



The politics of “educating” the Philippine technocratic elite

Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem

To cite this article: Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem (2015): The politics of “educating” the Philippine technocratic elite, Philippine Political Science Journal, DOI: [10.1080/01154451.2015.1084748](https://doi.org/10.1080/01154451.2015.1084748)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01154451.2015.1084748>



Published online: 06 Oct 2015.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 7



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)

The politics of “educating” the Philippine technocratic elite

Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem*

Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines

(Received 5 March 2015; accepted 25 July 2015)

The literature on technocracy generally highlights the importance of its educational background and the consequent technical expertise it has acquired to serve an expanding and industrializing society. This has enabled it to obtain crucial positions in government and, more importantly, it has thrust technocracy into a power bloc of its own in its respective societies. In the Philippine experience, this is also true but only to a certain extent. This article, which uses the Marxist political economy framework, will show that what is more significant is not its educational background per se but the manner in which this has been shaped by the United States (US) in collusion with the country's politico-economic elites. In particular, its educational expertise was nurtured within the context of US geopolitical and economic interests in the region during the Cold War period. Technical expertise was expected to bring forth development that would be a bulwark against any form of insurgencies. Thus, technocracy's educational training would be used for the perpetuation of a capitalist ideology that would liberalize the economy, favor foreign investors, and be biased toward an export-oriented industrialization policy. This would be in tune with a faction of the country's elite that was expanding and would service or enter into joint ventures with US multinational corporations. More importantly, it would ultimately serve the interests of the state, which shared this same development perspective.

Keywords: Philippine technocracy; US education; technical expertise; the Cold War; politico-economic elites; President Ferdinand E. Marcos

Introduction

Most of the literature on the Philippines has generally focused on how the US has nurtured the country's politico-economic elites in its attempt to facilitate American political and economic interests in the country. This has generally been highlighted in the country's American colonial and post-colonial periods. This is rightly so. It is, however, also important to focus on the role of the ascendance of technocrats into the country's power elite as nurtured by US political and economic concerns. In relation to this, the literature on technocracy has generally focused on their acquisition of “technical expertise” as their distinct trait, which has enabled their entry into the elite clique of their respective countries. This was particularly seen also during the era of authoritarian regimes in Latin America and in Southeast Asia, for example. Such “technical expertise,” it is pointed out, is mainly due to their educational backgrounds, in particular their attainment of higher educational degrees from the west, i.e., the US. Thus, one would have references, for example, to the influential Indonesian technocrats of the Soeharto regime as the “Berkeley Mafia” as they obtained their graduate degrees from

*Email: teresatadem@gmail.com

the University of California, Berkeley (Sulfikar 2007; Shiraishi 2014) and Pinochet's powerful Chilean technocrats as the "Chicago Boys" having received their graduate degrees from the University of Chicago (Huneus 2000).

Moreover, their technical training is in the fields of engineering, economics, and the sciences. What is important to emphasize, however, is that the attainment of the technocracy's academic qualifications was very much shaped by the nature of the global and local political and economic contexts of the societies wherein they operated. In the Philippines, this was molded by American colonialism. Moreover, there was a deliberate orchestration by the US in the manner in which the Filipino technocrats would be shaped by their "education" through US financial assistance during the post-colonial period to further facilitate US political and economic dominance in the country.

This article, therefore, attempts to contribute to the existing but still sparse literature on the role of the US in shaping the Philippine technocracy through education in pursuit of its strategic goals in the region. More importantly, it seeks to go beyond the discussion of the extent of their educational expertise in government, as most technocracy literature has not done. The study uses the political economy framework, in general, which provides an understanding of the manner in which the emergence of technocracy can be understood globally and locally. This framework generally implies that political factors are important in determining economic outcomes, and "economic factors are crucial in determining political outcomes" (Heywood 2013, 129). In particular, it will focus on Marxist political economy, which "portrays capitalism as a system of class exploitation and treats social classes as the key economic actors" (Heywood 2013, 129). This framework will thus elucidate how the Philippine technocratic elites were educated to serve American interests in complicity with those of the country's politico-economic elites.

Using primary and secondary data, the first part of this article will discuss the global context that saw the emergence of technocracy and the importance of the acquisition of technical expertise through education. It will situate the Philippines within this environment. Given this situation, the second part will examine US strategies in educating the Philippine technocratic elite. And lastly, it will analyze how this has helped to facilitate the technocrats into becoming major players in the policy-making process.

This article draws from interviews conducted with Marcos' pre-martial law technocrats. These interviews were made under the three-year research project (2007–2010) on "Economic Policymaking and the Philippine Development Experience, 1960–1985: An Oral History Project," sponsored by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) where the author was a project member. Focus will be placed on the pre-martial law technocrats during the Marcos administration in 1965 because these technocrats went on to become the authoritarian regime's chief economic planners from 1972 to 1986. They became the main core of the Marcos technocrats who played a key role in economic policy-making and in accessing financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund/World Bank (IMF/WB) during the martial law years. Moreover, although technocrats were already being recruited into government, particularly during the Macapagal administration (1961–1965), it was during the Marcos pre-martial law administration that the bringing in of technocrats to public service was intensified. It was also under this administration that the phenomenon of recruiting technocrats from the academe, as epitomized by Virata, began. Previously, technocrats generally came from the politico-economic elites of Philippine society. Under Marcos' authoritarian regime, they were regarded as the third leg that propped up the dictatorship, the other two being the military and Marcos' relatives and cronies.

This article, therefore, focuses on the following technocrats:

Cesar E.A. Virata: Secretary to Minister¹ of Finance (1970–1986) and Prime Minister (1981–1986).²

Other positions in the pre-martial law administration: (1) Deputy Director-General for Investments of the Presidential Economic Staff and Undersecretary for Industry of the Department of Commerce and Industry from 1967 to 1968; (2) Director and Acting Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank from 1967 to 1969; (3) Co-Chairman of the Joint RP-US Trade and Investments Panel from 1967 to 1974; and (4) Chairman of the Board of Investments from 1968 to 1970.

Placido L. Mapa Jr.: Alternate Executive Director, World Bank, 1970–1974; Executive Director, World Bank, 1979–1980; Executive Director, International Monetary Fund, 1972; Director, Presidential Economic Staff (PES) (1966–1967); Director for Capital Transfer, Program Implementation Agency (PIA) (1965–1968); Chairman, Development Bank of the Philippines, 1976–1979; Director General, National Economic Development Authority and Minister of Economic Planning (1981–1986); President, Philippine National Bank, 1983–1986.

Positions held in the Macapagal administration (1961–1965): Director for Capital Transfer, PIA, 1962–1965; Deputy Director General, PIA, 1964–1965.

Vicente T. Paterno: Chairman of the Board of Investments (June 1970–July 1979); Minister of Industry (1974–1979); and Minister of Public Highways (July 1979–November 1980).

Manuel S. Alba: Executive Director, Presidential Commission to Survey Philippine Education, 1971–1973; Minister of Budget, 1981–1986; Deputy Director-General (Undersecretary) for Planning and Policy, 1975–1981; and

Armand Fabella: Central Bank Consultant, 1969–1989; and Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Reorganization, 1980.

