will have nothing to do with the Security Treaty. However, we know that this is not true. The airport is connected with the Security Treaty in many ways.

"First of all, passing over Tokyo from Nikkō to Ōshima is an air corridor which, according to the treaty, is reserved for Japanese and American military aircraft. No civil aircraft may enter that area. Planes leaving Haneda [Tokyo's present airport] for Osaka cannot fly directly over Mt. Fuji but must angle out to sea in order to avoid passing through that corridor. Thus one of the reasons for choosing Sanrizuka as a location is that it is conveniently located just outside that forbidden airspace.

"Secondly, we have been told that the reason a new airport is needed is because Haneda has become too small to carry the traffic. However, what the government did not say is that the reason that Haneda has become so overcrowded is that fifty percent of its traffic is U.S. military charter flights. That means that it is because of the Security Treaty, and because of the war in Vietnam, that a new airport is needed. It also means that, if an airport is built here, it too will be used for Vietnam.

"Thirdly, the Transportation Minister stood up before the Diet and stated that if America demanded the use of Sanrizuka Airport for military planes, Japan could not, under the Security Treaty, refuse. That means that not only military charter flights, but actual warplanes could also use the airport.

"Thus we understand that our struggle, the Okinawa



struggle, and the Vietnam struggle, are one.

"All along the Pacific Belt, the government is building a vast system of highways which connect American bases, Self-Defense Force bases, and industrial areas into a single network. Many of these highways are made of concrete over a foot thick ... far thicker than would be necessary for automobile traffic but thick enough to carry tanks and to land aircraft. At the same time, the government is saying that there are too many farmers, and is trying to drive us and other farmers all over the country off the land and into the cities to work in industry. In the meantime the government is also reintroducing militaristic indoctrination into the primary and secondary schools, and has presented a bill to re-establish Yasukuni Shrine, where dead soldiers were once worshipped as gods, as the national shrine. This would be a big step toward re-establishing Shinto as the state religion, and reviving the old Emperor system.

"Thus all over the country a system is being constructed which cries out: 'To war! To war!'

"In Sanrizuka we still hold over 1,000 hectares of land on the site, some of it right in the center of the proposed airport. Close to 500 families are still holding out, and they are the strong families. The riot police does not frighten them. They will not be intimidated."

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Tomura offered us tangerines and roasted sweet potatoes ("grown by movement farmers"), and then he and Ogawa drove us around the area. We were quickly picked up by a carload of plainclothesmen, who followed us wherever we went. We were shown the place where they are putting in a new road, which will be used to bring in equipment to build the airport. On the site itself, land which has been long abandoned stands interspersed with land which is carefully cultivated and planted. Here and there one can see a steel oil drum secured to a raised wooden platform. These form the alarm system; the farmers beat on them to summon help whenever the surveyors, protected by armies of police, come to measure their land. Ogawa's movie shows the farmers building barbed wire barricades and laying up stockpiles of stones, the riot police attacking across fields and through trees with their absurd shields, the farmers pelting them with stones and shouting abuse. It also shows the women, in their straw hats and blue *mompe* trousers, standing right up against a police defense line and giving them a tongue-lashing: "Why don't you go home to your mother? Your mother must be ashamed of you now... attacking farmers and women..." The riot police, many of whom are farm boys, droop their heads to avoid the gazes of these mother figures, and their officers have to come around and order them to keep

their chins up and look straight ahead.

Sanrizuka is not the only area in Japan where farmers' struggles are going on. Some have been going on for years, as at the North Fuji Training Area. Others are recent, as with the fight against the construction of a missile site in Hokkaido. There seems to be excellent co-operation between these groups; they charter buses and visit each other for meetings or for confrontations with the police. The




Farm women are always in the forefront of the struggles for their land.



Children on their way to school pass through a riot police cordon. Their parents carry on the struggle.



Black Panther gets a big smile from demonstrating farm women.









Elderly farmers fight alongside members of the student sects.



Tomura Iseaki (leader of the Sanrizuka farmers' struggle) confronts riot police.

farmers' struggles are particularly significant because the ultra-conservative ruling Liberal Democratic Party has its main power base in the rural areas. All of the farmers in Sanrizuka used to vote for Sato's party before 1966. It would be incorrect, of course, to give the impression that farmers are being radicalized in sufficient numbers to have a serious effect on the results of the elections in the near future. However, these developments show clearly that even in Japan, rural conservatism is not immutable.

"What we must do next," said Tomura, "is to build a commune at Sanrizuka."

## SANRIZUKA: THE SHOWDOWN APPROACHES

Rounding a curve in the dirt road two miles from the center of Sanrizuka, the traveler is suddenly brought up short. Rising above the patchwork of neatly kept fields and great scarred stretches where work has already begun on new superhighways to Tokyo, a "combat hamlet" stands ominous guard. A single crude wooden house, surrounded by a forbidding maze of barbed wire lashed to fifteen foot poles; a primitive observation tower and a great gong rising above all command the surrounding countryside.

"Liberated area," a handpainted sign announces. A single farmer's defiance of overwhelming state power bent on driving him from the land; a militant symbol of the Narita struggle, the "second Vietnam," as Tomura Issaku recently put it.

