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The signing of the Nixon-Sato joint statement in Washington, December 21, puts the finishing touches on the imperialist camp's strategic reorganization of the Pacific by restoring Japan to the status of a full-fledged imperialist power. The mass media and government propaganda in Washington and Tokyo, insisting that the basic issue is the "return of Okinawa to Japan," have hailed Washington's vague, condition-ridden promise to return Okinawa "pursuant to the Constitution of Japan" in 1972 as a triumph of Japanese statesmanship and American largesse. Yet analysis of the joint statement confirms that its major preoccupation is not the return of Okinawa but creation of the political and military context for joint Japanese-American domination of Asia. The joint statement, while affirming the automatic extension of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (Ampo) beyond June 1970, actually is tantamount to the signing of a new treaty.

The return of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty with its counterrevolutionary strategic position preserved and indeed strengthened is the touchstone for the new Nixon-Sato strategy spearheaded against Asian revolution. Unfortunately, that mode of "returning Okinawa to Japan directly violates the wishes of the Okinawan people who have suffered for twenty-four years under American military rule. Significantly, on November 13, four days before Sato's departure for Washington, the Okinawan people, whose Sato intended to incratiate, rose in protest against the return of the Okinawa base. They saw through Sato's design to turn Okinawa from a U.S. strategic base into a U.S.-Japan joint military base, thereby binding the Okinawan people even more tightly to the chariot of militarism.

To understand the full significance of the strategic turn to provide a return to Japan as a fulcrum, we must examine, if briefly, the meaning of Sato's statement on the occasion of the Prime Minister's first visit to Okinawa in 1970: "We promised that the postwar period will not end until Okinawa is returned." On the one hand, Sato sought to appease the Okinawan people who had chafed under American colonial rule while demanding their rights as Japanese citizens. On the other hand, Sato was driven by a personal sense of mission to inaugurate a new stage in the postwar development of imperialist Japan.

THE "ECONOMIC ANIMAL" JAPAN

For Japan's ruling elite, the term "postwar period" implies a specific stage of development in which a weak Japan was forced to depend on American military and political power. Shigeru Yoshida, who has been called the Adenauer of Japan as Prime Minister during and after the American Occupation, was the principal Japanese architect of the course of development for the defeated and devastated Japanese Empire. The diplomatic expression of this policy of reliance on and subordination to American power was the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 which surrendered Okinawa indefinitely for exclusive use by U.S. military forces. The First Security Treaty with the United States, signed simultaneously, provided for extensive U.S. bases and the stationing of troops throughout mainland Japan. While accepting the framework of American military power, the emphasis of the Yoshida strategy was on economic development. In the meanwhile, Japanese diplomacy followed the lead of the America State Department so blindly that observers often pointed out that Japan lacked its own foreign ministry. Yet the Yoshida strategy was not to help Japan train its own military force indefinitely. Despite the constitutional prohibition against rearming, using the pretext of American military power, the emphasis of the Yoshida strategy was on economic development.

AMPO 1960

The Sato-Nixon accord providing for the return of Okinawa and joint Japanese-American military activity throughout Asia marks the end of Japan's postwar era of dependence on the United States. It was the postwar mode of existence that Sato determined to end when he took the initiative of "solving" the issue of Okinawa. To understand the Sato policy it is revealing to consider the American government's approach to the Okinawa problem 10 years ago before the 1950 Ampo was signed. In the course of negotiating the 1960 Ampo Treaty, then Foreign Minister Fujisawa suggested that Okinawa's return to Japan would be accelerated by treaty provisions including Okinawa within the Japan-U.S. defense perimeter. But suddenly, as the signing of the 1960 treaty approached, all reference to Okinawa disappeared. It was later reported that the United States had posed three conditions for the return of Okinawa:

1. That Japan assume primary responsibility for her own defense;
2. That Japan assume primary responsibility for the security of the Far East north of the Philippines;
3. That Japan drastically increase its economic aid to Asian countries.

In the explosive political context of 1960, to have accepted such conditions would have brought an uncontrollable upsurge of public opposition. Aware of this, the Kishi Cabinet, after trying to break the issue of Okinawa, suddenly dropped it like a hot potato.

The significance of this episode lies in the fact that since then Japan has never been able to secure Okinawa and to expand Japan's military role (Continued on page 7)
MASSIVE ARMED UPRISINGS MARK SATO'S DEPARTURE FOR U.S.

Kamata on the morning of November 17.

As we described in our last issue, October 21, 1969 marked the beginning of the Japanese New Left's month-long campaign against the visit of Prime Minister Sato to the United States. This struggle reached its climax on November 16, the date before Sato's departure from Tokyo's Haneda Airport. The fierce street fighting resulted in more than 2,000 arrests. After the tear gas had cleared up, it became evident to most observers that the New Left had been unable to win a victory in the face of the unprecedented police-state tactics used by the authorities. What, then, had been accomplished by the radicals in this massive confrontation?

AMFO gives here a factual run-down in this exclusive article based on Japanese newspaper reports and eyewitness accounts.

At 10:04 AM, November 17, 1969, Prime Minister Sato's special airplane, the DC8 "Seto," left Haneda Airport amid a heavy rain, carrying the Prime Minister and his wife to the United States. That same morning, 80 domestic and 60 international flights at the airport had been either cancelled or rescheduled, so that the airport's functions had come to a complete standstill.

The severity of the security precautions taken by the riot police completely broke all precedents, even for riot-torn Japan. During the five days from November 13 to 17, 75,000 riot police were mobilized throughout Japan — 25,000 of them in Tokyo alone. The airport itself was literally taken over by an occupying army of 3,000 riot police. All entrances were sealed off, and all individuals except pase-
carrying airline employees were prevented from even approaching the airport.

At first, the police had stated that they wished to
avoid invoking the Crime of Riot (syouka), but their attitude stiffened as the days went by. On October 28, the Metropolitan Police Department announced that this law would be applied without hesitation if the great demonstration failed. And that the police would use their pistols if explosives were used against them. As it turned out, the Riot Law was not invoked, and pistols were not used.

