Land and Natural Resource Redistribution in Zimbabwe: Access, Equity and Conflict

SAM MOYO

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the emergence of a complex socio-political and economic conflict over unequal land and natural resources control in Zimbabwe, focusing on the post independence period from 1980. Colonial expropriation of agricultural land and vast natural resource reservoirs, such as indigenous woodlands, water systems and wildlife resources, established a dualistic political-economic landscape characterised by competing resource ownership structures and multifaceted conflicts. Race dominance of natural resources by a white settler minority class of 4000 commercial farmers with an average of 200 hectares and large scale tourists operators, alongside large state controlled but leased forest and wildlife conservancies marginalized about 1.5 million peasants families, and other sub-alien classes from the access to key resources. The latter depend on natural resources for most of their basic livelihoods needs. Throughout the first 20 years of independence this extractive system remained unchanged and was worsened by increased demand for land by a growing rural and unemployed urban population. Neoliberal land reform and environmental management policies based on private property relations applied to commercial farmers’ land rights vis-à-vis ‘communal tenure’ and partially decentralized land and natural resources management systems, with limited financial and infrastructural investments failed to assuage historic grievances over resource control and the growing fragility of livelihoods among the poor. An export oriented structural
adjustment programme, favouring elite natural resources utilization and which led to wide economic decline, ignited popular struggles to regain land. A combination nationalist elite interests and peasants movements challenged the existing property relations of white minority and the ‘rule of law’ on which these inequities were founded, through a lands occupation or seizure process. A radical land redistribution programme based on land expropriation was initiated by the state in 2000, leading to the reallocation of the prime commercial lands to over 150 000 peasants and about 1600 new black sized farmers. While the redistribution resolved overarching inequities it has led to a series of political, economic and resource conflicts underlain by economic decline, and a second generation of inequities. Resolving these new resource conflicts remains a key challenge.

Introduction

Many conflicts in Africa are structured by socio-economic dominance over land and national resources. These resources are the key direct source of livelihood and wealth for the majority. They are also the means through which the poor pay for their education, health services, and hence a critical means to attain non-agricultural employment. The intensity of such conflicts however varies from one region to another, depending on specific histories of land concentration, the farming systems and political-economic structures that sustain resource inequalities (Moyo, 2004a).

The land and natural resource distribution and access question as a source of class, ethnic, racial and other political conflicts has tended to be underplayed in sub-Sahara Africa. This source of conflict has received some attention in former settler colonies (Zimbabwe, Republic of South Africa, Namibia) and in some mineral rich enclaves (Nigeria, Angola, Sierra Leone, etc.). Yet, this is the reason conflicts tend to be a common problem in many African countries, including in relatively stable economies and democracies. Resource conflict between populations in different regions, or ethnic groups is quite common throughout the continent. For example, pastoral groups compete for the control of grazing lands and water supplies, in various parts of the Sahel and Eastern Africa.

The land questions facing Africa are dominated by the negative effects of distorted settler-colonial decolonization, and the associated failure to address the national question, sustainable development and democracy, within the context of incomplete national democratic revolutions. While important differences exist in the nature of the African countries’ land
questions and ways in which these have been addressed, there are critical similarities in the fundamental socio-political and economic questions that fuel the persistent conflicts that arise from unequal land distribution and discriminatory land tenure systems (Moyo, 2004b).

An underlying major problem which confronts the land question in Africa is the continued increase in population among the peasantries in marginal and congested lands, without a net increase in the access to the maldistributed and underutilized arable lands, and a slow rate of growth in land productivity and agricultural intensification. Discriminatory land use policies and practices, and land tenure laws have tended to encourage underutilization of land or inefficient land use among large-scale farmers, who nonetheless have high levels of productivity on limited parts of the land they control. Yet, expanding the number of landholders through land redistribution could redress the land shortages and the patterns of insecurity of tenure that arise from maldistribution of land. Instead, African land reform policies have focused on reforming the regulation of land use and environmental management practices among smallholders, and reforming customary tenures towards market based land tenure systems, in the belief that these can lead to increased agricultural investment and intensification.

