THE AMERICAN-STYLE UNIVERSITY AT LARGE
TRANSPLANTS, OUTPOSTS, AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION

Edited by
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The American-Style University at Large

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**Introduction**

James L. McDougall

This book is an attempt to describe the present state of the globalization of U.S. higher education. It joins a chorus of works that have charted the corporatization of the university, the destabilization of the humanities as a core priority of university education, the state of labor and academic freedoms in the academy, and the forces of globalization that are currently sculpting higher education. The unique contribution that this volume hopes to provide comes from its focus on the globalization of U.S. universities from outside the boundaries of the United States. The writers gathered here theorize new cultures of globalization by creating and considering portraits of American-style institutions, examining global iterations of North American-centered disciplines, and recording the performance of U.S. identity in institutions of higher learning. The point is not to set up a simple center/periphery dichotomy, but rather to highlight new constellations that are coming into alignment and the horizons from which they arise. To continue the star-gazing analogy, where you look from is as important as the location of the object that you are looking at—they both shape your perspective. With high-profile developments, like the founding of New York University’s satellite campus in Abu Dhabi, the increasing attempts of U.S. universities to market themselves to students of the Chinese and Indian nouveau riche, the post-9/11 challenges for foreign students studying in the U.S., and the disastrous effects that the global economic crisis have had on state university systems, it goes without saying that the academic profession cannot be understood without taking the global university in all its manifestations into consideration.

In memory of one of the profound sources of inspiration for this project, Masao Miyoshi, whose support and encouragement gave us the motivation
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to begin contacting scholars and compiling this collected edition, I would like to begin with the questions he asks in his chapter, ""Globalization, Culture and the University,"" from The Cultures of Globalization. ""When do we begin to fight back? And how do we—the workers in Dayton, Ohio, and those of us in the university—form an alliance?"" Our project hopes to reposition Miyoshi's polemical questioning from ""when"" to ""where"" in regards to his opposition to the erosion of tenure, the disjointedness of radical critical theory disconnected from struggles of local communities, and the increasing power of university administrations to dictate course content and revise curricula. Just as Miyoshi considers how faculty members within the corporate university and the workers of Dayton share similar political interests, we must consider events occurring in Dubai, Mumbai, and Shanghai to understand at root what are the interests of the faculty and what kinds of supranational collaborations can be put into place.

At its heart, this work is an American Studies project, and a testimony to the changing nature of the subject of American Studies with its recent moves to engage a global perspective. For American Studies, the relatively recent surge in American-style universities that has spread around the globe brings with it a set of high-definition projections of idealized U.S. identities, providing a powerful set of images for understanding the construction of national mythologies. Furthermore, the way that these universities enact the mission of American-style education provides a close-up of issues ranging from U.S. cultural hegemony to the production and consumption of U.S. popular culture.

This collection labels the wide variety of institutions from around the world that specifically model themselves on U.S. higher education as ""American-style"" universities—not ""U.S.-style"" universities. This is done consciously, not to suggest that the U.S. is the center of the Americas, but to call attention to how the label ""American"" is an identity that universities outside of the United States choose, construct, and perform. In addition, some of the most venerable and respected institutions with long histories, like the American University of Cairo, Yenching University (that later split into Beijing University and Qinghua University, The People's Republic of China's elite institutions), and the American University of Beirut, offer models of how a domesticated ""American"" university can provide elite education on the terms of the nation state where certain ""American"" identities are championed, and others elided. One of the goals of the book, then, is to explore what is actually meant by an American-style institution, and how these formulations of Americanness shed light on the often invisible aspects of U.S. higher education.

Dating back to the spread of missionary colleges in the nineteenth century, the forms of globalized universities established on U.S. models have come in all sizes and shapes. For example, there are outposts or satellites, which U.S. universities establish as campuses overseas. There are foreign institutions that apply for institutional accreditation from U.S. accreditation agencies, and thus depend on ""transplants"" from U.S. institutions of higher education to oversee curricular design, and administration in addition to teaching and research. There are foreign universities with memorandums of understanding with U.S. schools, which result in several relationships between partner institutions that may or may not include systems of accountability. In addition, there are several universities that incorporate the name ""American"" as a brand and enact performances that cite U.S. institutions of higher learning in various aspects of their operation. The branding comes not only through the rhetoric of excellence that individual U.S. universities and the U.S. State Department use to categorize U.S. higher education, but through reports issued by transnational entities like the United Nations, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, which use the rhetoric of development and frequently cast education in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, the former Soviet Bloc, and Latin America as lacking ""developed"" elements of European and North American education. This in turn allows American-style education to represent itself as a panacea for everything from modernization to combating terrorism. Such branding of American-style education is occurring as study after study has shown that within the United States universities are producing a less diverse body of graduates—graduates who compared to their peers in other countries come to university less prepared, and who are taking longer to graduate at much higher costs.

Scholars have noted that as the university began to take on a transnational corporate structure, traditional forms of academic labor also began to radically change. The corporatization of the university has resulted in many well-documented problems, such as the exploitation of graduate and foreign students, the erosion of tenure, and salary inequalities. One of the reasons that American-style universities outside the United States, in all of their sizes and shapes, can offer university curricula almost identical to those that you would find in U.S. institutions is because there are many U.S.-trained PhDs who are over-qualified and often under-employed or underpaid within the United States. In addition, there are a large number of overseas students in the United States who complete their graduate degrees yet cannot find employment or cannot secure a working visa; thus, these American-style universities join other transnational corporate structures in providing work for a professional class of highly trained migrant labor. Cary Nelson in the forward to How the University Works: Higher Education and the Low Wage Nation writes, ""The mutual project of theorizing our situation is essential if we are to free ourselves from the powerless subject positions that all the institutions
higher learning have collaborated in articulating for us.”) In order to do so it is necessary to see the university within a global dynamic, and that the “subject positions” Nelson mentions are, too, defined in part by universities outside of the United States.

There are many areas of opportunity that the global university offers in constructing utopian horizons. Simply because the university has been led by management that has pushed towards multinational corporate structures, it does not mean that the globalization of higher education is coterminous with the business world of late capitalism—even though the fibers of university operation are woven into the system. There are many examples that can be drawn from where global alignments were used for empowerment and social transformation. Some of these movements have been successful in bringing together people with a shared vision, such as abolitionist movements, feminist movements, and international labor movements; even cultural nationalist politics have included strong internationalist activism. These forms of internationalism are based on the premise that supranational solidarity would provide possible networks of resistance against inequality, and that universal values did not necessarily stand for imperial ones. While the gestures towards the global in these movements have been critiqued for their reliance on grand narratives, and depending on Enlightenment and therefore European conceptions of the world, the importance of international solidarity should not be easily dismissed.

The essays in the collection are grouped according to the questions they ask and the possibilities that they raise. The book is divided into three sections: “Mapping the American-Style University,” “Performing the American-Style University,” and “Disciplining English and American Studies in the American-Style University.” The first section of the book contains essays that place the American-style university within a historical framework, in addition to describing specific types of institutions and how they function. This first section opens with Walter Mignolo’s essay, “Globalization and the Geopolitics of Knowledge: The Role of the Humanities in the Corporate University,” which paints a picture of what the global university can possibly look like as a center for rethinking our practice of everyday life through what he describes as working to decolonize knowledge. Mignolo provides an overview of the historical development of the medieval and Enlightenment university, the “Kantian-Humboldtian” rational university, and its current corporatized structure. He discusses the realities of the university within the structures of global capitalism, and offers alternatives by examining indigenous universities that have been developing in South America. Likewise in the second chapter, “American-Style Higher Education and the People of the Middle East,” Patrick McGeevney discusses the ways that the American University of Beirut provides a space for a public commons not seen in U.S. institutions. He demonstrates not only how the university allows for dissenting ideas to encounter each other without the same sectarian fallout found off-campus, but also how Lebanese students from AUB’s early days as a missionary institution pushed boundaries of free thinking and open debate much more than their U.S. professors.

One of the difficulties with any discussion of globalization is that it requires generalizations in order to construct broad ideas. In the United States, there are many types of universities; thus, a caricature necessarily replaces the face of U.S. education when painted with large brush strokes. Chapters 3 and 4 look at specific types of higher education as they have become globalized. Mary Ann Tetreault, an area studies scholar who focuses on the Middle East, in her “Soft Power Goes Abroad: The Transplant University as a Western Outpost in the Arab Gulf States,” examines liberal arts education taught by what she terms “transplant” faculty in the Middle East. She performs an ethnography of institutions of higher learning in the GCC region, looking at the sustainability of these enterprises, labor conditions of the faculty, and student reactions to the education that they are receiving.

The next chapter in this section moves from the examination of institutions for elites to outlining the challenges of democratizing higher education. Ting Man Tsao in his essay, “Open Admissions Contexts: Transplanting a ‘Clean’ American Community College Model to Postcolonial Hong Kong,” narrates the story of how American-style community colleges began to take root in Hong Kong. Tsao’s essay provides insight into one of the most common types of college in the United States, and one that is underrepresented in the literature on U.S. higher education. Tsao shows how globalized discourses on education become intertwined with policy making decisions. He examines how knowledge of U.S. higher education is locally produced and how public perceptions of education help define its contours. He looks closely at the often misguided politics that go into the adoption of foreign systems and the colonial legacy that inform such decisions. Yet, he keeps in clear view the idea that a community college education offers the radical potential to challenge elitism and social inequalities.

The section closes with an interview with Andrew Ross, whose recent book, Nice Work If You Can Get It, ends with a chapter, entitled “The Rise of the Global University.” Andrew Ross draws from his recent studies of China (Fast Boat to China: Corporate Flight and Consequences of Free Trade: Lessons from Shanghai), and the copyright industries (Nice Work If You Can Get It: Life and Labor in Precarious Times) to bring insight into the current state of the global university. He closes his interview by bringing attention to what is often missing in discussions of the university both
by corporatized administrations as well as scholars—the students. Students bring potential for change, and the forces of globalization can bring new tactics that allow students to work across national boundaries to construct a broad vision of change.

The second section of the book, "Performing the American-Style University," seeks to answer questions about "Americaness" in these institutions, and how they perform their identity as institutions of higher education. The section begins with Eng-Beng Lim's "Performing the Global University," which provides insight into how fine and performing arts programs are globalizing. In doing so he looks at how the humanities in U.S. institutions are put under pressure to justify their existence, and that this pressure is intensified by an "Edifice Complex," which can be best understood through the striking architecture found in many universities, and how performing arts departments assist in making the humanities marketable. This "Edifice Complex," is connected to what he labels as the "Outpost Complex," such that drama programs outside of the United States perform a Westernized drama that reproduces a "selfsame" theatre of canonical Western plays that depoliticizes the theater as it monetizes education. He closes with an important call for the profession to raise awareness of how histories and local knowledges are lost and the arts suffer when the university engages scholars to perform its brand. In the seventh chapter, "Notes on Non-place and the Localization of the Global American-style University," James McDougall examines how the university citiates and performs Americanness, calling into question how U.S. institutions brand themselves and how the student-as-consumer approach to recruitment allows universities administrations to manage potentially subversive practices; in the process the foreign university, which might be a transgressive space in local geographies, becomes a familiar cosmopolitan "non-place," to use Mark Auge's term, not unlike airports or international hotels.4

Similarly, Kathryn Kileyas's essay, "Nostalgia, Performance, and Pedagogy in the American-Style University," looks into how the American-style university depends upon a work force that is able to perform the brand as it is managed by way of a nostalgia that imagines idealized forms of an American university. She draws upon the notion of performativity to show how discourses on pedagogy, like critical thinking, are performed in order to construct the American-style classroom. Along similar lines, Mary Queen's chapter, "Rhetorics of Diversity and Difference: Branding an American-Style University in the Arabian Gulf," adds to this analysis by looking at the way that the language of diversity has become incorporated into the missions of American-style universities. In this chapter, Queen develops the concept of the hypervisibility to explain the paradoxes of diversity in higher education. By demonstrating specific instances of a university performing diversity as an aspect of its "American" identity, Queen offers insight into how the university works in concert with the nation state in mitigating anxieties of difference through rhetorical acts. In chapter 10, "A Neocolonialist Invader or a Postmodern Exile?: the American-Style University in the Desert of the Real," Yulia Pushkarevskaya Naughton employs Baudrillard's theorization of the simulacra to analyze how the liberal arts model of higher education, which is so often constructed as a fading if not outdated model of higher education in discussions of the corporate university is constantly modeled by different universities around the world, and by national systems of education that have faith in its results. Throughout her analysis she looks at the productive tension that exists when liberal arts colleges appear in places that have antithetical value systems, and how student and instructor encounters in this environment shape learning.

The last section, "Disciplining English and American Studies in the American-Style University," examines American Studies and Composition and Rhetoric, respectively—two disciplines that have developed in the North American academy. The emergence of these two disciplines in institutions outside of the United States make for important case studies for understanding how the location of the university becomes a factor in prioritization of knowledge, formation of knowledge communities, and community-based action outside of the university.

As previously stated, this book can be thought of in terms of recent developments in American Studies. There is no doubt that U.S. higher education is used as soft power by the U.S. State Department and universities have been very active in constructing official versions of what it means to be "American." Often times the only way to really understand the far-reaching effects of U.S. policies comes from being outside of the United States. Malini Johar Schueeller's "The Borders and Limits of American Studies: A Picture from Beirut" provides an analysis of how this works by narrating her experiences at the Center for American Studies at the American University of Beirut during the 2006 Israeli bombing of Lebanon. The events that occurred not only reveal the visceral effects of U.S. power in the Middle East, but also how American Studies would gain from a deeper and sustained dialogue with colleagues doing American Studies outside of the United States.

Likewise, Composition Studies has emerged as primarily a North American field of study. It is a discipline which has provided radical re-thinking of approaches to teaching literacies required in contemporary U.S. university education (e.g., digital, visual, and information), and the connections between writing and thinking in academic discourse, in addition to providing insight into inequalities that exist within the university labor force. However, it has remained an isolated field, as Mark Schaub points out in his chapter,
“Beyond These Shores: An Argument for Internationalizing Composition.” In his essay, he uses his experiences as a writing program administrator in Egypt and the United States in order to discuss how writing programs and scholars of Rhetoric and Composition within U.S. institutions would benefit from dialogues with scholars and teachers from outside the United States. As a result, he calls for more active internationalization of U.S. compositionists to better understand issues in the writing classroom like the hegemony of English and contrastive rhetoric, in addition to finding ways of bridging disciplinary gulf between Composition Studies and linguistics, and by extension TESOL programs.

The closing two chapters, Filitsa Sofianou-Mullen and John W. Mullen’s “Critical Thinking, Critical Writing, in Composition Courses at the American University in Bulgaria,” and Mary Goodwin’s “Running Dogs and English Gods: New Challenges for Taiwan’s English Departments,” examine the interplay between institutions and local culture. Focusing on school culture, Filitsa Sofianou-Mullen and John W. Mullen, argue for revising comparative rhetorics by substituting cultural characteristics as the essential governor of composition structure with school culture characteristics. Goodwin charts the development of English in Taiwan highlighting the debates between Lu Xun and Liang Shiqiu on the role of foreign literature and the humanities as agents of social change. She shows the role of English language in Taiwanese society and what it means for American-trained scholars working in English departments that were born from attempts to foster cultural hybridity, experimentation, and change.