Nevertheless, these extra-strict security measures netted immense numbers of victims. The massive police dragnet resulted in 2,168 arrests (249 of them women) in Tokyo alone on November 16. The nation-wide total of arrests made on this day alone was 1,857 persons (237 women). This total exceeded the previous all-
time high for arrests made on a single day; the previous record was reached on October 21, 1969, when 1,505 persons were arrested throughout the country. On November 17 alone, 280 arrests were made through-
out the nation (including 17 women). 252 of these arrests were made in Tokyo. The "weapons" confiscated on these two days reached immense proportions. This was particularly true in Tokyo, where literally thousands of Molotov cocktails were seized.

The Japanese police once again displayed the awesome efficiency of their security system, based on a well-organized information gathering system and the quick-
moving mobilized riot police.

The clashes in Tokyo on November 16 and 17 resulted in 62 injured, four seriously. They included 26 policemen, 19 students, three firemen and 32 others, mostly bystanders, two of whom were seriously injured. These figures include only the casualties officially reported as having been hospitalized. The actual number of injuries must have been much greater.

In calling for a determined effort to prevent Prime
Minister Sato's departure, the Japanese New Left groups were unanimous in their belief that the key to victory was to create a state of violent insurrection in the Kamata area, a region in Tokyo near the Haneda Airport. They hoped to be able to engulf the general populace of the area and to create a state of siege surprising that produced during the Shinjuku struggle on October 21, 1968. This would, they believed, plunge the nation into crisis, bring about a fluid political state, and make it impossible for the Prime Minister to leave the country as planned. However, they were not successful in attaining this goal. The stiff security measures prevented many from getting to Kamata.

Other groups arrived there too late. In other cases, groups of militants were intercepted by riot police on the platforms of Kamata station and arrested before they could go into action.

When the Kamata struggle was at its height — from 4:00 to 7:00 PM on November 16 — there was a throng of thousands in the plaza near the main exit of Kamata station. However, there was a clear-cut distinction between the militant demonstrators and the crowd of onlookers. After nightfall, the riot police at two places used water cannons to spray blue-tinted water onto the demonstrators who had been surrounded. The order was then given to arrest all those with garments stained by the tell-tale blue

(Continued on page 11)
Editor's note: The unprecedented upsurge of resistance within the U.S. military all over the world has been particularly important in Japan, and has had significant effects on the Japanese movement. To obtain an account of the present state of affairs we interviewed Yoshihawa Yuichi, General Secretary of the Kikaku-no-Tai (Department of Resistance). Yoshihawa has the memory of an elephant, and so interviewing him is roughly equivalent to doing empirical research, only a lot easier... Excerpts from this interview follow.

Change in the G.I. Resistance Movement

AMFO: Beheiren has been known as an organization that helps American deserters, but it seems to me that nowadays the scope of the activities of Beheiren has expanded to include cooperation and united action with those GIs who are opposing the war within their bases. Is this correct?

Yoshihawa: Yes, exactly. Since the Intrepid Four case, which gave such a shock to the Japanese public, the number of deserters seeking Beheiren's assistance has greatly increased. This increase reflects the widespread sentiment among the G.I.s against the war, and more than that, their determination to fight against the military justice which is patched up in order to maintain the war production. The G.I.s have come to have two functions...two purposes: to liberate the American military itself and to produce a domestic change in American society. AMFO has decided that JATGC is concentrating on secret activities...locating people who can conceal G.I. deserters. Now JATGC has realized clearly that it must conduct its activities on a mass basis. For that purpose a new publication, called the Deserters Bulletin (Dassei-Teishin), was inaugurated this spring.

Recent Activities

Yoshihawa: To give some of the outstanding examples...at Nago Airbase in Okinawa Prefecture...a very important strategic base in relation to the Soviet Union and the northern regions...fifteen G.I.s gathered around the flagpole (on October 15, Moratorium Day) to hold an overnight meeting that eventually became the basis for the new type of organized resistance movement which is spreading all over Japan. This group is a highly conscious group of resistance G.I.s; they are putting out an underground newspaper called Ha'iri which has been already been published. Ha'iri is not the only G.I. paper in Japan...for example at one of the bases in Tokyo area there is a new publication called All Free Peace, which is also edited by the G.I.s there. And there is another paper called We Got the Erase, which is the Asia edition of the Second Front International, and which has been distributed at dozens of bases from Hokkaido to Okinawa. Along with these activities by G.I.s in their camp, there are parallel movements of anti-war Japanese going on outside the bases. A typical example is the Okinawa Citizen's Group, which is located near Camp Asaka. They have established a "radio station", called "Radio Camp-Go'," which broadcasts music and news through loudspeakers. Their broadcasts include anti-war songs (folk and rock), comments on topical issues, messages from deserters. There has been a very favorable response from inside the camp: many soldiers respond with the "V" sign, while others have approached the group after the broadcasts off with a smile. The joint meetings are held between these soldiers and the Citizen's Group.

Resistance in the Self-Defense Forces

...This incident is not about American G.I.s, but it is related. Several days ago a Japanese soldier publicly announced his opposition to the Security Treaty, to the Japan-U.S. Joint Statement (the Nixon-Dato statement), and to the participation of Japan in the U.S. military activities...and demanded the dissolution of the Self-Defense Forces. While this is an individual case, it is not an isolated one, in the sense that it symbolizes a new tendency within the Japanese military. We have been fighting for a long time and in various ways against the existence of Japanese military forces, but these efforts have been based on the premise of the constitutionality of those forces. Or else they have demanded the basic human rights of soldiers be respected, referring to the frequent censorship by the authorities of publications which can be read by soldiers. However this new case is quite different...What this soldier has said amounts to the argument that the very existence of the Self-Defense Forces is a reflection of Japanese imperialism, that the SDF is an imperialist force whose aim is to suppress the Japanese people and to invade and suppress other countries of Asia, such as Korea and China...there has never been a single case in which an SDF soldier said such a thing. And this was corresponded exactly with the appearance of the new stage of Japanese imperialism...the stage which has just been entered with Sato's trip to Washington, the Joint Statement and the claim to reserve the Security Treaty System through the '70s. In that sense this event is highly significant...