Land conflicts today result from grievances over, and struggles for access to land and natural resources by both the poor and emerging African (black) capitalist classes. Such grievances reflect the deep roots of social polarisation along racial and nationality lines. These arise historically from the discriminatory treatment of blacks on farms, mines and towns through a proletarianisation process based on land alienation and cheap labour mobilisation, and the persistence of racially inequitable development. The increasing radicalization of land acquisition approaches in Namibia and South Africa, and the growth of the tactic of land occupations in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region since the 1990’s are manifestations of this deeply rooted phenomenon of common grievances over the unresolved land questions, and the failure of markets or land owners to reallocate land to a broader constituency.

Some of the key sources of resources conflict arise from the fact that the central state has taken over the absolute right of land allocation, while local authorities usually remain legitimate in the eyes of the community and enjoy considerable political power over land management systems. The right of eminent domain and the power to allocate land rights tend not only to be perceived and claimed locally as fundamental to customary resource tenure systems, but defines the power of local authorities.

State control over land allocation and concession procedures by both
the colonial and independent African governments has tended however to be delegated to ‘elected’ rural councils through various forms of land allocation procedures (Delville, 1999), leading to conflicts between various formal law and customary land rights. Thus the general causes of land and natural resources conflict are colonial land expropriation, the contemporary grabbing and sale of communal land and favouritism in its allocation; partisan roles of security agents in mediating conflicts; the squatting in communal land; the commercialization of cattle rustling and competition over natural resources such as pasture, water and livestock; human and wildlife land use conflicts. In some regions in Africa political intimidation over resources control, including the use of illegal firearms, has become common. Historical colonial alliances over the control of land explain some of these conflicts. But land and resource based conflicts also reflect disputes over community territorial land and district borders.

But the legacy of settler colonial land expropriation remains the main source of conflict over land and natural resource control in Africa. Racial inequality in the control of or access to land in Africa has been most extreme in the former settler colonies, such as Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and Kenya. Indeed this led to radical land reforms in Mozambique (1976) and Zimbabwe (since 2000). The proportion of land held by racial minorities ranged from 87% in South Africa by 1994 to 50% and 30% in Zimbabwe by 1980 and 1999. The mobilisation of race and ethnicity over land distribution has been a complex socio-political process filled with numerous contradictions and conflicts.

Colonial land policies institutionalized racial inequity with regard to land in southern Africa. Recent attempts to confront the historical land expropriation and contemporary land-based inequities and discriminatory legislation and institutions, have generated renewed racial conflict in the sub-region. Land-related conflicts today increasingly arise from social initiatives to forcibly repossess rights to land and embedded natural resources. The greatest threat to security in southern Africa lies in unequal land ownership patterns in countries where poor people’s livelihoods depend on farming. Formal employment is unable to absorb the numerous unemployed, land-short, landless and homeless (Moyo, 2004a; 2004b; Tevera and Moyo, 2000).

Environmental security problems in the southern Africa region, arise from multiple processes of natural resource conflicts and environmental change which manifest themselves at various spatial and sectoral levels. These include conflicts at the inter-state and intra-state levels, the class and racial levels and at the local level. Changing power relations are driven largely by class and race-based inequitable control over natural resources, which govern the emerging patterns of environmental insecu-
rity and conflict in the region. The key environmental problems which underlie and define environmental security in the region include: (i) the resurgence of unresolved historical claims over national boundaries and land including the natural resources which are embedded in them; (ii) conflict over definition, security and realization of rights to land, water and other natural resources and (iii) conflicting authority and relations of governance between the state and civil society groupings (Tevera and Moyo, 2000). Problems of environmental security thus transcend militaristic conflicts or aggressive confrontations, given that local communities and nations are in constant struggle for resources to sustain their basic needs, often under unpredictable conditions of changing demographic patterns, droughts and reduced returns to commodity exports.

Land and Natural Resource Distribution in Zimbabwe: Patterns and Origins

The nature of rural (agricultural) landholdings has been skewed largely on racial grounds in terms of area allocated and farm sizes, a pattern that has changed slightly in a 16 year perspective before the implementation of the ‘Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP)’ (table 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farm Class</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1996</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number hectares</td>
<td>Number hectares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smallholder</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small to Medium Scale Commercial</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large Scale Commercial</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Estates</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>2.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Moyo, forthcoming.