Position held in the Macapagal administration: Director, PIA, 1962.

Of the technocrats interviewed, the highest number of interviews (13) was with Virata. This is understandable as he was considered to be Marcos' "chief technocrat" due to his key Cabinet positions. In particular, he was the main person in charge of accessing the Marcos administration's much needed IMF/WB loans to the country. The number of interviews conducted with the other technocrats was as follows: Mapa (3 interviews); Alba (3 interviews); Paterno (1 interview); and Fabella (1 interview).

The project team also tried several times to interview Gerardo Sicat, but he said he could not accommodate us. Sicat occupied the following government positions: Chairman, National Economic Council, 1970; Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and Secretary for Economic Planning, 1973–1980. In 2014, his book, *Cesar Virata: Life and Times: Through Four Decades of Philippine Economic History* was published. Sicat acknowledged in his book that he used the interviews the project conducted with Marcos' technocrats, which he considered to be a "valuable study and it provided a second source of additional oral history material aside from my one-on-one interview with the subject ..." (Sicat 2014, 787).

The global context and the emergence of technocracy

In pure technocracy, what is emphasized is that technical knowledge will serve as the base of power. Importance is thus placed on education and training, which provide

credentials for access to it. Moreover, “those who rule would justify themselves by appealing only to technical expertise grounded in scientific forms of knowledge ...” (Fischer 1990, 18). With this definition, technocrats are generally referred to as physicists, mathematicians, chemists, engineers, computer programmers, and others who work in varying degrees of applied or pure research (Glassman 1997, 84). In western industrialized societies, technocracy, as pointed out by C.W. Mills, is identified with the rise of the new middle class (NMC) after World War II with the emergence of the new technocratic-bureaucratic industrial capitalist economy (Glassman 1995, 161). What differentiates the NMC from the old middle class (OMC) for Mills is that the latter consists of “small businessmen, shopkeepers, farmers and professionals, as independent from economic and political control” (Glassman 1995, 161). Another major distinction is that the NMC is a college-educated middle class (Glassman 1997, 108).

In the case of the Philippines, there are US strategic interests and the Southeast Asian context to consider. The Philippines as well as its Southeast Asian neighbors could hardly identify with the developments in these industrialized societies, much less with the emergence of an NMC, as their societies in the aftermath of World War II remained agriculturally backwards. In the Philippine case, the landed elite dominated the economy with no signs at all of a prominent middle class as identified in the capitalist societies of their western counterparts. US strategic interests in Southeast Asia to ward off communism and domestic insurgencies in the 1950s and 1960s would, however, shape the region’s trajectory toward corporate capitalist development. Shiraishi attributes this phenomenon to “the promotion of a politics of development and productivity in Southeast Asia through a triangular trade system between the US, Japan and Southeast Asia; and the nurturing of a technocracy manned by US-trained economists” (Shiraishi 2005, 2). During the 1950s and 1960s, Southeast Asia had no means of resisting the “threat” posed by communist and domestic revolutionary forces except through social change. What would serve as the agent for such change in the absence of industrial capitalism was a development agenda to attain this. To achieve this, an authoritarian system was to be put in place with emphasis on “national building from above” of “developmental states.” One element of this project was “a program of Americanization in which the US invested in education and training to foster ‘experts’ who ‘spoke the same language’ and thought the same way as Americans” (Shiraishi, 2005, 5–6); thus the emergence and nurturing of technocracy by the US in the Southeast Asian region.

Education for all classes of society during the American colonial period

The global and regional context, discussed above, led to the emergence of the US in nurturing a technocratic elite in the country. Unlike in the other Southeast Asian countries, the seeds for this were already planted in the Philippines during the American colonial period. American education became an important tool in colonizing the country. As observed by Constantino (1975, 314), “the principal agent of Americanization was the public school system, which was free for all, and the master stroke of educational policy was the adoption of English as the medium of instruction.” Furthermore, “what initially spurred the establishment of public schools was the conviction of the military leaders that education was one of the best ways of promoting the pacification of the islands” (Constantino 1975, 314–315). Thus, the US Philippine Commission adopted much the same view as the military and on 21 January 1901, passed Act No. 74 “establishing a public school system with free public primary education and a

normal school in Manila where Filipino teachers were to be trained to take over the educational duties of American and civilian teachers” (Constantino 1975, 314–315). The mass public school system which the US introduced in this period helped to cement US hegemony in the various spheres of Philippine life (Rivera 2001, 232).

Technocrat from the middle class: Cesar E.A. Virata

The public school system introduced by the Americans enabled Filipinos from the middle and lower classes to avail themselves of the educational opportunities that used to be mainly the privilege of those in the upper classes. The Americans also established the University of the Philippines (UP) in 1908 as a secular school. This was unlike the universities during the Spanish period, which were run by religious orders.

For Virata, his middle class background enabled him to take advantage of the public school system. Virata began his primary schooling in Medicion Primary School in 1937 and continued his schooling at the New Baguio Central School (now Quezon Elementary School), a public elementary school (Sicat 2014, 19). During the war years, Virata continued his schooling at Imus Institute, a private school (Sicat 2014, 24). It was at UP where he graduated in high school in 1946 and he went to the UP College of Engineering, earning a BS in Mechanical Engineering in 1952. In that year, he also graduated *cum laude* with a BS in Business Administration from UP. Upon graduation, he accepted an invitation from Dean Jose Velmonte to join the UP College of Business Administration (UP CBA). He was appointed an instructor in 1952.³

Technocrat from the lower class: Manuel S. Alba

The public school system also facilitated the mobility of Filipinos belonging to the lower classes. This was the case for Manuel Alba who was born in 1939 and who came from a very poor family. He is the fourth of 11 children and hails from a town called Dueñas, Iloilo. His father was a municipal treasurer, in the lower rank of the government bureaucracy, and his mother was a housewife. They had no landholdings. His father, Alba said, simply worked hard and, as is common among Filipino families, they had an extended family system where everybody helped out.⁴ Alba, however, was able to take advantage of the public school system and he finished his elementary schooling at West Visayas State University (formerly Iloilo Normal School), graduating valedictorian of his class, after which he attended the Iloilo National High School, one of the biggest high schools in the Philippines and where he graduated valedictorian in 1953. He was only 14 years old when he went to college at UP, where he was also a working student. His older sister, who finished with a college teacher’s certificate, supported him. His other relatives also helped out. For Alba, going to UP was a great achievement as it was considered an iconic institution and being a UP alumnus is a “ticket to everywhere.”

Technocrat from the upper class: Placido L Mapa Jr

As for the technocrats who came from the upper class, their choice of school was generally either the Jesuit-run Ateneo de Manila or De La Salle College of the La Salle brothers. This was the case for Placido Mapa Jr. Mapa belongs to the landed sugar elite clan of Mapa-Ledesma-Lizares from the provinces of Iloilo and Negros Occidental.⁵ For grade school and high school, he went to De La Salle in the 1940s to 1950s, and for college he went to Ateneo.