What we might actually be seeing in the recent expansion of American-style universities is not necessarily the flexing muscle of U.S. power and influence across the globe, leading to the dominance of U.S. institutions of higher education in the global marketplace. Instead we might be witnessing a symptom of the current corporate model based on continual growth, overextending itself in a quest for blind survival. Prostrated and spread-out, it no longer stands as high above in towers of ivory. This means its excesses as an elitist institution might be curbed and more importantly the time has come for rethinking, proposing, and taking action in ways that guide the future of the university for the sake of our profession, our communities, and, most of all, our students.

NOTES


BIBLIOGRAPHY


Chapter 1

Globalization and the Geopolitics of Knowledge

The Role of the Humanities in the Corporate University

Walter Mignolo

Perhaps it was inevitable. Just as American businesses and banks have looked overseas for new markets, so our universities are globalizing in a quest for revenue and growth. The numbers behind this new internationalism are impressive. Every year more and more overseas students apply to American campuses: last year, 103,260 came from India, 98,235 from China, even 11,381 from Nepal, according to the Institute of International Education. In a complementary move, American colleges are extending their range by establishing branch campuses abroad, like Carnegie Mellon in Qatar and the University of Nevada in Singapore. At last count, 38 American schools had 65 branches in 34 countries, all mandated to grant the home institution's degree.¹

“Humanities” has been a basic Western concept in higher education from the Renaissance to today. It goes hand in hand with the notion of Man/Human and Humanism.² Briefly, it is a very complex and controversial concept. Why? Because it is a local concept taken as universal due to the fact that those who invented the concept were controlling the conception of knowledge, the categories of knowledge, and the institutions where actors and categories of knowledge met. The history of the university (the Western version of higher education) has been the companion of European imperial expansion. Although the university as an institution of higher learning goes back to the Middle Ages, its transformation during the Renaissance greatly contributes to three simultaneous processes. First, this period saw the firming up of the idea that trustworthy knowledge was founded in Greek and Latin categories of thought and was evolving among six modern and vernacular
European languages (Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, French, English, and German). Thus, Europe became the point of origination of and the house of knowledge. Second, during the Renaissance there was an emergence of the routes of dispersals, whereby the European-style university was planted in the colonies. Finally, the European concept of knowledge served as a point of reference to disavow and relegate to the past epistemologies not based on Greek and Latin and knowledges in non-European languages, including but not limited to Arabic, Urdu, Hindi, Swahili, Wolof, Aymara, Nahuatl, Russian, and Mandarin.

Through the consolidation of knowledge, the mutation of the Renaissance university into an Enlightenment one was a long process. From the trivium and the quadrivium and the theological framework that dominated the Renaissance university into Emmanuel Kant’s “the contest of the faculty” and finally to William Dilthey’s distinction between “natural and human sciences,” the humanities occupied a dominant position in Western education. No longer. The ethics of learning and scholarship that guided education and higher learning in the past are no longer valid. The argument I have been building since the end of the twentieth century is that since corporate values are taking over education at all its stages (and more so now than 10 years ago), the need for the humanities is more urgent than ever. But not the humanities entrenched in the values of the modern European-guided and U.S.-enhanced universities, but decolonial humanities. For decolonial humanities an ethics of responsibility for survival of the planet and the human species is the prime and urgent goal. The current ethics in education have shifted toward education for individual success and of increasing wealth of the ethno-elites in different countries, of the nation-state, and of the global economy at the cost of dispensable lives, human and non-human (e.g., the science-fiction–like case of the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in the summer of 2010). Only an ethic of success and wealth can tolerate what is intolerable by simple common sense. An ethic of responsibility toward survival cannot be based on the mono-topic epistemology and hermeneutics of Western knowledge. The problems created by Western modernity cannot be solved with the same tools, the same categories of thoughts, and, above all, the same ethics outlined by Max Weber in his celebrated Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism. An ethics of responsibility to survival has to accept, not just recognize, that the disavowed by modernity have to contribute future ways of life on the planet. For that we need instead of a university, a pluriversity. A pluriversity has the responsibility of educating future generations to live not only in pluri-national states, as has been declared, for example, in the constitutions of Bolivia and Ecuador, but also in a pluri-epistemic and pluri-spiritual world.

Decolonial means undoing something in order to do, at the same time, something else. One might think, for example, of Ivan Illich, who argued for deschooling society. There is a match, in my view, between decolonizing knowledge to liberate learning and deschooling to liberate education. We can play with these words. What is at stake, and what really matters—and the words shall not distract us from the problem—is the “coloniality of knowledge” in the language of modernity/(de)coloniality. In terms of Illich, graduate studies train graduate “students for selective service among the rich of the world.” Along these lines, Mexican sociologist Pablo Gonzalez Casanova argues that research directed to solve the problem of poverty is not a priority. For example, there is in Mexico a discipline called pobretologia (povertology) which provides information about the poor and by so doing, also provides the illusion that something is being done. But the forward-looking research focuses on progress, development, and growth, all initiatives that on the one hand generated poverty and on the other maintain and increase it.

With the “language of coloniality” in mind, in this paper I offer a short history of the Western university since the Renaissance, in Europe and its colonies, in order to better understand a trend that began at the end of the twentieth century: to indigenize (in the vocabulary of Native Americans intellectuals, scholars, and activists), which has led to the emergence of the Indigenous university of which Amawtay Wasi (Universidad Intercultural de las Nacionalidades y Pueblos Indígenas) in Ecuador is the better known but by now not the only case. Parallel to the Indigenous universities, there is the initiation in Mexico (Chiapas and Oaxaca) of deschooling projects of education such as Universidad de la Tierra. I contrast these with the increasing corporate values, on the other side of the street, invading public and private universities as well as the developing Davos project of a “World University” alongside the “World Economic Forum.” I finally suggest that the time to give recommendations has passed; there is no room to do what avant-garde intellectuals used to do after Lenin. Changes within the university are being taken up by interested parties, by Native and African Americans in the United States, by indigenous leaders in South and Central America, and in Australia and New Zealand, by gays and lesbians, by feminists, and by academics in different disciplines. It is in this context in which decolonial humanities shall contribute to unveiling, on the one hand, the “schooling” effect (e.g., the coloniality of knowledge and shaping subjectivity in a world that celebrates individual success and consumerism) and, on the other, forward looking to contribute to making the humanities de-colonial, within the traditional universities and to join forces with similar parallel projects like Amawtay Wasi and Universidad
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de la Tierra. Briefly, to build a pluri-versal world we need a pluri-versal education, gaining terrains in existing universities and building parallel projects of deschooling and decoloniality of knowledge to liberate the pluri-versality of education.

There are—to start with—two kinds of histories of the university as an institution that may help us understand the dilemmas now confronting universities all over the world. In the Plan Bologna in Europe and at the meeting at Davos on the future of the university, learning is turned into a tool for efficiency and economic development whereby “learning to manage” becomes the central role in the corporate university.7 The task of learning to unlearn is urgent as far as management and efficiency are the terms of the rhetoric of modernity and progress that conceals the logic of coloniality and domination. For whom is management and efficiency beneficial? In the recent past the world has witnessed two failures that were guided by the rhetoric of management and efficiency: the invasion of Iraq and the collapse of Wall Street. That route of knowing, the belief under which knowledge is created and arguments built, is no longer tenable. To imagine non-managerial futures based on the principle of “living well” rather than in efficiency and the belief (or make believe) that good management and efficiency will bring happiness to all is an ideal that benefits the elite who put forward the idea and can maintain it through various means (e.g., institutions, money, media). We need then to recap the history of higher learning in Western civilization. Because in its history the university has been linked to colonial expansion since the sixteenth century, and it is therefore imperial. Learning to unlearn is a decolonial endeavor in two senses: it is necessary to simultaneously decolonize imperial education and work towards decolonial education.

Since the European Renaissance and European colonial expansion in the sixteenth century—that is, the foundational moment of the modern/colonial world—the accumulation of money has gone hand in hand with the accumulation of meaning and of knowledge. Today “historical-structural dependency” still structures the world, both economically and epistemically. How did that happen? How was it possible that a local conception of knowledge, grounded on Greek and Roman experience and categories of thought, became hegemonic through various stages of five centuries of imperial expansion? In what follows we will sketch how that happened and, in the end, we will advance some ideas of how to delink from that imperial legacy and engage in epistemic disobedience. Before engaging in that task, we need to identify the logic and the consequences of imperial thinking.

Western categories of thought (grounded in Greek and Latin and translated into the six modern European imperial languages: Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, French, German, and English) put any other category in a double bind: either they are incorporated (and their singularity erased) into Western categories (e.g., transforming Hinduism and Buddhism into “religions”) or they are dismissed and rejected, including all economies that are based on capitalist principles and knowledges that cannot be assimilated into Western normativization of life and subjectivities, from governments to “popular” knowledge (e.g., Vandana Shiva’s report on traditional knowledge of the forest or the administration of water in conditions of water scarcity). The logic of Western imperial epistemology consists of a meta-discourse that validates itself by disqualifying difference. That is, it consists of making and remaking epistemic colonial difference: barbarian, primitives, Orientals, Indians, and blacks are qualified as people “outside” or “behind” who need to be brought into the modern present. Modernity then is not a historical epoch, but an imperial category of self-validation and disqualification of the epistemic difference. Take philosophy of science, for example. Once these categories of knowledge have been institutionalized in Western scholarship and translated into common sense (or in Western appropriation of Greek and Roman legacies), they become totalitarian, preventing any other kind of knowledge from being recognized at the same level as philosophy and sciences. Political theory (democracy) or political economy (capitalism) are similar examples; after the financial crisis of 2008–2009 the main issue in the media and higher-learning institutions was how to save capitalism, not to ask if another economic system (based on reciprocity instead of gain and accumulation that promotes destruction and killing in all forms, from wars to food crises) were viable. Learning to unlearn means to delink from the illusion that knowledge in all spheres of life is bound to one set of categories that are both universal and Western.

To start shifting the geo-politics of knowledge, delinking and engaging in epistemic disobedience, it is necessary to excavate the foundation of Western categories and principles about the knowledge itself and the values attached to certain kinds of knowledge used to devalue epistemic differences: that is, building and maintaining the epistemic colonial difference that reverts and complements imperial epistemic differences. For example, Mandarin, Russian, and Arabic to name a few languages spoken by billions of people are not languages sustainable in the epistemic world order. Knowing how and critical thinking can be found in any community. Knowing how is a matter of surviving and living in a community. But with knowing how comes knowing that, which is the first level of theoretical knowing. Knowing what projects theoretical knowing into a level of complexity in which other doings and thinking enter into consideration: knowing what is the theoretical level that operates in the domain of options. One perhaps could say that the Greek breakthrough was to move from knowing that to knowing what and
the achievement of Western civilization was to capitalize on it: theology, philosophy, and sciences are three disciplinary formations responding to the same basic principles upon which knowing what has been built. Exploring and unveiling such principles have become an urgent task for decolonial humanities in confrontation with corporate values of management and efficiency. Therefore, decolonial humanities means epistemic disobedience (since critiquing the foundation of Western knowledge while accepting Western epistemic rules of the game will not go very far—it will remain within an obedient kind of criticism) and delinking. It means learning to unlearn (delinking, epistemic disobedience) in order to re-learn (inventing and working out decolonial categories of thoughts) that will allow building non-capitalist and imperial values and subjectivities.

We say the “humanities,” and not just “the humanists” (as a species distinct from natural scientists and scholars in the professional schools) for the reasons stated above regarding the role of the humanities and of decolonial humanities. Since all knowledge and understanding is human understanding (from genomics to dance, from electric engineering to literature, from mathematical models in economy to political economy), every scholar, academic, and scientist has a responsibility toward the humanities; in other words, he or she has critical, ethical, and political responsibilities in the production, dissemination, transformation, and enactment of knowledge. The humanities can and must do something else in relation to what they have been doing in the past. If the humanities, since the Renaissance, have contributed enormously to the expansion of the realm of interactions and imaginations of human beings, it was oblivious to what laid beyond the realm of a regional concept of the human that was projected as uni-versal. Unfortunately, the achievements in the humanities were the brighter side that had hidden from view the humanity that was being negotiated. Thus, the task of decolonial humanities is to redress the lost balance of which imperial humanities was responsible. In other words, the humanities have to be recognized in their contribution to the very idea of modernity as well as for the creation of its neglected side: the idea of the un-human.

As I argued, the accumulation of money, in the constitution of Europe, the West, or Western civilization, went hand in hand with the accumulation of meaning. The role of imperial humanities was crucial in this regard. Think about “museums of natural history,” for example. They are a clear example of the accumulation of meaning and knowledge; and the “histories” of museums of natural history parallel those of capitalism and European expansion all over the globe. Let this serve as a paradigmatic example in the sketching of two kinds of histories, the proper knowledge of which is beyond my reach at this point. As I said earlier, I am not interested in history per se, or in covering all the important details that would satisfy the empiricist scholar, but in underlying two historical trajectories: first, the linear history of the Western university, and second, the fractured histories of universities in colonial, third world, and “emerging countries.”

Redressing the balance in decolonial education, we have the case of Amawtay Wasi showing all of us a way out of these two histories, those of the Western universities and of the West’s colonial surrogates. In describing colonial universities as “colonial surrogates” I am not ignoring the fact that universities embedded in colonial histories are centers where critical scholars and intellectuals have emerged and continue to emerge. What we are saying is that critical scholars, scientists, and intellectuals trained in the universities of colonial, third world, or emerging countries will not fail to recognize their position vis-à-vis Western universities. In fact, the concept of “colonial surrogates” emerged from my encounters and conversations with critical scholars, scientists, and intellectuals working in Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina, Venezuela, South Africa, North Africa, and South Asia.

Let me say the same thing a different way: Universities, in the Americas since the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, were created and run by Spanish and British immigrants and by their Creole (Anglo and Spanish) descendants. Thus, the history of this place (America) is where a group of transplanted Europeans ignored and marginalized indigenous knowledge from Patagonia to Labrador and destroyed the African memories that the slaves had brought with them. They started a type of institution (the university) and a kind of education that was rooted in European history since the Middle Ages. The colonial universities both were and were not European universities; they aspired to be but were not quite. The colonial difference implied in this relationship explains the long, historical inferiority complex, in both Anglo- and Latin America, with respect to Europe. The theory embedded in the creation of the Universidad Intercultural led me to review the history of the university in the Western world and its links to colonialism. Or better yet, to coloniality. It is argued today that “colonialism” is no longer a valid description of our “postmodern” era. I argue, however, that although “colonialism” as a system of historical and geographical structures of power may have ended, “coloniality” is alive and well. “Global coloniality” is an appropriate description, in my view, of the current restructuring of the colonial patterns (e.g., coloniality) that have shaped the modern/colonial world, from the sixteenth to the twenty-first century. “Global coloniality” does not imply a global university but rather, the reproduction of coloniality on a global scale under neoliberal values and principles of education.

