Centenary reflections on the ‘three dimensional problem’ of rural China

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‘China’s problem is the peasants’ problem. The peasants’ problem is that there is no land’ – it was the last century’s old saying, utilized by both KMD and Chinese Communist Party (CPC) to mobilize peasants. Then CPC succeeded in the ‘War of Land Revolution.’

Now the catch-phrase has been changed to: ‘China’s problem is the peasants’ problem. The peasants’ problem is unemployment.’ Who can overcome this problem and gain the upper-hand this time? And how?

With the discussion at the turn of the century, people nowadays begin to think that there is no ‘agricultural’ problem in China. Instead, there are only rural problems in three dimensions: rural people, rural society and rural production.

Academics who were involved in the economic reforms in China all know very well that the main projects I carried out in the ‘Rural Reform Experimental Zones’ for the past ten years have always been market-oriented. In order to implement the first initiated ‘Policy Experiments’, I have been trying my best to learn from scholars working in different traditions, including those who believe in the so-called classical ‘Marxist Political-Economics’ as well as those who teach trendy theories of ‘Western Economics’, in order to illuminate the concept of property rights. During these years, I took different theories into consideration, respecting scholars from different traditions as ‘Masters’, treating all perspectives equally and practising eclecticism. On several occasions of theoretical discussion, I have repeatedly emphasized that I am only an ‘experimenter’, not a theorist, and I consider what I am proposing here merely an intuitive understanding of the experiments in the grassroots.

The meaning and value of the outcomes of ‘Experiments’ serve not merely as a reference for the government leaders whose agricultural policies were detested by peasants. They were therefore forced to review the ‘rural problem in three dimensions’, which serves as a stimulus for the centenary reflections of the scholars on what China has learned from the West.

What is the real problem of China?

The many years of experience in the rural grassroots communities have brought about a great deal of confusion in me with regard to the grand theories, but often I can resolve the confusion in the fieldwork in which I become engaged.

In my view, in the last century, one of the most prominent questions has been the distorted process of receiving and absorbing Western theories; that is, how to combine or make compatible Western science, including Western philosophy of science, with traditional Chinese thought, including the realities of Chinese culture. Marxist theory of political economics, which has an unshakeable grip on Chinese social scientists, and the theory of economics of liberalism as well, face the same question of the compatibility between Western epistemology and Chinese practice. Political leaders such as Mao, Deng and all serious scholars, native and abroad alike, all think or have thought that this problem has yet to be solved.

For this reason, the basic hypothesis I can contribute to this century-old problem in Chinese Studies is the simplest and the most
well-known diagnosis: ‘China’s problem is the tension aroused by an agrarian society, characterized by overpopulation and limited resources, in the process of internal and primitive accumulation of capital for state industrialization’.

This study can be abstracted as an investigation on the ‘two basic paradoxes and two historical phases’. Our economic development in this century can be summarized as ‘the four industrializations of a peasant state’. The lesson we learned from this approach is quite easy to understand: any innovation of the existing institution and system we have is only the end-result of, rather than the prerequisite for, the different structural changes under the constraint of the macro-environment.

An analysis of the ‘Land Revolution’ in modern China

Let us focus on the similar situation faced by Sun Yat-sen and Mao Tse-tung.

At the beginning of the ‘Old-Democratic Revolution’ in the last century, Sun Yat-sen had already made the peasants’ appeal for equal land distribution, put forward by many peasant revolts in history, into one of the two main goals of his Principle of Livelihood. The question of land-ownership immediately provoked the anger of the Royalists.

Even though Sun and his cohorts did not retreat in the theoretical debate with the Royalists, in practice he soon learned a lesson: virtually no common peasants were moved by the call to land revolution. He then understood that the inequality in Chinese agrarian society only manifested itself in a distinction between ‘extreme poverty’ and ‘less poverty’. Therefore, failing to mobilize the peasants, Sun Yat-sen changed his strategy into organizing ‘Parties’ uprisings’. The so-called bourgeois revolution he initiated, ironically without the support of the national bourgeoisie, finally turned into an internal war of provincial division waged by the warlords controlled by the Western Colonial Powers.

