

AMPO



A Report from the Japanese New Left



Sato's return: a day of mourning

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AMPO 70

Part 2 : THE DEAL

The signing of the Nixon-Sato joint statement in Washington on November 21 puts the finishing touches on the imperialist camp's strategic reorganization of the Pacific by restoring Japan to the status of a full-fledged imperialist power. The mass media and government propaganda in Washington and Tokyo, insisting that the basic issue is the "return of Okinawa to Japan," have hailed Washington's vague, condition-ridden promise to return Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty in 1972 as a triumph of Japanese statesmanship and American largesse. Yet analysis of the joint statement confirms that its major preoccupation is not the return of Okinawa but creation of the political and military context for joint Japanese-American domination of Asia. The joint statement, while affirming the automatic extension of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (Ampo) beyond June 1970, actually is tantamount to the signing of a new treaty.

The return of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty with its counterrevolutionary strategic position preserved and indeed strengthened is the touchstone for the new Nixon-Sato strategy spearheaded against Asian revolution. Unfortunately, that mode of "returning Okinawa to Japan directly violates the wishes of the Okinawan people who have suffered for twenty-four years under American military rule. Significantly, on November 13, four days before Sato's departure for Washington, the Okinawan people, whom Sato intended to ingratiate, rose in powerful, determined protest against the Prime Minister's deal over Okinawa. They saw through Sato's design to turn Okinawa from a U.S. strategic base into a U.S.-Japan joint military base, thereby binding the Okinawan people even more tightly to the chariot of militarism.

To understand the full significance of the strategic turn taken with Okinawa as the fulcrum, we must examine, if briefly, the meaning of Sato's statement on the occasion of the Prime Minister's first visit to Okinawa in 1965. He said then that "Japan's postwar period will not end until Okinawa is returned." On the one hand, Sato sought to appease the Okinawan people who had chafed under American colonial rule while demanding their rights as Japanese citizens. On the other hand, Sato was driven by a personal sense of mission to inaugurate a new stage in the postwar development of imperialist Japan.

THE "ECONOMIC ANIMAL" JAPAN

For Japan's ruling elite, the term "postwar period" implies a specific stage of development in which a weak Japan was forced to depend on American military and political power. Shigeru Yoshida, who has been called the Adenauer of Japan as Prime Minister during and after the American Occupation, was the principal Japanese architect of the course of development for the defeated and devastated Japanese Empire. The diplomatic expression of this policy of reliance on and subordination to American power was the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 which surrendered Okinawa indefinitely for exclusive use by U.S. military forces. The first Security Treaty with the United States, signed simultaneously, provided for extensive U.S. bases and the stationing of troops throughout mainland Japan. While accepting the framework of American military power, the emphasis of the Yoshida strategy was on economic development. In the meanwhile, Japanese diplomacy followed the lead of the America State Department so blindly that observers often

pointed out that Japan lacked its own foreign ministry. Yet the Yoshida strategy was not to rely on American military power indefinitely. Despite the constitutional prohibition against rearming, using the pretext of the Korean War, the Japanese government began to train its own military force. Until recently, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces were considered supplementary to American military forces in Japan and neighboring Asia. The latter was the mainstay of the imperialist police force responsible for preserving the economic and political framework of capitalism and repressing revolution throughout Asia. The postwar Japanese people, rightwing critics frequently observed, lacking any higher national objective, concentrated on becoming "rich and comfortable." This view, exaggerated to be sure, nevertheless is suggestive of an important facet of postwar Japan. In Asian eyes, a Pakistani leader remarked, Japan is an "economic animal" whose leader (former Premier Ikeda) was a salesman of transistor radios and who had no politics. From the point of view of American congressmen, Japan has been a "free rider," reaping the rewards of America's Asian wars while raking in the profits from lucrative military contracts. In the words of a prominent Japanese business leader, Japan remains a "semi-state," economically powerful yet dependent on the United States for its police, military forces and diplomacy. (Kiyoshi Sakurada, director of the Employers' Association) Each of these observers, in his own way, points to a basic element of postwar Japanese capitalism. Japan's postwar development has occurred within a framework of American military domination of Japan and Asia predicated above all on the full military control of Okinawa as the "keystone of the Pacific."

AMPO 1960

The Sato-Nixon accord providing for the return of Okinawa and joint Japanese-American military activity throughout Asia marks the end of Japan's postwar era of dependence on the United States. It was the postwar mode of existence that Sato determined to end when he took the initiative of "solving" the issue of Okinawa. To understand the Sato policy it is revealing to consider the Japanese government's approach to the Okinawa problem 10 years ago before the 1960 Ampo was signed. In the course of negotiating the 1960 Ampo Treaty, then Foreign Minister Fujiyama suggested that Okinawa's return to Japan would be accelerated by treaty provisions including Okinawa within the Japan-U.S. defense perimeter. But suddenly, as the signing of the 1960 treaty approached, all reference to Okinawa disappeared. It was later reported that the United States had posed three conditions for the return of Okinawa:

1. That Japan assume primary responsibility for her own defense;
2. That Japan assume primary responsibility for the security of the Far East north of the Philippines;
3. That Japan drastically increase its economic aid to Asian countries.

In the explosive political context of 1960, to have accepted such conditions would have brought an uncontrollable upsurge of public opposition. Aware of this, the Kishi Cabinet, after trying to broach the issue of Okinawa, suddenly dropped it like a hot potato.

The significance of this episode lies in the fact that ten years later, the Sato government, determined to secure Okinawa and to expand Japan's military role

(Continued on page 7)

MASSIVE ARMED UPRISINGS MARK SATO'S DEPARTURE FOR U.S.



Kamata on the morning of November 17.

As we described in our last issue, October 21, 1969 marked the beginning of the Japanese New Left's month-long campaign against the visit of Prime Minister Sato to the United States. This struggle reached its climax on November 16, the date before Sato's departure from Tokyo's Haneda Airport. The fierce street fighting resulted in more than 2,000 arrests. After the tear gas had cleared up, it became evident to most observers that the New Left had been unable to win a victory in the face of the unprecedented police-state tactics used by the authorities. What, then, had been accomplished by the radicals in this massive confrontation?

AMPO gives here a factual run-down in this exclusive article based on Japanese newspaper reports and eyewitness accounts.

At 10:04 AM, November 17, 1969, Prime Minister Sato's special airplane, the DC8 "Seto," left Haneda Airport amid a heavy rain, carrying the Prime Minister and his wife to the United States. That same morning, 80 domestic and 60 international flights at the airport had been either cancelled or rescheduled, so that the airport's functions had come to a complete standstill.

The severity of the security precautions taken by the riot police completely broke all precedents, even for riot-torn Japan. During the five days from November 13 to 17, 75,000 riot police were mobilized

throughout Japan -- 25,000 of them in Tokyo alone. The airport itself was literally taken over by an occupying army of 3,000 riot police. All entrances were sealed off, and all individuals except pass-carrying airline employees were prevented from even approaching the airport.

At first, the police had stated that they wished to avoid invoking the Crime of Riot (*sōransai*), but their attitude stiffened as the days went by. On October 28, the Metropolitan Police Department announced that this law would be applied without hesitation if the situation called for it, and that the police would use their pistols if explosives were used against them. As it turned out, the Riot Law was not invoked, and pistols were not used.

Nevertheless, these extra-strict security measures netted immense numbers of victims. The massive police dragnets resulted in 1,689 arrests (229 of them women) in Tokyo alone on November 16. The nation-wide total of arrests made on this day alone was 1,857 persons (237 women). This total exceeded the previous all-time high for arrests made on a single day; the previous record was reached on October 21, 1969, when 1,505 persons were arrested throughout the country.