An important chapter in the history of the university in the modern/colonial world (through the different phases of colonial and imperial European and U.S. expansion) was written in the early nineteenth century,
during the transition from the Renaissance to the Kantian-Humboldtian era when secular philosophy and science triumphed over Christian theology and rhetoric. The nation-state became the prevailing form of government, displacing despotic political regimes (which reappeared in the twentieth century as different forms of totalitarianism and dictatorship) and the foundation of the modern nation-states in Europe and in modern/colonial states elsewhere. The first wave of “postcolonial” states emerged in the Americas. The colonial Renaissance university, organized around the trivium and the quadrivium in the service of the church and the Crown, gave way to the colonial Kantian-Humboldtian university, organized around philosophy and sciences in the service of the emerging nation-states. However, in the seventeenth century several temporalities coexisted that were not alien to the planetary transformations of the Renaissance university. While in the Americas the university was part of the process of decolonization and the construction of colonial nation-states, in South Asia and (North and sub-Saharan) Africa, which were falling under the colonial control of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, the Renaissance university did not have the same strong institutional stature.

The university was and still is part of this set of changing processes, which maintains the logic of coloniality through “nation building.” Nation-states may be the end of specific forms and times of colonialism, but they are not the end of coloniality; they are simply its restructuring in the hands of native (India, Africa) or Creole elites (South and North America). British study in India in the nineteenth century, for example, followed a logic similar—although with different content—to the one that organized the study of Latin and rhetoric in Mexico in the sixteenth century: in both cases the university was crucial to the introduction, and eventual displacement, of existing forms of knowledge that were labeled “tradition” and that were measured against the “modernity” of secular philosophy in European science. The practice of science in nineteenth-century India and the creation of state universities in Latin America (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil) were both processes complementary to nation building and to the different temporalities in the restructuring of coloniality of power and knowledge. The difference was that in Latin America the new universities, built according to the Kantian-Humboldtian model, coexisted with universities from the colonial/Renaissance period, which entered into a process of radical transformation. In nineteenth-century Latin America, the state universities were linked to the process of nation building, although this occurred in “dependent” countries—or, if you prefer, under conditions of “internal colonialism.” Decolonization meant, in the nineteenth century and in the twentieth, that an elite of “Creoles” or “natives” took power and reproduced the patterns implanted by colonial rulers. In this sense nation building was a form of colonialism, of internal colonialism. That is, it was a pattern of coloniality in the hands of Creoles of Spanish descent or mestizos of Spanish and Indian mixture. The university of the nineteenth century, in British India as well as in Spanish America, followed the Kantian-Humboldtian model of the European university. What I conceive as the “corporate” university is the type of university that in industrialized countries has been displacing the Kantian-Humboldtian tradition since the 1970s. Its best model is the U.S. university. In ex–third-world countries the “model” began to be imposed in the late 1980s, but more clearly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The initial manifestations of the newly imposed “quality control” of the faculty as well as of departments and special programs, in Argentina or in Mexico, were the demands that professors publish in refereed journals, account for their research and publications periodically, and so on. Another manifestation has been the progressive deterioration of major state universities, and the parallel and complementary divergence between accumulation of money and accumulation of meaning, characteristic of capitalism and Western universities. In Latin America, state universities had been the home of the humanities or the human sciences of critical thinking (socio-historical, ethical, and political) and, of course, major centers of political upheaval against the various versions of dictatorship. The deterioration of state universities has been mirrored by the proliferation of private “universities,” the majority of which are centers for professional and technical training only. Philosophy and other humanistic disciplines either have a low profile or are not part of the curriculum in the private “universities” emerging in Latin America. They are, so to speak, the latest manifestation of “modernization,” in which local elites see the university as both a business like any other and a sign of “modern” status. A new facet of coloniality manifests itself in the turn that higher education is taking in both developed and emerging countries. Historically, Italy and the Iberian Peninsula provided the model of the Renaissance university, while Germany and France provided the model of the Enlightenment university, in the tradition of Immanuel Kant and Alexander von Humboldt. Today it is the United States that is mainly leading the way in the transformation of the latter model into that of the corporate university, a phenomenon that should be seen in the context of other neoliberal developments in Latin America such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and Plan Colombia. Let us consider the three moments in the histories of the university and the temporal epistemic fractures in its European version. And then let us look at the spatial epistemic fractures emanating from its colonial version. We will also examine spatial epistemic fractures in the emergence of the Universidad Intercultural, which has been led by indigenous intellectuals with the
collaboration, of course, of mestizos and whites. It may be objected that we are trying to cover too much ground in too few pages. Not really, since our goal is not to describe in detail the full history of the European and colonial universities but to highlight three epistemic fractures of the institution. The temporal one fits Michel Foucault’s conceptualization of “epistemic breaks” in the history of Western thought. The other two largely escape Foucault’s model at the same time as they allow for a critique showing the regional limits of his “epistemic breaks.”

One of the spatial fractures, in the Americas, is the history of the colonial university in the hands of Hispanos-, Luso-, and Anglophone Creoles as well as of mestizos, particularly in South America where the first four major modern/colonial universities were created. By spatial fractures I mean that the colonial university (its Renaissance, Kantian-Humboldtian, and corporate versions) was always coeval with and dependent on the metropolitan university, while at the same time disrupting the memories of the colonies. It was not the same thing to read Aristotle in Salamanca or Paris as in Mexico City/Tenochtitlán or Cusco. Similarly, it was a different experience to read Rousseau in Paris than to read him in Nigeria or Bolivia in the middle of the nineteenth century. In contrast to the Renaissance and (Kantian-Humboldtian) Enlightenment universities, which generated two colonial fractures (one when the university was at the service of the monarchy and church and the other when it served the metropolitan or colonial state), and to the corporate university, which expanded and introduced a new set of values over the state university (both in the metropolis and in the ex-colonies or independent states), Amawatay Wasi, the Universidad Intercultural de las Naciononalidades y los Pueblos Indígenas, introduced a fracture of a different kind. For the first time in the history of the modern/colonial world a university was created whose epistemic foundation (e.g., the principles and the type of knowledge) was no longer that of the European Renaissance university and its medieval and classical (Greek) foundations. The foundation of the Universidad Intercultural is not Greece but Tawantinsuyu. If you indeed asked yourself what “Tawantinsuyu” means, then I have made my point. You would not have asked if I referred to ancient Greek society and cosmology or to the Greek polis, doxa, and episteme. “Tawantinsuyu” is the Quechua word for “the Four Territorizes,” a map of the world for the Inca Empire. Of course, Western knowledge and civilization is part of the curriculum of the Universidad Intercultural. It will be duly “included” and processed. The radical difference here is that we are talking about the “inclusion” of Western civilization within a curriculum grounded in indigenous philosophy and not about the “inclusion” of indigenous knowledge within the state (and corporate) university, whose foundations remain in the Renaissance and the Enlightenment types of universities. The history of the European university since the Renaissance has been framed as part of the larger macronarrative of Western civilization. In this narrative, history originated in Greece, spread through the northwest of the Mediterranean, then crossed the Atlantic to culminate in the United States. Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” is as good an example as any other in rehearsing such macronarratives, although he mainly covers the twentieth century. In this framework, the university is an invention of the Middle Ages, of the High and Late Middle Ages around the twelfth century, to be more precise. The creation of the university as an institution was the culmination of a process of scholastic learning. There were continuities, writes Marcia Colish, linking the revival of speculation in the eleventh century with the interests and methods of masters and cathedral schools and universities in the twelfth century and after. One of the major links was the belief and the confidence that reason could shed light on any subject and that the increasing use of logic and semantics would take medieval philosophy well beyond its classical roots. Since the university, today, is rooted in a tradition of learning originating from monastic and cathedral schools, the university is complicit with both philosophical universalism and Christianity. The mottoes of many universities, inscribed on their official seals in Latin, with that language’s corresponding legacy in the conceptualization of knowledge, is an obvious reminder. Latin was not only the language of learning. It was also the language of power. Previously, Arabic and Hebrew had been pushed out of the temples of learning in favor of Greek, which supported a Greco-Latin tradition in learning parallel to the Judeo-Christian tradition in religion. These centuries-old epistemic power struggles have clear ramifications in the history of Israel, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as, of course, for the most recent history of colonialism, from the British Empire to U.S. imperialism. The medieval university, in other words, laid the foundation for the geopolitics of knowledge under whose hegemony much of the world still lives.

In the university of the European Renaissance, scholastic learning was displaced by the humanistic version. Accordingly, the role and profile of the humanist replaced that of the scriptor and notarius as well as new roles that had emerged in the twelfth century, the magister and the grammaticus. At the top of the pyramid were theologians and the “masters” of the law. The names they received at the time were literatus and jurispritus. The appearance of these social actors in the Middle Ages is linked to “the emergence of written culture.” In the late Renaissance, the towering symbolic image of the humanist, the Renaissance man, cut across the redistribution of knowledge in jurisprudence, political philosophy, history, grammar, rhetoric, poetics
Chapter 1

Globalization and the Geopolitics of Knowledge

(or literature, as we say since the Enlightenment), mathematics, music and dialectics. Latin was still the master language, and the trivium and the quadrivium remained as a general frame for the organization of knowledge.

But an extraordinary series of events intervened in the history of the Renaissance. And here is where a second kind of history begins. The out-of-the-ordinary events I am referring to involve the colonization of the New World and the creation of New World universities. The colonial university, in the Americas, had a function different from that of the European Renaissance university. It had a mission that was clearly “out of place”; that is, the university in the New World did not have the medieval university’s burden of the past (thus, a temporal epistemic fracture). It had the burden of the present since it was implanting itself over the institutions devoted to education in the Aztec and Inca “empires,” as well as over the remains of Mayan knowledge in astronomy and mathematics (thus, a spatial epistemic fracture). The colonial university was a university without history, so to speak, a university out of place since it did not include the educational tradition of the Aztecs but did include that of the Greeks and Romans. Nahua, in other words, was not considered as valuable as Greek and Latin. Indigenous knowledges and epistemologies neither corresponded to the history of the West nor were recognized by the missionaries and men of letters who founded the Universidad de México and the Universidad de San Marcos in Lima, Peru. The model of the Renaissance university, on the contrary, contributed to the eradication of the Aztec’s and Incas’ educational institutions and to the displacement and subalternization of their ways of knowing. Inca and Aztec knowledges, in the minds of missionaries and men of letters, were dictates of the devil and consequently had to be eradicated. What the Spaniards called the “extermination of idolatry” was in fact an epistemic lobotomy. The mission of the Universidad Intercultural is precisely to ground itself in that knowledge tradition that was marginalized and disrupted by the installation of the colonial-Renaissance university in the New World. But, of course, the mission of the Universidad Intercultural is not a recuperation of ancient knowledge but its reactivation in the process of appropriating Western technical contributions, but not Western values of education that are increasingly complicit with capitalism.

The second spatial epistemic fracture is harder to understand. To some, it may sound “New Age” or “new Rousseauian.” Those who think thus may be limited by the very frontiers of “modernity” that allowed for the successful invention of “traditions” to bolster the epistemic position of “modernity.” Other skeptics may not know Amawtay Wasi (House of Wisdom) is a political project—as were the Renaissance and Kantian-Humboldtian universities—grounded in many years of indigenous social movements and emerging from the 1987 reform of the Ecuadorian constitution. Still other doubters will remain unconvinced because they are ready to accept that indigenous people and people of African descent can meet their own needs instead of waiting for the whites and mestizos in power to generously offer what they—as inferior people—need. In other words, one of the difficulties in truly understanding the radical nature of the project of Amawtay Wasi is coming to terms with the fact that there are other forms of knowledge (beyond the Western tradition) that are equally valid. One of the imperatives to overcoming the blindness of the ideology of modernity and modernization is in understanding that the great intellectual and scientific achievements of the West are indeed great achievements, but that at the same time there is no reason why the rest of the world has to bend to them. The magic trick in the rhetoric of modernity is its logic. We have read and heard during and after Wall Street’s collapses, when it could no longer hide the irrationality of its leaders, that “well, after all, capitalism is not perfect, but there is no alternative to a world of growth and progress.” We know, progress, growth, accumulation is the rhetoric of modernity. What that rhetoric and the sentences I just quoted hide are the assumptions of capitalist believers that progress and growth are the only way to conceive the organization of society and the education of its members is a path without alternatives. The rhetoric was mainly addressed to the fear that Communism would come back. Thus a double totalitarian move: that progress and accumulation are the only ways to conceive life on this planet and that Communism is not a better alternative to capitalism. It is time to delink from that system of beliefs in which the world is today captured. Within the Western system of education, the humanities could and should contribute to the decolonization of education in order to liberate creativity.20 Linked to the need to uncouple the recognition of achievements from imperial motivations is the fact that the complicity between the accumulation of money and the accumulation of meaning (knowledge) are two sides of the same coin. “Knowledge,” in the prevailing view, is still conceived of as, above all, a kind of materiality and geopolitics available to everyone, regardless of sex and sexuality, color, belief, or the part of the world where one was born, grew up, and went to school and university.

Amawtay Wasi is one of the responses of the indigenous population to their long history of disavowal and marginalization, first by the monarchical colonial state (until the nineteenth century) and since then by the modern/colonial state—that is the state formed by Creole elites after independence from Spain and Portugal. The “conquest” of America meant the demolition of indigenous educational and economic systems. Universities in the New World were located in the land of people whose languages and histories bore no relationship either to Greek and Latin or to Arabic and Hebrew. In
sixteenth-century Mexico, there was a very interesting and intense effort to teach Latin to the Nahual-speaking Indians. The crown soon came to believe that this was a risky proposition (since indigenous people might use what they learned against the Spanish institution for their own liberation), and by the seventeenth century teaching Latin to the Indians was a forgotten episode of the early stage of colonization. Frederick Douglas told a similar story, later on, in the context of African slaves' relationships with their masters in the United States. There is a “discontinuity of the classical tradition” here, a discontinuity that can be attributed to colonialism, which I have identified as one of the two spatial epistemic fractures.21 The second, and radically different, fracture is the Universidad Intercultural.

Before going into more detail about Amawatay Wasi, let us look at the internal colonial transformation of the colonial Renaissance university into the colonial Enlightenment one, that is, at the first temporal epistemic fracture in the history of the university within Western civilization. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, secularization and the French Revolution, together with a redistribution and reconceptualization of knowledge, led to the emergence of what is known in the history of learning as the Kantian-Humboldtian university; that is, the university at the service of the emerging nation-states. The nineteenth century witnessed the birth of the social sciences—required by the need to organize government and civil society—and also the consolidation of political economy. Wilhelm Dilthey, at the end of the nineteenth century, conceptualized the distinction between the natural and the human sciences, between the nomothetic and the ideographic forms of knowledge, between explanation and understanding. Knowledge of nature became detached from knowledge of society and of human beings. Such a conception of knowledge is alien to the indigenous histories in the Americas, as well as to concepts of knowledge and understanding beyond European modernity. The transition, across the Americas, from the colonial to the national period implied the transformation of both the colonial Renaissance university into the colonial Kantian-Humboldtian university and the colonial provinces into nation-states. The colonial elites that controlled the economy, the church, and the government were not bourgeois elites as in Europe. There were significant differences between the Anglo- and the Spanish-American revolutionary elites; in both cases, however, coloniality was a physically invisible but always present force among the Creoles in both Anglo- and Spanish America.