The young Mao Tse-tung wrote a report called ‘On the Peasants’ Movement in Hunan’ in the 1920s, showing his affirmation of the much berated ‘Rascals’ Movement on this work, Mao further for primary theory of class division in Chinese society. Later, during the Autumn Harvest Uprising and in the process of establishing a revolution base at Jinggang Mountain, he attempted ‘attacking the local ruffian landlord and redistributing land-ownership’; soon after, because the petty peasants did not produce enough to feed the red army, he changed his land revolution to ‘attacking the local ruffians to gather provisions for the army’. For this practical policy change, he was severely punished by the Communist Party (CP) Leftist leadership and almost lost his life. Later, although the Red Army had recruited over 300,000 soldiers from Jinggang Mountain and other bases, without adjusting land policy to the contextual environment, the ‘Soviet Revolution’ in China failed. After that, the Red Army embarked on an arduous expedition – the ‘Long Match’. To escape the military attacks, they changed their destination several times and finally decided to settle in Shanbei. Taking away the factor of the Sino-Japanese War, what accounted for the final success of the CP – the fact that the Red Army could gain a foothold in the poor region of Shanbei, and that ‘Marxism can be derived from the village of Shanbei’ rather than an application of doctrines from Moscow dogmatically upheld by Wang Ming – was precisely the adjustment of reform from ‘land redistribution’ into a reduction of land tax and rent; from ‘attacking the local ruffians of landlords’ into an acceptance of ‘Li Dingming as an enlightened local gentleman’. Such moves implied a preservation of the tradition of the rural elite’s self-governance. Mao’s article on the Two Theories and on ‘How to Improve Our Learning’ in The Selections of Mao’s Writings are products of this struggle between the Chinese Communists and the Soviet doctrinaires.

Opposition of scattered peasants to state industrialization

Having learned from the bloody lesson, the peasant-based Chinese Communist Party gradually started to correct the extreme leftist
orientation, exported from the Western International Communism. Meanwhile, in the 1930s, the intellectual circle in China also went through a period of self-reflection. A group of scholars, focusing on the context of the Chinese situation, started a discussion of the Asiatic Mode of production. They referred to the self-reflective writings of Marx in his late years concerning his limited knowledge of ancient societies in Asia. He admitted that his theory, derived from the tradition of Morgan and Darwin on the five historical epochs in the West, was not applicable to the unique character of China. This discussion brought a ray of hope to ‘localize’ the western-based social sciences in China.

In ancient eastern countries, irrigation-intensive agriculture was the primary mode of subsistence. This mode of production required small social groupings such as family or village (clan) to be the basic unit of society. Their historical development therefore differs from Western societies, which consisted primarily of hunter-gatherers and herdsmen, with the individual being their basic social unit. I reached this conclusion by observing the remnants of human civilization at the New York Metropolitan Museum, the British Museum in London, and the Louvre in Paris. The evolutions of Eastern and Western civilizations were clearly different. The varying modes of production in ancient times gave rise to different social structures. Appropriation of nature – hunting and gathering – required a strong body and prized physical prowess, which led to the development of individual-based societies. In the East, particularly in China, a gigantic country that until now has never been completely colonized by the West, self-sufficient communities based on social groups emerged when primitive tribesmen irrigated their land together along the continental rivers. The Xia Dynasty that emerged 4000 years ago as the first state in China was a result of Xia Yu’s success in developing an irrigation system preventing the flooding of the Yellow River. Such historical processes were neither related to class oppression nor pillage. That was the reason why the western institution of slavery never appeared in China.

We also have to pay attention to the result of the discussion in the 1930s: ever since scholars who emphasized the Chinese context were labelled Trotskyian, the discussion of how historical materialism might be compatible with the context in China was accordingly interrupted. Meanwhile, The Age of Slavery, an influential book in the theoretical circle, was acclaimed because it argued that China, like the West, had the ‘five epochs’ of historical development, including slavery. This theory was taken up by some economists who concluded from their rural research that ‘80% of the land was controlled by 10% of the population – the rich landlords’. Their conclusion was a very influential political judgement, in the sense that it provided the theoretical basis for the nationwide land revolution.