This soldier's fight is closely connected with...is influenced by...the activities of JATGC and Beheiren and the Intrepid Four Association directed toward American G.I.s....

Balloon Attack

As an example of a different style of movement, when American bases are opened to the public on some...memorial day or something...some Beheiren members prepared many balloons and stood by the entrance. On these balloons they painted slogans such as "Amo Funai", "Dissolve the Self-Defense Forces", and so on. These balloons were given to children entering the base to show the children the desires of the children and also not give up the balloons. So the SDF people noticed this and tried to take away the balloons at the entrance of the children. The children were so angry and so they failed. This is a tactic that could be used any...

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CRISIS IN THE COURTS

Hundreds of Rebel Students to be Sentenced in Absentia

The Tokyo University Struggle

January 18 and 19, 1969, are dates which will never be forgotten in the annals of Japan's student anti-establishment movement. On these two days, after many hours of fierce fighting, some 6,500 riot police succeeded in expelling hundreds of student protesters who had been occupying the number of buildings on the Tokyo University campus. Some 10,000 canisters of tear gas were fired, and immense quantities of liquid and powdered tear gas were used. 369 students were injured, 76 of them seriously. One student was permanently blinded, and the burns from the liquid tear gas were found to be first degree burns.

Altogether some 786 arrests were made in the various incidents occurring both on and off the campus on these two days. More than 540 students were later indicted on a variety of counts such as "breaking into a building," "refusal to obey orders to evacuate public premises," "obstruction of the performance of public duties," and "defaming the reputation of the universities." These are all comparatively light criminal offenses, bearing maximum penalties of two or three years. It would be natural to expect suspended sentences to be meted out in nearly all of these cases, especially for first offenses.

Demand for Unified Trial

On February 13, a group of lawyers formed a defense panel for the students. A majority of the defendants refused to take part in a unified trial (tetsu saiban), arguing that they had acted together for a common goal, shared a common ideology, and wished to make a joint public hearing of the basic issues on which they were convicted in their struggle. However, the Tokyo District Court turned down their demand for a unified trial and divided the 469 defendants into three separate trials.

In demanding a unified trial, the defendants and their lawyers acted upon well established precedents in Japanese legal to try, especially for first offenses. It would be senseless for the court to consider only the isolated actions of the separate defendants (such as: who threw a rock at a policeman, or who was holding a pipe or pole in his hands at the moment of arrest), distorting them out of their entire historical context and into a separate trial. Separate trials (bunketsu saiban), they pointed out, would make it impossible to evaluate the actions of the defendants in relation to the entire picture. The District Court, it seemed to them, was attempting to treat the Tokyo University struggle as a bunch of minor legal technicalities, as a series of incidents of gang violence, rather than as an immense mass movement aiming at revolutionary change in society. The court showed no interest at all in considering the background and the causes of the campus disturbances which had been rocking Tokyo University for many months.

In refusing the request for a mass trial, the District Court argued that it would be difficult to find a courtroom large enough to accommodate such a large number of defendants. There would be difficulties in keeping order in the courtroom, and a mass trial might continue for years. (Japanese court cases have, in fact, been known to drag on for 17 years before the first verdict!) The purpose of the court, it was explained, was to determine the extent of the individual guilt of each defendant, weighing the evidence in each separate case. However, in grouping the defendants for separate trials, the court made extensive investigations of their personal backgrounds. For instance, the court inquired into the universities they attended, the political groups to which they were affiliated, their status of leadership within the groups, whether they had signed a confession or not, their previous record of arrests, and the role they played in the activities under indictment. The defense lawyers argued that this preliminary investigation and the grouping of the defendants in this biased manner clearly indicated that the court had abandoned all pretense of impartiality in the case. Such a system of classifying the defendants was clearly prejudicial to their interests and deprived them of all possibility of a fair trial. At the same time, the court was proceeding with the hearings of the 175 "repentant" defendants who had hired separate lawyers and had accepted separate trials. The sentences for all of these "repentant" students were handed down in March, 1969, and all of the defendants were given suspended sentences.

Separate Hearings Begin

The Tokyo District Court, overruling the objections of the defense, began its hearings of the separate groups on May 27. More than 300 of the defendants were still being held in detention. The courtroom atmosphere was entirely abnormal from the very outset. The few defendants who had been released on bail were, of course, obliged to attend the hearings, but they and the defense lawyers voiced loud protests against the unfairness of the separate trials and requested that all be proceeded by a unified trial. All the defendants in detention boycotted the trials completely, refusing to leave their prison cells when summoned by the court. Protests were also made to protest that the guards not only had all their garments and soaks in water in their cells so that the guards could not carry them out of their cells forcibly. Invoking Article 286 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the courts ruled that the defendants were absenting themselves from the courtroom without due cause and that the hearings would be held in the absence of the defendants. This was the very rare phenomenon of "trial in absentia" (kaseki saiban). The defense lawyers continued to use every possible opportunity to procrastinate with the trial, ordering the court to rest, and even fined and imprisoned for obstructing courtroom procedures.

Autumn in the court galleries -- relatives and friends of the defendants as well as concerned citizens -- were naturally appalled by the abnormal atmosphere reigning in these courtrooms. Many spectators who had wished to appear at all the hearings, but who eventually did not do so, since four or five hearings were held simultaneously in as many different courtrooms, requested that the court in the future consider the possibility of holding these separate trials in one courtroom. His crime? He asked the judge a question: "Are you familiar with the Constitution?" "Yes," snapped a 32-year-old defense lawyer, "imprisonment for a violation of (about 83) and was on two occasions sentenced to imprisonment (for terms of five days and three days, respectively) for failing to obey the orders of the judge. The hearings continued to be boycotted by the defendants and the lawyers. Even if the lawyers had wished to appear at all the hearings, it would have been physically impossible for them to do so, since four or five hearings were held simultaneously in as many different courtrooms. The court's attempt to control the defendants could do little more than make the rounds of the courtrooms and voice their protests in turn to each
of the judges until they were ousted, amid loud cries of angry protest from the spectators.