While this transformation was under way in the Americas, the British in India were beginning their version of a process that the Spanish and Portuguese had started in the “New World” almost three centuries earlier, and the Anglo-Americans a century after that with the foundation of Harvard and other early universities in what would become the United States.22 A similar process would unfold in the nineteenth century in other places in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean where the British and French empires extended their colonial administration. These processes were part of the second modernity, the Enlightenment. In the ex-colonies, the story evolved somewhat differently depending on whether the metropole was Spain, Portugal, France, or England. Between 1776 and 1831, approximately, these colonies became independent from their former masters and began the process of building themselves into nations. The colonial-Renaissance university founded in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries had to transform itself under new social demands and a New World order. New universities were created. The University of North Carolina, the first state university in the United States, was chartered in 1789 and opened its doors in 1795. The point here is that while the model of the Kantian-Humboldtian university was that of higher education under new forms of colonialism, in the emerging nation-states of the Americas, the same type of university began to replace the model established during the Renaissance. But, of course, the process in the Americas, particularly in the Caribbean, South, and Central America was not the same as the process in Europe. Europe and the Americas were separated by the colonial difference ("the colonial difference" meaning not only that people in the colonies are “different” but that they are “inferior” and need to be “civilized,” “modernized,” or “developed”), a difference that is in place today, although their histories have followed divergent paths. The university, in other words, played a fundamental role in nation building. However, while for England and France, and of course for Germany, nation building was part of Western expansion and the civilizing mission in the Americas, it was linked to nation building and the articulation of a new form of colonialism, “internal colonialism.” In India, as well as other places in Asia and Africa, the university was instead part of the colonial regime. This was also the period in which philology, in the European universities, contributed to the creation of the idea and the images of the “Orient,” as well as the idea of the “South” of Europe.23 The Kantian-Humboldtian university was, in other words, the university in what Hegel labeled as “the heart of Europe” (Germany, England, and France), while the Renaissance university was, mainly, the university in what became the “South” (Italy, Spain, Portugal).

And now, at the intersection of the two histories (the colonial and the modern), we come to the period after World War II. The United States started to assume the role played until then by England, France, and Germany. This was the era of the Cold War and the Cold War university, the era in which the social sciences, in the United States, gained preeminence over the humanities.24 It was also the era of decolonization in Asia and in Africa, and the era of the Cuban Revolution and of dictatorship in various Latin
American countries. The social sciences in the United States were associated with the materialization of "area studies." Even if there were conflicts between those who defended the purity and rigor of the disciplines and those who became experts in the "content" of certain areas, the fact remains that "area studies" was an affair of the social sciences as much as "Orientalism" was an affair of the humanities. It was also the heyday of the social sciences in the sense that they were part of the project of the "development and modernization" of the Third World. In Latin America the social sciences are a recent addition. Although there were cátedras of sociology before 1950, the social sciences as a branch of knowledge were introduced in or after the late fifties. Interestingly enough, the report of the Gulbenkian Foundation, Open the Social Sciences, emphasized the crisis of these disciplines not only in the "central countries" where they were born and prospered, but also in the third world.25 The Gulbenkian report was followed by thirteen small volumes in which the future of the social sciences in various regions of the former third world was discussed.

But this was also the period when the corporate university began to displace the Kantian-Humboldtian model. The more technologically-oriented social sciences (economics, political science, and sociology) remained the exemplars of rigorous and useful knowledge, the more the humanities and the interpretive social sciences (history, cultural anthropology, and interpretive sociology) lost their previous standing in the hierarchy of efficient knowledge required by corporate values associated with knowledge. The consequences of the corporate university's emergence became apparent after the end of the Cold War. In the former third world, including Latin America, the principles of "excellence" and "efficiency" became guiding tenets of knowledge production. Parallel to these processes, the large state universities in various Latin American countries started a process of disintegration.26 The fuga de cerebros, or "brain drain," accelerated in various countries, as well-regarded intellectuals, scholars, and scientists migrated to Europe and the United States. Scientists in former third-world nations also voiced their discomfort with the deprived and meager conditions under which they had to do their jobs. The "network society" (i.e., the world society connected through the Internet; more than by means of transportation), as Catalan sociologist Manuel Castells calls it, does not have the same intensity in the South as in the North. Until 1996 or so, Africa and Latin America were not yet on the map of this society. "Excellence" and "efficiency" turned against the scientific and scholarly production of the third world. And, once again, the possibilities for technological expansion have been restricted by the demands and expectations of economic designs.

The preceding narrative is a blueprint of two kinds of histories of the university. However, we are often reminded of the canonical names in the history of Western thought (Diderot, Smith, Marx, Freud) but not of those whose intellectual production was part of the canon not of "modernity" but of "coloniality." A few examples of the latter are Guamán Poma (late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries) in the Viceroyalty of Peru, Mohandas Gandhi in India, Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon in the Caribbean, Nelson Mandela in South Africa, and Subcomandante Marcos and the Zapatistas in Mexico. In all these cases, the production and transformation of knowledge and understanding was not restricted to the university.

There are three main issues from the previous narrative that I consider relevant to our discussion. First, our main thesis is that the history of capitalism runs parallel to the history of knowledge. Also, an implicit distribution of values and labor places knowledge in relation to nature. Asia, Africa, and Latin America became the providers of "natural" resources to be processed in the countries in which the Industrial Revolution took place and prospered. These three continents were also placed in the role of providing information and culture, but not knowledge. Or, the knowledge produced in the regions that were either colonized or that remained outside the scope of colonial expansion was only considered relevant in and for those regions. The situation today is not radically different from the one that began to unfold five hundred years ago when the Renaissance university was transplanted in the New World. Of course, since then numerous "nation-states" have been considered "developing countries." Universities are institutions that depend, today more than ever, on the economy. Thus, in "developing countries" one can surmise that we also have "developing universities." There is not yet a transnational institution for higher education with the function that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund perform in relation to the state in developing countries. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) may be the closest we can get to a transnational institution related to research and education.

Second, the histories, as I have told them, imply a relation of "dependency" that is not just economic but also epistemic (that is, cultural, intellectual, scientific in a larger sense of the word, and technological, as well as related to the natural and social sciences) and manifests itself at the level of the disciplines. This was one of the concerns of the Gulbenkian report. Dipesh Chakrabarty has noted the particular kind of epistemic dependency in the domain of history as a discipline. Chakrabarty remarks that the "history" of the third world cannot be written on "its own" since history (as a discipline) is a European invention.27 Consequently, the history of the world "depends" on European history. In this regard, Chakrabarty underscores that while European historians do not need to quote, mention, or take into account the history of India when they write
the history of Europe, Indian historians cannot write their own history without taking into account European history. My own understanding of “epistemic dependency” runs parallel to economic dependency and touches all areas of knowledge, as I suggested earlier in describing colonialism as disruption of the epistemic and economic organization in the Andes and Mesoamerica. You may be thinking that I am ignoring the fact that “dependency theory” has been harshly criticized. But I am aware of that. However, just because “dependency theory” has been criticized and because “dependency” does not “depend”—so to speak—on the evil designs of foreign capitals (only), it does not follow, necessarily, that we should not think in terms of “dependency.” How else can one describe the situation of Argentina today? As I finished an earlier version of this essay, Eduardo Duhaldie was the president and the Argentine crisis seemed to be hitting bottom. It would be difficult to ignore that, while the “financial dependency” of Argentina on the IMF and the government of the United States is not the only explanation for the crisis, “structural interstate dependency” is a foundational factor of capitalism at the international level. Capitalism functions not only by exploiting the labor of individual workers but by taking advantage of interstate export and import, natural resources in “third world” countries (oil, for example), and financial flows of capital and interest.

Third, if the map I just traced has a grain of truth, what then are the needs and possibilities for interuniversity cooperation, given the framework of the corporate university and the need to think in terms of international and interdisciplinary relations and cooperation? In order to address these questions, we need to remember that while the Kantian-Humboldtian university was linked to nation building, the corporate university has appeared at a time when certain nation-states are being rendered less and less relevant. That is, the corporate university is linked to a global and, in a certain sense, post-national era. How are the conditions of knowledge production changing today in terms of the invention of new tools (e.g., the Internet and other technologies that are opening up new avenues for the production and distribution of knowledge traditionally supported by the book)? How are these changes challenging and perhaps making obsolete the conceptualization of knowledge we inherited from the Kantian-Humboldtian university (natural sciences, social sciences, and the humanities)? And what would be the humanities’ role in the response of the corporate university to the needs of globalization?

The story is not over yet, however: a crucial chapter—the second spatial epistemic fracture (that is, a fracture from the European legacy as well as from the Creole/ mestizo colonial version of that legacy)—began to unfold with the creation in Ecuador of the Universidad Intercultural. This university, conceived from the perspective of indigenous knowledge but not for indigenous people only, constitutes a reversal, but not an opposition, of

and to the history of the university in the Western world and its colonies that I outlined above. From the perspective of the European university, whether in its Renaissance or Enlightenment models, whether in Europe or in the colonies, indigenous knowledge was, at best, an interesting object of study, but never part of what was considered true, sustainable, or generative knowledge. The project of the Universidad Intercultural radically reverses these relations. However, while in the European model of the university, in Europe and the colonies, indigenous knowledge was an object of study, from the perspective of the Amawtalki Wasi, modern (Western) knowledge is incorporated as sustainable and generative knowledge. This is a paradigmatic example, in my view, of the epistemic potential of border thinking. From the perspective of subaltern knowledges, all knowledge and understanding is potentially sustainable and generative, while from the perspective of Western hegemonic knowledge, the only generative and sustainable knowledge is founded on the canon of Western thought and scholarship.

Let me address first, then, the notion of interculturalidad as the indigenous intellectuals leading the project and the implementation of the Universidad Intercultural are using the term. Interculturalidad does not refer to the universality of certain phenomena but, rather, to the singularity of the perspective from which intercultural (epistemic, political, ethical) relations are being conceived. We should dispel from the outset the suspicion that interculturalidad is just another name for what in the United States is called multiculturalidad (in Spanish) or “multiculturalism” (in English). To avoid misunderstanding and false alarms, it should be said first that the meanings of interculturalidad and “multiculturalism” are similar when used in the discourse of the state. The differences are historical. That is, they lie in how multiculturalism and interculturalidad, as seen from the perspective of the state, have been formed.

Multiculturalism is, in the United States, an updated version of the “melting pot.” Both terms have been prompted by massive immigration transforming U.S. society. However, “melting pot” refers to a society transformed by European immigration at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, while “multiculturalism” refers to a society transformed by massive migration from the third world and by the internal transformation prompted by the Civil Rights Movement at the end of the sixties. The differences between “multiculturalism” in the United States and interculturalidad used from the perspective of the state in Ecuador or Bolivia are based on the formation of the ethno-racial maps in those countries.

In the United States, the first three sides of the ethno-racial pentagon were formed by the colonial history of Native Americans, African slaves, and European Protestant whites. To this basis was added the largely Catholic and
Jewish European immigration of the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. The fifth side of the pentagon has been added since 1970, with the extensive immigration from the third world. This is the point at which the "melting pot" has transformed into "multiculturalism." Furthermore, with the sudden "visibility" of Muslim Americans since 9/11, it has become clear that the pentagon is being transformed by public immigration-control policies into an ethno-racial hexagon.

In Ecuador, and more generally, in the Andean region of Latin America, the ethno-racial foundation was laid out by the Indians, that is, the population under the administration of the Inca Empire, and by the Spaniards. Creoles/mestizos, that is, people of Spanish (or European) descent (mixed with "Indian blood"), became the third component of the ethno-racial order. Later on, with the end of slavery, the displaced African population that was mainly concentrated in the Caribbean began to migrate to other areas of Latin America, chiefly to the west of modern Colombia and Ecuador. The European immigration of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did not greatly affect the ethno-racial composition of Ecuador. The bottom line is, then, that Indians (about 35 distinct groups) form 40 percent of the country's population, estimated at around 12 million. Mestizos comprise another 40 percent. People of Spanish descent, that is non-mestizos, are calculated to be 15 percent, and people of African descent make up the remaining 5 percent. The meaning of interculturalidad should be understood in this context. Moreover, it should be remembered that the Indian population has a strong organization, the Confederación Nacional de Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE), and that its representatives have occupied and continue to occupy important positions in the government. There are thirty-three cities, at this writing, governed by indigenous leaders, and many indigenous people have been members of the Congress; an indigenous woman, Nina Pacari, was vice president of the Congress until recently. 30 Luis Alberto Macas, a lawyer by training, was very influential in the foundation of the CONAIE and is currently director of the Instituto Científico de Culturas Indígenas, or ICCI-Rimmi. He is also the leading person in the instrumentation of the Universidad Intercultural. 31

The government conceives of interculturalidad as a generous move toward the inclusion, in education as well as in other spheres of life, of the population that has not been included during the long years of nation building and of Creole/mestizo concentration of power. The university in Ecuador, state or private, complemented the construction of the nation-state, which, in Ecuador as in any other country in Latin America, North America, or Europe, is a mono-national state. However, from the indigenous perspective, the Universidad Intercultural should lead toward a pluri-national state. The aims and goals of the Universidad Intercultural, from the perspective of the indigenous people, are not the same as the goals and principles of the Creoles/mestizos who created the nineteenth-century university in Ecuador on the European Kantian-Humboldtian model.

The Universidad Intercultural is not framed on a "campus" but disseminated throughout the country, among the communities, like a net. The nodes of the net are mainly in areas with high concentrations of indigenous population. However, the university is for everybody and not for indigenous people only.

All the degrees that the university offers are named in Quichua. The official language of all universities in Spanish America is (still) Spanish, although the colonial languages of the second modernity (English, French, and German) are, in relation to Spanish, what Spanish is to Aymara. That is, "valuable" knowledge nowadays is produced in English, French, or German, not Spanish. There are significant grammatical (not to mention historical) differences among these languages, but it is still "easier" to translate between Spanish and German than between Quichua and Spanish or German. The same token, translation between Quichua and Aymara or Nahua is easier than translation between any of these languages and German or Spanish, and so on. One example of the difficulty: for a speaker of modern European languages, the future is "in front" of the speaker, thus the possibility and the importance of the idea of "progress." For Quichua or Aymara speakers, the future is "behind," because it cannot be seen. The past can be remembered and therefore "seen": it is thus "in front" of you, hence the difficulty among Quichua or Aymara speakers of naturally inventing an idea like "progress."