In order to understand the impacts of institution on economic developments, I studied the founding of rural fieldwork in this century chronologically, disregarding the researchers’ political views. And initially my study proved that the ‘separation of rights in land ownership and land use’ is a system derived from the internal structural logic of the rural society: on the one hand, the increase in population, which led to a tension of land-population ratio, had prevented the land ownership from falling into the hands of a few. On the other hand, as a result of high rental rate, the right in land use was limited to kulak and mid farmers, who had the capability to manage agricultural production. These property rights systems maintained a balanced distribution of land resources and rural labour that supported an extremely stable social structure of the Old China for centuries.

How, then, do we explain the frequent social uprisings and class struggle in Old China?

A further structural analysis revealed that the major conflict that led to the collapse of peasant economy in modern Chinese history was that between peasants and landlords who were also usurers, industrialists and merchandisers. The industrial and commercial capital accumulated through the circulation of goods had increased the degree of exploitation of peasants, which became much more severe
than the exploitation of land rate; and the profit from usury was even higher than the profit from industrial and commercial capital. This conflict reflects that the essential problem yet to be tackled is the developmental path of this agrarian country. In other words, the issue at stake is the means of extracting and accumulating capital, in the process of urbanization and industrialization, from a highly scattered and low surplus agricultural economy. We have thus developed a scale to measure the effectiveness of the system in this kind of agrarian country: a system is considered effective if it may efficiently lower the transaction cost paid by the ‘zillions’ of scattered peasants and completes the primitive accumulation of capital in the inevitable historical process of industrialization.

Two basic theses

Considering the imperatives of rural development, one can see that there are two basic theses in the studies of rural economics. First is the constraint for an innovation of land system under the pressure of high population density. The other is the constraint of an agricultural surplus-distribution system under the binary structure between the urban and the rural.

Land Reform under the structural constraint of high population density

(a) The issue of property rights in land reform

The land reform that was launched to redistribute land-ownership according to the family size of peasants (including landlords and kulak) was the direct result of the Third Land Revolution War (also known as the War of Liberation). In practice, it was a thorough privatization of farmland (except the right to lease land) including the originally publicly owned farmland in traditional villages.

Afterwards, the interdependent ‘Mutual Aid Teams’ ensured that the land rights of peasants could remain unchanged; the ‘Primary Cooperatives’, which was set up in 1950s based on pre-existing villages, also allowed the peasants to hold shares of the land property. However, since the ‘Advanced Co-operatives’ and the ‘People’s Commune’ came into being in 1957 and 1958, respectively, the natural boundaries of traditional villages (clans) were broken and the peasants lost their land rights. This time, it was a complete nationalization of privately owned land. However, from 1957 to 1962, a short interval of five years, a nationwide famine broke out, pressuring the government to readjust its agricultural policy. The production units retrieved from the ‘people’s commune’ and ‘brigade’ to ‘production teams’ and natural villages, once again became the bases of production and land ownership. At the same time, in the 1960s, the re-adjustment also gave space to the development of private land, free market and the ‘contract system’, which meant that the peasants could keep a small portion of land for self-subsistence. By the end of 1970s, the government finally gave back most of the land ownership to the peasants.

Currently, the so-called ‘Share-holders’ Cooperatives’ in villages, based on a ‘dual structural property rights’, are widely practised in many regions. The central idea of this system is still to protect the peasants’ land ownership through contracts, while the villages hold shares of ‘public-owned land’. Many conflicts occurred in the villages, which indeed involved undue occupation of land and the underestimation of land value by the local government.