However even with the two major races considerable differentiation of land size holdings have been typical, providing an extreme social categorisation and status of landholders. On the one hand, there are transnationals and what have been called the landed gentry comprising whites (Moyo, 1998) holding large estates and multiple farms with sizes of between 10,000 and over 100,000 hectares, pitted against black ‘kulaks’ holding between over 10 and 100 hectares depending on the agro-ecological region potential. On the other hand, the black landless and land poor dryland holdings of below 3 hectares were pitted against their relatively fewer large scale white landowners land sizes were on the lower
end, averaging 500 to 2,000 hectares. In addition to these numerous ‘squatters’ in various rural and peri-urban areas tended to occupy small plots of less than 1 hectare, and former farmworkers with informal access to below 1 hectare, at the mercy of white landowners. Land reform since 1980 gradually shifted the land distribution and holdings size patterns over time, as the comparative figures of 1980 and 1996 show.

Before FTLRP, over six million people lived in Zimbabwe’s marginal rural lands without fertile soils and reliable rainfall, lacking control of water rights and restricted from access to the bulk of the nation’s natural resources (Moyo, 2000a). Not only were communal farmers confined to the poorest land, but the size of land available to individual households was meagre. Thus, this put great pressure on soil resources given that most peasant farmers cannot afford fertilizer or other inputs to maintain soil fertility. By 1996, Zimbabwe had redistributed about 3.6 million hectares to approximately 70,000 families. Inequitable access to these resources meant that about 4,500 mainly white large farmers dominated Zimbabwe’s largely agrarian economy. Together with transnational capital, white agrarian interests controlled key sectors such as tourism, forestry, commodity exports and the narrow agro-industrial complex underlying its urban political economy. These imbalances dramatically skewed Zimbabwe’s income distribution structure, reflecting an unchanged legacy of colonial rule.

This distributional inequality was also reflected in the water and irrigation resources distribution in the 2 sectors. About 45% of stored water was in government-owned dams with the rest in some 5,700 dams found in the former large-scale commercial sector and privately owned plantation estates. This left the majority of the population, mainly in the communal areas with little access to these water resources of which they also lack the rights. Prior to the FTLRP, the large scale commercial sub-sector accounted for over 80 percent of the area under irrigation on about 1,500 commercial farms with the average irrigated area per farm being approximately 100 hectares. The dominance was due to generous state support in relation to land and water rights as well as financial support. By contrast, smallholder irrigation schemes in communal and resettlement areas, home to about 70 percent of the national population, in 1997 only had 12,900 hectares under irrigation. The operational capacity was 9,450 ha in some 306 schemes where farmers had average plot sizes ranging from 0.1 to 1 hectare.

As a result of unequal land distribution (quantity and quality), the distribution of forestry and wildlife resources in Zimbabwe was concentrated among the white community, the state, black elites and multinational companies. Since gaining proprietorship over wildlife in 1975, large-scale
commercial farm landowners had increased the amount of private land under wildlife in Zimbabwe from 1,700,000 ha to 3,000,000 ha. By 1994, more than 500 of Zimbabwe’s nearly 4,000 commercial farmers derived all or part of their income from wildlife and more than 75% of the private ranches were earning some revenue from wildlife (Moyo, 2000b). The large scale commercial farming (LSCF) area allocated to wildlife was increasing at the time at an annual rate of 6%, a significant trend given that approximately 35% of Zimbabwe’s land was in private hands. To conceal land underutilization and speculative uses of land, white commercial farmers and multinational companies tended to convert their land to wildlife ranching. Such lands were held in various shareholding structures that remained dominated by small groups of white landowners, excluded the majority blacks, who in turn contested such arrangements through the “illegal occupations” of lands. The tourism sector had excluded blacks, given that, in terms of marketing its products, it was regarded too technical for black smallholders, whom, it was argued, should concentrate on less-technical crops such as maize and sunflower rather than wildlife and horticulture (Moyo, 2003).