On November 17 also, 288 arrests were made throughout the nation (including 17 women). 252 of these arrests were made in Tokyo. The "weapons" confiscated on these two days reached immense proportions. This was particularly true in Tokyo, where literally thousands of Molotov cocktails were seized. The Japanese police once again displayed the awesome efficiency of their security system, based on a well organized information gathering system and the quick-moving mobilized riot police.

The clashes in Tokyo on November 16 and 17 resulted in 82 injured, four seriously. They included 28 policemen, 19 students, three firemen and 32 others, mostly bystanders, two of whom were seriously injured. These figures include only the casualties officially reported as having been hospitalized. The actual number of injuries must have been much greater.

In calling for a determined effort to prevent Prime Minister Sato's departure, the Japanese New Left groups were unanimous in their belief that the key to victory in the struggle would be to create a state of violent insurrection in the Kamata area, a region in Tokyo near the Haneda Airport. They hoped to be able to engulf the general populace of the area and to create a state of siege surpassing that produced during the Shinjuku struggle on October 21, 1968. This would, they believed, plunge the nation into a crisis, bring about a fluid political state, and make it impossible for the Prime Minister to leave the country as planned. However, they were not successful in attaining this goal. The stiff security measures prevented many from getting to Kamata. Other groups arrived there too late. In other cases, groups of militants were intercepted by riot police on the platforms of Kamata station and arrested before they could go into action.

When the Kamata struggle was at its height -- from 4:00 to 7:00 PM on November 16 -- there was a throng of thousands in the plazas near the east and west exits of Kamata station. However, there was a clear-cut distinction between the militant demonstrators and the crowds of onlookers. After nightfall, the riot police at two places used water cannons to spray blue-tinted water onto the demonstrators who had been surrounded. The order was then given to arrest all those with garments stained by the tell-tale bluish water. The demonstrators were then trapped by squads of riot police who had been lying in wait in the side streets around the station. Militant students and workers belonging to the Anti-War Youth Committees (Hansen Seinen Iinkai) were pursued by the riot police (Continued on page 11)

AMPO interviews Yoshikawa Yuichi on G.I. Resistance

Editor's note: The unprecedented upsurge of resistance within the U.S. military all over the world has been particularly important in Japan, and has had significant effects on the Japanese movement. To obtain an account of the present state of affairs we interviewed Yoshikawa Yuichi, the General Secretary of Beheiren. Yoshikawa has the memory of an elephant, and so interviewing him is roughly equivalent to doing empirical research, only a lot easier.. Excerpts from that interview follow.

Change in the G.I. Resistance Movement

AMPO: Beheiren has been known as an organization that helps American deserters, but it seems to me that nowadays the scope of the activities of Beheiren has expanded to include cooperation and united action with those GIs who are opposing the war within their bases. Is this correct?

Yoshikawa: Yes, exactly. Since the Intrepid Four case, which gave such a shock to the Japanese public, the number of deserters seeking Beheiren's assistance has greatly increased. This increase reflects the widespread sentiment among the G.I.s against the war and, more than that, their determination to fight against the war. And so in accordance with that change JATEC (Japan Technical Committee to Aid Anti-War Deserters) and Beheiren have come to have two functions....two parallel functions. The second and new function is cooperation and assistance to the resistance movement within the American military. In accordance with that, the domestic style, or mode of activities, of JATEC has changed. Previously JATEC was concentrating on secret activities...locating people who can conceal G.I. deserters. Now JATEC has realized clearly that it must conduct its activities on a mass basis. For that purpose a new publication, called the Deserters Bulletin (Dassoshei Tsushin) was inaugurated this spring.

Recent Activities

Yoshikawa: To give some of the outstanding examples... at Misawa Airbase in Aomori Prefecture...a very important strategic base in relation to the Soviet Union and the northern regions...fifteen G.I.s gathered around the flagpole (on October 15 Moratorium Day) to hold an overnight meeting. Eventually they were discovered and dispersed by the MPs. That group is a highly conscious group of resisting G.I.s; they are putting out an underground newspaper called Hair, of which three issues have already been published. Hair is not the only G.I. paper in Japan...for example at one of the bases in Tokyo area there is a paper called Kill for Peace, written and edited by the G.I.s there. And there is another paper called We Got the Brass, which is the Asia edition of the Second Front International, and which has been distributed at dozens of bases from Hokkaido to Okinawa. Along with these activities by G.I.s in their camps, there are parallel movements of anti-war Japanese going on outside the bases. A typical example is the Oizumi Citizen's Group, which is located near Camp Asaka. They have established a "radio station" there called "Radio Camp-Must-Go," which broadcasts regularly into the base through loudspeakers. Their broadcasts include anti-war songs (folk and rock), comments on topical issues, messages from deserters. There has been a very favorable response from inside the camp: many soldiers respond with the "V" sign, while others have approached the group after the broadcasts offering to cooperate. Now joint meetings are held between these soldiers and the Citizen's Group.

Resistance in the Self-Defense Forces

...This incident is not about American G.I.s, but it is related. Several days ago a Japanese soldier publicly announced his opposition to the Security Treaty, to

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A Report from the Japanese New Left

AMPO is produced by Beheiren (The Japan "Peace for Vietnam" Committee) and Gaikokujin Beheiren, its affiliate organization for foreign residents in Japan. AMPO is a movement publication designed to overcome the fact that the Japanese Left, one of the most articulate and active movements in the world, is covered by a blanket of silence in all languages but Japanese.

Send correspondence to:
AMPO, Ishii Building
6 - 44 Kagurazaka
Shinjuku, Tokyo, Japan

Make checks payable to:
AMPO, Account No. 0061656
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AMPO is not copyrighted, and Movement publications are welcome -- indeed urged -- to reprint any articles or pictures without restrictions. Non-Movement publications should contact us first. We trust you to know who you are.

It is our specific hope that this magazine will contribute to unified action in 1970 against the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which is an enemy of the people of both countries, and of the people of all Asia.

Any suggestions -- either for this magazine or for unified action -- will be greatly appreciated.

Editorial Committee: Makoto Oda, Yuichi Yoshikawa, Yoshiyuki Tsurumi, Ichio Muto, Lafcadio Black, Gerry Winstanley

the Japan-U.S. Joint Statement (the Nixon-Sato statement), and to the American Military occupation of Okinawa, and demanded the dissolution of the Self-Defense Forces. While this is an individual case, it is not an isolated one, in the sense that it symbolizes a new tendency within the Japanese military. We have been fighting for a long time and in various ways against the existence of Japanese military forces, but these struggles have been all based on the premise of the unconstitutionality of those forces. Or else they have demanded the basic human rights of soldiers be respected, referring to the frequent censorship by the authorities of publications which can be read by soldiers. However this new case is quite different...What this soldier has said amounts to the argument that the very existence of the Self-Defense Forces is a reflection of Japanese imperialism, that the SDF are imperialist forces whose aim is to suppress the Japanese people and to invade and suppress other countries of Asia, such as Korea and China...there has never been a single case in which an SDF soldier said such a thing. And this event corresponded exactly with the appearance of the new stage of Japanese imperialism...the stage which has just been entered with Sato's trip to Washington, the Joint Statement, and the decision to preserve the Security Treaty System through the '70s. In that sense this event is highly significant...

This soldier's fight is closely connected with... is influenced by...the activities of JATEC and Beheiren and the Intrepid Four Association directed toward American G.I.s

Balloon Attack

As an example of a different style of movement, when American bases are opened to the public on some...memorial day or something...some Beheiren enter the bases and put flowers on the weapons and airplanes, with the inscription "flower power", or distribute papers like "We Got the Brass."