The helicopter circled lazily in the southern sky, suddenly swooping down low directly above us before resuming its circling pattern. Napalm, defoliant, tear gas? Perhaps; for now just checking. The meeting proceeded, the voices of 6,000 New Left demonstrators mobilized to support the farmers' struggle competing with the roar of police helicopters which plied the skies throughout the day. On January 15th, as both sides geared for a final bloody struggle, 700 Narita farmers were joined by representatives of the workers' Anti-War Youth Committee, university and high school student activists as well as Beheiren and other citizens' groups. In firmly uniting workers, farmers and students against the Japanese state and the Ambo system (the 4,000 meters of runway are clearly designed for military purposes), the action symbolized the revolutionary hopes of many activists. At the same time the day's activities clearly demonstrated basic obstacles to the success of the movement. These were manifest not merely in the tremendous array of police power martialled to control the people, but in the sharply conflicting approaches within the movement.

The voice of an eighty year old man wearing the colors of Sanrizuka's "Old People's Dare-to-Die Corps" cracked with emotion as he told of the farmers' struggle. In the direct quality of his appeal and the freedom from ideological cant he evoked the militant and radical thrust of the farmers' movement. The issues of Sanrizuka, however, were frequently lost as the student sects began the infighting to establish their own claims to militancy and ideological purity in slashing attacks on their rivals. The Sanrizuka struggle had momentarily brought together the student groups which last fall had formed the backbone of the Zenkyōtō

struggle against Ampo. Yet the strains among them, greatly intensified by mass arrests and the mood of despair following the Sato-Nixon communique, could not easily be papered over. "It is good to have the support of the students," one peasant woman in the blue checked pants, wide-sleeved blouse and kerchief typical of this area remarked. "But they are so difficult to understand."

Their rally completed, the demonstrators set out on a four mile march through the countryside scouting the area of the proposed airport as riot police braced for a confrontation. Viewed from a distance, their banners waving in the breeze, the march resembled a great feudal procession; from within it breathed the spirit of recent New Left demonstrations -- helmeted youths, snake-dancing,

and chanting of slogans "Ampo funsai!" and "Smash the Narita Military Airport!"

To the surprise of many demonstrators as well as the riot police, January 15th ended peacefully as evening descended. The farmers of Sanrizuka were clearly conserving their strength for the next showdown with the army of surveyors, builders and their police guards, who have already begun surveying and who will attempt to dispossess the farmers in the spring. Yet the tragic dimensions of the struggle -- the isolation of the Sanrizuka resistance from their farming and working neighbors whose land and livelihood have not been marked for destruction by the bulldozer, and the overwhelming power of the state -- were as plain as the heroic stance of the farmers.

In the meantime the government is going ahead with its schedule of clearing everyone off the land so that construction can begin by late Spring. The next few months will be the showdown. No one really dares to predict that the farmers can hold out. And yet...

## IMMIGRATION PROBLEMS OF CHINESE AND VIETNAMESE RESIDENTS IN JAPAN

In our last issue we discussed the politically motivated deportation procedures brought against two Western residents of Japan.

As their cases mark the beginning of the revival of pre-war repression of Western residents here, their struggles are significant. However, the repression of these Westerners is only the most visible part of the submerged iceberg of the repression experienced by resident Asians, particularly the Chinese and Koreans.

In this issue of AMPO we will take up the immigratory discrimination which the Chinese community has and continues to experience. At the same time we will include a section on resident Vietnamese students, who though small in number, are placed in a very dangerous position if they dare to express their true opinions about the Vietnamese war.

\* \* \* \* \*

There are approximately 50,000 Chinese residents in Japan. Almost all of them, except, naturally, for their children, have been residents of Japan since World War II. Many of them were forcibly brought to Japan from mainland China or Japan's then



colony of Taiwan to work in coal mines or war industries.

In contrast to the Koreans, many of whom were also forcibly brought to Japan, at the end of World War II China was considered a victorious ally. Consequently the resident Chinese enjoyed preferential treatment during the first part of the American occupation. When it became clear, however, that the Chinese Communists were winning the revolution, the American authorities gradually came to regard the Chinese, and later the Koreans, as "dangerous elements" requiring careful surveillance and repression, if necessary.

When the Japanese received their American-supported independence in 1953, the Japanese government continued the same immigration laws that the Americans had initiated. Thus, the entire responsibility to decide the conditions for a foreigner's entrance and residence in Japan is placed on one man, the Minister of Justice. Naturally, he delegates much of his authority, but the "freedom of decision" which he enjoys is without parallel, even in Western bourgeois democracies.

The following examples will show just how broad these powers are and how they have been used with regard to resident Chinese.

\* \* \* \* \*

Chen Yu Hsi is a young Taiwanese now serving a seven-year sentence for "sedition" in a Nationalist Chinese military prison on Taiwan. Originally he had been a student at the East-West Center in Hawaii, from which he received a Master's degree in June, 1968.

Chen had intended to continue his studies in economics in the doctor's course of Brown University, where he had already been accepted as a scholarship student. The Nationalist Chinese government, however, ordered him to return to Taiwan and refused to renew his passport. His "crime" in the U.S. had been that he had participated in an anti-Vietnam war demonstration, plus having read Communist Chinese magazines.