Let me give you an example from the organization of graduate studies. The name of the program is "Amautai," amauta meaning a person of wisdom in ancient Quichua and Aymara. The program is comprised of cycles "Amautai Kallari" (general wisdom, first cycle) and "Sumak Amautai" (particularized wisdom, second cycle, which is equivalent to the PhD). The first focuses on specific knowledges, either practical or reflexive. The second is devoted to the process of researching and writing the doctoral dissertation. The two cycles are linked through the axis of "communitarian practice" in the sense that while preparing the doctoral dissertation the candidate has to do work in the community. The other two cycles are "Runa Yachaikuna" (cycle of indigenous sciences) and "Shuktak Yachaikuna" (cycle of universal sciences). The second is seen as "complementary" to the indigenous sciences that are the main component of the curriculum. The first cycle, "Runa Yachaikuna," has as its main objective "to socialize indigenous knowledge to allow the students to consolidate their identity and to strengthen their self-valorization. That is, the goal is to allow student learning to be." 32
Tinku is an Aymara-Quechua word meaning a conflict of power, contrary as well as contradictory, a dialogue of feelings as well as a conceptual struggle, a dialogue of experiences and of conceptions of life. Tinku alludes to physical as well as conceptual encounters that are embedded in the history of colonialism and, certainly, in the installation and survival of the Renaissance and Kantian-Humboldtian universities in the history of (Latin) America. The very conceptualization of the Universidad Intercultural is redirecting the future, and changing the path of history. It is a tinku, but now one performed by indigenous agents instead of one performed on them, as was the case with the Renaissance and Kantian-Humboldtian universities. The Universidad Intercultural opens up a wide range of opportunities but, above all, it makes possible an education from the perspective of those knowledges that have been subordinated and displaced in the history of the Western and colonial universities, from the Renaissance university to the corporate one. At this juncture I see two types of university for the future, and a wide range of possibility in between. I am saying “two types” and not “two universities.” Each type may have a variety of manifestations, but there is a “difference” between the two types that cannot be transcended without serious negotiation. That difference is “the colonial difference” that has been historically articulated in a wide array of configurations, through the diversity of colonial experiences. The two “types” of possibilities I see are the following. At one extreme is the potential of improving the university within the neoliberal ideals of civilization and democracy. That is, a society in which democracy is managed from above, by “skillful and efficient managers,” and in which 30 percent of the population enjoys prosperity and the remaining 70 percent is left out of the social order. At the other extreme is the promise offered by the Universidad Intercultural as a model reproducible around the world. This type of university will be guided by the ideal of a “critical cosmopolitanism.” That is, an education whose final goal will be to generate, simultaneously with positive knowledge (medicine, law, economy, technology), a critical understanding that will balance “efficiency” and “justice,” “development” and “democracy,” “freedom,” and “violence to defend freedom,” and so on.

The critical role of the humanities should be involved with the critical legacies within the colonial university and the radical transformation being enacted by projects like the Universidad Intercultural. At this point, the humanities cease to be the “humanities” of the European tradition and its colonial legacies. They become something else, a space of “border thinking” and political transformation in which the Western contribution to universal knowledge is only one, as important as any other, but regional, not itself universal. And in the same way that the Western and modern epistemology and its institution, the university, built itself by absorbing and integrating other legacies (e.g., Arabic epistemology, so crucial to European modernity), the myriad subaltern knowledges around the world are a living example that Western legacies will survive by dying in the womb of those knowledges that modernity itself had to subdue in order to survive as modernity. The next step in the transformation toward a better world, where knowledge would no longer be controlled by corporations and imperial states, the university would become a pluriversity, and knowledge would no longer emanate from Western modernity. The incomplete project of modernity cannot be completed by and from the ideals under which European modernity was built. Modernity belongs to the world, and it is up to the rest of the world to complete the project that European modernity could not. The total collapse of morality and expertise that we have been witnessing with Enron, BP, WorldCom, the Catholic Church, the IMF in Russia, Turkey, and Argentina, and the silent secrecy of the Pentagon and the CIA vis-à-vis 9/11 are all signs of the limits of Euro-American modernity. More than the accumulation of knowledge and an information superhighway, what is needed are new principles of understanding. In that regard, Western humanities can join forces with the reactivated subaltern knowledges in the modern/colonial world, as the example of the Universidad Intercultural illustrates.

I have sketched the history of the university in the West, since the Renaissance (which means, since the inception of the modern/colonial world, the foundation of capitalism and of Western imperialism); I have outlined the formation of the modern/colonial university, since the sixteenth century, in the non-European world. That formation implied a double movement: the incorporation of a philosophy and system of education alien to the places where it was implanted (from the University of Mexico by the mid-sixteenth century to Peking University at the beginning of the twentieth century). Additionally, I have pointed to a formation of higher education, Amawatay Wasi. Delinking from both the history of European (and its extension in the United States) and the history of colonial universities in Spanish America, Amawatay Wasi opened up a new path, showing the restitution of the past in the present is urgent and necessary in order to avoid the totalitarian orientation of higher education in complicity with corporations and major players in the global world order (e.g., the G20). Next to Amawatay Wasi, the Universidad de la Tierra in Mexico, was initiated within the trajectory of deschooling initiated by Ivan Illich. To understand what I mean I will tell you a story that began to unfold by 2008, but that I became aware of at the beginning of 2009.

On April 29, 2009, I received an email with the subject line: “World Universities Forum, Davos, Switzerland, 9–11, 2009, Call for Papers.” It caught my attention for two reasons. First, based on the history of the
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models in computers, the calculation of consumer reactions, and the extreme confidence in these numbers and computer models were no different from an entertaining children’s game, and not serious knowledge. Children can forget about “reality”—that is why they are children. But arrogant and unethical behavior committed by grownups belongs to the category of “crimes against humanity”—crimes that human rights organizations have been successful in pursuing and penalizing (e.g., Pinochet, Milosevich, and guilty parties from various truth commissions around the world).

I suppose that the organizers of the World Social Forum are already examining the consequences of the World Universities Forum. It will be indeed great and necessary, but much more is needed beyond what the World Social Forum may do. What is needed is a global epistemic and conceptual discussion of the decolonial politics of knowledge: a massive and global debate about learning to unlearn—the subject that is presupposed in the Davos call for papers and in Taylor’s article. What is needed then is a network of Worlds Epistemic and Ethic Fora toward communal futures as a means of de-westernizing and decolonizing knowledge and education.

Since the World Universities Forum embodies corporate interests, the underpinnings of any university reform it proposes would presuppose that knowledge should serve corporate values and horizons of life. These horizons, in their more acceptable formulations, would be “development and freedom,” as argued by Amartya Sen. The problem is that “development” is not necessarily a shared horizon. Beyond the rhetoric of development is the seed of exploitation of human labor and natural resources, which continues. The problem is that while Davos has the resources provided by development projects, those who suffer the consequences, or are aware of the devastating consequences of development, do not have the same resources (e.g., institutions, mainstream media, publishing industry, and so on) to promote communal, rather than corporate, life horizons.

Thus, while many of us who see that development is a problem and would agree with organizers of the Forum and with Mark Taylor that the university is in need of transformation, we do not agree on what transformations are needed. And we do not believe that these decisions can be only taken at Davos. While defenders of corporate values in research and education are entitled to their own arguments, they are not entitled to act as if the final truth lies in devastating global futures of which we already have a surplus of examples (food crises, Wall Street collapses, viruses caused by lack of hygiene among food producers, water crises, growing economic differences between the shrinking global economic elite and the growing global impoverished masses, just to scratch the surface). Development and growth are not the answer. Mark Taylor has a good point: universities, like Wall Street and Detroit, need
to be regulated; but who will do the job and with what purpose? If we, all of us, want to live well instead of living better than our neighbors, as Bolivian President Evo Morales has been stating, based on the tradition of Aymara philosophy instead of the tradition of Greek and European Enlightenment philosophy of life (for which “nature” has to be known and dominated), then regulation has to be pluri-versal and not uni-versal.

The problem with Mark Taylor’s recommendations, and what I surmise are Davos’s too, are only formal. And they are only formal because the supposition is that there is one, and only one way to go forward: development, improvement of the existing horizon of life which began to be formed and spread during the sixteenth century, in the Atlantic, under the leadership of Europe, the labor of Africans and the lands taken away from the Indians in the Americas and the Caribbean. It is not ancient Greece we should place at the center of modern/colonial history if we really want to democratize the economy and put education at the service of economic democracy. However, after the ongoing turmoil stemming from the 2008 Wall Street collapse, the debates are not about economic democracy but about saving capitalism. And that the way of life, the ethics and the subjectivities (produce, save, and accumulate; consume, consume, consume, and be happy), cannot be solved with a transformation of the curriculum and the expansion of technology that, today, is part of the problem. Take, for example, the effects of transnational companies felt in small towns in Argentina, like Cerro de Patima, where people rely on water polluted by heavy metals as a result of processes by which minerals are extracted and then used to produce more and more cell phones, iPods, video game consoles, and computers—products that not only drive consumer markets, but also manage and discipline them.

The paradox mentioned in the Davos call for papers that creativity lately takes place outside of the university is partially true. Indeed, biographies of political celebrities, comedians and anchors of economic programs, like Lou Dobbs, are more successful in the quantity of book sales than most academic books from university faculty. “Success” in selling is one story. It has to do with information and books as commodities. “Creativity” is another thing. Creative successes based on standards of the free market that exist outside of the university, unfortunately, have been under continual scrutiny for human rights, food safety, and environmental protection violations, which have lead to catastrophes such as swine flu, mass mortgage fraud, and the torture of innocents, not to mention age-old “creative” manipulations of food stock prices to haul in magnificent economic gains at the expense of the well-being of millions of human beings.

The needs of our time cannot be decided unilaterally—neither can the solutions. If there is an agreement between Bolivian organizations, the leader of the Summit of the Americas and the leaders of the World Universities Forum, in consultation with all involved parties, that water is a pressing problem, the solution cannot be determined at Davos: Davos is not the United Nations but only a group of interests. It is a particular group of interests that advocates “development and economic growth” under the conviction, the belief, or just the interest that economic growth and development is the way to freedom and happiness. That is not a commonly shared view, not even a majority view. Second, it would be detrimental for the future of society and life on the planet if the university turns completely to support corporate values. It is crucial that the university remain the place of free thinking and research, where “creativity” is not valued in relation to pressing needs but will indeed contribute to anticipate future problems. A just world and democratic economy need the collaboration of all sectors involved and not just one. This touches on the problem of tenure. It is imperative for a free and creative community of researchers and free thinkers that tenure be maintained. It is imperative that researchers and free thinkers who regulate the excesses of the corporate world and politicians be not only granted tenure but the necessary security of their life and families, and not be prosecuted, killed and sometimes forced into suicide. What could be done is that a sector of the university, say 25 percent of it, be organized around creativity and corporate values and that sector of the university will not grant tenure but it will work under contract regulations connected to the corporations. In other words, the corporate sector will be allowed to use university facilities and hire their researchers under contract.

The unparalleled, creative research of organizations such as La Via Campesina and Sovereignty of Food should be supported by all organizations working toward “democratic economy” (instead of “saving capitalism”), for the well being, and full participation of the population of the planet. Beyond the creative, forward-looking, imaginative measures in devising and implementing social organizations not pushed and managed by corporate and state interests, they also do creative research to unveil the strategies used by corporations, in many cases with the assent of the state, to prevent such development. Corporations interested in exploiting natural resources are not interested in having “competitors” like La Via Campesina who are not competitors in the same terrain, but organizations that are de-linking from the rules of the game established by corporations who are interested in increasing gains and not letting people improve their quality of life. Monsanto, or any other corporation, cannot decide what quality of life is for peasants who are producing their own knowledge, leading their own life, and not competing with Monsanto in terms of gain but competing in terms of the vision of life and quality of life.

One of the major roles of the non-corporate sector of the university, the free thinking and research sector, confronted with the problems of our time is, precisely, to contribute to regulate the corporations and the state, rather than
leaving the state and the corporation to regulate the university. In a balanced situation, indeed, the three entities should regulate each other, and that there should be no zero point of regulation. Corporations are entitled to defend their interests, but they have no right to impose their interest onto other sectors of society. An example of this comes from Taylor’s article, where he states, “Consider, for example, a water program . . . [i]n the coming decades, water will become a more pressing problem than oil, and the quantity, quality and distribution of water will pose significant scientific, technological and ecological difficulties as well as serious political and economic challenges.”

Indeed! Under the horizon of life guided by ideals of economic development and social modernization water will be a commodity and research may be more oriented toward generating gains for the corporations than solving problems for humanity.

Therefore, in addition to applying academic research to regulation, a second trajectory of research would go into projects like demonstrating why water problems cannot be solved as long as water remains a commodity. This kind of research (technically, ethically and politically) would show that (a) a new type of economy is needed; (b) the knowledge of Western experts has to be complemented with the knowledge of local communities that for centuries were successful in solving water problems; and (c) these experts would have to submit themselves to the needs and knowledge of communities to help solve problems and not to bring solutions based on abstract knowledge but on living experiences and knowledge accumulated for centuries. This second trajectory of research, creative research, would have to unveil the danger of coloniality; that is, of the ideology of economic development and of modernization. For example, in Water Wars Indian scientist and activist, Vandana Shiva, reports on the principle and structure of knowledge that for millennia allowed people in desert zones to build balanced systems of irrigations that ensure the water availability under adverse climatic conditions. One day the experts from the West came with technology, tubes and water-pumps, all explained in their rhetoric of modernization and development. They believed technology would solve the problem. They dug into the dry desert and splashed water . . . for a while. The system of irrigation, which had been in place for thousands of years, employed knowledge that was built by doing and living, and was dismantled by the ignorance of the “expert.” The locals generated knowledge in the process of organizing their lives. The expert acquires knowledge to further economic growth by ignoring his or her ignorance and by imposing his or her expertise.58

The Amazon Rainforest is the world’s greatest natural resource—the most powerful and bio-actively diverse natural phenomenon on the planet—and provides us with our final example of creative research. It is still being destroyed just like other rainforests around the world. The problem and the solution to rainforest destruction are both economic. This is a case in which accumulation of wealth at the expense of life promotes the production of objects over the reproduction of life. Common sense will say that this is totally irrational, but the rhetoric of modernity is constantly converting the irrational into the rationality of progress and development, highlighting production instead of regeneration. Thankfully, this viable economic alternative does exist. Many organizations have demonstrated that if the medicinal plants, fruits, nuts, oils and other resources like rubber, chocolate, and chicle, are harvested in a sustainable fashion rainforest land has a much more economic value than if timber were harvested or if it were burned down for cattle or farming operations. Sustainable harvesting of these types of resources provides this value today as well as more long-term income and profits year after year for generations to come. However, viable economic alternatives are important but not yet enough: it is imperative to shift the geography of reasoning and understand that the conquest and domination of nature is one of the most detrimental principles of modernity.