Here is an example from the Japanese base, Niho; when the base was opened to the public, several Beheiren members prepared many balloons and stood by the entrance. On the balloons they painted slogans such as "Ampo Fun-sai", "Dissolve the Self-Defense Forces", and so on. These balloons were given to children entering the base to see the airplanes, and so the base was soon filled with children holding slogan balloons. So the SDF people noticed this and tried to take away the balloons at the entrance. But the children cried and wouldn't give up the balloons. The officers bought candy, and offered it in exchange for the balloons, but the children liked the balloons better than the candy, and so they failed. This is a tactic that could be used any-

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CRISIS IN THE COURTS

-- Hundreds of Rebel Students to be Sentenced in Absentia --

The Tokyo University Struggle

January 18 and 19, 1969 are dates which will never be forgotten in the history of Japan's stormy anti-establishment movement. On these two days, after many hours of fierce fighting, some 8,500 riot police succeeded in expelling hundreds of militant students who had been occupying a number of buildings on the Tokyo University campus. Some 10,000 canisters of tear gas were fired, and immense quantities of liquid and powdered tear gas were used. 369 students were injured, 76 of them seriously. One student was permanently blinded, and the burns from the liquid tear gas were found to be especially serious.

Altogether some 786 arrests were made in the various incidents occurring both on and off the campus on these two days. More than 540 students were later indicted on a variety of counts such as "breaking into a building," "refusal to obey orders to evacuate public premises," "obstruction of the performance of public duties," and "illegal assembly with dangerous weapons." These are all comparatively light criminal offenses, bearing maximum penalties of two or three years. It would be natural to expect suspended sentences to be meted out in nearly all of these cases, especially for first offenses.

Demand for Unified Trial

On February 13, a group of lawyers formed a defense panel for the students. A majority of the defendants -- 469 of the 540 indicted -- demanded a unified trial (*tōitsu saiban*), arguing that they had acted together for a common goal, shared a common ideology, and wished to make clear in public hearings the basic issues which motivated them in their struggle. However, the Tokyo District Court turned down their demand for a unified trial and divided the 469 defendants up into 37 groups of 10 to 13 each.

In demanding a unified trial, the defendants and their lawyers acted upon well established precedents in Japanese legal history. They argued that the Tokyo University struggle (*Tōdai tōsō*) was an ideologically motivated movement. It would be senseless for the court to consider only the isolated actions of the separate defendants (such as: who threw a rock at a policeman, or who was holding a pipe or pole in his hands at the moment of arrest), distorting them out of their entire ideological context. Separate trials (*bunkatsu saiban*), they pointed out, would make it impossible to evaluate the actions of the defendants in relation to the whole picture. The District Court, it seemed to them, was attempting to treat the Tokyo University struggle as a bunch of minor legal technicalities, as a series of incidents of gang violence, rather than as an immense mass movement aiming at revolutionary change in society. The court showed no interest at all in considering the background and the causes of the campus disturbances which had been rocking Tokyo University for many months.

In refusing the request for a mass trial, the District Court argued that it would be difficult to find a courtroom large enough to accommodate such a large number of defendants. There would be difficulties in keeping order in the courtroom, and a mass trial might continue for years. (Japanese court cases have, in fact, been known to drag on for 17 years before the first verdict!) The purpose of the court, it was explained, was to determine the extent of the individual guilt of each defendant, weighing the evidence in each separate case.

However, in grouping the defendants for separate trials, the court made extensive investigations of their personal backgrounds. For instance, the court inquired into the universities they attended, the political groups to which they were affiliated, their status of leadership within the group, whether they had signed a confession or not, their previous record of arrests, and the role they played in the activities under indictment. The defense lawyers argued that this preliminary investigation and the grouping of the defendants in this biased manner clearly indicated that the court had abandoned all pretense at impartiality in the case. Such a system of classifying the defendants was clearly prejudicial to their interests and deprived them of all possibility of a fair trial.

In the meantime, the courts were proceeding with the hearings of the 175 "repentant" defendants who had hired separate lawyers and had accepted separate trials. The sentences for all of these "penitent" students were handed down in March, 1969, and all of the defendants were given suspended sentences.

Separate Hearings Begin

The Tokyo District Court, overruling the objections of the defense, began its hearings of the separate groups on May 27. At that time, more than 300 of the defendants were still being held in detention. The courtroom atmosphere was entirely abnormal from the very outset. The few defendants who had been released on bail were, of course, obliged to attend the hearings, but they and the defense lawyers voiced loud protests against the unfairness of the separate trials and repeated their demands for a unified trial. All the defendants in detention boycotted the trials completely, refusing to leave their prison cells when summoned by the guards. Frequently the imprisoned students would remove all their garments and soak them in water in their cells so that the guards could not carry them out of their cells forcibly. Invoking Article 286 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the courts ruled that the defendants were absenting themselves from the courtroom without due cause and that the hearings would be held in the absence of the defendants. This led to the very rare phenomenon of "trial in absentia" (*keiseki saiban*). The defense lawyers continued to use every possible opportunity to remonstrate with the judges, but they were repeatedly silenced, ordered out of the courtroom, and even fined and imprisoned for obstructing courtroom procedures.

Spectators in the court galleries -- relatives and friends of the defendants as well as concerned citizens -- were naturally appalled by the abnormal atmosphere reigning in these courtrooms. Many spectators would rise to their feet and attempt to protest, but the judges would order them removed or would even call in the riot police (who, it appeared, were waiting in an adjoining room) to evict spectators or arrest them. On July 2, a 53-year old mathematician and writer, Mr. Nagaoki Mononobe, was sentenced to seven days' imprisonment by a judge for making a disturbance in a courtroom. His crime? He asked the judge a question: "Are you familiar with the Constitution?" Jirō Yamane, a 32-year old defense attorney, was twice fined ¥30,000 (about \$83) and was on two occasions sentenced to imprisonment (for terms of five days and three days, respectively) for failing to obey the orders of the judges.

The hearings continued to be boycotted by the defendants and the lawyers. Even if the lawyers had wished to appear at all the hearings, it would have been physically impossible for them to do so, since four or five hearings were held simultaneously in as many different courtrooms. The group of 14 or 15 defense lawyers could do little more than make the rounds of the courtrooms and voice their protests in turn to each

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of the judges until they were ousted, amid loud cries of angry protest from the spectators.

In the absence of defendants and defense attorneys, the hearings proceeded extremely smoothly. The only persons present were the prosecutors, the judges, the court clerks, and the prosecution witnesses -- usually the riot policemen who made the arrests. The judges showed little interest in safeguarding the rights of the defendants. In some cases, they called in the parents of the students or attempted to display their impartiality by saying that they would consult several books about the Tokyo University struggle.

Lengthy Detention Protested

The defendants, arrested in January, remained in detention for extremely long periods of time in view of the relative lightness of the offenses with which they were charged. It has been pointed out that there is a tendency for the courts to hold student defendants for disproportionately lengthy periods of confinement. As of July, 323 of the defendants still remained in detention, and over 260 were still detained as of August 20. A large percentage of the defendants refused to accept release on bail even when this was offered by the judges (who intended in this way to force them to attend the separate hearings), and as of December 6 there were still some 120 in detention refusing bail. They argued that to accept bail under these conditions would oblige them to appear in court and would constitute recognition of the separate trials.

In July, 173 members of the Tokyo University faculty signed a petition protesting against the lengthy detention of most of the defendants in the Tokyo University case. They argued that lengthy detention of more than six months constituted in fact a prison term in anticipation of the verdict. They noted that considerations unrelated with the trial were involved; the authorities were obviously interested in keeping the defendants in custody as a kind of "preventive arrest," so that they could not resume their political activities. Another consideration was that practically all of the defendants had availed themselves of their constitutional right (Article 38 of the Constitution) to maintain silence under questioning to avoid self-incrimination. To subject them to lengthy detention simply because they exercised their right to silence (*mokuhi-ken*), it was argued, constituted a virtual denial of their constitutional rights. One female defendant, famous as "Kikuyabashi No. 101" (the number of her cell at the Kikuyabashi Police Station), has steadfastly refused to reveal even her name to the authorities, and on June 13 the Supreme Court officially ruled that she was not entitled to appoint a lawyer unless she disclosed her name.