The US role in establishing the academic foundation of the technocrats

Despite their class differences, what the technocrats had in common was the pursuit of higher educational degrees in the US.⁶ Technocrats from the upper class had their own personal funds to finance this. In the case of Mapa, when he graduated from Ateneo he was planning to take agriculture as his family owned enormous landholdings. His father, Placido Mapa Sr., however, persuaded him to take economics. Thus, he obtained an MA in Economics from the Jesuit-run St. Louis University, Missouri, USA in 1957 and a PhD in Economics from Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA in 1962. As for Paterno, he also personally funded his Masters of Business Administration (MBA) from Harvard University. Before that, he obtained a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering from UP. As for Fabella, he earned an AB in Economics from Harvard College in 1951.

For those who could not afford higher US education, the US government provided fellowships to make this possible. The first of these was the *pensionado* program instituted in 1903 which accelerated the production of Filipino transmission belts of colonial education. The first batch of young Filipinos chosen for “stateside” training numbered 100. By 1912, more than 200 young men and women had obtained their university degrees in the US (Constantino 1975, 316). An example of this was Virata’s father, who was a *pensionado* to Harvard University in 1922, graduating *magna cum laude* with a bachelor’s degree in math and in 1925 a master’s degree. He then pursued his PhD, initially at Harvard University, finishing it at Johns Hopkins University where his dissertation advisor from Harvard University had moved to.⁷ With his PhD, he continued to serve UP, where he was a professor. He went on to become the head of the Math Department.

The US also began to offer other fellowships for UP academics to pursue their higher degrees in the US. Cesar Virata was able to avail himself of this when he was a faculty member at the UP CBA and was given a fellowship by the Mutual Security Administration (MSA), a forerunner of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), to study at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. This was facilitated by UP CBA Dean Jose Velmonte. Virata graduated in 1953 with an MBA in Industrial Management.⁸ Velmonte also assisted Alba in getting a US fellowship to obtain an MBA specializing in Marketing and Transportation from the University of Minnesota in 1961. This was care of a fellowship from the USAID. He later received another fellowship to pursue a PhD in Management Science and Business Administration (with Marketing, Economics, Transportation Management, Operations Research and Social Psychology as specialized areas) at Northwestern University, Chicago and Evanston, Illinois, USA, which he obtained in 1967.⁹ Sicat, who was a UP faculty member in economics, also received a US fellowship to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) where he received a PhD in Economics in 1963. The practice of obtaining US fellowships for UP CBA faculty as well as former students continued when Virata became Dean, mainly through the Ford Foundation.¹⁰

US support in academic institution-building

The US not only provided fellowships for higher studies which helped shape the Philippine technocracy; it also allotted funds for academic institutions that would be the base of the future technocrats, namely in economics and business administration. As Virata pointed out, originally the Department of Economics was under the UP

CBA. However, the Rockefeller Foundation donated funds to UP that enabled the establishment of the Institute for Economic Development and Research (IEDR) and the construction of the economics library, later known as Benton Hall. The donation was given before Virata came in as Dean of the UP CBA in October 1960.¹¹

The perpetuation of the US capitalist ideology

US education afforded the technocrats a specific and common perspective on policy-making, which was determined by their shared social, educational, political, and professional backgrounds. This marks their effectiveness because, as pointed out, without such an ideological congruence, technocrats will remain relatively passive actors in a process dominated by other persons and institutions. Without such a link between identity and ideology, the significance of technocracy is severely limited. (Centeno 1993, 310)

The inculcation of the US economic perspective for Virata at the Wharton School was through all the classes he studied about American industry which he did not study at UP. These included topics on the economics of American industry in general and specific topics on American labor, the steel industry, and the automotive industry. They studied the characteristics and structure of each industry, the world economy, markets, location, and competition. While studying these subjects, Virata also studied money and banking and he took up cost accounting and advanced money and banking courses. For Virata, the Philippines was always on his mind. Although he found his courses quite interesting, he felt that practically one third of what he was studying there was not applicable to his country. He pointed out, for example, that the Philippines could not manufacture these products because of the scale needed.¹² Virata said that what he liked was what he learned from Frederick Taylor on scientific management. He also saw the relevance of Gilbreth's time and motion studies and work simplification. Virata's expertise in time and motion study would later become his niche as a consultant in the business community. With his country in mind, he also selected electrification in the Philippines in support of industrialization and community development as the topic of his thesis. One reason for this was because numerous factories were being set up as part of the country's industrialization program.¹³

As for Mapa, he was very much influenced by his Harvard economics professors and he particularly liked Evsey Domar, known for the Domar model for the investment multiplier effect. Mapa said that the heart and analytical part of his dissertation was the expansion of Domar's model, i.e., the investment multiplier model, except that this was for a closed economy. What Mapa did was to put in a coefficient for an open economy and this would take foreign exchange into account.¹⁴ Alba's doctoral dissertation, on the other hand, was inspired by his adviser, Philipp Kotler, whom he considers the guru of marketing. His dissertation topic was "Micro analysis of the socio-dynamics diffusion of innovation: a computer simulation model," for which he won the best doctoral dissertation.¹⁵

US-educated technocrats in the service of the business community

An important purpose of the technocrat's western training and education was to serve a business community that was attuned to the needs of the US economy in general. Moreover, the technocrats were not meant to be at the service of the masses but of the elites. With the expansion of the Philippine economy, technocratic expertise was in

demand. This seemed to reflect the worldwide trend in the need for technocrats. As noted, the concentration of capital had created a great mass of surplus value which requires handling and utilization. This created a need for various managers, accountants, lawyers, and economists to tend to the realization and reinvestment of these great profits. (Heffren 1982, 165)

Filipino technocrats were equipped to do this with their US degrees. The technocrats played a key role in facilitating the country's development. This came at a time in the 1950s when the country was experiencing a remarkable economic growth initially propelled by exchange controls and import-substitution, which saw the manufacturing sector grow at an average annual rate of 12 per cent, nurtured a generation of new middle-class rooted in the private business sector and outside the state bureaucracy. (Rivera 2001, 232)

UP in the 1950s provided the business community with the technical expertise it needed by allowing its faculty, particularly from the UP CBA, to work as consultants for local and multinational corporations. This was the case for Virata who, as an instructor at UP, worked for Federico Borromeo and Victor Lim in 1954 to improve the operations of the Philippine-American Drug Company (PADCO), Botica Boie, in terms of drug manufacturing, formulating, and bottling home remedies.¹⁶ At that time, Botica Boie was the foremost retail drug company in the country. It had branches in Cebu, Iloilo, and Davao. It represented many important American pharmaceutical companies in the Philippines, such as Parke Davis and Abbott. Borromeo had an undergraduate degree from MIT while Lim had taken some graduate studies at Harvard University (Sicat 2014, 65).