This is no castle in the air. It is a fact and it is being implemented today. Today, entire communities and indigenous tribes earn five to ten times more money wild harvesting medicinal plants, fruits, nuts and oils than they can earn by chopping down the forest for subsistence crops. This much-needed income source creates the awareness and economic incentive for this population in the rainforest to protect and preserve the forests for long-term profits for themselves and their children and is an important solution in saving the rainforest from destruction. Once again, while it is crucial to have economic incentives in a still capitalist economy, decolonial future horizons do not accept that economic incentives are the only ones. Economic incentives make sense only in the philosophy of capitalist economy. But, as I am arguing here, economy and capitalism are not the same, and non-capitalist economies are thinkable and available. Democratizing the economy will be one specific and concrete way of thinking decolonially and promoting decolonial creative research.

I was recently in a dissertation defense. The dissertation’s first sentence was something like: “Human beings are political animals; we have known it since Aristotle.” I will accept that Aristotle said so, but from the fact that Aristotle said it does not follow that indeed human beings are political animals. Certainly Aristotle is entitled to his own opinion and he certainly had reason and needed to make such an assertion. Aymara and Quechua intellectuals in the Andes, when the Spaniards arrived spouting the same Aristotelian convictions (Aymara and Quechua intelligentsia, men of wisdom as much as Aristotle), would have disagreed with that assertion.
Let us take the case of the artist. Artists are not necessarily at or interested in the university. However, more and more departments of Art History, Literature, Drama, and Film and Video are hiring “artists” since the “scholar” does not have the same experience. This is indeed a welcome change at the university that, I hope, will transform that sector of the university in the next decades. Immanuel Kant devised three primary disciplinary formations in the radical transformation, occurring in Europe, between the theological university in the Renaissance period and the secular university that unfolded after the Enlightenment. Unless we decide that artists do not have anything to do with “crucial issues of our time” and that their role is entertainment and enjoyment when the world population is not concerned with survival, death, war, violence, and the like, their role in the future decolonial and humanistic university is essential. Why? For many reasons, but let us just take one, which is the most crucial and perhaps the most invisible for the leaders of the World Universities Forum at Davos: the distinction between labor and work.

The distinction between work and labor which can be found in Karl Marx was elaborated in the sense I am taking it here by Hannah Arendt in her book The Human Condition. The basic distinction is this: in a communally organized society you have to work to live. In a capitalist organized society, you live to work: this is labor. Labor is a force of de-culturation; it takes your soul out of you, like in a system of slavery, as you labor for somebody else. The trick of a capitalist society has been to build a type of subjectivity in which the religious belief is that you are “free to choose” between labors. That was the justification for the end of slavery when labor was needed for the new stage of capitalism.

Now, imagine that part of the curriculum, the interdisciplinary and international curriculum in the new decolonial university, will elaborate on the distinction of labor and work, and the distinctions between a concept of economy that promotes “creative research to accumulate wealth” and a concept of economy that will promote “creative research toward communal life.” Remember, not communist, but communal. Communism did not make the distinction between labor and work and turned the exploitation of labor in the direction of the all-powerful state instead of in the benefit of private investors and corporations. However, the society we are envisioning and the university we need are communal, not communist. Corporations should be allowed to have their creative research corner to improve “commodities” that will be no longer such but “goods” for the well-being of the community. Therefore, corporations will maintain their previous name but their function will change: they will work toward the communal not toward the board of trustees and shareholders who accumulate money without labor. Global forums for de-westernizing and decolonizing knowledge and transforming the university toward a non-capitalist horizon of life is what we all shall strive for: a democratic economy that will allow the plurality-versality of communal organization in different parts of the world, which will also allow people to live and re-create languages, histories, religions, values, etc., that over the past five hundred years have been eroded by the belief (in the West and among elites in the non-West) that Western lifestyles, industrialization, technology and the like was the point of arrival in the history of human civilization. Moving towards the pluraversity as a new horizon (where decolonial knowledges and research are oriented toward the construction of communal societies of work rather than global societies of labor) brings us closer to what has become a global consensus among the de-westernizing and decolonizing—global futures will be decided by many and not by one single power, be that the United States, the European Union, or China.

NOTES


3. To make a long story short, each time that I write “coloniality,” I just think about the other side, the darker and obscure side of “modernity.” And remember that there is not and cannot be modernity without coloniality. The reason why “coloniality” sounds odd and remains invisible is that the histories of modernity have been told from the perspective of modernity itself! As is often said, it is difficult to understand and feel poverty while standing in the marina in Marseilles, looking at the sun set in the Mediterranean. Of course, you can “conceive” of colonialism and “know” that there are poor people around. But that is a different story.


6. Illich, Deschooling.

8. See Natalia Vinel’s interview with Felipe Quipe. Quipe, also known as El Mallku, is a Bolivian indigenous activist and leader; he is finishing a PhD in history at the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés.


10. As far as the history of science is concerned, Mexico provides a good example to be contrasted with that of India; see: Gyan Prakash, Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Eli de Gortari, La Ciencia en la Historia de México (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 1979). As for the “original” scientific revolution, that is, the metropolitan one that gets exported to/adopted into the colonies, see: Lisa Jardine, Ingenious Pursuits: Building the Scientific Revolution (New York: Nan A. Talese Doubleday, 1999).


17. Ibid., 266.


20. Theologian, intellectual, and activist Ivan Illich advanced strong arguments in this direction. See his Deschooling Society.


26. See: Chomsky et al., Cold War and the University, and the NACLCA, Special Report on the Crisis of the Latin American University.


28. See Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe.

29. The complexity of interrelated issues such as “interculturalidad,” “plurinational state,” “the right of nature,” and “sumak kawsay” (all incorporated in the latest approved Constitution of Ecuador, 2009), have been addressed by Catherine Walsh in a well informed and argued book: Interculturalidad, Estado, Sociedad, Luchas (de) Colonials de Nuestra Ñpoca. (Quito: Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar Abya Yala, 2009). An interview with Catherine Walsh related to this book appears in Reartikutulacja 10 (October 2010), www.reartikutulacja.org/ ?p=674.

31. For more information about the structure and goals of the Universidad Intercultural, see: Luis Macas, “Como se forjó la Universidad Intercultural?” Boletín ICCI (Instituto Científico de Culturas Indígenas) RIMAY (October 2002). icci.nativeweb.org/boletin/19/macas.html; Luis Macas Ambuludi, and Alfredo Lozano, “Reflexiones en Torno al Proceso Colonizador y las Características de la Educación Universitaria en el Ecuador,” uinpci.nativeweb.org/docs/macas1.rar/macas1.html; and Luis Macas, “Fueling Destruction in the Amazon: Interview between the Multinational Monitor and Dr. Luis Macas, President of the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONALEP),” www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/41/042.html (Originally published in Multinational Monitor, April 1994).

32. See the special issue of the Boletín ICCI-RIMAY: it is entirely devoted to the Universidad Intercultural and provides ample information related to the issues I am bringing up here: Luis Macas, “Como se forjó la Universidad Intercultural?” Boletín ICCI-RIMAY: Publicación Mensual del Instituto Científico de Culturas Indígenas 2, no.19 (October 2000). icci.nativeweb.org/boletin/19/.


37. Taylor, “End of the University.”


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Chapter 3

Soft Power Goes Abroad

The Transplant University as a Western Outpost in the Arab Gulf States

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Globalization, defined as the movement of people, goods, and ideas out of the places where they were generated to different political jurisdictions is a process as old as human societies. What makes globalization qualitatively different today is the speed at which these transfers occur; the protection they receive from receiving as well as sending governments; the predatory competition they engender and nourish; and their radical democratization that guarantees that no country can expect to stay on top or even in the middle without constant effort. Transfers occur on real and virtual superhighways created by highly complex integrated systems of transportation and communication. They constitute strategic alliances in addition to trade and financial linkages that create webs of dependencies into which nations and people are drawn—perhaps sucked would be a better word—regardless of their individual desires and, for many, their dismay at the unprecedented levels of inequality arising from this process. Although one might assume that leaders of developed countries would not share the anxieties of their developing-country counterparts, globalization has brought fears of falling to policy makers there, too. Consequently, there is a confluence of interests between senders and receivers of transplants and, as I argue here, there is more harmony than conflict in their relationship.

In spite of its highly unequal returns, modern globalization is not entirely elite-generated or managed. Indeed, what alarms powerful international actors about globalization is how few of its outcomes they can control, and this unease is long-standing. The oil revolution of the early 1970s spawned a developed-country–based literature on international “interdependence” most of which lamented a state of affairs that left “sensitive” Western states “vulnerable” to “events” occurring in politically volatile—not to mention “backward”—lands outside their boundaries. Subaltern states were not the
only sources of uppity behavior. Individuals and groups as varied as peace activists, bird watchers, migrant workers, terrorists, and criminals also travel along globalization’s superhighways to far-off physical and virtual destinations. Indeed, the most profound impact of globalization might be its erasure of the boundaries that kept desire management within the power of states and regimes. Now the poor, the bypassed, and the disaffected construct their own visions of globalization and what it can do for them. Competition flourishes, but it is not merely a collection of “great power” jousts; it also features challenges from subaltern nations, ideas, bodies, and persons.

Globalization’s guiding ideology is neoliberalism, which travels hand in hand with domestic neoconservatism, most notably in English-speaking developed countries like Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States but also visible in Europe and Japan. The result for human beings and societies is acute socio-economic instability. Andrew Ross sees the expansion of “precarity,” structurally generated job insecurity, as one of its primary products. Formerly confined to various domestically-based reserve armies of capitalism, such as women, ethnic minorities, and illegal aliens, job insecurity now dogs the footsteps of Japanese salarymen, American attorneys, and Danish school teachers. Attempting to carve out politically protected markets, developed-country policy makers have striven to define and protect intellectual property. This has produced an equally intense drive to institute national cultural policies to govern how to develop and sell pieces of that intellectual property on international markets. Education is one of several such products, like cars and toothpaste, which comes complete with brand names and marketing strategies.

CANTHEARBGULFSTATESCOMPETE?

The 2003 Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) argued that there is an acute need to create “knowledge societies” in the Middle East. A knowledge society is able to mobilize, generate, and diffuse knowledge across a population so that individuals can make sound decisions and their societies can participate fully in a globally integrating world. A knowledge society is a concept that builds on the notion of sustainability, but it also accepts the neoliberal worldview of global integration as a development strategy. Development as a concept is problematic. Gilbert Rist argues quite convincingly that what it seems to represent best is the current fashionable academic and policy consensus in the West, whatever that might be at any time. Development as process and outcome is problematic nearly all the time and on many fronts in the Middle East where structural and cultural reasons, from poor infrastructure to “traditional” thinking, are offered to explain why the Arab world lags behind places like China and India even though, collectively, it spends more per capita on education and boasts a higher proportion of its population in post–high school study than they. The comparison of countries and regions reflects the key role of education and professionalization in how development is understood, especially from the perspective of governments seeking autonomy along with prosperity. Middle Eastern governments have long attempted to achieve both. The anxiety openly expressed in the AHDR with regard to education, and tacitly with regard to ideology and social customs, reflects the clash between “culture,” itself a floating signifier like “development,” and the structural changes that moving toward a knowledge society initiates.

The AHDR is critical of Arab education at every level. Its authors decry the dominant style of child rearing in the Arab world which they say is both authoritarian and overprotective. Social strictures block the education of women so thoroughly that “high rates of [female] illiteracy persist,” and neither state nor private-sector resources are sufficiently channeled into education, not even into primary schools, so that high levels of male illiteracy persist, too. Indeed, public spending on education region-wide actually declined between 1985 and 2003. Universities were singled out as deficient in producing knowledge and failing to lead to “collective learning” that “can contribute to finding solutions to problems affecting society at a particular time.”

In this chapter, I examine university-level education in the Arab Gulf states, focusing mainly on Kuwait, a country whose politics, society, and economy I have studied for almost 30 years. Universities are a primary site of professional socialization and training and, in the West, are integral to the constitution and operation of knowledge societies. Yet a broad consensus holds that university education in the Gulf is failing across a wide front. Programs and places in universities are insufficient to meet demand, and too few courses are offered for matriculated students to fulfill requirements for graduation in a timely manner. Quality assurance is a major preoccupation of education ministries, but concern is directed almost entirely to teaching rather than research, which A. B. Zahlan identifies as crucial to developing a knowledge society, or to service activities that could bring useful new knowledge to local communities. Equally problematic are the effects of censorship, which not only limit access to knowledge but also constrain the interrogation of what is known as well as the generation of new knowledge. Another regime-imposed impediment is state surveillance of communications, highlighted in the summer 2010 banning of Blackberry e-mail and chat services by Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the grounds that the state cannot monitor Blackberry’s encrypted messaging. Additional deficiencies limiting research include inadequate science policies, insufficient funding, and university policies and practices governing the professional obligations and work loads of faculty.
In earlier work on democratization in Kuwait, I found that education had made pervasive and generally successful contributions to the development of a constituency for political and economic liberalization, including support for minority and women's rights. This shows the flexibility of Arab and/or Islamic culture in response to new information and to the new status quo produced by a half century of female education and legal, although unequal, protection. In addressing the desirability of change, "culture" commonly is used as an excuse for inaction and politically motivated obstruction. The fear of retaliation for challenging the content of culture held by powerful officials and interest groups is certainly justified. It might be fear of retaliation framed as an attack on culture and/or religion that leads educational reformers in the Gulf to concentrate their efforts on policies to improve student preparation for local and international job markets rather than on the hot-button issues that undergird ideological and structural impediments to the generation and use of knowledge.

The contribution of education to the situation of new graduates certainly merits attention. Many face a long wait before they get their first jobs. Economists argue that this is a function of state (and private-sector) decisions to import labor much of which is cheaper and all of which is instantly exportable in the event of unrest. At the same time, however, potential employers complain about a dearth of job applicants with desired skills and attitudes toward work. Well before the AHDR was written, governments and citizens in the Gulf states were expressing dissatisfaction with the quality of education at domestic universities. Among the range of possible strategies for improving it, importing Western education models and practitioners and "transplanting" institutions has become the favored solution of Arab Gulf governments.

Transplants constitute a neoconservative education strategy. They introduce alternative and decidedly "foreign" education models directly into the domestic market. Officials hope that students will vote with their feet, putting pressure on national institutions to improve and enrich their offerings. They also resemble other GCC labor policies in that much of the "labor" at transplants is foreign, allowing university managers to sidestep structural issues like the effects on education of regime type and the nature and aims of governing coalitions because foreigners are foreclosed from local politics. Job insecurity enforces that proscription.

Such reverse dependency is compatible with the aims of Western educational institutions and governments which view consultancy and transplanted outposts as potential sources of revenue and opportunities for home-based faculty and students. Educators and policy makers are aware of the role of international education as an exercise of soft power which, along with study-abroad and academic-exchange programs, gives the sending country an advantage in the strategic and economic markets of the future by mediating a transfer of values, especially between democratic and authoritarian states. But as I argue below, imports and transplants face many of the same structural limitations that national institutions labor under, bringing into question just how well values transfers work in practice, while the values transfers that do occur not only work both ways but also sharpen distinctions between words and deeds that elites might prefer to be elided.