The absences of defendants and defense attorneys, the hearings proceeded extremely smoothly. The only persons present were the prosecutors, the judges, the court clerk, and the prosecution witnesses — usually the riot policemen who made the arrests. The judges showed little interest in safeguarding the rights of the defendants. In some cases, they called in the translators or the students to permit them to display their impartiality by saying that they would consult several books about the Tokyo University struggle.

Lengthy Detention Protested

The defendants, arrested in January, remained in detention for extremely long periods of time in view of the relative lightness of the charges with which they were charged. It has been pointed out that there is a tendency for the courts to hold student defendants for disproportionately lengthy periods of confinement. As of July, 323 of the defendants still remained in detention, and over 260 were still detained as of August 20. A large percentage of the defendants refused to accept bail even when this was offered by the judges (who intended in this way to force them to attend the separate hearings), and as of December 5 there were still some 120 in detention refusing bail. They argued that to accept bail under these conditions would oblige them to appear in court and thus contribute to the recognition of the separate trials.

In July, 173 members of the Tokyo University faculty signed a petition protesting against the lengthy detention of most of the defendants in the Tokyo University case. The petition was supported by argumentation of more than six months constituted in fact a prison term in anticipation of the verdict. They noted that other defendants with similar charges were released, the authorities were obviously interested in keeping the defendants in custody as a kind of "preventive arrest," so that they could not resume their political activities. No one, of course, could be certain that practically all of the defendants had availed themselves of their constitutional right (Article 38 of the Constitution) to apply for release on bail. As a result, with only a few exceptions, the defendants were kept in jail to avoid self-incrimination. To subject them to lengthy detention simply because they exercised their right to a fair trial was, the petitioners argued, a virtual denial of their constitutional rights.

One female defendant, famous as "Kikuyabashō No. 101" (the number of her cell at the Kikuyabashō Police Station), has steadfastly refused to accept bail, and on June 13 the Supreme Court officially ruled that she was not entitled to appoint a lawyer unless she disclosed her name.

Verdicts in Absentia

Extraordinary court cases are now coming to an end one after another. Judge Isao Okagaki completed all of his hearings on November 5 and sentenced seven defendants on November 28, more than 10 months after they were arrested. The judge sentenced them to periods of 18 to 20 months at hard labor. Only two of the defendants had their sentences suspended, and the others five will have to spend at least a year in prison. (In some cases, some of the time spent in detention during the trial was deducted from the total term to be spent at hard labor.) In three of the cases, the penalties assigned by Judge Okagaki were even harsher than those demanded by the prosecution. Of the 30 spectators who protested the sentencing on November 28, five (including one woman) were arrested in the courtroom and sentenced to seven days in detention by Judge Okagaki for making a disturbance in his courtroom. Judge Okagaki was heard to remark heavily on circumstantial evidence in reaching his decision, as only one defendant had confessed to having thrown rocks at the police. There was no clear evidence about the others, but the defendant had confessed that he had observed the presence of piles of rocks in the vicinity proved that the other defendants had either thrown them or had at least transported them to the scene. The judge ruled out the possibility that some of the defendants had participated in the riot. These stiff sentences were obviously intended as a deterrent. Even if the defense had presented its own evidence and arguments, they said, it was quite probable that the same penalties would have been forth-coming as long as the defendants had not expressed "repentance."

(Continued on page 7)
The Japanese Government through its spokesmen repeatedly insists that “anti-nuclear weapons” is a policy and not a principle. Sato himself, when he invited the U.S. nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise to visit Japan in 1966, declared that the “nuclear allergy” of the Japanese people should be eliminated. There is in fact a concerted government effort to overcome the anti-nuclear “sentiment of the Japanese people” as well as new Japanese policy departures. Once this has been accomplished, the U.S. government will be quick to deploy nuclear weapons throughout Japan.

Yet even this is an innocent interpretation of the text. For no one in Japan knows or is in a position to know what kind of American weapons are deployed in Okinawa now. The U.S. government has never officially acknowledged the presence of nuclear weapons there. Even in the case of mainland Japan, we do not know whether there are nuclear weapons or not. We are simply asked to believe that the Japanese Government is “convinced that there are no weapons of the kind.”

The meaning of Sato’s bombastic statements about preserving Japan’s non-nuclear posture is clear. The U.S. Government’s recent announcement that MACE-B missiles, believed to have nuclear warheads, will be removed from Okinawa by the end of 1969, is all that is meant by a “nuclearless” Okinawa. It is well known that MACE-B is an outdated weapon; missile flying slower than that of a bird. Nevertheless, Sato’s election campaign, has been widely publicized to prove that the United States has accepted the “denuclearization” of Okinawa.

While Sato was busy creating a facade to hide the real meaning of the Okinawa deal and the new Japan-U.S. American military alliance, very significant political developments were occurring within Japan. The essence of the Okinawa question lies not in the rhetoric of the Washington declaration but in these concrete political processes. The major developments are the following:

1. The hasty formulation of the Fourth Defense buildup Program to start in 1972, coupled with an Okinawa defense program.

2. Bold statements by Sato and other government and business leaders openly inspiring nationalism connected with the militarization of the Okinawa deal.

3. Increased overseas economic “assistance” pledged on several occasions, most notably during the June meeting in Japan of the Asian Pacific Ministerial Conference (APAC).

4. Rampant and indiscriminate use of police repression to crush the university struggle and a virtual reign of terror, culminating in the “emergency situation” declared in October and November to deter ordinary citizens from taking part in the anti-Ampho struggle.

The practical revision of the existing Security Treaty so as to facilitate freer use of American military bases in Japan and to allow Japanese military troops’ intervention in foreign affairs.