The project of subjugating blacks was underpinned by the discourses on environmental aestheticism (eco-culture, ecotourism), which claimed to preserve primordial black cultures as part of the image of the African wilderness. Thus, eco-tourism allocated monies to trickle into the landless black communities, while the bulk of benefits of land control rested with external financiers and safari operators. Many of the black, white and foreign elites tended to allocate themselves large tracts of land for commercial farming or tourism and, in addition, lobbied the state for favourable tourism policies (Moyo, 2000b). The marginalization of the majority of the people tended to create political conflicts with those minority groups who sought to control such benefits. The political and economic consequences of these problems were: poverty, enforced high population density in customary lands, land degradation, lack of resources to invest in adequate land management and political uncertainty.

Land Use, SAP and Social Impacts

Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) oriented policies since 1984/85 led to a gradual redefinition of Zimbabwe’s land question through the promotion of a qualitatively increased and intensifying rural economic differentiation among varied landholders and regions (Moyo, 2000b). Such differentiation is a result of the diversification of land use, labour management and commodity marketing, as well as of increased commercial crop and natural resources marketing, including sub-contractual
systems of farm production, increased foreign financing of exports and imports induced technological change during the 1990’s. The emergence of new and global markets for the products of rural land and natural resources, and the resultant land use conversions particularly towards extended field crop exports, wildlife management, horticultural export cropping, livestock exports and other tourism related land uses were key consequent trends. The class, racial and regional differentiation processes of these agrarian changes are fundamental to understanding contemporary land reform policy making, increasing rural poverty and the politics of economic nationalism and indigenisation (Moyo, 2000b; 2001).

The SAP type (1985-1989) and Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP) (1990-1997) reforms promoted land use diversification especially towards exports through introducing new forms of financing and marketing of commodities derived from land. The profitability of new land uses on the one hand, and growing poverty on the other hand, influenced the structure of demand for land. The land rights of the rural majority poor continued to be eroded by elite white and black large scale land owners who legitimised this inequity through the promise of dynamic economic growth based upon new land uses claiming to be productively superior to land uses established prior to ESAP type reforms (Moyo, 2000b; 2001).

Salient changes in the land use systems and underlying social relations of production, especially regarding intensified demand for land and its use shifted the organisation of agriculture. Horticulture provided for more intensive land use, high returns on relatively small area of land by many more farmers and workers in any agro-ecological location given the right inputs or technology. Economies of scale to land use in terms of farm size were diminishing for high value intensive farming, thus also reducing the importance of controlling monopoly capital to purchase large farms. Wildlife production encouraged extensive land use on larger sizes of marginal lands with reasonable financial returns. Increasing returns to wildlife ranching raised the margins at which productive land use could be undertaken and shifted the demand for land from prime natural regions towards the more marginal regions where mostly animals thrive today. Remoteness from infrastructures and towns, and the retention of given natural resources typical of remote areas add value to marginal lands (Moyo, 2000b; 2001).

Since the new land uses required different kinds of land, such as extensive woodlands for wildlife and irrigated lands for horticulture, the sites of land struggles also changed geographically. The pressure for survival amongst the poor increased and the increased scope for accumulation among elites grew. Increased export oriented production and related
social differentiation under ESAP thus broadened and intensified the demand for access to land, and the demand to participate in new higher value land uses. However only some of the more powerful social forces gained substantial access to land while others informally access land in piecemeal fashion. It is this expanded demand for land during ESAP, which defines the ideological struggles for land reform policy.

New land uses during Zimbabwe's structural adjustment programme era grew differentially. Larger than small farmers engaged in these new land uses on much larger areas than small farmers, led to differential benefits among the farmers. Even among blacks the elite had entered the new land uses more rapidly. About 50% of the large-scale commercial farmers engaged in the new land uses, although they combined this with other land use enterprises. Among Communal Area farmers, the maximum number of households involved in the new land uses amounted to 10% of the Communal Areas.