BEFORE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Even before the neoliberal vision had taken hold, ambitious young citizens of the Gulf states had sought professional and social status through studying abroad to earn university degrees. Most graduates found it easy to get jobs when they returned home, and generally performed well in them. Having been trained early in their country's oil industry development, before the mass education that oil money made possible, they were highly motivated themselves and enjoyed the support of family members and governments. They were required to meet rigorous standards throughout their academic careers while they enjoyed a degree of intellectual and social freedom unknown at home.

Structurally, the early cohorts of such degree-seeking, study-abroad students composed a small proportion of their age cohorts and returned to expanding economies with plenty of jobs for qualified nationals in the private and public sectors. As oil income transformed domestic economies, however, study-abroad returnees faced job competition from peers who had graduated from newly established national universities where learning and practice were "culturally" limited. Job qualifications became less important for university graduates because government employment was available to citizens unable to find work in the private sector or in state agencies requiring a high level of technical competence. Some graduates were unwilling to accept entry-level jobs, private-sector salaries, and working conditions more stringent than those governing state employees whose positions are highly paid and widely regarded as entitlements. University degrees, already viewed as optional acquisitions to many male students in the Gulf, became less clearly a preparation for professional life and more a credential for entitlements. During the late 1980s, a consultant group conducted a study of civil service employees in Kuwait and found in addition to high levels of overemployment, the awarding of jobs and promotions to individuals whose skill sets had little or nothing to do with their job descriptions.

A 2007 World Bank report noted that even though countries in the Middle East and North Africa had made great progress in educating growing
proportions of their populations, especially women, a gap persisted between them and other countries at similar levels of economic development. Three causes were proposed to explain this gap. First, that the quality of instruction locally is low; second, that the gap is an artifact of aggregating results from countries with very different levels of educational outcomes; and third, that variations in education within countries are large while research shows that a more equal distribution of “educational attainment” leads to higher economic growth. Among the recommendations of the study were suggestions that could have been taken directly from the AHDR: to change the content of education to incorporate both new subjects of study and a broader vision of what constitutes useful skills; and to provide multiple avenues for “post-compulsory” education, including continuing education for adults already in the workplace. The education establishments in the Arab Gulf countries had already embarked on multiple pathways for achieving these changes, and using a broader range of education exports was one route.

Expanding opportunities for university education at home has become especially attractive with regard to increasing the proportion of men among university graduates. A concern of policy makers in the region, male university enrolment lags behind female enrolment in most GCC states. Young men have a range of work options that do not require university degrees, from the military to family businesses. These options are scarce for women. Study abroad remains an option for good students but foreign university entrance requirements, visa issues, and a reluctance to leave friends and family make it less attractive than in the past, especially for marginal candidates. The result is a lopsided population distribution in national universities such that women outnumber men, and sometimes by very large proportions. More problematic socially is that these female students outclass men in terms of grades, although not necessarily in post-graduate employability, whether they perform as well as or better than their male peers or not. According to focus studies I performed in the region, expanding student options with regard to programs and university settings could entice more young men into higher education. The new private universities fill a niche that policy makers and citizens are anxious to see occupied.

**A KUWAITI EXAMPLE**

The American University of Kuwait (AUK) was established in 2003 and admitted its first students in 2004. Although its degree licenses are heavily weighted toward technical majors, a shift toward liberal arts education occurred immediately. As the AUK dean of academic affairs, Nizar Hamzeh told me in a 2010 interview: “[AUK] became, as of 2004, the main liberal arts institution of Kuwait. It makes AUK distinctive.”

Liberal arts are seen by professors and administrators at AUK as the gateway to “critical thinking,” and is the essence of the “American-ness” of the institution. This American contribution is defined as the antithesis of what is believed to be “traditional” education in the Arab world: an emphasis on rote learning, a mastery of specific skills, and immersion in a curriculum shaped by and taught through a religion presented as a set of immutable and unquestionable fact. Critical thinking involves the systematic questioning of received wisdom in pursuit of new knowledge. Instead of asking students to memorize unassailable facts, AUK advertises itself as committed to developing students’ capacities to challenge accepted verities, develop new ideas, and contribute to producing the knowledge societies envisioned in the 2003 AHDR. Students are assigned to read actual texts rather than mere summaries. They are encouraged to engage the texts directly, understand the main ideas, assess their validity and usefulness, and apply this knowledge to real-life situations. Achieving this goal has proven to be an arduous task thanks to the structural and cultural obstacles the AHDR deplored.

Some tension arises from state policies that diverge sharply from U.S. academic standards and attenuate the connection between AUK and American standards. Two are especially troublesome: compulsory gender segregation and censorship. Gender segregation is relatively new—when Kuwait University opened its doors in 1966, it was coeducational, although it also incorporated a women’s college permitting voluntary segregation. Almost 30 years later, the Kuwait National Assembly passed a law during the last days of the 1992 parliament decreeing that universities would have to segregate their classes by sex. The outcry from educators ensured that the law would be implemented slowly and reluctantly.

The dilatory tactics employed by university officials enraged Islamist advocates of gender segregation in and outside of parliament. The perfect opportunity to quash resistance from the education establishment occurred in early 2008 when then-Minister of Education Nouria Al-Subeih faced a vote of confidence following a parliamentary interpellation. Locally known as “grilling,” this required her to respond to questions during a session of the National Assembly dealing with news reports of illicit sexual behavior among low-level university employees. Behind-the-scenes negotiations produced enough votes to save Al-Subeih’s position in return for more rigorous enforcement of the gender segregation law. Although the stepped-up attention and monitoring of gender segregation that followed also provoked organized push-back from civil society groups the law still stands and AUK is required to enforce it. Indeed, enforcement is more rigorous at AUK and the other private universities in Kuwait than it is at Kuwait University (KU), the state’s flagship institution. KU is permitted to schedule up to 25 percent mixed classes whereas, at least theoretically,
there are no exceptions to gender segregation at the private universities although this is not entirely true in practice.

The impact of gender segregation at AUK is both less and more than one might expect. With regard to less, although classrooms and labs are segregated, along with seating at university events, there is no segregation in informal gathering spaces or at most student activities, including foreign trips, and a few mixed-gender classes are offered in spite of the rules, although this requires exemptions. Other efforts, however, such as the sexualization implicit in forced gender segregation, add to the burden on young people at an age where getting used to gender-integrated environments as a preparation for job markets and work places should be a priority. The insistent focus on segregation thus contributes to an unnecessarily sexualized atmosphere and, in the opinion of AUK students, sexualized behavior.44

Some disadvantages of gender segregation are gender specific. In interviews and focus groups at three Kuwaiti universities, students complained about the scarcity and consequent lack of variety in male-only classes in spite of the relative gender balance that characterizes AUK as compared to KU.45 Despite the greater balance in overall gender ratios, exceptions must be requested for a few mixed upper-level classes in some majors each semester, both to ensure that students will be able to graduate on time, and that these classes will attract enough students to allow them to be taught as part of a regular faculty load, which is not always the case when separate male and female sections must be offered.

In the classroom itself, the absence of the other sex affects the quality and content of education. Faculty members report generally minimal efforts from male students in segregated classes and notably greater ones in mixed classes. One male student in an AUK focus group confirmed this observation, saying that he worked harder in mixed classes because he didn’t want the girls to outperform him academically. Faculty members at all three universities report that female students are more likely to attend regularly, engage the material more energetically, and submit their work on time in both segregated and mixed classes. Yet women also lose out from segregation. One AUK faculty member noted that he incorporates current events in his classroom examples but, in female classes, few or no students are aware of them. In male classes, when he referred to something like the 2009 unrest in Honduras, several students knew about it and were able to contribute to the discussion of the event as well as to the development of the linkage between that event and the subject matter of the class. None of the girls in the corresponding female class knew about Honduras.

Even more destructive of AUK’s “American” educational environment is censorship. The government bans books, periodicals, web sites, and other forms of communication if they are judged to be insulting to the ruler and his family, contrary to accepted religious and family values, insulting to friendly governments, sexually explicit or deviant, or can be deemed offensive in other ways. These prohibitions apply to both domestic and foreign media. Aware of its position in the cross hairs of religious zealots and anti-westerners, AUK imposes even more stringent censorship on campus than one encounters in society outside. For example, access to streaming media and several blog sites are by default blocked on campus. Instructors can request access to such sites for teaching or research purposes but students cannot. Although Kuwait as a whole labors under a severe shortage of bandwidth, one rationale given for this policy, there also is concern that AUK could be accused of propagating dangerous, derogatory, or criminal materials.

Censorship extends to the classroom, where pressure from administrators contributes to self-censorship that limits discussion of taboo issues such as homosexuality, and makes discussion that impinges even tangentially on religion a potential minefield. In April 2007, the Kuwait Private Universities Council (PUC) sent a letter of complaint to AUK. The allegations in the letter were based on a newspaper article published by a student who appears to subscribe to conservative Islamic values:

[S]ome foreign professors working at private foreign universities in Kuwait (the American University of Kuwait) . . . are intentionally spreading the teachings of modernism which contradicts our Islamic religion, belief system, traditions and values of Kuwaiti society. These professors also promote their modernist ideas, waging a war against Islam and spreading the poetry and literature of sexuality, alcohol and immoral love in order to westernize youth. This calls for a collective and firm position to stop these westernizing intellectual satires. The [newspaper] article mentions that a female professor . . . is teaching a course against our uncontested Islamic religion, traditions and societal orthodoxies.46

Once again, the contest between an Islamist identity, which here is conflated with Kuwaiti identity, and the professed values of AUK and presumably other transplants, casts them as implacably opposed. Secularism, or the privatization of religion, is explicitly rejected by those sharing the viewpoint reproduced in the letter. In a country long noted for religious tolerance, “secularist” has become another epithet to hurl at professors who often are targets for other reasons.47

What usually is defined as a cultural issue by Western observers also presents difficulties. Some students routinely skip or come late to class, copy one another’s work, incorporate materials from unacknowledged sources, and/or purchase papers online. These behaviors are problems everywhere, and AUK faculty deal with them the same way that faculty at my home institution do: by checking attendance, proctoring examinations, and subscribing to online services that analyze papers and report on how much of them came
from sources available on the Internet. Peer culture at AUK interferes with these professional checks, however. Offending students’ peers are loyal to them as friends or classmates. Although U.S. students rarely report others’ “honor-code violations,” they seldom defend or abet them. In contrast, AUK students excuse, cover up, and try to compensate for them. Peer tolerance of academic dishonesty makes discipline difficult to impose, contributing to a culture of impunity and has a negative impact on student-teacher relations in the class as a whole.

Poor language skills also interfere with the kind of intellectual transformation that is one of the goals of transplant education. The need for remedial English is real and recognized at AUK, where a number of male students participating in focus groups said that the reason they had matriculated at AUK rather than studying abroad was that they had failed the TOEFL. Studying English in an English-speaking country increases the pressure on students to learn the language. Few such pressures exist at AUK where Arabic is the language most often heard in cafes and hallways, and fellow students act reflexively as informal translators for peers whose English-language skills are deficient. According to an interview with the Intensive English Director, Margaret Combs, although students’ spoken English is often quite good, their vocabulary and syntactical sophistication are limited; these are some reasons why some reading assignments are perceived as too difficult and not completed.

OUTPOSTS

Language and identity are deeply intertwined. The analytical goals set out in the vision of AUK’s first president, Shafeeq Ghabra, depend on students acquiring skills and techniques in a foreign language that are not generally taught to Kuwaiti students learning in Arabic. In a focus group I conducted with upper-level English literature majors at Kuwait University (KU), one student remarked that it was difficult for him to shift from classes taught in English to classes taught in Arabic because “the whole method of thinking and teaching the material is different.” Bilingualism is not simply a technical facility. It requires a shift in consciousness, body language, and facial expressions. Even though significant elements of the mother tongue persist, an English-language learning environment can rightfully be regarded as a fundamental challenge to customary modes of thought and behavior even in Kuwait.48

American-style teaching also represents a challenge to customary modes of thought and behavior. The content, organization, and teaching of courses in an “American” university demand regular attendance and a high level of performance in the classroom, including both organized and impromptu engagement in classes, regular interaction with faculty members, and multiple formal evaluations of assignments and other products of student work. These characteristics are evident in fine and performing arts instruction in Europe but are less common in undergraduate social science and humanities courses. The hands-on, do-more approach of U.S.-trained faculty in an “American” institution, according to my interviews with students, seems to those who are not used to it like endless struggles to perform on demand; however, this is part of the “rigor” that students—American and Kuwaiti—associate with American education. Because transplant faculty were educated in institutions in many different countries, and because they employ a broad range of teaching styles, it is easy for students who do not want to endure American-style rigor to choose a more laid-back approach, especially in electives. Everyone is aware that many students look for the easiest courses (e.g., Kushner interview), a strong selection pressure favoring faculty whose demands are light and grading standards low. Just because students get to vote with their feet does not mean they will all want to walk in the same direction.

The neoliberal approach to education is similar to neoliberal trade policies in that they create a climate that favors cost saving over quality. At privately owned transplants, the faculty experiences such race-to-the-bottom pressures in the form of increases in class size, teaching loads, and the student body as a whole. Most of the transplants offer an impressive array of student services and activities which constitute an important element in the high level of “customer” satisfaction expressed by students—and their absence is cited as a primary source of student dissatisfaction, according to focus groups in Kuwait and Bahrain. However, it is not services that make a university—the most consistently necessary element of university education is a dedicated and demanding faculty. Teaching is not analogous to manufacturing. A high-quality graduate is an artisan product.

The structural framework created by a mostly expatriate faculty working with minimal job security at a for-profit institution shifts education costs from the owners to the faculty. Expatriates work under limited-time, usually three-year contracts, and are ineligible for tenure. Long-term job security is tenuous at best and some administrators express concern about the ability of new PhDs, who still have professional reputations to create, to change jobs in the region much less to amass the kind of research record that would allow them to return to their home countries and find university positions there.49 Their precarity increases the longer they remain abroad unless they can juggle their teaching loads and research demands sufficiently to satisfy both professional obligations. At AUK, geographical location can discourage faculty attendance at professional meetings during the academic year,
limiting a professor's ability to find and participate in research communities with others who share their interests. Censorship and limitations on library resources, including interlibrary loan, also can constrain research productivity. Somewhat like the growing permanent academic underclass in the United States, composed of jobless PhDs who support themselves through poorly paid adjunct teaching, the conditions of employment at transplants make finding better academic jobs difficult, although the high demand for faculty throughout the region offers good prospects for finding other academic jobs.