With a passport good only for a "one-way, shortest distance" trip back to Formosa, Chen arrived in Japan in August, 1968. Knowing that he would face imprisonment or even death if he returned to Taiwan, he hoped to remain in Japan indefinitely. Due to his excellent record in Hawaii he was soon able to enter Hosei University, with the university president even acting as his sponsor.

On February 8 of the following year, the Tokyo Immigration Bureau ordered Chen to report to their office for an extension of his residence permit, ordering him to bring ¥100,000 (approximately \$275) as bond money. When he reported there, however, he was summarily presented with a deportation order and forcibly turned over to Nationalist Chinese police, waiting inside their plane at Tokyo's Haneda International Airport. He was given neither the opportunity to collect his belongings nor to contact his friends.

In Taiwan, Chen was first sentenced to death by a secret military tribunal. Due to the strong protest movements conducted on his behalf both in Hawaii and in Japan, however, he received a new "public" trial in which his sentence was reduced to seven years. When the head of the Japanese Immigration Department was questioned about this case, he stated that Chen had decided to return to Taiwan "of his own free will".

Chen is not the only example of the Japanese government's co-operating with the Nationalist Chinese government in the return of political prisoners. Particularly in recent years there have

been a number of deportations of native Taiwanese connected with the Taiwanese Independence Movement, a branch of which is located in Tokyo. Either death or long prison terms await them on their return to Taiwan.

There is also another group of Chinese who find themselves victims of the Japanese Immigration Department. These are the Chinese who have been in Japan since before the end of World War II. As stated previously, many of them were forcibly brought to Japan during the war and were unable or unwilling to return to China at the war's end.

Although many of these Chinese married Japanese, because of the social discrimination which they faced, few of them were able to lead an economically stable life. Consequently, many have had either to seek welfare assistance or to seek a living through illegal means, often smuggling. Involvement in either one of these is grounds for deportation.

In addition to the fact that such deportees often have families in Japan, neither the Nationalist nor the Communist Chinese governments will accept responsibility for these men. Consequently since it is impossible to deport them, they are placed in one of two detention centers, either the one near Yokohama or the one near the city of Omura in Kyushu. Here they are usually kept for approximately three years before being given a "temporary release."

The conditions in these centers are worse than in Japanese prisons. In such matters as food, the Chinese and the Koreans find themselves discriminated against in comparison with detainees from other countries. For example, the daily allowance for their food is only ¥106 (0.29¢) while that for the other detainees is ¥162 (0.45¢). By comparison, the daily food allowance for members of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces is ¥274 (0.76¢), over two and a half times that of the Chinese.

In the spring of 1968, shortly before Chen Yu Hsi's deportation, the Japanese government made a secret agreement with the Nationalist Chinese. According to this pact, the Nationalists would accept 30 such Chinese "undesirables" for each "anti-Nationalist Chinese" the Japanese turn over to them. Because of the furor caused by Chen's deportation the first group of 30 Chinese has not yet been deported, but even now there are 43 Chinese being held in the Yokohama Detention Center while the government waits for the opportune time.

Recently three Vietnamese exchange students refused to return to Vietnam for military induction. As a result they were sentenced "in absentia" to six years imprisonment by a South Vietnamese military tribunal. The South Vietnamese government has already disclosed its intention not to renew their passports when they expire at the end of March. Since their visas expire at the same time, they, too, will be subject to deportation.

For the Japanese government, Chinese, Koreans, and other Asian residents of Japan who express their opposition to their home governments are both dangerous and embarrassing. Further, those Asians whom Japanese capital can no longer use are simply a bother and need to be gotten rid of.

If the proposed Immigration Control Bill is passed, the deportation process will be greatly simplified and speeded up. The Chinese residents of Japan, together with the Koreans and other Asian residents, and even "troublesome" Westerners are going

to find themselves in an increasingly unstable and dangerous position in Japan.

NEXT TIME -- the story of Japan's Korean residents

Brian Ryōjun Victoria

## THE VIETNAMESE STUDENTS' STRUGGLE IN JAPAN



Nixon and Thieu burned in effigy in the compound of the Saigon Embassy in Tokyo.

On December 30, in a mockery of justice extraordinary even for our times, Saigon's Third Military Court meted out six-year prison sentences to three Vietnamese student participants in a protest demonstration at Saigon's Tokyo Embassy. Let us consider the significance of these events from the perspectives of the anti-war movement and the political rights of foreigners in Japan.

During the past year the Vietnamese students (there are approximately 120 in Japan) have emerged as a politically conscious and effective force in the anti-war movement. On June 9 twenty-five students, outraged at the Vietnamization strategy announced by Nixon and Thieu at the Midway Conference, staged a militant protest in the courtyard of the Saigon government's Tokyo Embassy. Their placards read "North and South Vietnam are one," "Down with the Thieu-Ky Government," and "Oppose American Intervention." The demonstration concluded by burning effigies of Nixon and Thieu and shouting slogans denouncing the Midway Conference and the continued destruction of Vietnam by American forces. On June 22 the

demonstrators joined with other students to form the Vietnamese Students Committee for Peace and Unity in Vietnam (Behelto), which has developed as a powerful voice of Vietnamese aspirations and protest. As perhaps the most articulate group of independent Vietnamese anywhere outside Vietnam, they have begun to play a significant role in discrediting whatever shreds of legitimacy may still cling to the Thieu puppet government and in voicing the desires of their countrymen for a just peace predicated on the withdrawal of American forces. Their recent demands on the occasion of the December Moratorium give voice to these aspirations:

1. The immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all United States military forces now in Vietnam.
2. Withdrawal of support from the Thieu-Ky regime.
3. Respect the political self-determination of the people of Vietnam.
4. The beginning of serious and binding peace negotiations in Paris.