Verdicts in Absentia

These extraordinary court cases are now coming to an end one after another. Judge Isao Okagaki completed all of his hearings on November 5 and sentenced seven defendants on November 28, more than 10 months after they were arrested. The judge sentenced them to periods of 18 to 20 months at hard labor. Only two of the defendants had their sentences suspended, and the other five will have to spend nearly a year in prison. (In some cases, some of the time spent in detention during the trial was deducted from the total term to be spent at hard labor.) In three of the cases, the penalties assigned by Judge Okagaki were even harsher than those demanded by the prosecution. Of the spectators who protested the sentencing on November 28, five (including one woman) were arrested in the courtroom and sentenced to seven days in detention by Judge Okagaki for making a disturbance in his courtroom.

It was noted that Judge Okagaki had relied heavily on circumstantial evidence in reaching his decision, as only one defendant had confessed to having thrown rocks at the police. There was no clear evidence about the others, but the prosecutors had claimed that the presence of piles of rocks in the vicinity proved that the other defendants had either thrown them or had at least transported them. The defense attorneys pointed out that these stiff sentences were obviously intended as a deterrent. Even if the defense had presented its own evidence and arguments, they said, it was quite probable that the same penalties would have been forthcoming as long as the defendants had not expressed "repentance."

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STUDENT MURDERED BY RIOT POLICE IN OSAKA

Three Osaka riot policemen have been accused of killing Takayuki Kasuya, a 21-year old student of Okayama University, who succumbed on November 14 after having been arrested in a clash with riot police in Osaka on the previous day.


Kasuya was arrested around 6:30 PM on November 13 near the Ōgimachi Park in Osaka. The police who arrested him are accused of beating him repeatedly on the head, face, arms, and legs with night sticks, giving him a skull fracture and severe bruises. As a result, Kasuya died at 9:00 PM the following day.

Kasuya had attended a rally at Ōgimachi Park to protest Prime Minister Sato's visit to Washington. Some 30,000 labor unionists and students attended the rally in the park, and there were clashes with the riot police afterwards. 58 persons were arrested, and almost all of them were injured. Eye-witnesses said that the police action was especially brutal. Many demonstrators were beaten repeatedly with night sticks and Duralumin shields, and some were dragged by their feet across the pavement.

The Kansai Legal Aid Center and the defense lawyers on December 13 lodged a complaint with the local prosecutors' office against three riot police members: Yukio Araki, Akio Akamatsu, and Tokihito Sugiyama, charging them with brutality and manslaughter. Their complaint charges that the three policemen forced the critically injured student to walk handcuffed about one kilometer to the Sonezaki Police Station, where he was photographed and questioned. At the police station, he complained of being unwell and collapsed. Even after he had lost consciousness, he was given no first aid, but was left lying on the floor in a corridor. He was taken to the Yukioka Hospital two and a half hours after his arrest.

The hospital to which Kasuya was taken by the police had no facilities for brain surgery, and the doctor who operated on him there was a plastic surgeon, not a specialist in brain surgery. In fact, Kasuya was left for six hours without being given any medical treatment. The doctor who conducted the autopsy reported that death resulted from brain damage caused by blows on the head. The lethal instrument was said to be a hard, blunt instrument applied with great force once or twice.

Kasuya was the fifth person to lose his life in student demonstrations since 1960. He was affiliated with the Proletarian Student League (*Purogakudō*), the student organization of the Communist Workers Party (*Kyōsanshugi Rōdōsha Tō*), and was a leader of the *Zenkyōtō* struggle committee in his class at Okayama University. A mass meeting was held to protest his murder at Tokyo's Hibiya Park on December 14.



Takayuki Kasuya

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(Continued from page 2)

in Asia, was able and willing to accept all of the conditions posed earlier. It is true that Japan-U.S. negotiations for the "return of Okinawa" began in 1965. However, those negotiations centered not on the three basic conditions publicly proclaimed by Sato, but rather on creating an official façade for the Okinawa deal to minimize popular and legislative opposition in both countries. Sato's pledge to stand by his three slogans of "return in 1972," "return without nuclear weapons," and "the same status for Okinawa as for mainland Japan" was designed to appease the peace and anti-nuclear sentiment of the Japanese people as well as the nationalistic feeling of the Okinawan people. The American government, facing a different kind of Congressional pressures, had to emphasize virtually the opposite aspects of the Okinawa deal. The United States thus had to secure the Japanese promise to allow free use of Okinawa for American military operations against the Vietnamese people as well as to permit the American nuclear presence to continue after 1972. The immediate political propaganda lines in the two countries were so different that their close coordination in wording the accord was essential. But whatever the name they might give to the future status of Okinawa, the future reality of Okinawa as desired by the leaders of the two countries was one and the same -- the strengthening of Okinawa as the strategic counter-revolutionary military base in Asia on the basis of a new policy of Japan-U.S. joint control and management.

NUCLEAR ARMAMENT IN JAPAN

That the façade given to this reality was insignificant is clear from the wording of the statement itself. The statement contains no assurance that nuclear weapons will be eliminated at the time of Okinawa's reversion. Indeed, it does not even acknowledge the existence of nuclear weapons on the islands. The president took note of the Japanese people's strong sentiment against nuclear weapons (point 8), but his avowed intention to follow a nuclear policy consistent with that of the Japanese government provides no assurance that nuclear weapons will be eliminated.

(Continued from page 6)

In the meantime, the courts and the bar associations were applying pressure on the defense lawyers. On November 5, a Kobe lawyer, Kazuo Nakai, lodged a complaint with the prosecutor general against defense lawyer Jirō Yamane, charging the latter with having repeatedly obstructed court procedures. Nakai also complained to the Bar Association, seeking Yamane's expulsion. The disciplinary committee of the Tokyo Bar Association is now investigating seven defense attorneys, who may possibly be punished by suspension, reprimands, or even expulsion from the Association.

At any rate, Japanese courts have now, for the first time in their entire history, handed down *kesseki hanketsu*, or "verdicts in absentia." This judgment by default is quite unprecedented and has called forth a wave of protest. The judges in these cases claim adamantly that their trials are perfectly legal. However, many legal authorities have pointed out that trials held in the absence of the defendants and of defense counsel are a travesty of justice. Such trials may be "legal" according to the letter of the law, but few would call them "fair" in the accepted sense of the word. The militant student defendants, carrying on the Tokyo University struggle in the solitude of their prison cells, have clearly won an important victory. They have plunged the Japanese court system into a serious crisis. What is more, they have completely erased the illusions still lingering in some minds about the "independence" and "neutrality" of the Japanese courts and about the "impartiality" of bourgeois justice.

The Japanese Government through its spokesmen repeatedly insists that "anti-nuclear weapons" is a *policy* and not a principle. Sato himself, when he invited the U.S. nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise to visit Japan in 1968, declared that the "nuclear allergy" of the Japanese people should be eliminated. There is in fact a concerted government effort to overcome the anti-nuclear "sentiment" of the Japanese as a prelude to new Japanese policy departures. Once this has been accomplished, the U.S. government will be quick to deploy nuclear weapons throughout Japan.

Yet even this is an innocent interpretation of the text. For no one in Japan knows or is in a position to know what kind of American weapons are deployed in Okinawa now. The U.S. government has never officially acknowledged the presence of nuclear weapons there. Even in the case of mainland Japan, we do not know whether there are nuclear weapons or not. We are simply asked to believe that the Japanese Government is "convinced that there are no weapons of the kind."