THE RESURGENCE OF JAPANESE MILITARISM

These actions, taken hastily and with a sense of urgency in a short period, were coupled with a powerful propaganda campaign centering on the drive to secure the reversion of Okinawa. These were not mere coincidences, but part and parcel of the Sato plan to resolve simultaneously the problems of Okinawa and Japan’s resurgence as a military power. The Fourth Defense Plan coupled with the return of Okinawa, charts Japan’s changing role from that of a semi-state dependent on America’s nuclear and political initiative, to a full-fledged and aggressive member of the
imperialist camp.

The first draft of the Fourth Defense Buildup Program was brought to Washington in Foreign Minister Aichi's personal note to the U.S. foreign policy in Japan.

The program's major features, announced in May by Defense Agency Director Arisaka, are as follows:

1. Henceforth "defensive budgetary cutout" should be kept in mind as a national defense expenditure. The "defense expenditures" should be raised to four percent of the national income from the present level of one percent. The plan explicitly departs from the previous posture of subordination to American military might by charting a new forward posture for Japanese forces. The plan's major features, announced in May by Defense Agency Director Arisaka, are as follows:

2. With the return of Okinawa, Japan will assume the prime responsibility for the defense of Okinawa... Japan should build up its forces as quickly as possible and maintain the necessary defense forces for this area of the country. This is in accordance with the American forces' dependence on international trade. Consequently, it is vital to maintain the safety of our country's maritime transport. Efforts should be stepped up to strengthen the maritime defense of Japan so that the Japanese merchant fleet can serve as the convoy for the merchant fleet.

3. In order to defeat any invasions in their initial stage, land and air defense capabilities should be enhanced so that the invasion can be defeated. For this purpose, a striking force against ships and tanks on land should be strengthened.

THE NEW JAPANESE IMPERIALISM

This is no longer a military program advanced to satisfy American demands that Japan shoulder a larger defense burden. It is a program to prepare Japan for direct confrontation with Asian people's revolution, though still in cooperation with the United States.

More dangerous is the fact that the defense program, as well as the economic and political strategy of the new Japanese state is explicitly spearheaded against South Korea. In the last issue, we explained the "Three Arrows" operation, based on the supposition that disturbance in South Korea develops into an international conflict. It is precisely for such an eventuality that all "security" measures and training of the self-defense forces are being prepared under the Sato-Nixon accord.

This special Japanese interest in South Korea (coinciding with Washington's interest in the area) has prompted a major revision of the Security Treaty to facilitate Japan-U.S. joint military operations for suppressing future disturbances in South Korea. The Japanese side promised to say "yes" in any prior consultation concerning the deployment of U.S. troops from mainland North Korea to South Korea. The Japanese government agreed to regard the security of South Korea as Japan's own security, and consequently the time full support for U.S. operations in the area. This has a special meaning against the background of the long practice of the treaty. The Sato-Nixon accord, however, goes beyond this announcement. Japan's agreement to drop the prior consultation clause in the case of Korea. By proclaiming that the security of South Korea is "essential to the security of Japan," it clearly augurs the deployment of Japan's own troops to the area. This danger was recently pointed out by Shuzki Matsumoto, a leading diplomatic trouble-shooter who was dispatched as the government's envoy to South Korea in 1965. By changing the exclusive focus of the Sato-Aichi treaty from Japan's external security to Japan's overseas military expansion, the basic provisions of the peace constitution have been discarded and the way opened to an aggressive Japanese military role in Asia.

A strong parallel can be drawn to the Day of Healing Resolutions regarded as innocuous at the time but later used to legalize the subsequent military operation of U.S. troops in Vietnam. Japanese troops assuming primary responsibility for the situation in South Korea means nothing less than the emergence of Japan again as a full imperialist power in this area. This is the direct consequence of the agreement for the reversion of Okinawa as the bastion of oppression in Asia. As Sato frankly said in his Washington Press Club speech (regarded as Sato-Nixon accord), Japan (not Okinawa alone) is going to be the "keynote of the Pacific." From now on, our defense forces are the masters, with Amo (meaning U.S. troops) playing an auxiliary role.

This is in fact an application of Nixon's Guam doctrine. "The war in Vietnam is to be Vietnamized." The direct role of American forces is to be minimized. Nixon's Guam doctrine is the Japanese version of the "Vietnamization" of Southeast Asia. Japanese, Vietnamization in a way means Japanization of colonial wars in Asia, particularly Japanization of South Korea. Most significantly, Japan is no longer an "American satellite," it is becoming an independent U.S. policy but is determined to enter the "Pacific era" (Nixon and Sato) of its own accord and to fulfill its own imperialist interests. With its fast growing economy (Japan's GDP doubles every ten years), there is irresistible indigenous pressure for full expansion overseas. So far, this pressure has been expressed through economic channels (the stage of the economic animal), but it has by now become so colossal that the Japanese state feels an active urge to equip itself with the full apparatus of an imperialist state.

From the Sato-Nixon Joint Communiqué (November 21, 1969)

4. The President and the Prime Minister exchanged frank views on the current international situation, with particular attention to developments in the Far East. The President, while emphasizing that the countries in the area were expected to make their own efforts for the stability of the area, gave assurance that the United States would continue to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East by honoring its defense treaty obligations in the area. The Prime Minister, appreciating the determination of the United States, stressed that it was important for the peace and security of the Far East that the United States should be in a position to carry out fully its obligations referred to by the President. He further expressed his recognition that, in the light of the present situation, the presence of United States forces in the Far East constitutes a mainstay for the stability of the area. The Prime Minister and the President specifically noted the continuing tension over the Korean Peninsula. The Prime Minister deeply appreciated the peace-keeping efforts of the United Nations in the area and stated that the security of Korea was essential to Japan's own security. The President and the Prime Minister shared the hope that Communist China would adopt a more cooperative and constructive attitude in...
its external relations. The President referred to the treaty obligations of his country to the Republic of China which the United States would uphold. The Prime Minister said that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan. The President described the earnest efforts made by the United States for a peaceful and just settlement of the Vietnam problem. President and the Prime Minister expressed the strong hope that the war in Vietnam would be concluded before return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan. In this connection, they agreed that, should peace in Vietnam not have been realized by the time reversion of Okinawa is scheduled to take place, the two Governments would consult with each other in the light of the situation at that time so that reversion would be accomplished without affecting the United States efforts to assure the South Vietnamese people the opportunity to determine their own political future without outside interference. The Prime Minister stated that Japan was exploring what role she could play in bringing about stability in the Indochina area.