(b) The structural constraint of ‘rural China’

Examining the five thousand years of Chinese agricultural civilization, we can easily see that the tradition of the peasant economy and the tension in land-population ratio actually complemented each other. Under this constraint of ‘rural China’, the major historical events were caused by man-made calamities rather than natural disasters. Very often the problem was that the rich and powerful occupied land by force, bearing witness to the theory that ‘the real evil is not scarcity but unequal distribution’. Alternatively, it was due to the excessive construction of ‘infrastructure’, continuous warfare, and heavy taxation, which led to an increase in flowing population and social instability. When coupled with a natural disaster or foreign invasion, the
social crisis inevitably led to a ‘reform’, or even a change of dynasties. Then, the very first national policy of the new dynasty was, usually, land-redistribution and a tax waiver.

The so-called heydays of Chinese civilization – the Han and Tang Dynasties – were successful because these dynasties increased their agricultural productivity by expanding their territories. Because of the large number of wars, I exclude Jin and Sui in my list of examples. The political instability of the Song and Ming Dynasties both had to do with the imbalance in the ratio between land and agricultural resources, on one hand, and their population on the other hand. A most obvious example is the Mongol’s invasion of China. Despite the fact that it was a foreign domination, and that the Mongolian tyranny implemented most unreasonable and brutal policies, which were unacceptable to the commons, the Yuan Empire still lasted for 87 years. It was related to the unprecedented size of its territory, which released the tension of land–population ratio. The situation of the Qing Dynasty was similar to the Yuan Empire. The Manchus, an small ethnic minority, in ruling the vast continent for approximately 280 years, owed their success to their adaptation of central China’s culture into its own governmental system. However, more significantly, the vast territory of the Qing Dynasty enabled a reallocation of land and natural resources and reduced the tension derived by population density. Together with the reduction of taxation, the adjustment of the land–population ratio led to a long period of social and political stability.

From the late Qing period to Republican China, the continent was first invaded by the foreign powers and then plagued by domestic warlords. With a rapid increase in population, the ratio of available resources to people went down dramatically, which subsequently resulted in the polarization of the rich and the poor. However, the rural community in traditional villages could still be self-sustaining because of the stabilizing system of property rights, which was characterized by the ‘dual land ownership,’ i.e. ‘separation of rights in land ownership and land use’. Since the middle of the 19th century, the Taiping Rebellion, the Sino-Japanese War and the two Civil Wars greatly decreased the population of China, by approximately 20 to 30%. These changes more or less altered the land–population ratio. However, the context did not allow a nationwide readjustment of the land–population ratio, which resulted in a serious regional difference in agricultural production. Despite the fact that, in the South, tenant peasants outnumbered land-holding peasants, and vice versa in the North, the living standards were considerably higher in the South than in the North. This discrepancy explains why the peasants’ revolts became a dominant revolutionary force in the North.

When the War of Land Revolution won its victory, Mao redistributed the land to the peasants in his land reform; Deng Xiaoping’s policy of ‘15-years contract of rights in land use’ was another redistribution of land. The third generation of leaders in China followed the policy of their predecessors, promising that the contract of rights in land use would not be changed in the next 30 years. Under the constraint of the tension caused by the land–population ratio, these three succeeding land reforms, all aiming at the equal distribution of land, could only be implemented by dividing the farmland along the natural boundaries of villages. Indeed, the fact that villages in China cannot afford the institutional cost of polarization is also a result of such constraints. This is an important issue we all know but have not adequately articulated.

(c) ‘Rural problem in three dimensions’: principle of equality versus market economies

Because of the extreme tension in the land–population ratio, arable land in China, as ‘survival material’, which is to be differentiated from the notion of ‘production material’, can only be distributed among the village population, which embodies the principle of equality. In our ‘experiment’ we have promoted land transactions. In the past ten years, only 1% of the peasants have sold their rights in land use to others. It proved that this kind of property rights system, which grew out of our internal structural constraint, is not compatible with market economy. The notion of efficiency, a goal set up by agricultural eco-
nomics, cannot be a guiding principle for land reform in the present context of rural China, unless there is a radical change in the land-population ratio. Owing to the lack of resources, China, throughout history, has never had a purely ‘agricultural’ economic problem. The real problem is always a ‘rural problem in three dimensions’.