The repressive reaction of the Saigon government -- in addition to the six-year sentences, the Saigon authorities have harassed the families of the 25 demonstrators and cut off all remittances from home -- has generated a wave of Japanese support for the students. In April, the expiration of the visas and passports of the 25 will again bring their case to public attention and underline the urgent need for a political asylum law demonstrated by numerous recent cases involving Chinese, Koreans, and Western residents in Japan. A major campaign to secure Japanese government permission for them to continue as students despite the withdrawal of their passports by the Saigon government has already begun to take shape.

## NOTES ON G.I. ORGANIZING IN JAPAN

by Roger Hobbitt

When writing about GI organizing and resistance in the States, a very relevant parameter of each operation is the political conservatism of the surrounding community. In Europe, basically the same political factor enters the picture with slightly more complicated overtones of cultural differences -- but nonetheless Europeans and Americans are culturally close to understanding and working with each other.

When considering GI organizing and resistance in Asia, it is precisely the cultural/racial/linguistic parameters which are of primary importance. The proximity to the war is obviously a relevant factor, but one which we have unconsciously allowed to obliterate our considerations of the cultural barriers.

For a long time we have recognized a pattern in the US where military trouble makers were transferred from the base where they were organizing and disproportionately sent to Asia as opposed to other stateside bases or Europe. It was first surmised that this was done as a threat -- shorten the proximity to the war zone. "Either shape up or the Pentagon will arrange for the Vietnamese to shut you up!" Often they were sent directly to Nam. Thus, with the rationale provided, the movement analysis of that transfer ended.

After spending some time working with the GIs in Asia one suddenly discovers that the Pentagon is thoroughly aware of and talented in utilizing cultural/racial/linguistic differentiations.



The placard reads: "We support the struggle of the Black servicemen."

A member of a local citizens' group. Her placard proclaims support for the struggles of Black U.S. servicemen.

For a GI movement to function actively and continuously it usually requires certain types of support activities from the outside. In the States this support is generally available, and if not, GIs can develop it through casual contacts during off-duty hours. In Europe, a slightly more difficult but similar situation exists. But consider how many GIs speak English, French, German? How many speak Korean, Thai, Vietnamese, Chinese, Japanese? How many understand Christ, Locke, Rousseau, Jefferson? How many understand Confucius, Buddha? How many understand individualism? How many understand non-dissension and harmony?

We have experience with the legal/economic/political pressure that can be brought to bear on movement sympathizers and supporters in the Mid-West and South. But what about those same pressures as applied in our bastions of "free Asia"? Consider lending your printing press or coffee house in Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, South Vietnam. Or what about Okinawa, where a US military officer has veto power over everything that goes on on the island including the decisions of the supreme court of the civilian judiciary. The consolation in Okinawa is that you can find out which prison they are in so you can visit. In Japan, at least, you only lose your job or your business.

The convenient combination of cultural and political barriers has effectively prevented much solid organizing to take a firm foothold in Asia. (With the notable exception of the creation of a black city in Okinawa.) Language barriers alone generally prevent a hip GI from being able to convince a local citizen that he should work to build resistance within the belly of the enemy. All of Asia has in fact been a sanctuary where the Pentagon could send organizers and effectively nullify their ability to construct a sustained movement.

Beheiren was the first organization to follow its international philosophies and begin to cross those cultural barriers. It started with a subtle change in slogans from 'Yankee go home' to 'Army go home.' Then, when four anti-war sailors deserted from the carrier Intrepid, the Japan Technical Committee to Aid American Anti-War Deserters moved things a step further with 'Yankee let me help you go home!' And now, late as usual, the Americans have joined by supplying organizers and counselors through the American-in-Exile program.

The Japanese people have determined to break those cultural/racial/linguistic barriers and communicate with and aid the GI movement as they begin to build their own Japanese soldiers' movement. The Japanese have set out to understand the US military, Americans, English, and that strange Christianity which seems to somewhat pervade us foreigners. The Japanese have recognized their relative political freedom and since Japan is one of the R & R centers of Asia they are taking on the task of aiding the movement throughout Asia.

Sporadic instances of resistance keep appearing throughout Asia -- those in Vietnam usually getting reported in the States. But the Pentagon has always been able to prevent them from developing into a coherent movement by adroit use of transfer. But the last of the Pentagon's sanctuaries is beginning to disappear as GIs in Asia are learning about coalition politics. Cultural barriers are beginning to fall, encouraging people inside the US military and around it to risk the political barriers and build resistance. Coalition politics are beginning to emerge amongst people who all have one common oppressor manifested through one common instrument

of that oppressor, the US Military.

## NEWS BRIEFS

### 1970 BUDGET HAS GREATEST INCREASE IN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES

Government proposals for Japan's largest postwar defense budget, providing for a major upgrading of defense expenditures, was announced on January 24 by Finance Minister Fukuda. The government's draft plan provides for a general budget of 7,949,764 million yen, an increase of 17.9% over the 1969 budget. (The average annual rate of increase over the past five years is 12.6 per cent.)