But it was not only the local economic elite with tie-ups with foreign companies who needed the technocrats, but also the elites who were expanding their personal business and even buying up American companies. The Lopez family, led by its patriarch Eugenio Lopez Sr., was an example of this, as seen in their purchase of Meralco which they bought together with a group of Filipino investors. The owner corporation in the US was called the General Public Utilities Corporation, or GPU.¹⁷ The Lopezes needed the technical expertise of Paterno, whom they hired in 1964 to help them confront the challenge for Meralco which at that time was the largest company and had already outstripped the capability of the Philippine banking system to provide guarantees for new foreign borrowings. Paterno's important task was to find ways by which they could offer collateral for foreign loans. Paterno found a solution to this through an instrument for collateralization derived from US practice, which was called mortgage trust indenture. Paterno describes the concept of the mortgage trust indenture as one indenture whereby one mortgages all of the assets into one mortgage document. This enabled Meralco then to add to the value of its trust indenture as one acquires new property and deduct value from it as one subtracts assets, e.g. through depreciation. As it goes up or down, the total value of one's assets is reflected in a document.¹⁸

Technocrats were also pulled into the financial sector, which was expanding during the 1950s. Mapa said that his economics degree enabled him to pursue a banking career and his first job was at the First National Citibank. Another technocrat, Sixto Roxas, who was the director-general, recruited him.¹⁹ Roxas graduated *summa cum laude* in economics from Ateneo de Manila. He went on to obtain an MA in Economics from the Jesuit-run Fordham University. It was also during this period whereby the accounting firm Sycip, Gorres, Velayo (SGV) became a heavy recruiter of graduates with business and economic expertise. Washington Sycip was setting up another unit in his Certified Public Accountancy practice that was focused on management consulting

following the US model. It was through the SGV that Virata, who worked there both as a consultant and later in a full-time capacity for a couple of years, got his exposure as a consultant for multinational corporations such as the agribusiness multinational corporation Dole Corporation which invested in a banana plantation in Davao.²⁰ The tie-up of this multinational corporation with the US academe was seen through by Herbert Cornuelle, who was both the chairman of the East-West Center and president of Dole Corporation in Hawaii. The controlling shareholder of Dole then was the Castle and Cooke Corporation, a very large conglomerate in Hawaii and on the West Coast.²¹ SGV also provided the link between the World Bank, the USAID and other bilateral agencies and the technocrats. This was mainly in terms of “monitoring technical assistance and loan projects supported by these development organizations” (Sicat 2014, 68).

During this period, the technocrats also continued to provide a strong link between the academe and the business community. When Virata left the academe to work full-time at SGV for a couple of years, he was eventually drawn back into teaching on the graduate program at night. De La Salle College, during this time, also asked UP faculty to come in as lecturers. Together with other academics, Virata was asked to organize the La Salle Graduate School of Business in 1958 and 1959.²² The technocrats helped to train future businessmen such as John Gokongwei, currently one of the richest *tail-pans* in the Philippines. At that time, Virata said that Gokongwei was already managing his Universal Robina Corporation (URC), which was producing corn starch and feeds.²³ Virata also observed that UP made it easy for academics with technocratic skills, like him, to service the business community. He pointed out that there were talks between Sycip and UP President Vicente Sinco concerning how he (Virata) could continue his professional practice while being Dean of UP CBA at the same time. In UP, the doctors, engineers, and other professionals were allowed to practice their professions. Sinco gave his permission for this to be possible.²⁴

Virata's experience with SGV in general, and with helping Dole set up a banana plantation in Mindanao, also gave him the incentive to integrate agricultural business courses at the UP CBA (Sicat 2014, 72). All these highlighted the role of the academe in pursuing the interests of the business community, which were allied with the interests of the US and its multinational corporations. This can be attributed to Virata's acquired technical expertise (Tadem 2012, 25).

US-educated technocrats in the service of the government

It was not only the business community that was in need of technical expertise, but the state as well. State interest in recruiting technocrats in the Philippines can best be understood in three contexts, which are not mutually exclusive but in fact are very much intertwined. One is Weber's view that “the growing size and complexity of the modern economy and the modern state would necessitate bureaucratic administration” (Glassman 1997, 77) whereby state technocrats and state managers would play a strategically critical role in the economy. In this situation, “social and political life was heavily influenced by views that the national interest should assume priority over vested interests, with the state naturally constituting the guardian of the former” (Robison and Goodman 1996, 7).

In the Philippines where society is dominated by a few politico-economic elites, however, the educational backgrounds of the technocrats would be seen more as a response to the specific requirement of a class and the role played by the state bour-

geoisie. As pointed out by neo-Marxists like Ralph Miliband, “top civil servants share the same educational and social background as industrialists and business managers, and therefore likely to share their ideas, prejudices and general outlook” (Heywood 2007, 384). And lastly, there is the US interest in the country in particular and in the Southeast Asian region in general, whereby western-trained technocrats were viewed as playing a pivotal role in the country’s economic policy-making process. This was the developmentalist role it saw for the state to become a bulwark against communism in the region. The experiences of the technocrats who occupied key government positions in the Macapagal administration (1961–1965) and the Marcos administrations from 1965 onwards give an idea of the dynamics of the contexts in which these western-trained technocrats were recruited into the state machinery.

Technical expertise in the service of family economic interests

In the case of Mapa, his family determined his joining the government service. This seemed to be the thrust of the landed elites, particularly in the sugar industry, who played a key role in the government policy-making process. A classic case is Alfredo Montelibano who came from the sugar landed elite of Negros Occidental and was the chair of the National Economic Council (NEC)²⁵ in the 1950s. Montelibano, who was also an industrialist and a politician, started his political career by running for public office in his province. As pointed out by Raquiza (2012), key policy-makers, even those known for their technical education and capacity, moved back and forth between their three worlds as politicians, government bureaucrats, and businessmen. In the process, they “never left their economic or political interests behind when they pursued planning or economic development policy.” This was also the case for the Mapa family. Mapa’s grandfather was a politician and was a member of the National Assembly during the Philippine Commonwealth period. Mapa’s father, on the other hand, was the Roxas administration’s (1946–1947) first Secretary of Trade and Commerce. He later joined the Quirino administration (1948–1953), where he was Secretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources as well as Chairman of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), which later became the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Mapa’s uncle, Oscar Ledesma, was Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources of the Mag-saysay administration (1953–1957). The positions of Mapa’s family, therefore, were in sync with their family interests in the sugar industry as well as in the area of banking as his family in the 1950s owned Metrobank.

Mapa’s father charted his son’s career in government when he joined the Macapagal administration’s Program Implementation Agency (PIA).²⁶ The PIA was organized to implement the government’s socio-economic plan. It was created on 24 August 1962 to provide President Diosdado Macapagal’s technical staff. The agency “conducted socio-economic planning, formulated policy recommendations, established priorities and programmed the utilization of public funds, manpower resources, materials and equipment” (*Official Directory of the Republic of the Philippines* 1955, 153). For Mapa, the PIA was an elite core of people from the private sector who joined the government because they were idealistic and their intention was to stay for a short time and contribute. They also got bright people from other departments and retained them in the PIA. For Mapa, it was a very effective and powerful office.²⁷ His first assignment in the agency was as head of the capital transfer division and he continued to be involved in money management. For Mapa, the transition from the private to the public sector was very easy, coming from a PhD in economics and with his practical banking training in Citibank.