Under the framework of property rights theory in institutional economics, the restructuring of land property rights, a manifestation of the idea of equality, was a result of transformations in the political system, either through revolutions or by governmental reform. Because the formation of this unique property rights concept is contingent upon the convergence of political forces rather than market forces, in our history, the notion of ‘private’ property never existed. This is an important element of ‘All land under the sky is the king’s land, and all natural resources are the king’s servants’ – the basis for feudalism and centralized totalitarian authority.

The binary opposition between urban and rural: agricultural surplus-distribution system – over-exploitation of small farmers’ surplus

An economist pointed out once that, as early as 1000 years ago in China, the commodification rate of agricultural product had already reached 15%. In recent years, China has been industrialized, but out of the total production of grain, the percentage of commodity grain was only increased to 30%, and 15% of total yearly grain produce was state-owned. Statistics showed that 50% of rural peasants did not produce any commodity grain, and only 30% of rural peasants could sell more than 30% of their total produce. Therefore, 70% of the small peasants faced the problem of low surplus rate. Industrialization did not solve the problem of rural poverty; indeed, the situation was worse with a population increase over time under the rural–urban binary structure.

Under the structural constraint in China, whether it was armed revolution or peaceful reform, the subsequent result could only be an equal redistribution of land. We can see that the core of Chinese society’s ‘stabilizing structure’ is an internal distribution system of property and profit in the peasant economies. In the villages, the economic internalization of property and the mechanism of profit-distribution became a stabilizing force for rural society and, essentially, it rejected the capitalist system that accompanied Western industrialization.

Four attempts to industrialize China

There were ‘four attempts to industrialize China’ since the Late Qing period. First was the ‘Westernization Movement’ (Yangwu Yundong) initiated by the Qing government from 1850 to 1895. The second attempt took place from the 1920s to the 1940s with the Republican government. Both led to the outbreak of revolutions because the bureaucratic industrial and commercial capital had extracted an excessive amount of surplus from the peasants that intensified social conflicts.

The other two attempts were the so-called two ‘historical phases’ I mentioned at the beginning of this article. The first phase was from the 1950s to the 1970s, when the central government launched industrialization in the name of ‘socialism’, and ‘people’s ownership’ had been relatively successful in completing the primitive accumulation of state capital. The second phase took place since the open door policy in the 1970s. Under the goal of rapid economic growth set up by the central government, the local governments initiated ‘local industrialization’ on different levels, which successfully accelerated economic growth and national power, but also created serious environmental problems. Institutional innovation was mainly aimed at tackling the problem of transaction cost between government and peasant in the process of capitalizing resources and extracting agricultural surplus.

State industrialization and its capitalist primitive accumulation

By the time the People’s Republic of China was established, the West had already partitioned resources through colonization, and the geopolitical structure brought about by
the two World Wars was fixed. China had no choice but copy the Russian model of industrialization in order to ‘stand up’. It had to complete the ‘State Capitalist Primitive Accumulation’, which could not possibly be done under the conditions of a low commodity-rate peasant economy.

The first three years since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, its four hundred million peasants were able to provide enough agricultural produce for the fifty million urban population. During the first Five-Year Plan, twenty million rural labourers were recruited into the city to support the construction of an industrial infrastructure. The sudden increase of 40–50% of a grain-consuming urban population led to a shortage of agricultural produce. Moreover, with the excessive amount of surplus labourers in the village, the mode of accumulation in this peasant economy was indeed the investment of labour force rather than capital. Industrial products, therefore, could not enter the rural market and the two sectors could not support each other through the exchange of products.

As a result, China was forced to carry out an unprecedented self-exploitation led by a highly centralized government: In the villages, they implemented the symbiotic system of people’s communes and state monopoly for purchase and marketing, while, in the cities, they established a system of planned allocation and bureaucratic institution. By controlling all surplus value produced by both rural and urban labour, the central government redistributed resources to expand heavy-industry based production.