6. The Prime Minister emphasized his view that the time had come to respond to the strong desire of the people of Okinawa to return to Japan on the basis of the friendly relations between the United States and Japan and understanding between Okinawa and its normal status. The President expressed appreciation of the Prime Minister's view. The President and the Prime Minister also recognized the vital interest of Okinawa in the security of the Far East, and the present situation in the Far East. As a result of their discussion it was agreed that the mutual security interests of the two countries could be accommodated within arrangements for the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan. They therefore agreed that the two Governments would immediately engage in consultations regarding specific arrangements for accomplishing the early reversion of Okinawa without detriment to the security of the Far East, including Japan. They further agreed to expedite the consultations with a view to accomplishing the reversion during 1972 subject to the conclusion of these specific arrangements with the necessary legislative support. In this connection, the Prime Minister made clear the intention of his Government, following reversion, to assume gradually the responsibility for the immediate defense of Okinawa as part of Japan's defense efforts for her own territories. The President and the Prime Minister agreed also that the United States and Japan would constitute a Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security such military facilities and areas in Okinawa as required in the mutual security of both countries.

The Prime Minister agreed that, upon return of the administrative rights, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and its related arrangements would apply to Okinawa without modification thereof. In this connection, the Prime Minister reaffirmed the recognition of his Government that the security of Japan could not be maintained without international peace and security in the Far East and, therefore, the security of countries in the Far East was a matter of serious concern for Japan. The Prime Minister was of the view that, in the light of such recognition on the part of the Japanese Government, the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan would not hinder the effective discharge of the international obligations assumed by the United States for the defense of countries in the Far East and in Japan. The President replied that he shared the Prime Minister's view.

7. The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese Government reflecting such sentiment. The President expressed his deep understanding of the Prime Minister's views. He stressed the position of the United States Government with respect to the prior consultation system under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The Prime Minister stated that the security of Okinawa would be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by the Prime Minister.

14,202 STUDENTS ARRESTED IN 1969 -- REPORT UNDERSCORES SOCIAL TURMOIL

For most of us, the year's end is a time to take stock of our accomplishments and to try to foresee what may be coming in the new year. This is what Japan's National Police Agency (Keisatsu-shō) did in its 1969 White Paper on Security, which was released on December 12. Police statistics must, of course, be approached with a certain amount of caution, since they are slanted so as to minimize the strength of the anti-establishment forces. However, they do make interesting reading, and AMPO gives here a brief resume of the key report. (All figures quoted for 1969 are those applying as of November 30, 1969.)

First of all, the White Paper provides convincing confirmation of a fact which AMPO readers already knew -- the fact that 1969 surpassed all previous years in Japan's history for the number of campus disputes, the number of police intrusions on campuses, the number of people participating in demonstrations, the number of riot police mobilized, and the number of students arrested. In other words, 1969 was a year of unprecedented social turmoil, and the police are prepared for even more unrest in 1970.

There is at least one figure in the White Paper which even AMPO is willing to accept unqualifiedly. This is the number of students arrested. The police are the only ones who know this number, and it is 14,202 -- more than twice the number of students arrested during 1968. This is a number of students arrested in 1969.

According to the police report, student strikes were held, buildings were occupied, or barricades were erected at 152 universities.

There was also a big increase in the number of street demonstrations organized by radical student groups. The biggest ones were Okinawa Day on April 28, the anti-Asian demonstrations in June, Anti-War Day on October 21, and the November demonstrations against Sato's visit to the U.S. According to the police estimates, 440,000 students marched in 2,363 demonstrations during 1969. This far exceeded the 1968 totals of 240,000 students who participated in 1,095 demonstrations. If one adds to the 1969 total the members of the Anti-War Youth Committees (Hanssen Seinen Inkaikyoku) and the Heibenhien, the total number of participants in New Left street demonstrations increased to 670,000 persons.

The police estimates of the present strength of the radical student movement are also interesting. The White Paper says that the number of student self-government associations controlled by New Left student activists has increased from 8,900 to 14,200 (an increase of 65%). The number of New Left student activists has increased from 9,300 to 14,200 (if true, this is a phenomenal increase of 71%), and the number of students who join New Left groups may mobilize in demonstrations has grown from 31,700 to 64,000 (a 131% increase). Interestingly, the number of students arrested (14,202) parallels the estimated number of activists.

The student groups affiliated with the Japanese Communist Party, the police report says, control 359 student self-government associations and have 147,000 students in their demonstrations. Thus, it would seem that the New Left student groups are approximately equal in strength to the CPC group.

An upsurge of student activism was noted also at the high school level. According to the report, campus disorders broke out in which 600 to 800 of these cases school buildings were occupied and barricaded by the students. 30,000 high school students participated in demonstrations in the streets, and 60% of them were arrested by the police.
This infringes upon the just rights of the people to advocate their own opinions.

Konishii reportedly produced three editions of his leaflet. The first he placed on bulletin boards in three places in 1969. The second was distributed outside the base and also tacked on the walls of hallways inside the base. The third he posted at the entrance to the mess hall and placed on the seats near the entrance.

Konishii explained his motives to his lawyers as follows: "While living the life of a Self-Defense Force member, I noticed that there were a number of contradictions inside the SDF. Around the beginning of September, it was announced that riot-control practices under the name of "Special Police Training" would be carried out, even here at the Sado base. Ideological indoctrination also began, dealing with such questions as: 'What is a demonstration?' and 'What sort of group is the New Left?' As the training proceeded, I began to realize that if we were called out for anti-riot duty, we would have to confront the general populace. If worst came to worst, we would even have to kill our fellow citizens. When I realized this, I simply couldn’t stand it any longer, and on October 13 I refused to participate in the training. I printed up the leaflets myself, hoping that there might be others who would agree with my ideas.'