A major transition in the structure of land control, use and struggles thus emerged from ESAP, leading to major shifts in the organisational framework of the state and civil society in relation to land and agrarian resources. A variety of types of land user and related private sector interest groups, mainly divided between those which represent white, large scale formal sector hunters, market agents and, farmers and those which represent black (“indigenous”) smaller scale and more informal land user sector activities emerged. Similarly rural based Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) grew with a sharp racial and class divisions. The high profile NGOs engaged in policy influence tended to be externally and to some extent white dominated, while the mass based Community Based Organisations (CBO’s) and popular NGOs are black and rural based.

The substantive basis for this organisational differentiation reflects the historical but continued racially unequal structure of ownership, control and access to land and other rural productive resources, as well as of control over capital and commodity markets. Indeed even the national scale representativity of economic lobby organisations varies racially. The black organisations tend to canvass a wider population base, particularly of the small farmers in “Communal Areas”, and to seek policy support from urban workers, while the Commercial Farmers Union and other sectoral farmer associations, represent a smaller white population in LSCF areas. Within this spatial and institutional framework of policy lobbying, most black NGOs claim to articulate the development and policy requirements of the rural poor, a constituency which various NGOs and the state compete to influence. These differences are reflected in differing values held on land control and use, as well as in the nature of land reform policy changes sought by the various organisations.
Environmental Pressures and Degradation Patterns and Effects on Livelihoods

Before 2000, communal lands faced numerous problems of natural resource degradation because of skewed and segregated land distribution dating back to the colonial era. Overcrowding caused many people in communal areas to settle on riverbanks, steep slopes, grazing areas and fragile land that resulted in severe rates of resource degradation. This high population in communal areas on low potential land has been associated with high magnitudes of erosion. About a third of the 55 communal lands countrywide are severely affected by erosion on over 12 percent of their total land areas. In the former LSCF areas, numerous studies revealed that minimal erosion and not as much deforestation occurred as these areas were less densely populated and had relatively better soils than most communal areas.

Much of the literature on environmental degradation has either focused on measuring the quantities of soil erosion and the time-frame of deforestation, or commented on the quality of specific natural resource management practices in communal areas (Moyo, 1995). Research has tended to neglect the broader livelihood and survival strategies developed by peasant households within their environment. In this latter vein, without greater land distribution, technology transfer and investment in water development in communal areas, the reproduction of nature in these areas remains threatened. Incentives for alternative rural production activities to the extensive land and natural resources degrading requirements of communal areas are thus critical for sustainable development (Moyo, 1995). Some studies\(^1\) have pointed to the increasing “poaching” in the use of land and various natural resources outside the communal areas as the prevailing means of rural survival inside “besieged” communal areas.

Specific policy interventions such as rural afforestation, tree planting, grazing schemes and erosion management (streambank cultivation, dambo cultivation control and river basin management) have been promoted by the government, NGOs and external donors to halt the growing environment damage in communal areas. These schemes have tended, like their prevalent wildlife conservation counterpart schemes, to be focused more on physical protection and reconstruction than on household or community centered sustainability. Lacking economic incentives, environmental projects have received little popular support (Moyo, 1995) due to their neglect of the material socio-economic needs of the peasantry.

The pervasive dependence among communities on increasingly scarce land and natural resources for their survival, the dominant emerging social and economic tendency in the communities revolved around the competition for access to land and related resources (Moyo, 1995). Competing interests over these natural resources manifest themselves in the growth of markets for natural resources, divergent social values surrounding land and resource conservation practices, and direct conflicts of access to, and use, of given pieces of land and natural resources. The growing commodification of natural resources and intensifying conflicts over them, reflecting the unequal distribution of land ownership, control over and access to lands with such resources (Moyo, 1995).

**Land and Natural Resource Conflicts and Struggles**

The limited civil society involvement in land issues has relegated rural social movements on land reform to informal politics while giving prominence to more organized, middle class civic groups and policy organizations that typically advocate market-based methods of land reform and, liberal civic and political rights issues (Moyo, 2004c). Yet the race question of land reform persistently dominates land reform struggles and debate because the land to be redistributed is mainly expected to come from land largely owned by whites, while the black potential beneficiaries compete for redistribution and affirmative action along class lines, but in the common name of healing the wounds of past grievances.