Precarity is evident in other situations that are rare but not unknown, such as when a faculty member is discharged. If this happens for cause (violating a university regulation; violating a national law), it is bad enough for the university community. But some causes are questionable, such as discharging or not renewing a contract for a faculty member because he or she has been accused of offending the sensibilities of a vocal interest group. According to faculty members and students, this has occurred at AUK and also at NYIT in Bahrain. Having a good reputation is crucial for any university, and it is ironic that the private owners' fears that a faculty member targeted by a strong interest group (AUK—the writer of the letter to the PUC quoted above) or members of a pool of lucrative potential students (Saudi students at NYIT) could depress future applications and enrollment were the apparent reasons for the dismissal.\(^4\)

Contract renewal also is hostage to the personal likes and dislikes of supervisors and administrators. Once again, this is not merely a Kuwaiti problem but also affects individuals and members of subaltern groups in highly rule-bound cultures like the United States.\(^5\) Tenure, or contracts requiring strict adherence to formal procedures in which faculty members participate, that specify, in addition to the obligations of faculty, the economic and civil rights of accused persons are the only means faculty members have to mitigate their vulnerability to unjust termination of employment. This is inherently more difficult for expatriate employees.

Workloads increase in importance as administrators increase demands for faculty research productivity, putting faculty members in the position of balancing higher enrolment against research that raises academic visibility and prestige. The teaching load at AUK is 3/4, slightly higher than the average 3/3 load at schools in the United States that also emphasize teaching but include requirements that professors publish. Demands for research productivity have also changed at KU, where teaching loads are even heavier whether faculty members teach overloads or not because the average class size is much larger than at AUK. Yet many more faculty members at KU are Kuwaiti nationals, eligible for and protected by tenure whether or not they get promoted, while there is less pressure on them to engage in the high-effort teaching that is expected of faculty members at AUK.

Despite their vulnerability, mitigated to some extent by generous salaries and benefits, most faculty members teaching abroad enjoy their professional and personal lives. They like living abroad, especially in the Gulf where, in the words of one AUK instructor, "you are so close to other places." High salaries, a central location, and students who have been reared to respect adults and behave accordingly are strong attractions. These positive qualities, along with professional vulnerability, contribute to a mostly easily controlled workforce, just as they do with regard to expatriates working in other sectors in the Gulf economies. So what are the values transferred by the outposts?

**INTERDEPENDENCE**

In the Gulf, local owners and government officials set the terms of affiliation with foreign educational institutions, and local culture draws restraining parameters in terms of the exchange of educational values. Values, such as academic freedom as they appear in the United States and other countries, are controlled and limited, because such values are perceived as posing a threat to existing power structures. In both Kuwait and Bahrain, I heard stories from students that revolved around the lack of academic freedom accorded to students and, in Bahrain, also of a lack of academic freedom for professors. Students perceive the faculty's refusal to question limits on academic freedom as a form of hypocrisy. Due to the apparent acceptance by faculty members of restrictions arising from censorship and gender segregation, students call into question the very values the transplants are supposed to be transferring.

Students assume, however, that the faculty's role is to mitigate hypocrisy, and one way that this plays out in American-style education comes in the form of activities that depend on aspects of education that are independent of external motivation. Such aspects are important components of Western teaching which are highly valued, and inasmuch as they produce graduates accustomed to a nose-to-the-grindstone environment, they reinforce ideologies of work and neoliberal tenets of universalism however much or little they are adopted in any particular student's own life. Transplant institutions provide the creation of an intellectual environment that pushes students to achieve outside recognition as well as personal satisfaction.\(^6\) This reinforces the inner-directed value, thereby justifying the effort for students with family and peers who often do not sympathize with, much less share or even understand such satisfactions.
In the Gulf, the importance of having foreign workers registers on several levels of these nations' strategic planning and overall development. On a basic level owners of private institutions need transplant faculty members to attract customers and make profits. Foreign partners need transplants as resources in their own status competition, and also for the material benefits and access that transplant relationships confer on their students, faculty, and home campuses. The transplants themselves need strong faculty and must overcome the structural problems I have noted with regard to expatriate employment, such as the limits on academic freedom and exposure of injustices, in order to attract gifted faculty, prestigious partners, and eager applicants in the future.

The transplant relationship is one of interdependence rather than dependency. Each element in these international partnerships has some leverage available to carve out a space of autonomy, although leverage varies within and across groups depending on their resources and their willingness to bring them to the table. The ensemble formed by these islands of autonomy is a regime that, over time, rewards cooperative relationships and high performance among the various elements. Although some relationships have been sorely tried by the Great Recession, which helped to force the 2010 closure of the Michigan State University campus in Dubai, and others are so high-maintenance as to produce default decisions that are harmful to the joint enterprise as a whole, the transplants as a group are enjoying a much-deserved success in the Gulf.

GLOBALIZATION AND SOFT POWER

It is still early days, and uncertainties, especially the kind of economic uncertainties that underlay unfortunate outcomes in Dubai and Bahrain, are far from over. They do reveal, however, the existence and persistence of interests that could alter the current transplant regime. When I began my study of transplant institutions, I envisioned three images: differently sited constituencies, that the transplants have to satisfy; students and parents seeking a nurturing yet demanding environment within which young people can develop professionally, ethically, and emotionally; faculty seeking professional recognition as teachers and researchers in an environment within which they can build reputations for excellence; and governments, donors, and investors whose aims are directed toward what they expect of graduates: that they become good citizens and efficient workers within the parameters set by culture, politics, and the global economy. I assumed and continue to believe that these constituencies must be satisfied simultaneously, requiring that the content of their separate images of what is valuable and appropriate in the university setting be harmonious. Harmony depends on compatible, although not necessarily identical, values. If values change or shift at any level, they must be met with some sort of accommodation by the other two. At the approximate halfway point in my field work, I believe that some of the values reflected in transplant institutions have achieved a level of harmony that enables most of them to continue operating in the current mode.

One source of potential disharmony is the state of the global economy. The closure of the Michigan State outpost in Dubai is only one example that reveals the dependence of harmony on adequate financing, itself a product of realistic budgeting based on reasonable expectations among the denizens of all three images of the university. There are many ways in which this foundation can crumble. One arises from success, which is drawing more transplants into the Gulf region. Given a growing collection of alternatives, Michigan State could not attract enough applicants to qualify for admission to finance its operations. As a U.S. public university, it could not make up the operating deficit using funds from the state of Michigan. The Ras Al-Khaymah branch of George Mason University, another state school, was closed for similar reasons. The inability to find enough students able to meet admissions requirements was only one of its problems however. It also could not provide faculty from its home-country campus, a stable administration, or accreditation. Given current U.S. visa policies, matriculated local students could not rely on being able to finish their degrees or even do a semester abroad in the United States.

The reasons for these two failures in the UAE reflect the lack of available money to make up deficits in the two emirates involved. In contrast, Abu Dhabi, the source of most of the oil exported by the UAE, is financing a state-of-the-art branch campus of New York University while Qatar hosts a panoply of foreign institutions in its renovated “Education City” (Lewin 2008). The difference lies in the depth of the governments’ pockets in the latter cases, and the fact that the governments on the other end of the Michigan State and George Mason transactions had tightly zipped purses. There was no “funder of last resort” to bail these ventures out.

The difficulties encountered by the two state universities should not be seen as unique to transplants of public institutions. As more outposts are planted, competition for the limited number of students available will only increase. Globalization as the impetus for establishing transplants does not feature a non-Schumpeterian mechanism that signals when enough of a good is being provided. Gulf transplants could attract wealthy students from places like India and Pakistan, but as the number of providers rises, survival will depend more and more on the prestige of the sending institution and the willingness of the local government to make up any differences between transplant
incomes and obligations. Tuition increases alone cannot compensate for state support because they simply are not large enough. 59


The dependence of transplant success on host-government support reveals value systems in addition to capitalism that are part of the two-way values transfers that keep the regime operating. Indeed, the exercise of soft power is another. Each transplant operates under a contract between the host government and the sending institution. These agreements are limited in time and must be renegotiated. Either party can make demands the other cannot meet, including that costs be shifted, the type and quality of services be altered, and/or operations be changed in fundamental ways. Even though the physical plant of most transplants is provided by the host government, the loss of an overseas campus represents a collection of sunk costs to the sending institution, along with the end of income, access, and prestige. Like the situation between some of the very same host governments and the private and state-owned oil companies operating on their territories during the 1950s and 1960s, the balance of power is shifting to the host governments. As contracts are (or are not) reworked and renewed, the impact of globalization on international education will become clearer.

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11. Some of the discrepancy arises from adding all the Arab countries together and comparing them as a region, whereas funding and outcomes differ by state (e.g., Zaljan, “Higher Education.”)


15. Ibid., 36–7.

16. These are the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), i.e., Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), along with Iraq which is not discussed here.

17. This can be seen in the 2003 AHDR, and I have also found this to be true from the professionals in higher education in the Gulf region that I interviewed over the course of my field research.


23. Some inequalities are matters of religion, found in issues like inheritance, child custody upon divorce, lack of alimony, and polyandry. Others are customary, such as the greater restraints imposed by families on girl children.

24. Christopher Ohan, “Conditions of Kuwaiti Dependence: Labor and Security” (Paper presented at the panel on Multi-perspective Assessment of the Labor Market in Kuwait, May 15, 2007); and “The History of Liberal Arts Education and Implications
46. Ohan, “The History of Liberal Arts.”
47. Kuwait’s tradition of religious tolerance is noted in a variety of historical sources. See, for example, F. Breeze, “Kuwait before Oil: They Dynamics and Morphology of an Arab Port City,” in Gateways of Asia: Port Cities of Asia in the 13th–20th Century (London: Kegan Paul, 1997), quoted in Eran Segal, “Mercarts’ Networks in Kuwait: The Story of Yusef Al-Mazrui,” Middle Eastern Studies 45, no. 5 (2009): 711. The contemporary debate on the role of Islam in human rights discourse in the Arab world is highly polarized, a direct result of the strategy of confrontation reflected in the quote. See, for example, Amr Hamzawy, “Globalization and Human Rights: On a Current Debate among Arab Intellectuals,” in Human Rights in the Arab World: Independent Voices, ed. Anthony Chase and Amr Hamzawy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 51–68. That secularism is a dangerous western doctrine designed to undermine Islam was asserted by a student at AUK during an interchange with Aseel Al-Awadi, a member of parliament, when she met on-campus with students in March 2010.
49. Dottie Milligan Lewis, Dean, New York Institute of Technology (interview by author, Bahrain, May 2010).
50. The repercussions on applications and enrollment are magnified by their passage through governmental bodies such as the Ministry of Education (Bahrain) and the parliament (Kuwait). Islamists in these positions have been especially harsh toward reports of “misbehavior” by non-U.S. transplants.
52. Two such notable achievements during my field research at AUK were a highly professional performance of Waiting for Godot by theatre arts students under the direction of Christopher Gottschalk, and the capture of first place in the regional 2010 Microsoft Gulf Imagine Cup by a team of three computer science students mentored by professor Amir Zeid—see Menon 2010.
56. Ibid.
58. English Economist Joseph Schumpeter believed that new entries into a market brought “gales of creative destruction” when they forced old firms out. Capitalism
"... incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. It is what capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got to live in..." From Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 1942. The individuals blown away by these winds rarely take such a cavalier view of them.

59. Complaints about tuition were aired at length by both focus groups I ran at NYIT, although only two AUK students even mentioned it. Both were from wealthy families. I believe that the small number bringing up this issue in Kuwait was due to the availability since 2006 of what in practice are essentially need-based scholarships, coupled with the fact that these particular students were unhappy at being ineligible for them.

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Focus groups. Conducted with students and administrators in Bahrain and with students in Kuwait. March-May, 2010.


and critical writing to mean and how our students’ understanding of these concepts matches our own teaching and expectations.

11. Perhaps the students’ quite accurate definitions are the result of our insistence on addressing the concept at every turn. Perhaps this, too, is a rote response: telling us what we want to hear.

12. As Kaplan identified it. “Cultural Thought Patterns in Inter-Cultural Education,” 12.

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Conclusion

Kathryn L. Kleypas

One of the things that attracts me the most as I read and re-read these essays is the profound sense of responsibility taken by each of the authors. I do not mean responsibility as scholars to the production of excellent scholarship. (Although that is also true.) I mean a sense of responsibility to the ideal of the university—the institution which for better or for worse controls who we are as scholars by paying our salaries, choosing the type of research we do, and deciding the ways we spend our time. Each essay in this collection in the process of developing its own unique argument about the global university wrestles with the conflict inherent in the gap between what is and what he or she believes should be.

This project’s beginnings are imbricated in that very conflict. My co-editor James McDougall and I, during many conversations about such conflicts at our current American-style university, began to notice the relative dearth of scholarship on the type of institution where we had decided to devote a large part of our respective careers—there was no scholarship already in place to give us a vocabulary in which to describe the phenomena we were witnessing in our daily lives as professors at this institution.

Before immediately jumping to the task of filling in the gap in scholarship on the global university, we did a literature review on the subject of the university in general that brought us right away to Bill Readings’ The University in Ruins. Readings’s argument that modern notions of culture in this era of global capital moot the need for a university as we knew it is dire, but the conclusion, written right before Readings’ untimely death allows for optimism: “At this point, the university becomes no longer a model of the ideal society but rather a place where the impossibility of such models can be thought—practically thought, rather than under ideal conditions.” Similarly, as James McDougall notes in his introduction, Masao Miyoshi’s essay “‘Globalization,’ Culture
and the University” became central to our formations of this collection and its goals, especially his call for university professors to “fight back” and “form an alliance.” Finally, Andrew Ross’s 2009 book, Nice Work If You Can Get It, with its chapter on the global university inspired us in a multitude of ways, not least of which for me was the chapter ending which read: “It may be all too easy to conclude that the global university, as it takes shape, will emulate some of the conduct of the multinational corporations. It is much more of a challenge to grasp the consequences of the coevolution of knowledge-based firms and academic institutions. Yet understanding the latter may be more important if we are to imagine practical educational alternatives in a civilization that relies on mental labor to enrich its livelihood.”

It was these moments in the respective analyses, and others like them coming sometimes in the form of impulses rather than explicit expressions of optimism that gave me the confidence to ask if we might be to able add something meaningful to this body of knowledge by asking other scholars involved in American-style higher education outside of the United States to participate in this discussion with us. When we began contacting scholars with our idea, we were amazed and often humbled by the positive feedback we received, much of it in the form of the submissions here in this book. As this collection began to come together, I found a common thread in all of these essays in their underlying commitment to the future of the university as more than just a money-making operation for stakeholders. I am very proud of this collection, not only because of the top-notch essays but because each of the essays performs such an important role in the imagining of what the university should look like.

Analysts in this collection and elsewhere predict that the global university is going to keep growing and that the American-style university outside of the United States is only in its infancy and that the pressures of an ever-shifting global economy will push more and more professors out of the already-small tenure pool. This will make contingent employment at universities outside the United States more and more attractive to a larger number of scholars thus making the future of this style of institution of immediate importance to more and more people. We who are making our careers at a university, whether on the geographic terrain of the U.S. or at one of the American-style outposts, have an obligation to continue to think hard about what this means and what our role in the evolution of the institution is.

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