The meaning of Sato's bombastic statements about preserving Japan's non-nuclear posture is clear. The U.S. Government's recent announcement that MACE-B missiles, believed to have nuclear warheads, will be removed from Okinawa by the end of 1969, is all that is meant by a "nuclearless" Okinawa. It is well known that MACE-B is an outmoded winged missile flying slower than sound. For several years the Pentagon has stated that these obsolete missiles should be scrapped. The announcement of the removal, however, made at the height of Sato's election campaign, has been widely publicized to prove that the United States has accepted the "denuclearization" of Okinawa.

While Sato was busily creating a façade to hide the real meaning of the Okinawa deal and the new Japanese-American military alliance, very significant political developments were occurring within Japan. The essence of the Okinawa question lies not in the rhetoric of the Washington declaration but in these concrete political

processes. The major developments are the following:

1. The hasty formulation of the Fourth Defense Build-up Program to start in 1972, coupled with an Okinawa defense program.
2. Bold statements by Sato and other government and business leaders openly inspiring nationalism connected with the military buildup.
3. Increased overseas economic "assistance" pledged on several occasions, most notably during the June meeting in Japan of the Asian Pacific Ministerial Conference (ASPAC).
4. Rampant and indiscriminate use of police repression to crush the university struggle and a virtual reign of terror, culminating in the "emergency situation" declared in October and November to deter ordinary citizens from taking part in the anti-Ampo struggle.
5. The practical revision of the existing Security Treaty so as to facilitate freer use of American military bases in Japan and to allow Japanese military troops' intervention in Korean affairs.

THE RESURGENCE OF JAPANESE MILITARISM

These actions, taken hastily and with a sense of urgency in a short period, were coupled with a powerful propaganda campaign centering on the drive to secure the reversion of Okinawa. These were not mere coincidences, but part and parcel of the Sato plan to resolve simultaneously the problems of Okinawa and Japan's resurgence as a military power. The Fourth Defense Plan coupled with the return of Okinawa, charts Japan's changing role from that of a semi-state dependent on America's military and political initiative, to a full-fledged and aggressive member of the

imperialist camp.

The first draft of the Fourth Defense Buildup Program was brought to Washington in Foreign Minister Aichi's portfolio in June this year at the time of preliminary negotiations. Its size in terms of budgetary outlay is in fact double the Third Defense Buildup Program. Yet even this fourth program in its present form is regarded as insufficient by important Liberal Democratic leaders who insist that the "defense expenditures" should be raised to four per cent of the national income from the present one per cent. The plan explicitly departs from the previous posture of subordination to American military might by charting a new forward posture for Japanese forces. The plan's major features, announced in May by Defense Agency Director Arita, are as follows:

- (1) Henceforth defense efforts should be promoted more positively in view of Japan's changing internal and external situation, expanding national strength, and heightened world status, so that Japan can cope, effectively and flexibly, with intermediate and immediate aggression.
- (2) With the return of Okinawa, Japan will assume the *prime responsibility* for the defense of Okinawa.... Japan should build up as quickly as possible the necessary defense forces for this area of the country.
- (3) Japan is surrounded by the sea and depends on international trade. Consequently, it is vital to maintain the safety of our country's maritime transport. Efforts should be stepped up to strengthen the maritime defense force so that the Japanese fleet can serve as the convoy for the merchant fleet.
- (4) In order to defeat enemy invasions in their initial stage, land, sea and air defense capabilities should be combined so that the invasion can be defeated. For this purpose, a striking force against ships and tasks forces on land should be strengthened.

THE NEW JAPANESE IMPERIALISM

This is no longer a military program advanced to satisfy American demands that Japan shoulder a larger defense burden. It is a program to prepare Japan for direct confrontation with Asian people's revolution, though still in co-operation with the United States.

More dangerous is the fact that the defense program as well as the economic and political strategy of the new Japanese state is explicitly spearheaded against South Korea. In the last issue, we explained the "Three Arrows" operation, based on the supposition that disturbance in South Korea develops into an international conflict involving Japan. It is precisely for such an eventuality that all "security" measures and training of the self-defense forces are being prepared under the Sato Cabinet.

This special Japanese interest in South Korea (coinciding of course with Washington's interest in the area) has prompted a major revision of the Security Treaty through agreement reached in Tokyo this summer. The negotiations, conducted by Assistant Foreign Minister Togo and U.S. envoy Schneider, resulted in complete accord about changing the interpretation of the "prior consultation" clause in the Security Treaty to facilitate Japan-U.S. joint military operations for suppressing future disturbances in South Korea. The Japanese side promised to say "yes" in any prior consultation concerning the deployment of U.S. troops from mainland Japan to South Korea. The Japanese government agreed to regard the security of South Korea "as Japan's own security," and consequently to guarantee full support for U.S. operations in the area. This has a special meaning against the background of the long practice of the treaty. Previously, prior consultation was required before U.S. forces in Japan could be deployed anywhere in the Far East. The new interpretation of the Sato government is that the security of South Korea should no longer be regarded as that of the "Far East," but as an integral part of Japan's own security. This is tantamount to regarding Japan's former colony as part of the Japanese territory.

The Sato-Nixon declaration, however, goes beyond Japan's agreement to drop the prior consultation clause in the case of Korea. By proclaiming that the secu-

rity of South Korea is "essential to the security of Japan," it clearly augurs the deployment of Japan's own troops to the area. This danger was recently pointed out by Shuichi Matsumoto, a leading diplomatic trouble-shooter who was dispatched as the government's envoy to South Korea in 1965. By changing the exclusive focus of the Ampo treaty from Japan's internal security to her overseas military expansion, the basic provisions of the peace constitution have been discarded and the way opened to an aggressive Japanese military role in Asia. A strong parallel can be drawn to the Bay of Tonkin Resolution, regarded as innocuous at the time but later used to legalize the subsequent military operation of U.S. troops in Vietnam.

Japanese troops assuming primary responsibility for the situation in South Korea means nothing less than the emergence of Japan again as a full imperialist power in this area. This is the direct consequence of the agreement for the reversion of Okinawa as the bastion of oppression in Asia. As Sato frankly said in his Washington Press Club speech (regarded by Washington as part of the Sato-Nixon accord), Japan (not Okinawa alone) is going to be the "keystone of the Pacific." "From now on, our defense forces are the masters, with Ampo (meaning U.S. troops) playing an auxiliary role."

This is in fact an application of Nixon's Guam doctrine. The war in Vietnam is to be "Vietnamized." The direct role of American forces is to be minimized. For us Japanese, Vietnamization in a way means Japanization of colonial wars in Asia, particularly Japanization of South Korea. Most significantly, Japan is no longer passively following U.S. policy but is determined to enter the "Pacific era" (Nixon and Sato) of its own accord and to fulfill its own imperialist interests. With its fast growing economy (Japan's GNP doubles every five years), there is irresistible indigenous pressure for full expansion overseas. So far, this pressure has been expressed through economic channels (the stage of the "economic animal"), but it has by now become so colossal that the Japanese state feels an active urge to equip itself with the full apparatus of an imperialist state.

★ From the Sato-Nixon Joint Communiqué (November 21, 1969) ★

3. The President and the Prime Minister exchanged frank views on the current international situation, with particular attention to developments in the Far East. The President, while emphasizing that the countries in the area were expected to make their own efforts for the stability of the area, gave assurance that the United States would continue to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East by honoring its defense treaty obligations in the area. The Prime Minister, appreciating the determination of the United States, stressed that it was important for the peace and security of the Far East that the United States should be in a position to carry out fully its obligations referred to by the President. He further expressed his recognition that, in the light of the present situation, the presence of United States forces in the Far East constituted a mainstay for the stability of the area.