Emphasis in this draft budget was laid on expending internal security and promoting science and technology. Along with these items, considerable sums will be laid aside for strengthening the defense capacity and for promoting unification with Okinawa.

The Finance Ministry lists the following reasons for this sudden increase in defense expenditures:

- (1) Pay raises for SDF members.
- (2) Concrete realization of already established plans for strengthening equipment and facilities such as the purchase of modern F4EJ fighter planes, expansion of buildings to meet the increased numbers of members of the Ground SDF, and the construction of Nike and Hawk missile units.

These increases reflect Japan's growing military capacity in the era of the return of Okinawa.

### DEFENSE AGENCY TO ESTABLISH TWO NEW NIKE LAUNCHING BASES

The Defense Agency recently decided to establish a new land-to-air missile group for launching Nike-J missiles in the Nagoya and Osaka-Kobe areas. This missile group, to be known as the Fourth Group, will consist of Nike launching pads in five locations.

The Agency decided to locate the headquarters of the group and one artillery company (with nine launchers) in the Gifu base at Kagamigahara, Gifu prefecture. Another artillery company will be stationed at the Ground Self-defence Force base at Aibano in Shiga prefecture. The locations for the other three launching pads have not yet been decided. The formation of this Fourth Missile Group is expected to be completed by the end of 1971. The existing Missile Groups are the First Group, around the Tokyo area, the Second Group, for Northern Kyushu, and the Third Group, for Hokkaido.

The Nike-J is a revised version of the Nike-Hercules anti-aircraft missile produced by Western Electric of the U.S. These missiles are produced in Japan under a licensing agreement by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. The range is about 150 kilometers (effective range about 100 km). and the missile travels with a

speed of about 3 Mach. They are not equipped for nuclear warheads but carry high-grade explosive warheads weighing about 200 kg. It is claimed that they cannot be used in offensive attacks.

## RALLY MARKS ANNIVERSARY OF TOKYO UNIVERSITY STRUGGLE

On January 18, the first anniversary of the fall of the Yasuda Auditorium at Tokyo University, a commemorative "Workers-Farmers-Students-Citizens Rally" was held. The rally at Rekisen Park was jointly sponsored by the National Zenkyoto Federation and the national committee of representatives of prefectural Anti-War Youth Committees. It was attended by 13,000 students belonging to the Zenkyoto at various universities in and around Tokyo, workers belonging to the Anti-War Youth Committees, and citizens.

Speakers at the rally emphasized the importance of the Tokyo University struggle in transcending the framework of reformist campus struggles and in heightening the class struggle. A three-point resolution was adopted to.

- (1) Develop further the Tokyo University struggle.
- (2) Win the 1970 struggles by solidarity between the Zenkyoto and the Anti-War Youth Committees.
- (3) Fight from the April 28 Okinawa struggles through the June struggles by means of armed struggles.

In the evening, the participants in the rally held a demonstration past the front gates of Tokyo University.

Another meeting of approximately 3,800 was held by the Revolutionary Marxist (Kakumaru) faction at Hibiya to mark the anniversary of the Tokyo University struggle and to support the All Okinawa Military Workers' Union (Zengunro).

To deal with both of these rallies, 2,000 police were mobilized in an imposing show of force including riot police units, water cannon trucks, and patrol cars stationed at points along the demonstration course.

The Tokyo University campus was sealed off and students were denied entrance by riot police carrying tear gas rifles and by water cannon trucks stationed in front of the main gates. Consequently the only people visible anywhere on campus were 60 members of the joint struggle committee of militant teaching assistants and university staff members wearing helmets who gathered in front of the Yasuda Auditorium, which is still in the same shambles it was left one year ago. They held a rally to mark the anniversary of the January struggle at Tokyo University. After the rally, they gathered in front of the main gate and chanted slogans to greet the Zenkyoto students and Anti-War Youth committee members as they passed by in their demonstration.

During the demonstrations on January 18, 38 were arrested for breaking the Public Safety Regulations.

In the afternoon of January 18, about 1,000 Zenkyoto students, teaching assistants, and staff members held a meeting and rally inside the Tokyo University Hongo campus to mark the first anniversary of the Tokyo University struggle.

## NON-VIOLENT CITIZENS' DEMONSTRATION

This year's first anti-Ampo demonstration took place in Tokyo in the after-



noon of January 2. The demonstration was held by a dozen citizens belonging to the "Non-Violent Citizens Joint Struggle Committee." All the members of the group expected to be arrested, but no arrests were made.

The representative of the group, Mr. Yoshizaki Shuichi (34), recently issued a call for non-violent direct action in which all the participants intended to be arrested. "We will continue the demonstration in an orderly manner, using no so-called violence, until the last individual has been arrested."

About 30 persons came forward to support this proposal (company employees, chauffeurs, university students, etc.), and late in December they formed the Non-violent Citizens Joint Struggle Committee and decided to hold their first demonstration on January 2.