Meanwhile, the government converted its developmental strategy of the ‘New Democracy’ that contained elements of private capitalism and state capitalism into a state monopolized property ownership system during the period of the so-called ‘transition toward socialism’. In the process of developing heavy industrial bases, it required an intense investment of capital and limited labour force and thereby restricted the influx of rural labourers into the city and reconfigured the binary structure of the rural and the urban. Although thousands of peasants perished in the process of the capital-accumulation of state industrialization, China finally crossed this threshold in the shortest time and completed the formation of an industrial infrastructure for the political and economic autonomy of the country. This unique historical period from the 1950s to the 1970s, the Age of Mao Tse-tung, was also called the ‘Heroic Period’ because everybody was devoted to the betterment of society.

Restrictions on development and alternative policies

Rural development under the restriction of the dual system

What do we inherit from this period? It is the gigantic state capital in the name of ‘people owned property’. State capital has been gradually redistributed and possessed by recent and future generations, with the various claims that they may stake. However, people also inherit a problematic binary system that divided the urban and the rural into antagonistic positions. Obviously, and unfortunately, everybody is eager to take part in the redistribution of capital only, leaving the problem of the binary opposition to others in the future to solve.

An expert on central policy studies, Mr Du Runsheng, pointed out in the 1980s that China’s agricultural economy would have no future if the situation of ‘eight hundred million peasants feeding two hundred million citizens’ could not improve.

According to Western economics, the flexibility of the demand for agricultural produce in the city would be predictably low because of the highly concentrated and governmental subsidy. By contrast, the supply from the countryside is self-sufficient, mostly scattered, and very flexible, which is actually completely different from the case of the West.

Because of the rural–urban binary structure, the flow of information is asymmetrical. Agricultural supply and demand fluctuates. For this reason, the market for agricultural produce and the fluctuations in price do not follow any predictable order. Peasants, then, typically try to grow a variety of produce, as a result, to cater for different markets in the hope of avoiding risks, unless government
helps them gain financial security. This situation leads to further fragmentation of the scale of agricultural production. This, in turn, intensifies the market fluctuations. From the 1980s to the 1990s, the fact that cyclical ‘excessive supply’ occurred three times is an example of this logic.³

In addition, due to the increase in rural population, arable land gradually became a basic prerequisite for peasants’ survival and not merely a factor of productivity, and its surplus accordingly decreases. The theory of a ‘population trap’ can partially explain this paradox. If the surplus rural population of a particular place could not move out, the benefits of either modern technology or a government’s price policy would not take effect; quite the contrary, any effort on the part of the government, which usually involves financial subsidy, would only bring about negative effects. Obviously, none of the governments in the world is able to subsidize such a vast and half-unemployed rural population as the one in China.

Therefore, some have claimed that China has no ranches and America has no peasants. European countries and the United States have consistently endeavoured to protect the resources that they have accrued in the period of colonization, paying special attention to their agricultural resources, which have an affinity to the ecosystem. For that reason they subsidize the ranchers in the rest period and do not allow the ranchers to maximize their production in order to protect the natural resources. The negotiation between WTO and Uruguay that took place recently was done on terms completely dictated by the West. If we take into consideration the potential competition between our small peasants’ economy and the giant international agricultural economy, we should remember the catastrophic precedent of the bankruptcy of the peasants in Su-han – the area reputed as a ‘worldly paradise’ – raided by the international market in the 1930s and 1940s.

Alternative policies

In the past, China tried to enlarge the ‘scale of economy’ in agricultural production by establishing collectives, and then the situation worsened. Adding a plough to a scythe – one small peasant to another – the simple regrouping of individuals would not lead to any progress in productivity. Now the government and its technocrats still have not given up the attempt to enlarge the ‘scale of economy’. However, since the agrarian population has doubled, and if we take the situation of surplus labour force into consideration, ‘investment of labour instead of capital’ should be our guiding principle in economic development. In any region, no matter how developed it is, any modern and capital-intensive agricultural production cannot achieve a reasonable ratio of investment–production.

I believe policy-makers have two choices: one, the primary policy of China should be a ‘labour intensive development’. The government can direct the labour force into the building of state infrastructure, even if it implies a slow growth rate and a low level of technological development. Meanwhile, the government can accelerate urbanization by removing the dual system, at least in small cities, counties and towns, to readjust the industrial and employment structure and facilitate the transfer of rural surplus labour to other sectors.