During this period, the PIA technocrats pressed for an open door policy to foreign investments and foreign loans, mainly from the IMF. In the meantime, there was no turning back for Mapa. Under the Marcos administration, the PIA was dissolved on 1 February 1966, and in its place was established the Presidential Economic Staff (PES) through Executive Order No. 8. Mapa became its Director General. The creation of the PES was to differentiate it from Macapagal's PIA, but it basically had the same functions. The PES was also to have a major link to the Executive Office (Sicat 2014, 121). When Mapa was appointed as Undersecretary of Finance in 1965, he was also offered a bigger salary in Philamlife, an insurance company. This made him think of leaving government service as he now had a family to support. But when his father found out about his intention, Mapa Sr. told him that "he will take care of the salary difference."²⁸ By having a family member in key economic agencies in government, the Mapas were able to play a pivotal role in economic policy-making in government, which would be in tune with their interests. As Mapa Jr. said, he is for liberalization. This is understandable as this policy serves the economic interests of his family clan and other members of the elites who are sugar exporters.

Technical expertise in the service of state interests

Unlike Mapa, Virata, who does not belong to any political dynasty or economic clan, did not pursue any family interests when he joined government. The interest he was to serve was that of President Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was not part of the country's big landed elite class. The Marcoses are described as belonging to the middle sector of society from which the professional classes and civil servants were recruited (Daroy 1988, 17). Marcos' economic vision, however, coincided with the view of members of the politico-economic elites who were open to the liberalization of the economy, the entry of foreign investments and capital, and tie-ups with multinational corporations. Virata was recruited into government specifically for this purpose, leading him to assume several key economic positions in Marcos' pre-martial law government. Initially, Virata's position was an additional assignment to his basic appointment as a UP employee,²⁹ highlighting the tight link between the academe, specifically UP, and the government.

The recruitment of fellow technocrats

In the case of Virata, he played an active role in recruiting UP graduates or faculty members who shared his and Marcos' views to join them in government. Foremost of these was Sicat, whom Virata brought into government service in 1970 as head of the NEC, which had a prominent role in national development planning and policy formulation. Virata said that he agreed with Sicat's article, which he co-wrote with Gustav Ranis. This was published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and International Labor Organization (ILO) and is called the Ranis report. (UNDP/ILO 1974) The report advocated for trade and export liberalization. Virata said that Sicat had an appointment already at the Yale University Economic Growth Center.³⁰ Virata replaced Filemon Rodriguez, who was the NEC chair then and who wrote the country's industrialization and development plan which favored heavy industries for the core program. For Virata, such a view was anathema to liberalization as it would require some degree of protectionism.³¹ Virata was also responsible for recruiting Paterno into government. Paterno at that time was a lecturer at the UP CBA.³²

Technocracy in the service of US interests

Aside from servicing the business interests of the economic elites, the technocrats' education would also be vital for US concerns in the country. Even before the Cold War, because of their colonial ties with the US, the technocrats had already established close relationships with the US and its international agencies. This was seen, for example, in the experience of Leonides Virata, the uncle of Virata, who worked for the Central Bank of the Philippines, established in 1949. Among his initial work there was the task of preparing a country program which he had to present to the IMF, to the UN, and to the World Bank. He specifically had to estimate the gross national product (GNP) of the Philippines after the war.³³ Leonides was a government *pensionado* in 1941. He obtained an MBA from the University of Chicago. This was when the war broke out and he was taken in by the government in exile and he, together with other Filipinos, went to Washington DC and became an economic counselor.³⁴

The granting of independence in 1945, however, saw the emergence of "nationalist" economists in government agencies, which reflected the interests of a faction of the country's business community, as exemplified in the Philippine Chamber of Industries (PCI), which were into import substitution industries and protectionist policies. Under the Marcos administration, the technocrats who were for nationalization and industrialization were marginalized in favor of those for the export-oriented industrialization policy and more incentives for foreign investors. Thus, the PIA was replaced by the PES, headed by technocrats who were for further liberalization, led by Virata, Mapa, and Fabella. As for the NEC, where one would find the nationalist economists, this was dissolved.

These US interests would emerge in the biases of the economic agencies, as was exemplified in the Philippines. As Mapa pointed out, there was a debate between the more nationalistic NEC under Henares and the PIA under Sixto Roxas and later under Fabella which was more for an open door policy allowing for more foreign investments.³⁵ Henares was a technocrat who pursued graduate studies in economics at Harvard University but did not adhere to the development strategy that was being advocated by the US. Education, therefore, does not necessarily lead to alignment with orthodox capitalist ideology.

A consideration that could factor in relates to the technocrats' business interests, upon which the entry of foreign investors may impinge. Henares, for example, headed a multi-million peso business enterprise, manufacturing paints, chemicals, and such products as Mongol pencils, Crayola, and Parker Quink (UNTV 2015). This may very well have shaped his view that importance should be placed on industrialization via the propagation of import substitution industries, which was anathema to the IMF/World Bank thrust of export-oriented industrialization. This was unlike Mapa who, coming from the sugar landed elite, benefitted highly from the export of sugar, which was propagated during the American colonial period, thus the openness toward an export-oriented industrialization.

The sugar landed elite's openness to the export-oriented industrialization policy could, however, also be because no business interest is involved and it is based on their ideological belief. This can be seen with the nationalist economist, Harvard-educated Alejandro Lichauco, who served in the Congressional Planning Office, which is said to be the precursor of the National Economic Development Agency (NEDA). The NEDA was established in 1973. Together with other national economists and captains of industries such as Henares, Gil J. Puyat, Claro M. Recto, and Salvador Araneta, they formed

the Philippine Chamber of Industries which advocated for heavy nationalist industrialization and the “Filipino First Policy” in the mid-1950s. This for them was the way out of mass poverty. Lichauco supported the idea that Philippine national development is impossible under conditions of foreign economic and political domination (Locsin 2015; Braid 2015). The nationalist economists would find support in the Philippine Congress, foremost among whom was Senate President Gil Puyat, a politician, academic (he was former Dean of the UP CBA), and businessman. Puyat, who had interests in the banking sector and the steel and cement industries, among others, was also president of the National Economic Protectionist Association (NEPA). The NEPA was against the country’s liberalization.³⁶ During the Marcos pre-martial law administration, these were the major issues of contention among the politico-economic elites, which the technocrats had to deal with, not crony capitalism which burgeoned during the martial law period.³⁷

Virata’s ideological position would differ from these nationalist economists. Although he had no business interests, unlike Mapa, his adherence to the orthodox capitalist ideology that he developed while studying in the US was reinforced when he traveled to Taiwan and Korea and noted that the Philippine economy could stabilize if it had more exports like these countries.³⁸ The outcome of the US education of the technocrats is thus also very much shaped by the ideological inclinations, political, and economic interests as well as the experiences of the technocrats themselves. It is in this sense that technocrats also have their own agency.