The group requested permission to demonstrate along a course which would take them in front of the Prime Minister's official residence and the headquarters of the Liberal Democratic Party, but the Tokyo Public Safety Commission refused to allow this course approving instead a different, round-about course. The demonstrators attempted to walk along the course which they had originally requested, but were restrained by the police and forced to follow the approved course. After the demonstration, they attempted to go to the Prime Minister's residence, but were again blocked by the police. Some of the demonstrators sat down on the street. Two policemen removed the demonstrators one by one, grasping them by both arms and pulled them as far as Hibiya Park where they were forced to disband.

Mr. Yoshizaki said: "Because of the small size of our group, we were unfortunately unable to undergo mass arrest. In the future we will gather together more like-thinking people and will hold a demonstration of about 1,000 in which all of the demonstrators will be arrested."

## POLICE TO PLAY LEADING ROLE IN THE 1970'S?

The Metropolitan Police Department on January 10 held a New-Year Drill at the Meiji Jingu Outer Garden in Tokyo. Superintendent-General Hatano inspected the 7,000 police participating in the drill.

The Headquarters units, the Riot Police, the Police School units, the traffic mobile police, the automobile patrol units, and other police units drilled in their uniforms and were inspected by the Superintendent. This was followed by a parade which included 11 police horses, 6 police dogs, patrol cars, barricade removal trucks, armored trucks for riot control, multiplex radio cars, and three helicopters.

In his Address, Hatano said: "In a certain sense, the police may in more cases than before come to play the leading role during the 1970's. It is gratifying to see these rigorous preparations here today. I hope that the young members will discipline themselves sternly, that the officers will be stern to their subordinates, and that they will redouble their efforts treating themselves with even greater sternness."

## A LETTER FROM THE TOKYO DETENTION HOUSE

Students in Japanese prisons also are reading AMPO. One of us received the following letter from a young (23 years old) woman who was arrested during the October struggles in 1969 and is now at the Tokyo Detention House. We translated it from Japanese into English.

"Thank you very much for the chocolates, which I received yesterday. I must keep them strictly under surveillance, or the other girls will eat them in unlimited amounts. Of course, when we eat them, we all share them equally.

"It took me two whole days to read through the second number of AMPO. I have been away from English for some time, but as I was reading it, many of the vocabulary words came back to me. I thought the article about the Tokyo University trials was especially important, and as I read it I wrote down a Japanese translation in my notebook.

"About my impressions of AMPO, I got a rather good idea about the kind of people who edit it, and I was very happy to know that now there is a possibility that our movement may be introduced, in the English language, to a wider range of people. The issue was especially welcome to me because it contained some news that I had not heard about.

"I have a few comments about the article on the Tokyo University trials. The article said that the court showed no interest in the ideological background of the Tokyo University struggle, but was merely attempting to judge the defendants according to their individual actions. What I would like to say is that the court -- that is, the judges and the prosecutors acting together -- are trying to judge us precisely FOR our ideology. The enemy IS interested, I am sure, in our thoughts and, especially, in our FUTURE ACTIONS. This is shown clearly by the AMPO article where it mentions the lighter sentences given to the 'repentant' defendants. In other words, all of the defendants had done exactly the same things, but the severity of the sentences depended entirely upon whether or not they indicated their willingness to submit to the powers-that-be IN THE FUTURE. This does not apply only to the Tokyo University struggle, but the same thing is true of the people who were arrested during the October and November struggles last year, and also in all other similar incidents. In the case of Akita Akehiro\*, it seemed exactly as if they decided which crime (?) they wanted to indict him for AFTER they had arrested him. The most important thing for the authorities is to keep us in bodily confinement. They have only a superficial interest in what we did, and this is simply for the sake of making a PRETENSE that this is a law-governed country. 'Freedom of thought and conscience' is nothing at all but an empty phrase. Since coming here I have been doing a little reading of the Law Compendium, and this has convinced me to a terrifying extent that these laws were all enacted quite arbitrarily by the rulers for one purpose: to preserve their own skins. These were my impressions, although I have phrased them rather inelegantly.

"Every once in a while, one or two of us will be released on bail from this women's wing where we are kept. They usually leave in the evening. Sometimes I can hear them through the door as they call out to each other: "Good-bye!" or "Take good care of yourself!"

"The other day I received two picture postcards from M....

"I suppose that you are very busy with all of your various activities.

"I sincerely hope that you keep well.

January 27, 1970

W.....K.....

"P.S. Today is exactly the 100th day since I was arrested."

\*Akita is the leader of the Zenkyoto movement at Nihon University.

## 70% OF DIET MEMBERS ELECTED BY CHEATING

Campaigners of about 70 per cent of the 486 successful candidates in the Dec. 27 Lower House elections committed election law violations, according to figures released by the National Police Agency.

Campaigners for three members of the third Sato Cabinet -- Posts and Telecommunications Minister Ichitaro Ide, Construction Minister Ryutaro Nemoto and Sadanori Yamanaka, director of administrative affairs in the Prime Minister's Office -- were arrested.

Campaigners of Educational Minister Michita Sakata and Health and Welfare Minister Tsuneo Uchida were questioned by police on suspicion of election irregularities.

While violations were committed by 70 percent of the campaigners of the successful candidates, the rate for campaigners of the 460 losing candidates was about 40 percent.

A total of 7,667 election law violations involving 13,346 persons were exposed by police throughout the nation as of Monday, and 1,733 persons were arrested. Eighty-four percent of those arrested bought votes, police said.

## ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT IN THE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES

Japan's radical movement recently entered a new stage by inaugurating anti-war agitation within the armed forces. The revolt of Makoto Konishi, 20-year old sergeant in the Air Defense Force, like the analogous case of the Fort Hood Three, has initiated a new soldier-civilian anti-war movement which is spreading rapidly throughout Japan. (For the story of Konishi's revolt see AMPO No. 2.) Immediately following the announcement of Konishi's revolt local Beheiren and other groups organized the "Niigata Action Committee for a Second and Third Konishi," and similar organizations shortly sprang up in Tokyo, Sendai, Osaka and elsewhere. In December the Niigata group initiated leafletting of local Self-Defense Force members despite provisions of the SDF Law which stipulate punishment for anyone attempting to influence soldiers to "neglect their duties."

On February 3 Konishi, appearing with Beheiren chairman Makoto Oda and Franz Schurmann (invited to Japan by Beheiren), launched a nationwide speaking tour to publicize the case. Speaking as a team in Niigata, Tokyo, Nagoya and Fukuoka, their rallies were attended by thousands.

On February 11, the newly instituted National Founding Day (the holiday, based on a myth utilized during the last war to fan Japanese chauvinism), leafletting began at bases throughout Japan. At the Nerima Camp in Tokyo, several hundred students and citizens demonstrated and circulated leaflets denouncing the Self-Defense Forces. The police and the Self-Defense Forces were alerted, all gates to the camp were locked, and barbed wire barricades were erected inside the gates.

These activities are only a prelude to a major campaign. Beheiren has marked the issue as a focal point of its spring activities and an underground army newspaper is presently being prepared to give voice to protest within the armed forces.

Monthly Salaries of Servicemen of Different Nationalities  
in Vietnam (in dollars, including bonuses)

Country Rank	Korea	Vietnam	U.S.	Philippines	Thailand
Maj. Gen.	354.16	217.38	1,294.15		
Brig. Gen.	320.00	212.35	1,060.65	641.60	
Colonel	291.72	170.43	833.15	590.40	590.76
Lt. Col.	256.67	153.66	686.65	539.20	563.39
Major	224.57	138.56	601.45	500.80	518.43
Captain	190.40	123.48	569.05	475.20	406.92
1st Lt.	166.70	111.74	483.85	454.72	395.19
2nd Lt.	151.55	103.35	435.85	441.92	389.33
Warrant Off.	137.14	86.58	430.15	404.80	
Master Sgt.	102.50	76.51	402.25	284.80	266.39
Sgt. 1st Class	86.35	69.82	366.25	282.24	261.51
Sergeant	54.40	68.13	333.35	279.68	257.60
Corporal	37.47	62.64	304.75		
PFC	34.33	58.53	259.15		
Private	31.11	57.16	238.73		
Recruit	30.96	55.79	235.15		

## TRANSCENDING MODERNITY

### A review of *Concerned Theater Japan*

*Concerned Theater Japan* was inaugurated coincidentally about the same time as AMPO, and shares many of our concerns, though from a different perspective. CTJ is projected as an English language quarterly "published by Theater Center 68/69, an association of theater artists, scholars, and critics based in Tokyo."

The present issue is a sample, containing only two articles: a manifesto of Theater 68/69 and a long article by co-editor Tsuno Kaitarō. The first regular issue promises to be full journal size, including a full-length play in translation.

According to its manifesto, 68/69 is an extraordinarily ambitious bunch. In addition to putting out CTJ and another journal in Japanese, they are also staging plays in their own Freedom Theater. Moreover, they are planning to begin street theater from the back of a flatbed truck: "...theater that assaults the complacent bureaucrat as he trudges ill-humoredly his well-worn path to work...theater that acts out a news, a history different from that manufactured by the forces that oppress and exploit us..." And not only that, they are also planning to begin something they call "wall theater," an idea born "out of graffiti, Red Guard wall newspapers, posters from the May Revolution, and the action petitions of striking Japanese university students..."

Tsuno's article is fascinating, and if it is truly a sample of future contents, then CTJ will surely open up a dimension of Japanese cultural life which has been hitherto almost entirely unavailable to the English reading audience, though the market has been flooded by translations of establishment darlings like Mishima and Kawabata.

Tsuno writes of the condition of contemporary theater, and its attempts to break free from the failure of its success. He finds the principal traditions of Japanese theater to be sterile: "...our theaters are always full, and it is because they are always full that they are always empty." Kabuki, whose actors were once "despised as outcasts, and yet ...feared as those able to don the guise of gods," made a conscious decision after the beginning of modernization in the 19th century to "eradicate the irrational, the violent, and the erotic," and to become "palatable to the period's wielders of power... the bourgeois and the bureaucrat." The result, according to Tsuno, is "actors...who seem to stand absent-mindedly erect like a statue of Buddha in a glass case."

The other main theatrical tradition is Shingeki ("new theater") which began as a brave and radical attempt in the '20s to introduce modern European theater. From its pre-war days of hunger and political oppression, Shingeki has today "assumed its proper (1) place in the social order; and at the same time, it has become harmless..." Shingeki has become a "tradition of the new."