SELF-DEFENSE FORCE UNITS WILL BEEF UP RIOT POLICE

Early in November, the Japanese Defense Agency and the National Police Agency agreed that the Self-Defense Forces can transport riot police and lend them tear gas and other riot control equipment even in situations where the Prime Minister has not issued an order for the SDF to go into action to maintain law and order.

The agreement is sure to raise heated debate, since it means that the SDF has been set for full-scale SDP aid to the police in maintaining law and order even though the Prime Minister has not issued a mobilization order. According to Article 7 of the Self-Defense Force Law, the Prime Minister can order action by part or all of the Self-Defense Forces when he believes that police power cannot cope with "indirect aggression" or other emergencies.

In the meantime, the Self-Defense Forces have been pushing ahead with their program to build up their preparedness against expected civil disorders. $75 million worth of weapons and protective gadgets such as shielos, tear gas canisters, and wooden sticks have been purchased and distributed among the SDF bases. The same amount of money is expected to be appropriated for the same purpose in the next fiscal year. The SDF is also stepping up their programs for practice in riot control. The divisions in charge of guarding the Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya metropolitan areas were assigned one-third of their total training time in preparing for mobilization in riot control.

DEPORTATION OF POLITICAL "UNDESIRABLES"

On December 7, 1969, Roger Scott, an American English teacher from Ibaraki, was deported from Japan for his political activities. Scott was accompanied by his bride, Yuko, whom he married during a brief two-day meeting from the Immigration Department's Detention Center (read: prison) at Yokohama, where he had been incarcerated for over a month.

Scott has engaged in no violent activities nor broken any Japanese laws, other than getting a visa to return to the US. Scott was told at the time of his deportation that he was being deported on the basis of his political activities. Scott has admitted to no political activities and remains at his home, where his principal "offense" was his joining Dr. Earl Reynolds and other Americans in an attempted goodwill mission to China on the peace yacht "Phoenix" last summer. The government, despite its claim to wish to improve relations with the US, took such a dim view of this journey that it refused reentry visas to three of the crew members (the only three who...
intended to remain in Japan): Scott, Zen Buddhist priest Brian Victoria, and Dr. Reynolds himself. Since their return, the three have never been a court battle to stay in Japan. Handling their cases with magnificent bureaucratic confusion, the Justice Ministry has jailed them, released them, rejailed them, offered deals, reversed decisions, made vague promises, and maintained the air of an attitude of prima facie righteousness. The American Embassy, though bound by law to make efforts to protect the rights of its citizens, has been only insulting. The Ambassador’s findings were so far from the truth of the decision, “I understand you hate not only America but Japan too,” Scott: “Now Mr. Ambassador, that’s a pretty childish thing to say.” (2) The representative’s first words to Victoria, who had demanded that he be released from solitary confinement at Yokohama (where he had been placed for organizing a demonstration inside the prison): “Well Mr. Victoria, you say this is solitary, but we take the view that it is only isolation. Solitary is a .... black hole.” (Perhaps he was referring to the fact that in Victoria’s cell the light was kept burning 24 hours a day.)

Though Scott and Victoria were not treated particularly well in prison, they found that, according to the Justice Ministry’s systematic discrimination, prisoners from Asian countries were treated even worse—for example by receiving a far smaller food allotment per day. Many, who had become destitute, whether to release or not to deport, have been left in prison for years ... never, of course, having been charged, indicted, or tried for any violation of law.

When Scott lost his appeal and was deported, Victoria has been linked in the press with the possibility of an important precedent-setting decision—that a foreign resident cannot be imprisoned merely on suspicion of having violated immigration laws. Thus he is free at least while his court case is pending...which may take years. Reynolds, who lives in Hiroshima, is also awaiting the results of his appeal.

AMPO is planning to run a series of articles on the Japanese immigration laws, including reports on the pending deportation cases, on the shocking and discriminatory treatment of Asian residents... especially Chinese and Koreans... and an analysis of the new and even tougher Immigration Bill which has been drawn up by the Government.

Yoshikawa Interview

(Continued from page 4)

where there is a base. Another example... on the last Memorial Day of the Japanese Navy, Yokosuka shipyard... gates at the station, and a Pick Gue- rilla group, began a march toward the base. The base authorities were shocked, and closed down the base to all military personnel during the scheduled closing time, claiming “bad weather”.

On Future Strategy

First of all we have to distribute such papers as We Got the Brass as widely as possible, and urge soldi- ers to edit and publish their own papers. Through those papers they should try to organize a united national network of resistance. Therefore we should take some oppor- tunity... say for example Feb. 7 of next year, the anniversary of the date when the bombing of the North began... express their opposition to the war by taking unified action inside their camps in cooperation with the Japanese movement, which will stage demonstrations on the same day. ... And in particular, as the Japan-U.S. Joint Statement made clear, the leaders of the two countries consider the Korean situation to be “very dangerous”, which means that fighting in Korea may erupt at any moment. Victoria thought this ended, or even before it has ended. In that case Japanese Self-Defense Forces will probably be sent to Korea. Thus the activities of Gis in the Korea-Japan zone are very important. And just as it is becoming more important strategically it is becoming more active in fact; there is a growing resistance to the war among the Gis, which we expect soon to make contact with existing Gis here, and eventually with the movement inside the Japanese military.

Massive armed uprisings

(Continued from page 3)

and by vigilante committees of local residents wielding wooden swords.

Vigilante committees of this type made their first appearance in Shinjuku on October 21, 1969. Local "self-defense" organizations were organized in several districts around Kamata and Haneada after powerful public urging. Vigilante committees, the vigilantes went about patrolling in groups, carrying paper lanterns and holding brand-new wooden swords and hammers. They kept a sharp eye on the movements of the students and workers, supplying information to the riot police. When the students and workers were fleeing from the riot police, the vigilantes would overpower them and prevent them from being arrested.