It was Virata, Mapa, and the other technocrats who carried the orthodox capitalist ideology that Marcos pulled into his administration. They consequently became his conduits with US international agencies, particularly the World Bank and the IMF. Mapa narrated how, as the country’s World Bank Alternate Executive Director, he would come across his Harvard University economics professors when he would go to Washington DC for missions. He would, in particular, see his professors in international trade, Gottfried Habeler and James Stemple Duesenberry, who was the authority on monetary policy. They were among the economic advisers of President John F. Kennedy in the Treasury Department or the West Wing of the White House.³⁹

The role of universities was thus very important in perpetuating US interests and this was further magnified in the Philippines when technocrats took on government positions to institutionalize this. As narrated by Alba as Executive Director of the Presidential Commission to Survey Philippine Education, the Commission formulated the First Ten-Year Development Plan for education. This incorporated a list of development projects for education that the World Bank funded with US\$35 million. It was one of the biggest World Bank projects in education, and subsequently, after the Presidential Commission, the Educational Development Projects Implementing Task Force, or EDPITAF, was established to implement the projects. Fabella and Mapa served as members of this Commission,⁴⁰ highlighting the importance that technocrats placed on charting the country’s educational trajectory. Shiraishi, therefore, points out that given such a situation, “technocratic development in Southeast Asia (and elsewhere) can be understood as an extension and entrenchment of an American-centered technocratic network in Southeast Asia” (Shiraishi 2005, 6–7). In the Philippines during the Marcos pre-martial law administration, the emergence of such a network intensified at a time when the capitalist class was gradually expanding. Using Gramsci’s analysis, which Hedman (2006, 7) applies in studying Philippine civil society, the emergence of the Marcos technocrats, who are heavily US influenced, comes in the “... moments in history when long-term change in economic structures surfaces in immediate political

realignments which, in turn reflect shifting patterns of class formation.” One can relate this to Marcos’ US-educated technocrats bringing forth an economic vision of liberalization which favors the interests of one faction of the politico-economic elite over the other. In the process, with the support of the president, they are also able to marginalize or even eliminate the nationalist economists in government. These technocrats have formed what Gramsci would refer to as a “historic bloc of social forces during a critical moment of contested hegemony” and they also provide “an intellectual leadership of some kind which enables the assertion and maintenance of their hegemony as a bloc” (Hedman 2006, 7–8).

The technocrat’s dominance in economic policy-making, however, has perpetuated the adverse effects on the Philippine economy, as was seen during the American colonial period in the country. As pointed out by Kerkvliet (1979, 23), this encouraged the expansion of the capitalist economy, which favored American investors and wealthy Filipinos ... And the regime’s credit and banking allowances helped Filipino capitalists to invest in export-oriented business ventures. At the same time, the regime made the Philippines an open market for American manufactured goods and undermined Filipino industries. This not only stifled production of local consumer goods, but denied rural people alternative sources of jobs and incomes.

This led to unrest and rebellion, culminating in the formation of the *Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas* (PKP) or the old Communist Party of the Philippines in the mid-1930s and in 1969, the new Communist party of the Philippines (CPP), with the decimation of the PKP in 1957. This also came in the light of the resurgence of nationalism in the 1960s with a focus on the military bases, parity rights, and the Vietnam war, as seen in the context of the Cold War era (Daroy 1988, 2), which perpetuated the rise of the technocrats. The turning point was in 1970 when political and economic turmoil engulfed the country. This was aggravated by foreign investors, mostly Americans, who started coming in and investing in plantations, agricultural export crops, mining, and in the tire and drug industries (Daroy 1988, 11), which only favored the US and elite interests.

Furthermore, despite the World Bank programs on education, the reform movements in the schools “revolved around the issues of lowering tuition fee increases and the improvement of educational facilities.” (Daroy 1988, 3). A major arena of struggle was in the academic institutions whereby the student movement would provide the fuel to link the other sectors of society, particularly the workers and the peasants. Thus, although the technical or scientific training of intended specialists, as pointed out by Freire (1972, 127), does not bring about a conscientization that will spawn a revolutionary movement, its adverse effects may prove to be the opposite, as was the case in the Philippines.

Analysis and conclusion

This article has thus highlighted the crucial role played by the US in promoting the Philippine technocracy to become key players in the policy-making process of the country, with education playing a key role in this process. Although this could also be said of the manner in which the US did the same for the Philippine politico-economic elites, the US had a particular interest in how the technocrats were to feature not only in the business community but more importantly in government. This was very much shaped by the geo-strategic interests of the US in the region. The technocrats were to facilitate a particular development in society so as to make it a bulwark against com-

munist insurgencies during the Cold War era. Such a perspective was given impetus through the education they received in their post-graduate training.

Comparisons with the Southeast Asian experience

The Philippines makes for a good comparison with its other Southeast Asian neighbors who were also part of this US geo-strategic ambit and who shared similar experiences. In Thailand, for example, the Cold War era with Sarit's successful coup d'état on 20 October 1958, witnessed a marked shift from economic nationalism to economic liberalization and a new emphasis on private sector investments both locally and internationally (Shiraishi 2005, 72). The Philippines, however, offers a variant track as the perpetuation of American political and economic interests was already embedded in military and economic agreements during the US colonial period in the country.

Education was to play a crucial role to pursue this, as was seen in the mass public school system set up by the US, as well as the fellowship programs it instituted, particularly through the *pensionado* program in order to produce professionals for the country's bureaucracy. The technocrats were a product of this development. The acquisition, however, of technical expertise in an era when industrial capitalism was emerging and there was a growing need for a more interventionist state, which generally gives rise to technocracy, is not enough to explain its ascent. What this article has shown is the importance of the kind of education and technical expertise it acquired. That is, an education steeped in the development thrust of the US, which would inculcate a technical expertise that would be geared toward the promotion of a more open economy that would favor American investors, particularly their multinational corporations. It was also biased toward an export-oriented industrialization policy as opposed to a protectionist economy. The latter was the preference of politicians and economists whom the US viewed as "nationalists." The US also poured in economic assistance for short-term training programs in American universities as well as in building facilities, particularly in the University of the Philippines which provided the major pool of technocrats during this period. Focus was placed on their technical skills in the manufacturing sectors to allow for joint projects between local and foreign enterprises and to facilitate American multinational agribusiness interests, among others, in the country.

Such an experience can also find parallels with the country's Southeast Asian neighbors. In Indonesia, for example, the establishment of the Faculty of Economics at the University of Indonesia in the early 1950s was made possible through a grant from the Ford Foundation. Graduates from this faculty received Ford Foundation fellowships to undertake graduate studies in the US. As a result, by the early 1960s, the Faculty of Economics of the University of Indonesia had become an enclave of American economists and American-educated Indonesian economists. They were also sent to Indonesia from US universities to teach in the capacity of visiting professors (Shiraishi 2005, 6). Moreover, close attachments were forged between Indonesia's new economic technocrats and neo-classical economists in the World Bank and various Western universities. Western liberal economists heralded the rise of Soeharto's New Order in 1965 as the victory of rationality over ideology and of economics over politics. (Arndt 1967)

The Philippine politico-economic elites, i.e., the landed elites who controlled the country's economy and politics, also played a potent role in taking advantage of the technocrats' academic qualifications to further their (the elites') economic interests.