This raises contradictory tendencies in the ideologies and foci of social movements, between those who struggle for access to social (land and broader resource redistribution) rights and those focused on political (civic and human) rights. Thus most civil society organisations, which are generally one issue oriented in their advocacy, have tended to divide along the lines of those with structuralist (redistributionist) and proceduralist (governance) perspectives of social and economic change, even though in reality both issues need to be addressed in calibrated combination.

Over the years however, the formal demand for radical or merely extensive land reform has tended to be submerged, especially in recent struggles for democratization, by the proceduralist thrust of civil society activism, much of which is ensconced within a neoliberal framework. This is reinforced by the fact that the balance of external aid, in Zimbabwe for example and elsewhere, has tilted in the last 5 years towards the support of governance activism. While such support is necessary, this trend has served to highlight mainly the issues of human rights and electoral transgressions by the state, to the detriment of the redress of structural and social rights issues. The exception here are food aid and
HIV/AIDS, and health, which defy the dichotomy and tend to be considered as basic humanitarian support.

Civil society discourses on land reform, therefore to the extent that these go beyond rule of law issues, have been focused on a critique of methods of land acquisition and allocation, without offering alternatives to land market acquisition and expropriation instruments, and without mobilizing the more deserving beneficiaries of land reform in support of extensive land reform in the face of resistance by landlords and other stakeholders. Because of the polarization of society on political party and ideological grounds in Zimbabwe for example, engaging the state in furtherance of land reform has been sacrificed for rejecting the administrative processes and legal rules applied in land reform, despite the legal challenges and resistance. Yet there is a fait accompli redistribution on the grounds (Nyoni, 2004) of this trend of civil society land advocacy is not conjunctural or limited to the Zimbabwe experience.

Historically, the radical demands for land reform or land redistribution were not made by an organized civil society. Under colonial rule, the land cause was led by the liberation movements, and in the 1970s, was pursued by means of armed struggle (Chitiyo, 2000). In the independence period, civil society land advocacy has been constrained by their predominantly middle class, social welfarist and neoliberal developmentalist values, which are in turn dependent on international aid. Meanwhile formal rural and urban community based organizations which seek land tend to be appendages of middle class driven intermediary civil society organizations while local land occupation movements have tended to be shunned by them (Moyo, 2003b). The rural operations of NGOs within a neoliberal framework have thus been characterized by demands for funds for small “development” projects aimed at a few selected beneficiaries (Moyo, Rapftopoulos and Makumbe, 2000), and have left a political and social vacuum in the leadership of the land reform agenda.

Advocacy for land reform in the region has increasingly been dominated by former liberation movements’ associations, scattered traditional leaders and spirit mediums, special interest groups and other narrowly based structures rather than by broadly based civil society organisations. Black indigenization or affirmative action lobbies, some with ethnoregional and gender foci, have on the other hand re-focused the land reform agenda, including the demand to “return of lost lands” more towards the de-racialization of the ownership base of commercial farmland, at times as a racial substitution formula for capitalist farming (Moyo, 2001). So far however a dual approach of land redistribution to large black and poor peasants remains on the formal or official land reform
agenda, even of resource allocations have tended to favour elites. However, large white farmer organizations, black technocrats and many NGOs, have tended to support the commercial farmer orientation of land redistribution in general, given their general tendency to believe in the inefficiency of small farmers. This has shifted policy discourses on the criteria for access to land, refocusing the redistribution vision from the “landless” and “insecure” towards the “capable,” and presumed “efficient”, indigenous agrarian capitalists, within the terms of the neoliberal global development paradigm.