4. The President and the Prime Minister specifically noted the continuing tension over the Korean Peninsula. The Prime Minister deeply appreciated the peace-keeping efforts of the United Nations in the area and stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security. The President and the Prime Minister shared the hope that Communist China would adopt a more cooperative and constructive attitude in

its external relations. The President referred to the treaty obligations of his country to the Republic of China which the United States would uphold. The Prime Minister said that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan. The President described the earnest efforts made by the United States for a peaceful and just settlement of the Vietnam problem. The President and the Prime Minister expressed the strong hope that the war in Vietnam would be concluded before return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan. In this connection, they agreed that, should peace in Vietnam not have been realized by the time reversion of Okinawa is scheduled to take place, the two Governments would fully consult with each other in the light of the situation at that time so that reversion would be accomplished without affecting the United States efforts to assure the South Vietnamese people the opportunity to determine their own political future without outside interference. The Prime Minister stated that Japan was exploring what role she could play in bringing about stability in the Indochina area.

6. The Prime Minister emphasized his view that the time had come to respond to the strong desire of the people of Japan, of both the mainland and Okinawa, to have the administrative rights over Okinawa returned to Japan on the basis of the friendly relations between the United States and Japan and thereby to restore Okinawa to its normal status. The President expressed appreciation of the Prime Minister's view. The President and the Prime Minister also recognized the vital role played by United States forces in Okinawa in the present situation in the Far East. As a result of their discussion it was agreed that the mutual security interests of the United States and Japan could be accommodated within arrangements for the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan. They therefore agreed that the two Governments would immediately enter into consultations regarding specific arrangements for accomplishing the early reversion of Okinawa without detriment to the security of the Far East including Japan. They further agreed to expedite the consultations with a view to accomplishing the reversion during 1972 subject to the conclusion of these specific arrangements with the necessary legislative support. In this connection, the Prime Minister made clear the intention of his Government, following reversion, to assume gradually the responsibility for the immediate defense of Okinawa as part of Japan's defense efforts for her own territories. The President and the Prime Minister agreed also that the United States would retain under the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security such military facilities and areas in Okinawa as required in the mutual security of both countries.

7. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that, upon return of the administrative rights, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and its related arrangements would apply to Okinawa without modification thereof. In this connection, the Prime Minister affirmed the recognition of his Government that the security of Japan could not be adequately maintained without international peace and security in the Far East and, therefore the security of countries in the Far East was a matter of serious concern for Japan. The Prime Minister was of the view that, in the light of such recognition on the part of the Japanese Government, the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa in the manner agreed above should not hinder the effective discharge of the international obligations assumed by the United States for the defense of countries in the Far East including Japan. The President replied that he shared the Prime Minister's view.

8. The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese Government reflecting such sentiment. The President expressed his deep understanding and assured the Prime Minister that, without prejudice to the position of the United States Government with respect to the prior consultation system under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the reversion of Okinawa would be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by the Prime Minister.



14,202 STUDENTS ARRESTED IN 1969 --- REPORT UNDERSCORES SOCIAL TURMOIL

For most of us, the year's end is a time to take stock of our accomplishments and to try to foresee what may be coming in the new year. This is what Japan's National Police Agency (Keisatsu-chō) did in its 1969 White Paper on Security, which was released on December 12. Police statistics must, of course, be approached with a certain amount of caution, since they are slanted so as to minimize the strength of the anti-Establishment forces. However, they do make interesting reading, and AMPO gives here a brief resumé of the NPA report. (All figures quoted for 1969 are those applying as of November 30, 1969.)

First of all, the White Paper provides convincing confirmation of a fact which AMPO readers already knew -- the fact that 1969 surpassed all previous years in Japan's history for the number of campus disputes, the number of police intrusions on campuses, the number of people participating in demonstrations, the number of riot police mobilized, and the number of students arrested. In other words, 1969 was a year of unprecedented social turmoil, and the police are prepared for even more unrest in 1970.

There is at least one figure in the White Paper which even AMPO is willing to accept trustfully. This is the number of students arrested. The police are the only ones who know this number, and it is 14,202 -- more than twice the number of students arrested during 1968. Campus disputes also spread during 1969. According to the police report, student strikes were held, buildings were occupied, or barricades were erected at 152 universities.

There was also a big increase in the number of street demonstrations organized by radical student groups. The biggest ones were Okinawa Day on April 28, the anti-ASPAC demonstrations in June, Anti-War Day on October 21, and the November demonstrations against Sato's visit to the U.S. According to the police estimates, 440,000 students marched in 2,363 demonstrations during 1969. This far exceeded the 1968 totals of 240,000 students who participated in 1,504 demonstrations. If one adds to the 1969 total the members of the Anti-War Youth Committees (Hansen Seinen Linkai) and the Behelren, the total number of participants in New Left street demonstrations increases to 670,000 persons.

The police estimates of the present strength of the radical student movement are also interesting. The White Paper says that the number of student self-government associations controlled by New Left student groups has increased from 180 in 1968 to 209 (an increase of 16%). The number of New Left student activists has increased from 8,300 to 14,200 (if true, this is a phenomenal increase of 71%), and the number of students whom New Left groups can mobilize in demonstrations has grown from 33,700 to 44,000 (a 31% increase). Interestingly, the number of students arrested (14,202) parallels the estimated number of activists.

The student groups affiliated with the Japanese Communist Party, the police report says, control 355 student self-government associations, have 14,200 activists, and can mobilize 47,600 students in their demonstrations. Thus, it would seem that the New Left student groups are approximately equal in strength to the pro-JCP groups.

An upsurge of student activism was noted also at the high school level. According to the report, campus disputes broke out in 163 high schools, and in 62 of these cases school buildings were occupied and barricaded by the students. 30,000 high school students participated in demonstrations in the streets, and 602 of them were arrested by the police.

The White Paper reports an escalation in the "weapons" used by militant radicals. The report states that 136 bombs and other explosives, 16,777 Molotov cocktails, 17,825 wooden staves, 6,165 steel pipes, 885 bottles of acid, and 207 tons of rocks were either confiscated by the police or used against them. In spite of all of this, only one policeman died from injuries sustained in a clash with students.

The White Paper notes that young workers belonging to the Anti-War Youth Committees (Hansen Seinen Iinkai) are playing an increasingly active role in militant struggles. It estimates their strength at about 17,000 and says that they are strengthening their ties with radical student groups.

The General Council of Trade Unions (Sōhyō) has been stepping up its strike activities, which reached their high point during 1969 in the United Action on November 13, in which 58 local industrial unions participated, mobilizing about 890,000 unionists. This number exceeded even the number mobilized in the massive General Strike held on June 4, 1960 to oppose the ratification of the Security Treaty.

The police agency's White Paper concludes with the prediction that the movement of the Japanese Left will continue to pick up momentum in 1970 and will probably reach a new height in June, 1970, when there will be a General Strike to protest the extension of the Security Treaty.

SELF-DEFENSE FORCE MEMBER ARRESTED FOR ANTI-WAR ACTIONS



Makoto Konishi

A sergeant in the Japanese Air Self-Defense Forces, Makoto Konishi (20), was arrested in Sado, Niigata Prefecture, for distributing leaflets inside his base. He was charged with violating a prohibition against political activity by members of the Self-Defense Force, and also with "instigating others to neglect their duties."

The former noncommissioned officer at the 46th Aircraft Control and Warning Group on Sado Island in the Sea of Japan was arrested October 18 for posting leaflets denouncing Prime Minister Sato's visit to the U.S. and calling for abrogation of the Security Treaty. This is the first time a member of the SDF has ever been arrested and prosecuted for security reasons.