The second choice is, if the first proposition is too difficult to carry out, we should then focus on an institutional innovation characterized by a ‘non-market’ system, an internal property and an equalized revenue system. At the same time, the government needs to dissolve the monopolies in circulation and finance, so that the external economic scale can be enlarged to sustain the small peasant economy.

Short of this, the peasants have no hope, the villages could not develop, and agriculture could never stand alone as a market-oriented industry. Of course, this would not prevent the few major metropolitans from modernizing themselves with the mushrooming of slums. It would then inevitably fall into the ‘Latin-Americanization Trap.’

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Notes

1. ‘Rural problem in three dimensions’ (San Nong Wen Ti) meant: the rural problems cannot be simply treated as an agricultural issue, but are interrelated with rural people (income/migrant/ etc), society (social capital development and multiple socioeconomic and political issues), and production (agricultural vertical integration/ township and village enterprises development) etc. I have published several papers from 1989 to 1999 arguing that China is not a large agricultural country but a huge rural population country. There is no isolated agricultural problem, but rural problem in three dimensions. ‘Rural problem in three dimensions’ is nowadays a hot topic in central governmental policy studies. There is a recently founded ‘State Council Office of Important Economic Issues’ in which the ‘Rural problem in three dimensions’ has been listed as one of the most significant issues, to be tackled by the so-called ‘fourth generation leadership.’ The ever-worsening situation in rural areas has led the politicians and their technocrats to accept and address the ‘rural problem in three dimensions’ again.

2. The rural reform experimental zones were founded in 1987, by the former RCRD (Research Center of Rural Development) which has been one of five major policy think tanks in 1980s’ reform. I was one of the researchers engaged in the rural experiments who have insisted on the policy studies projects for 11 years, even though RCRD was disbanded in 1989. Otherwise, the government would have signed the ‘policy letter’, in which the government would acknowledge the ‘market oriented reform’ in the rural area in order to gain a $300 million ‘World Bank Adjustment Loan’. This policy letter was 5 years earlier than the formal announcement at 1992’s 14th CPC Convention.

3. The title of this paper is the subtitle of my newly published book Study on Basic Institution of Rural China, published by ‘China Economic Publishing House,’ May 2000. This paper is a summary of my book.

4. Mao defined his Land Revolution not as ‘Communism’ or ‘Socialism’, but ‘New Democratic Revolution’. Deriving from his concept, Chinese scholars redefined Sun Yat-sen’s political movement as the ‘Old Democratic Revolution’.

5. The public ownership took place only in the short period of ‘Advanced Cooperatives’ and ‘People’s Communes’, when the so-called rural ‘collectivization’ was caused by the selling of industrial products to the rural. It meant that the success of industrialization in the ‘First five year plan’ required the government’s intervention in setting up a larger rural organization for creating the demand for urban products.

6. ‘Dual structural property rights’ mean that the villagers can hold the membership right of the village resources as shareholders. It is different from the individualized property right in the West.

7. These events happened in 1984, 1990 and 1997 with the over-supply of grain and other agricultural products.

Special terms

Autumn Harvest Uprising 秋收起义
Dual land ownership 双田制
Han Dynasty 漢朝
Jin 金
Jinggang Mountain 井冈山
Ming Dynasty 明朝
On the Peasants’ Movement in Hu-nan 湖南農民運動考察報告
Old-Democratic Revolution 舊民主主義革命
Parties’ uprisings 靈黨起義
Qing Dynasty 清朝
Rascals’ Movement 瘋子運動
Rural Reform Experimental Zones 農村改革實驗區
Share-holders’ Cooperatives 股份合作制
Song Dynasty 宋朝
Su-han 蘇杭
Sui 唐朝
Taiping Rebellion 太平天國之亂
Tang Dynasty 唐朝
Three-dimensional problem of rural China or rural problems in three dimensions 三農問題
War of Land Revolution 土地改革戰爭
War of Liberation 解放戰爭
Westernization Movement (Yangwu Yundong) 西化運動
Xia Dynasty 夏朝

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