The technical expertise they acquired from US universities favored those who shared the same interests as the Americans. But more importantly, the role of the state,

particularly the economic bias of the leadership, i.e., the president, was crucial in determining the country's economic thrust. The US found itself an ally in President Marcos, who upon coming into power solidified the hegemony of the technocrats who were for a more open economy. This experience was also echoed in Thailand and Indonesia. In the case of the former, specific government bodies were created to oversee the promotion of private investments as a main component of liberalized economic development. There was the Office of the National Economic Development Board (which later became the National Economic and Social Development Board [NESDB]). This was created along with the Board of Investment (BOI). The policies of these agencies were incorporated into the National and Social Economic Development Plan (1972–1976). These policy changes continued well beyond Sarit's time and cemented close relations between the leaders of the Thai and US governments (Shiraishi 2005, 72). As for the latter, US-educated Indonesian economists were appointed to high-ranking posts in the government, foremost of which was the national economic development apparatus that emerged with the establishment of the National Development Planning Agency, government-affiliated development banks and the Government Board of Investment. These technocrats managed the Indonesian economy in cooperation with the IMF and the World Bank. Moreover, the Indonesian government also signed consulting contracts with the Harvard Center for International Development and investment banks such as the Lehman Brothers (Shiraishi 2005, 6).

Comparisons with the East Asian experience

Despite these similarities with their counterparts in Southeast Asia, an issue that emerges is why Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia moved on to be New Asian Tigers in the 1980s, unlike the Philippines. The country in the 1980s, particularly with the downfall of the dictatorship, even became known as the basket case of Asia. Such a comparison becomes magnified when one compares the Philippines with East Asia, i.e., Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, which also benefitted greatly from their western-trained and educated technocrats. It is in this sense that education plays a crucial role in providing the foundation for technocratic expertise, but the influence of this expertise is also very much shaped by the political economy of the society in which it is exercised. Deyo (1987) and Budiman (1988) bring several valuable insights to this aspect that make one reflect on the experience of technocrats in developing societies like the Philippines.

One factor is the composition of the elites in society. In the case of the Philippines, one has very well-entrenched landed elites or *hacenderos* with large tracts of land, similar to those found in Latin America. This is not the case in Taiwan and South Korea, which both underwent land reform under the auspices of the US after World War II. In the process, whatever semblance of landed elites they had were eliminated. Secondly, geo-strategically, Taiwan and South Korea were more important to the US than the Philippines was (Taiwan because of the China threat and South Korea because of the threat of North Korea/China). There was thus a lot at stake for the US in the successful development of Taiwan and South Korea. Because of this, much more US assistance was poured into these two East Asian countries compared to the Philippines. The question that emerges, therefore, is whether without such massive economic assistance from the US, would the US development paradigm, with an emphasis on export-oriented industrialization (EOI), have succeeded? A fourth aspect is the sense of nationalism in Taiwan, South Korea, and even Singapore to economically succeed for nationalist

reasons. For Taiwan, this was the place of refuge of the Chiang Kai Shek-led Kuomintang who fled with the success of the first communist revolution in the world, i.e., China, in 1949. As for South Korea, there was the immediate threat of an invasion from North Korea as they were divided only by a geographical border. For Singapore, its national pride was at stake as it was kicked out of the Malaysian federation. Thus, they strove not only to survive as a nation-state but, more pertinently, also to excel. The Philippines did not experience such compelling reasons for nationalism. On the contrary, the country's elites were beholden to the US for their political and economic survival. The country basically remained a colonial one, unlike the newly industrializing developing countries (NICs). The battle that emerged was against a communist insurgency spawned by massive poverty in the countryside. A fifth aspect of comparison is the timing. Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong, also referred to as the NICs, embarked on an EOI in the 1970s in the Asian region when no other country was doing this. The Philippines was a latecomer in the 1970s, making it more difficult to compete with these more established NICs. These are some domestic and external factors to keep in mind when examining the extent to which the educational background of the technocrats speaks for the success of their respective countries. This was highlighted in the Philippine experience, whereby the value and relevance of technocracy's technical expertise was very much determined by the country's politics and the state of the economy, which were very much affected by the global environment, particularly by US interests.

The experience of the Philippine technocrats thus makes for a relevant comparison with its fellow counterparts in developing countries. Importance is placed on how their technical expertise, acquired through their American education, was greatly shaped and nurtured by the US in collusion with the leadership and politico-economic elites who would profit from it. This was also greatly defined by the global and regional security contexts that impinged on the local politico-economic dynamics of Philippine society, in the process creating a new elite in the form of technocracy, the underpinnings of which were their US academic credentials.

Acknowledgments

The author wishes to thank the article's two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions but bears full responsibility for the views expressed here.

Funding

This work was funded by a UP System Enhanced Creative Work and Research Grant [grant number ECWRG 2015-1-028].

Notes

1. In 1981, the Philippines changed from a presidential to a presidential-parliamentary form of government, thus the change of title to Minister from Secretary for Cabinet officials.
2. For further details on the role of Virata during the martial law period, see Tadem 2012.
3. Virata, Cesar E.A. 2007. Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga, and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. Tape recording. 21 November. RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
4. Alba, Manuel. 2008. Interview by Yutaka Katayama and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. Tape recording. 12 December. Third World Studies Center, G/F Palma Hall, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines, Diliman.

5. Mapa, Placido. 2009. Interview by Yutaka Katayama and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. Tape recording. 13 March. Metrobank Plaza, Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City.
6. For further details on the role of education and the expansion of technocracy's social/cultural capital, see Tadem 2013.
7. Mapa, interview.
8. Virata, interview, 21 November 2007.
9. Alba, interview.
10. Virata, interview, 21 November 2007.
11. Virata, interview, 21 November 2007.
12. Virata, Cesar E.A. 2007. Interview by Cayetano Paderanga and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. Tape recording. 30 September. RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
13. Virata, interview, 30 September 2007.
14. Mapa, interview.
15. Alba, interview.
16. Virata, interview, 21 November 2007.
17. Paterno, Vicente. 2008. Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Teresa Encarnacion Tadem, and Temario Rivera. 13 March. Metrobank Plaza, Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City.
18. Paterno, interview.
19. Mapa, interview.
20. Virata, Cesar E.A. 2008. Interview by Cayetano Paderanga Jr. and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. Tape recording. 16 June. RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
21. Virata, interview, 16 June 2008.
22. Virata, Cesar E.A. 2007. Interview by Yutaka Katayama and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. Tape recording. 23 November. RCBC Plaza, Makati City, Philippines.
23. Virata, interview, 23 November 2007.
24. Virata, interview, 21 November 2007.
25. The National Economic Council (NEC), which was reconstituted by Secretary of Finance Miguel Cuaderno during the time of President Manuel Roxas (1946–1947), was tasked with preparing economic plans and defining the country's major economic policies and objectives. However, it has no implementing powers, except on foreign economic assistance (Araneta 1965, 247).
26. Mapa, interview.
27. Mapa, interview.
28. Mapa, interview.
29. Virata, interview, 21 November 2007.
30. The Economic Growth Center of Yale University has had the objective of studying and promoting understanding of the economic development process in low-income countries and how development is affected by trade and financial relations between these countries and those that developed earlier (Yale Economic Growth Center 2010).
31. Virata, interview, 21 November 2007.
32. Laya, Jaime. 2009. Interview by Yutaka Katayama, Cayetano Paderanga, and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. Tape recording. 9 February. 1000 United Nations Avenue corner San Marcelino St., Ermita, Manila 1007, Philippines.
33. Virata, interview, 23 November 2007.
34. Virata, interview, 23 November 2007.
35. Mapa, interview.
36. For further details on how the technocrats politically navigated the contending politico-economic elite factions, i.e., those who were for protectionism, heavy industrialization, and import substitution industries vs. those for liberalization and export-oriented industrialization, see Tadem 2012 and Tadem 2014.
37. For further details on how the technocrats dealt with crony capitalism during the martial law period, see the following: Tadem 2012 and Tadem 2013.
38. Virata, interview, 21 November 2007.
39. Mapa, interview.
40. Alba, interview.