According to the indictment, Konishi's leaflet read in part: "Is it not true that the SDF forces are robots, servants, and slaves of the bourgeoisie? Refuse training for the repression of demonstrations!

This infringes upon the just rights of the people to advocate their own opinions."

Konishi reportedly produced three editions of his leaflet. The first he placed on bulletin boards in three places inside the base. The second he distributed outside the base and also tacked on the walls of hallways inside the base. The third he pasted by the entrance to the mess hall and placed on the seats of parked army buses.

Konishi explained his motives to his lawyers as follows: "While living the life of a Self-Defense Force soldier, I noticed that there were a number of contradictions inside the SDF. Around the beginning of September, it was announced that riot-control practice, under the name of 'Special Police Training,' would be carried out, even here at the Sado base. Ideological indoctrination also began, dealing with such questions as: 'What is a demonstration?' and 'What sort of group is the New Left?' As the training proceeded, I began to realize that if we were called out for anti-riot duty, we would have to confront the general populace. If worst came to worst, we would even have to kill our fellow citizens. When I realized this, I simply couldn't stand it any longer, and on October 18 I refused to participate in the training. I printed up the leaflets myself, hoping that there might be others who would agree with my ideas."

SELF-DEFENSE FORCE UNITS WILL BEEF UP RIOT POLICE

Early in November, the Japanese Defense Agency and the National Police Agency agreed that the Self-Defense Forces can transport riot police and lend them tear gas and other riot control equipment even in situations where the Prime Minister has not issued an order for the SDF to go into action to maintain law and order.

The agreement is sure to rouse heated debate, since it means that the stage has been set for full-scale SDF aid to the police in maintaining law and order even though the Prime Minister has not issued a mobilization order. According to Article 78 of the Self-Defense Force Law, the Prime Minister can order action by part or all of the Self-Defense Forces when he believes that police power cannot cope with "indirect aggression" or other emergencies.

In the meantime, the Self-Defense Forces have been pushing ahead with their program to build up their preparedness against expected civil disorders. \$75 million worth of weapons and protective gadgets such as shields, tear gas canisters, and wooden sticks have been purchased and distributed among the SDF bases. The same amount of money is expected to be appropriated for the same purpose in the next fiscal year. The SDF authorities are also stepping up their programs for practice in riot control. The divisions in charge of guarding the Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya metropolitan areas now spend one-third of their total training time in preparing for mobilization in riot control.

DEPORTATION OF POLITICAL "UNDESIRABLES"

On December 7, 1969, Roger Scott, an American English teacher from Lubbock, Texas, was deported from Japan for his political activities. Scott was accompanied by his bride, Yuko, whom he married during a brief two-day release from the Immigration Department's Detention Center (read: prison) at Yokohama, where he had been incarcerated for over a month.

Scott has engaged in no violent activities nor broken any Japanese laws, other than overstaying his visa... a tautology since his visa was refused for his political activities. He has marched in peace demonstrations and spoken at rallies, but his principal "offense" was his joining Dr. Earle Reynolds and other Americans in an attempted goodwill mission to China on the peace yacht "Phoenix" last summer. The government, despite its claim to wish improved relations with China, took such a dim view of this journey that it refused reentry visa to three of the crew members (the only three who

intended to remain in Japan): Scott, Zen Buddhist priest Brian Victoria, and Dr. Reynolds himself.

Since their return, the three have been waging a court battle to stay in Japan. Handling their cases with magnificent bureaucratic confusion, the Justice Ministry has jailed them, released them, rejailed them, offered deals, reversed decisions, made vague promises, and maintained throughout an attitude of prim self-righteousness. The American Embassy, though bound by law to make efforts to protect the rights of its citizens, has been only insulting. The Ambassador's first words to Scott, telephoning from prison: "I understand you hate not only America but Japan too." Scott: "Now Mr. Ambassador, that's a pretty childish thing to say." The Embassy representative's first words to Victoria, who had demanded that he be released from solitary confinement at Yokohama (where he had been placed for organizing a demonstration inside the prison): "Well Mr. Victoria, you say this is solitary, but we take the view that it is only isolation. Solitary is a....black hole." (Perhaps he was referring to the fact that in Victoria's cell the light was kept burning 24 hours a day.)

Though Scott and Victoria were not treated particularly well in prison, they found that, according to the Justice Ministry's systematic discrimination, prisoners from Asian countries were treated even worse...for example by receiving a far smaller food allotment per day. Many, whom the authorities can decide neither to release nor to deport, have been rotting in prison for years....never, of course, having been charged, indicted, or tried for any violation of law.

While Scott lost his appeal and was deported, Victoria has been released in what will hopefully be an important precedent-setting decision...that a foreign resident cannot be imprisoned merely on suspicion of having violated immigration laws. Thus he is free at least while his court case is pending...which may take years. Reynolds, who lives in Hiroshima, is also awaiting the results of his appeal.

AMPO is planning to run a series of articles on the Japanese immigration laws, including reports on the pending deportation cases, on the shocking and discriminatory treatment of Asian residents.... especially Chinese and Koreans....and an analysis of the new and even tougher Immigration Bill which has been drawn up by the Government.

Yoshikawa Interview

(Continued from page 4)

where there is a base. Another example...on the last Memorial Day of the Japanese Navy, Yokosuka Beheiren... gathered at the station and, together with a Folk Guerrilla group, began a march toward the base. The base authorities were shocked, and closed down the base to all visitors long before the scheduled closing time, claiming "bad weather".

On Future Strategy

First of all we have to distribute such papers as We Got the Brass as widely as possible, and urge soldiers to edit and publish their own papers. Through these papers they should try to organize a unified national network of resisting soldiers. Then, taking some opportunity... say for example Feb. 7 of next year, the anniversary of the date when the bombing of the North began...express their opposition to the war by taking unified action inside their camps in cooperation with the Japanese movement, which will stage demonstrations on the same day. ...And in particular, as the Japan-U.S. Joint Statement made clear, the leaders of the two countries consider the Korean situation to be "very dangerous", which means that fighting in Korea may erupt after the Vietnam War has ended, or even before it has ended. In that case Japanese Self-Defense Forces will probably be sent to Korea. Thus the activities of GIs in South Korea are becoming more and more important. And just as it is becoming more important strategically it is becoming more active in fact; there is a growing resistance movement among the GIs there, which we expect soon to make contact with resisting GIs here, and eventually with the movement inside the Japanese military.

Massive armed uprisings

(Continued from page 3)

and by vigilante committees of local residents wielding wooden swords.

Vigilante committees of this type made their first appearance in Shinjuku on October 21, 1969. Local "self-defense" organizations were organized in several districts around Kamata and Haneda after powerful police urging. Wearing yellow caps and arm-bands, the vigilantes went about patrolling in groups, carrying paper lanterns and holding brand-new wooden swords and baseball bats. Brawny young vigilantes kept a watchful eye on the movements of the students and workers, supplying information to the riot police. When the students and workers were fleeing from the riot police, the vigilantes would overpower them and hand them over to be arrested.

After 3:00 PM on November 16, militant students and workers began to engage in simultaneous guerrilla actions at many places, such as the two Kamata stations (of the Japanese National Railways and of the Keihin Kyūkō Line), near the Shinagawa station, at Tokyo station, and elsewhere. Numerous railway lines were thus brought to a stop.

About 4:20 PM, some 400 students of the Chūkaku faction stopped an electric train bound for Kamata on the Keihin Tōhoku Line. Alighting from it, they ran along the tracks to Kamata station. Breaking out of the station, they emerged into the plaza in front of the station, where they joined the students and workers who were already there. Large numbers of Molotov cocktails were thrown at the intersection in front of the station, and the area was transformed into a sea of flames.