Tsuno relates the following anecdote about the beginning of Shingeki. In the '20s the program of the theater which was producing Pirandello's *Each in his own way* carried the self-congratulatory comment of one member of the audience: "At long last we have accustomed ourselves to sitting and watching a play in silence." At long last, cries newly "modernized" man, we have trained ourselves to be observers, to watch without participating, to sever our passions from our actions so that we can see a play without weeping or crying out, and to sit among a crowd of our friends and neighbors without talking to any of them. A triumph of self-alienation...and this at a play called *Each in his own way*!

Ginsberg once called himself a "distant early-warning radar system." The expression applies to poets generally. Social scientists and technologists have not caught it yet, but modernity is not advanced by greater modernity, and nothing is more hackneyed than newness. There has been a time called "The Modern Age" and we are in the last stages of it. If I read Tsuno correctly, his formula for creating new theater (and new man) is contained in his quotation

from another writer: "to make the premodern a negating force and with it to *transcend the modern*." (My italics) This is in utter opposition to the notion of *preserving* the premodern (as, for example, Kabuki purports to do). The idea of preserving the past is wholly an invention of modernity...made possible, one imagines, by the invention of the glass case.

Tsuno goes on to describe how new theater in Japan is diving deep into the past and bringing up psychic entities long thrust into the unconscious by the modern organization mind...myth, ritual, festival, the actor as pariah/god, the hero as despicable/sacred. The theater is no longer a place where (as with "modern" drama) an audience of watchers is taught disenchantment and cynicism (or the counterpart of cynicism: senti-mentality). Rather it seeks to join actor and audience in a group experience of great power...even mystery.

D.L.

#### Is AMPO Indispensable?

A number of indignant readers (most notably a writer for the Danish revolutionary journal *Politisk Revy*) have called us to task for our rash statement that the Japanese Left is "covered by a blanket of silence in all languages but Japanese." In the spirit of true *jiko-hihan* (self-criticism) demanded by the situation we hereby acknowledge the important work being published elsewhere. We will attempt to keep our readers abreast of relevant information as it comes to our attention.

1. Ichiro Sunada's "The Thought and Behavior of Zengakuren: Trends in the Japanese Student Movement" in the June 1969 *Asian Survey* remains the best brief introduction to the student movement.

2. An ambitious special supplement (including magnificent photographs) on the Japanese student movement was published in the October-November issue of the *Plain Rapper*. Includes extensive documentation on the recent student struggle and the origins and development of the movement. (\$.25 plus postage; 424 Lytton Avenue, Palo Alto, California 94301)

3. A number of excellent and carefully documented analyses of post-war Japanese-American relations, of the Ampo system and Japanese-American imperialism, and Japan's growing military-industrial complex have recently appeared in the *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* and *Pacific Research*. (*Bulletin*, see numbers I,1 and I,2 [Nov '69, 2/'70]; \$1 per issue; \$4/year; Rm. 301, 1737 Cambridge St., Cambridge, Mass. *Pacific Research*, see Number I,3, November, 1969; \$5 per year, Pacific Studies Center, 1963 University Avenue, East Palo Alto, California.)

4. Peter Wiley's article on "Vietnam and the Pacific Rim Strategy" in *Leviathan* number 3, June 1969, is a major interpretation of Japan-American imperialism in Asia.

5. Readers of AMPO may also be interested in the English translations of Katsuichi Honda's *Vietnam. A Voice from the Villages* and *The National Liberation Front*. Originally published in the *Asahi Shimbun*, Japan's largest and most prestigious newspaper, these on-the-spot accounts of the

American pillage and destruction of South Vietnam and of life in the liberated areas stirred a powerful Japanese reaction to American policy long before My Lai.  
(Available from Mrs. R. Ishida, 2 - 13 - 7 Nishikata, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo. \$1 airmail for each, \$.50 seamail; bulk rates)

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### Note to Subscribers:

As you see, we have changed our format. This is because with the third issue we are changing the nature of the operation. We sent thousands of free copies of the first two issues all over the world, and so were concerned to cram as much in as possible and still stay within the minimum postage rate. Now we have a solid base of subscribers, and from this issue forward the magazine is primarily for them. By simplifying the format we not only save time but cut costs, thereby making it possible to afford a heavier magazine.

You may have noticed that we have not quite lived up to our promise to be a monthly. In the future AMPO will appear roughly bi-monthly, contingent on developments in the movement and our own strength. Naturally, subscribers will receive the number of issues they paid for, however long it takes to make them.

Finally, we are happy to see that our material is being reprinted, not only in the U.S. but in Europe as well. We repeat that Movement publications are free to reprint anything from AMPO without restriction....but would like to add that we would appreciate it if you would mention where the material came from.

AMPO No. 3

A Report from the Japanese New Left

AMPO is produced by Beheiren (The Japan "Peace for Vietnam!" Committee) and Gaikokujin Beheiren, its affiliate organization for foreign residents in Japan.

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The poster from Kara Juro's *Long John Silver*

AMPO is not copyrighted, and Movement publications are welcome -- indeed urged -- to reprint any articles or pictures...all we ask is proper credit. Non-Movement publications should contact us first. We trust you to know who you are.

It is our specific hope that this magazine will contribute to unified action in 1970 against the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which is an enemy of the people of both countries, and of the people of all Asia.

Any suggestions -- either for this magazine or for unified action -- will be greatly appreciated.

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