Notes on contributor

Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem, PhD, is Professor of Political Science at the University of the Philippines, Diliman. Her other writings on the Philippine technocracy include topics on the politics of economic decision-making during the martial law period (1972–1986) and social capital and the martial law technocrats.

References

- Official Directory of the Republic of the Philippines*. 1955
- Araneta, S. 1965. *Economic Nationalism and Capitalism for All in a Directed Economy*. Rizal, Philippines: Araneta University Press
- Arndt, H. 1967. "Economic Disorder and Task Ahead." In *Soekarno's Guided Indonesia*, edited by T. K. Tan, 129–142. Brisbane: Jacaranda.
- Braid, Florangel. 2015. "The Legacy of Alejandro Lichauco." *Manila Bulletin*, May 25. <http://www.mb.com.ph/the-legacy-of-alejandro-lichauco>.
- Arief, Budiman. 1988. "The Political Economy of Industrialization in South Korea and Indonesia." *Kasarinlan: The Philippine Quarterly of Third World Studies* 4 (2): 25–32.
- Centeno, M. A. 1993. "The New Leviathan: The Dynamics and Limits of Technocracy." *Theory and Society* 22 (3): 307–335. doi:10.1007/BF00993531.
- Constantino, R. 1975. *The Philippines: A Past Revisited*. Quezon City: Renato Constantino.
- Daroy, P. Bn. 1988. *Dictatorship and Revolution: The Roots of People's Power*. Metro Manila, Philippines: Conspectus Foundation Incorporated.
- Fredric, Deyo. 1987. *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Fischer, F. 1990. *Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise*. London: Sage.
- Freire, P. 1972. *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Auckland, New Zealand: Penguin Education.
- Glassman, R. M. 1995. *The Middle Class and Democracy in Socio-historical Perspective*. Leiden and New York: E.J. Brill.
- Glassman, R. M. 1997. *The New Middle Class and Democracy in Global Perspective*. London: MacMillan Press Ltd.
- Eva-Lotta, Hedman. 2006. *In the Name of Civil Society: From Free Election Movements to People Power in the Philippines*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
- Heffren, M. 1982. "Ideology and Hegemonic Projects: The Alliance between Corporate Capital and the New Middle Classes in Early Twentieth-Century United States." In *Class and Social Development: A New Theory of the Middle-class*, edited by D. L. Johnson, 155–176. London: Sage.
- Heywood, A. 2007. *Politics*. 3rd ed. UK and US: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Heywood, A. 2013. *Politics*. 4th ed. UK and US: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Huneeus, C. 2000. *Journal of Latin American Studies* 32 (2): 461–501. doi:10.1017/S0022216X00005812.
- Kerkvliet, B. J. 1979. *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines*. Quezon City: New Day Publishers.
- Locsin, Joel. 2015. "Economist Alejandro Lichauco Passes Away at 87." *GMA News Online*. May 24. <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/492066/news/nation/economist-alejandro-lichauco-passes-away-at-87>.
- Raquiza, A. R. 2012. *State Structure, Policy Formation, and Economic Development in Southeast Asia: The Political Economy of Thailand and the Philippines*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Rivera, T. C. 2001. "The Middle-classes and Democratisation in the Philippines: From the Asian Crisis to the Ouster of Estrada." In *Southeast Asian Middle Classes: Prospects for Social Change and Democratisation*, edited by Abdul Rahman Embong, 230–260. Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan.
- Robison, R., and D. S. G. Goodman. 1996. "The New Rich in Asia: Economic Development, Social Status and Political Consciousness." In *The New Rich in Asia: Mobile phones, McDonalds and Middle-Class Revolution*, edited by R. Robison and D. S. G. Goodman, 1–16 London and New York: Routledge

- Shiraishi, Takashi. 2005. "Chapter 1: Introduction: States, Markets and Societies After the Asian Crisis." In *After the Crisis: Hegemony, Technocracy and Governance in Southeast Asia*, edited by T. Shiraishi and P. N. Abinales, 1–14. Kyoto University Press and Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press Kyoto.
- Shiraishi, Takashi. 2014. "Indonesian Technocracy in Transition: A Preliminary Analysis". *Southeast Asian Studies*. Vol. 3, No. 2, August 2014, pp. 255–281.
- Pathmanand, Ukrist. 2005. "Chapter 3: The Resurgence of US Government Influence on Thailand's Economy and Southeast Asia Policy." In *After the Crisis: Hegemony, Technocracy and Governance in Southeast Asia*, edited by T. Shiraishi and P. N. Abinales, 69–84. Kyoto University Press and Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press Kyoto.
- Sicat, G. 2014. *Cesar Virata Life and Times: Through Four Decades of Philippine Economic History*. Diliman, Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.
- Sulfikar, Amir. 2007. "Symbolic Power in a Technocratic Regime: The Reign of B. J. Habibie in New Order Indonesia." *Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 22 (1): 83–106. doi:10.1355/SJ22-1D.
- Tadem, T. S. E. 2012. "Philippine Technocracy as a Bulwark against Corruption: The Promise and the Pitfall." *Philippine Social Sciences Review* 64 (1): 99–124.
- Tadem, T. S. E. 2012. "Virata: The Trials and Tribulations of a 'Chief Technocrat'." *Philippine Political Science Journal* 33 (1): 23–37. doi:10.1080/01154451.2012.684515.
- Tadem, T. S. E. 2013. "Philippine Technocracy and the Politics of Economic Decision-making during the Martial Law Period (1972–1986)." *Social Science Diliman* 9 (2): 1–25.
- Tadem, T. S. E. 2013. "Social Capital and the Martial Law Technocracy: The Making and Unmaking of a Power Elite." *Kritika Kultura* 69–94. doi:10.13185/KK2013.02004.
- Tadem, T. S. E. 2014. "Philippine Technocracy and the Politics of Economic Decision-making: A Comparison of the Martial Law and Post-martial Law Periods." *Southeast Asian Studies* 3 (2): 345–381.
- UNDP/ILO. 1974 [Ranis Report]. *Sharing in Development: A programme of employment, equity and growth for the Philippines. Report of an inter-agency team financed by the United Nations Development Programme and organised by the International Labour Office*. Geneva: International Labour Office.
- UNTV. 2015. *Larry Henares UNTV*. Accessed July 19. <http://www.untvweb.com/hosts/larry-henares/>
- Yale Economic Growth Center. *Introduction Economic Growth Center*. Accessed March 23, 2010. <http://www.econ.yale.edu/~egcenter/>