About the same time, the Kamata station of the Keihin Kyūkō Line also was attacked with Molotov cocktails, and the trains were brought to a stop. In the vicinity of both these Kamata stations, exchanges of Molotov cocktails and tear gas volleys continued until late at night. Also near the Kamata and Ikegami stations of the Tōkyū Ikegami Line, hundreds of students attacked police boxes and built barricades of buses.

At Tokyo station, some 500 students jumped off the platform onto the tracks at 3:53 PM. Some of them broke into the central signaling center, and the Yamate Loop Line and other lines were brought to a stop temporarily.

After 5:00 PM, about 500 students belonging to the ML faction got off trains at Shinagawa station and threw Molotov cocktails into the Shinagawa police station. Part of the entrance to the police station was destroyed by fire. Subsequently, they seized a bus near the police station and rammed it into a police water-cannon truck.

Japanese Socialist Party

The Japanese Socialist Party had planned to hold, on the morning of November 17, an on-the-spot meeting of protest near Haneda, to be followed by a march towards the airport. However, on the day before this scheduled meeting, the Party decided at the last minute to cancel the meeting and demonstration. It based its decision on "high-level political judgment" that if it were involved in "extremist action," this would be disadvantageous for the Party in the forthcoming general elections. This decision came in spite of the fact that, on November 15, 80 percent of the delegates to a national conference had voted in favor of holding the on-the-spot meeting. The executive committee in charge of organizing the November 17 rally refused to accept this decision and went ahead with the meeting and demonstration as planned. The demonstration on the morning of the 17th was attended by some 1,500, and there were clashes with the riot police.

The Japanese Socialist Party views its protest actions through November 17 as having been successful. It laid particular emphasis on its Central Rally of November 16, which was attended by about 50,000 persons. The Socialist Party's demonstrations all ended peacefully.

The General Council of Labor Unions (Sōhyō) had no particular plans for taking any action on November 17. However, about 800 members of the National Railway Locomotive Engineers' Union (Dōryokusha Rōdō Kumiai) held an independent meeting and demonstration on the

morning of November 17 to protest the brutal suppression by the riot police of their demonstration on the night of November 16. At that time, they had suffered one arrest and more than 100 injuries.

General Council of Labor Unions (Sōhyō)

As its first effort in the 1970 struggles, Sōhyō carried out a United Action on November 13. The transport unions carried out an early-morning strike, and strikes were held also by the Teachers' Union and other government employees, by employees of public enterprises such as the Postal Workers' Union and the Telegraph Workers' Union, as well as unions of workers in private industries. Altogether 54 local industrial unions joined the strike, which began in the morning and continued until the afternoon all over the nation.

By the east exit of the Shinjuku station, some 1,500 Beheiren demonstrators joined bystanders to form a crowd of about 5,000. About 7:30 in the evening, persons in this crowd threw Molotov cocktails at the police.

Beheiren

In the afternoon of November 16, the Tokyo Beheiren sponsored a mass rally at Hibiya Amphitheater to oppose Sato's visit to Washington. The Metropolitan Police Board earlier had prohibited a Beheiren demonstration that day, but Beheiren immediately filed a lawsuit against this action. On the morning of November 16, the district court ruled that the police prohibition ought to be canceled and the demonstration permitted. However, 30 minutes after the Court ruling was handed down, the authorities resorted to a notorious emergency measure: the Prime Minister's right of "objection," from which there is no recourse.

Consequently, it was impossible for Beheiren to carry out the day's demonstration legally, even though more than 15,000 people packed the Hibiya Park.

A characteristic feature of the day's action was the fact that vast numbers of "non-sect" radicals (meaning people who are radical but have no affiliation with political groups) were unable to participate in the "armed struggle" because combat groups were organized strictly along the line of the political groups. These multitudes of students, workers and citizens flowed into Beheiren's rally, and then organizing themselves into several major groups started their own spontaneous actions for the rest of the day, and some of them until the morning of November 17.

There were about 5,000 Beheiren students who formed a unified contingent. After the rally they boarded railways and appearing here and there all through the night engaged in street guerrilla fighting in Shinjuku, Shinagawa, Yokohama and elsewhere. Early in the morning of November 17, they joined workers and citizens who held the last demonstration for the whole campaign near Haneda.

Citizens' contingents and local groups, despite the police ban, staged demonstrations in the city center, creating several street rallies in front of the Asahi Shimbun building and in the Ginza areas.

If we include unions which took protest actions such as shop meetings, the total number of participating unions would be about 67 unions. The central issues were political ones, such as protests against Sato's visit to the United States, demands for the return of Okinawa, and demands that the Security Treaty be abrogated. The November 13 United Action had the largest number of participating unions in any political strike since the Security Treaty struggles of 1960. However, most of the strikes ended within one or two hours, and they were not very broadly based. As a result, the strikes had almost no effect on the general situation.

Okinawa

A protest strike was held all over the islands by the Okinawa Reversion Council (Sokoku Fukkikyō). According to figures tabulated by the sponsors, altogether 64 unions with 57,000 members participated in strikes on November 13. In addition, 40 organizations belonging to the Reversion Council, with about 40,000 members, also participated in some form of protest activities on November 13. A big rally of some 100,000 people was held on November 13 at a public park in Naha. After the meeting protesters marched to the Naha Naval Base, where clashes occurred between demonstrators and riot police. 86 persons were reported injured, three of them seriously. 47 of the injured persons were policemen.

On the evening of November 17, a rally was held by the Reversion Council near the U.S. Kadena Air Base to protest Sato's Washington visit. It was attended by an estimated 55,000 people. Students belonging to the Chūkaku and Kakumaru factions attacked the Kadena Air Base and nearby police boxes with Molotov cocktails and battled with the police. Ten students were reported arrested, and several were bitten by dogs released by the U.S. security forces at Kadena.

The slogans adopted by the Reversion Council for its rallies indicated that the Okinawa Reversion movement is moving away from emotional demands for Okinawa's return to Japan; attention is now being focused on opposition to the Ampo system itself and on demands for the removal of military bases.

Rallies on November 15 and 16

On the afternoon and evening of November 15, altogether 21 citizens' demonstrations took place in Tokyo and other cities in response to an appeal from the June Action Committee Opposing the Vietnam War and the Security Treaty. On the same day, workers belonging to the Anti-War Youth Committees (Hansen Seinen Linkai) held their own rally at the Amphitheater in Hibiya Park to protest Sato's visit to America. More than 10,000 militant workers and students attended.

On November 16, meetings and demonstrations opposing Sato's visit were held all over Japan. They included rallies sponsored by the Socialist Party and Sōhyō, the Communist Party, and Beheiren.

What was the over-all meaning of the events of November 13 - 17? First of all, both in Okinawa and in the main islands of Japan proper, there was an unprecedented upsurge of popular militancy. All observers agreed that tactics of revolutionary violence -- including the use of explosives and Molotov cocktails -- are becoming more and more widely accepted among militant students and workers. At the same time, the oppressive actions of the riot police are also being escalated. Police techniques now include lock-outs of entire portions of Tokyo, increased use of checkpoints to keep unauthorized persons out of sensitive areas, random searching of personal baggage carried by pedestrians, cancellation of airline flights, the organization of vigilante bands to help the police hunt down demonstrators, as well as the usual tactics of mass arrests and indictments of demonstrators, followed by protracted terms of detention and court battles for most of them.

Thus, the Japanese New Left has demonstrated again that it is capable of mobilizing thousands of young workers and students for fighting pitched battles against the authoritarian power structure. However, this alone is not enough. Such tactics of mass violence can succeed only if they sweep up large segments of the general public and create a political crisis so serious that the reactionary government is forced to back down. This point was not reached by the struggles culminating in November 17.

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6 - 44 Kagurazaka
Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, Japan