After 3:00 PM on November 16, militant students and workers began to engage in simultaneous guerrilla actions at many places, such as the two Kamata stations (of the Japanese National Railway and of the Keihin Kyuko Line), near the Shingawa station at Tokyo station, and elsewhere. Numerous railway lines were thus brought to a stop.

About 4:20 PM, 450 students of the Chukaku faction stopped an electric train bound for Kamata on the Keihin Tokyoku Line. Alighting from it, they ran alongside the tracks and screamed. The demonstration of the station, they emerged into the plaza in front of the station, where they joined the students and workers who were already there. Large numbers of police and crowds were in the intersection in front of the station, and the area was transformed into a sea of flames.

At the same time, the Kamata station of the Keihin Kyuko Line was also attacked with Molotov cocktails, and the trains were brought to a stop. In the vicinity of both these Kamata stations, exchanges of Molotov cocktails and tear gas volleys continued until late at night. Also near the Kamata and Ikegami stations of the Tokyu Ikekami Line, hundreds of students attacked police boxes and the police station, which was fired on.

At Tokyo station, some 500 students jumped off the platform onto the tracks at 3:55 PM. Some of them broke into the central signaling center, and the Yamanote Line and other lines were brought to a stop temporarily.

At 5:00 PM, about 500 students belonging to the ML faction got off trains at Shingawa station and threw Molotov cocktails into the Shingawa police station. Part of the entrance to the police station was destroyed by fire. Subsequently, they seized a bus near the police station and hurried it into a police water-cannon truck.

Japanese Socialist Party

The Japanese Socialist Party had planned to hold, on the morning of November 17, an on-the-spot meeting of people near Hamamatsu Police Station. The executive committee in charge of organizing the November 17 rally refused to accept this decision and went ahead with the meeting and demonstrations. Demonstrations at the police station on the morning of the 17th was attended by some 1,500, and there were clashes with the riot police.

The Japanese Socialist Party views its protest actions through November 17 as having been successful. It laid particular emphasis on its Central Rally of November 16, which was attended by about 50,000 persons. The Socialist Party’s demonstrations all ended peacefully.

The General Council of Labor Unions (SShY6) had no particular plans for taking any action on November 17. However, about 800 members of the National Railway Locomotive Engineers’ Union (Shoryokuhsha Hikk8 Ruman) held an independent meeting and demonstration on the
morning of November 17 to protest the brutal suppression by the riot police of their demonstration on the night of November 16. At that time, they had suffered one arrest and more than 100 injuries.

General Council of Labor Unions (SDKyō)

As its first effort in the 1970 struggles, SDKyō carried out a mass demonstration on November 13. The transport unions carried out an early-morning strike, and strikes were held also by the Teachers' Union and other government employees. The teachers' strike lasted the largest number of participating unions in any political strike since the Security Treaty struggles of 1960. However, most of the strikes ended within one or two hours, and they had a very limited effect. As a result, the strikes had almost no effect on the general situation.

Okinawa

A protest strike was held all over the islands by the Okinawa Reversion Council (Sōkoku Pukkkyō). According to figures tabulated by the sponsors, altogether 64 unions with 87,000 members participated in strikes on November 13. In addition, 40 organizations belonging to the Reversion Council, with about 42,000 members, also participated in some form of protest activities on November 13. A big rally of some 100,000 people was held on November 13 at a public park in Naha. After the meeting, protesters marched to the Naha Naval Base, where clashes occurred between demonstrators and riot police. 86 persons were reported injured, three of them seriously. 47 of the injured persons were policemen.

On the morning of November 17, a rally was held by the Reversion Council near the U.S. Kadena Air Base to protest against Sato's visit. Development of Sasebo also has been opposed by an estimated 55,000 people. Students belonging to the Chūkaku and kakumuru factions attacked the Kadena Air Base and nearby areas with Molotov cocktails and battled with the police. The students were reported arrested, and several were injured by dogs released by the U.S. security forces at Kadena.

The slogans used were the traditional "Reversion is the national issue." This indicated that the Okinawa Reversion movement is moving away from emotional demands for Okinawa's return to Japan. The new phenomenon is being oriented toward opposition to the Amo system itself and on demands for the removal of military bases.

Rallies on November 15 and 16

On mornings of November 15, altogether 21 citizen's demonstrations took place in Tokyo and other cities in response to an appeal from the June 26th Committee against the Vietnam War and the Security Treaty. On the same day, workers belonging to the Anti-War Youth Committees (Hansen Seinen Linkai) held their own rally at the Amphitheater in Hibiya Park to protest Sato's visit to Okinawa. More than 10,000 militant workers and students attended.

On November 16, meetings and demonstrations opposing Sato's visit were held all over Japan. They included rallies sponsored by the Socialist Party and SDKyō, the Communist Party, and Beheiren.

What was the over-all meaning of the events of November 13 - 17? First of all, both in Okinawa and in the main islands of Japan proper, there was an unprecedented upsurge of popular resistance. All observers agreed that tactics of revolutionary violence -- including the use of explosives and molotov cocktails -- are becoming more and more widely accepted among militant students and workers. At the same time, the oppressive actions of the riot police are also being escalated. Police techniques now include lock-outs of entire portions of Tokyo, increased use of checkpoints to keep unauthorized persons out of sensitive areas, random searching of personal baggage carried by pedestrians, cancellation or strike threats, the organization of vigilante bands to help the police hunt down demonstrators, as well as the usual tactics of mass arrests and indictments of demonstrators, followed by prolonged terms of detention and court battles for most of them.

Thus, the Japanese New Left has demonstrated again that it is capable of mobilizing thousands of young workers and students for fighting pitched battles against the authoritarian power structure. However, this alone is not enough. Such tactics of mass violence can succeed only if they sweep up large segments of the general public and create a political crisis so serious that the reactionary government is forced to back down. This point was not reached by the struggles culminating in November 17.