**Land Occupations History (1980-1996)**

Over the years land occupations have traversed various land tenure categories: white owned commercial land, state land and communal lands (Moyo 2000b; 2003; Moyo and Yeros, 2004). Table 2 gives the synopsis of conflicts over land during the 1980-2000 period, of which the 1997-2000 period is discussed in later sections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Type of conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980-1985</td>
<td>• Rehabilitation, transition</td>
<td>• Squatting on abandoned farms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Farmers flight outside the country</td>
<td>• Some farmers did not take reconciliation seriously</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Accelerated resettlement scheme</td>
<td>• People not willing to go to resettlement for fear of being exploited by government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Beneficiary selection – anon issue</td>
<td>• Conflicts of new institutional structures versus traditional leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Prime minister’s directive creating Vidco and Wardcos</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-1989</td>
<td>• Blacks bidding for equal opportunities, affirmative action and empowerment</td>
<td>• Intolerance towards squatters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Growing demand for land expressed through poaching, streambank cultivation</td>
<td>• Violence against farm workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Subsidies on agriculture</td>
<td>• Prosecution of stream bank cultivators by government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ill treatment of farm workers</td>
<td>• Slow progress in meeting land reform targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Subsidies seen as drain on the fiscus yet government felt it has a social responsibility to its citizenry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Table 2 (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Land use which is the most</td>
<td>• Stakeholder participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>profitable</td>
<td>in land reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Land pressure due to</td>
<td>• Donor conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>retrenchments</td>
<td>• CFSS origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Farm leases</td>
<td>• Land occupations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Evictions for development</td>
<td>• Land and the constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Compensation for contributing</td>
<td>• Intense land occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the liberation struggle</td>
<td>• Draft constitution rejection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Land acquisition</td>
<td>• Amendment to the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Beneficiary selection</td>
<td>constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• State negative view of</td>
<td>• Reactionary civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wildlife in prime lands</td>
<td>movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Farmers diversifying into</td>
<td>• Donor conference promised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wildlife</td>
<td>much but delivered little</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Increasing squatters in</td>
<td>• Conflict over who pays for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communal areas</td>
<td>land and capital improvements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increased poaching of natural</td>
<td>• No transparency in beneficiary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resources</td>
<td>selection</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Corruption in the issuing of</td>
<td>• Nuanced debate on land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government leases</td>
<td>acquisition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Politically driven evictions</td>
<td>• Farmers against war veterans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Negative perception of farm</td>
<td>• Compulsory acquisition and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leases</td>
<td>change of constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conflict between government</td>
<td>• Rule of law 2000 versus rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and contesting commercial</td>
<td>of law before independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>farmers</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Farm workers women disabled</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and youths</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The first phase of land occupations can be termed one of ‘low profile, high intensity’ occupations. These occurred throughout the country, from 1980 to 1985, while a parallel process of ‘accelerated’ land resettlement financed mainly by British funds was initiated to formalise some of the occupations, and to assuage parallel land pressures. These early land occupations were led by landless communities inspired by war veterans, the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF), ‘dis-
sidents’ in Matebeleland, and by other leaders, such as the spirit mediums. They were tacitly supported by ZANU (PF) and Patriotic Front Zimbabwe African People Union (PF ZAPU) structures albeit without the public flaming of the political basis of the mobilisation. While government distanced itself from the occupations its leading lights financed them. Local ‘squatter’ communities made themselves beneficiaries by occupying mainly abandoned and under-utilised land, most of which was in the liberation war frontier zone of the Eastern Highlands. This ‘community-led’ occupation approach involved their local identification of land through its occupation, while the central government came into purchase such occupied lands at market prices, thereby formalising the occupations in what came to be known as then an ‘normal intensive land reform’.

The period between 1985 and 1996 witnessed what we can call in relative terms ‘normal low intensity occupations’. They took place in the context of dwindling resources for continued land resettlement and economic liberalisation, which resulted in many people losing their jobs in urban areas and the mines. During the 1990s landless communities increased ‘illegal’ occupations of land and poaching of natural resources in private, state and ‘communally’ owned lands, and in urban areas (Moyo and Yeros, 2004).

Thus the land occupations cannot be claimed to have been spontaneous. Zimbabwe hosts a facile debate, which oversimplifies the question of spontaneity of land occupations vis-à-vis politically mobilised occupants. In my analysis rarely in the years have occupations been spontaneous, since they were mostly planned through either the liberation movement, local Member of Parliament (MPs) and party structures. While the intensity of political support to the occupants may differ in form between the 1980’s and 1997/2000 period, the substance has been similar. Even when the state practiced extensive evictions of ‘squatters’ during the 1985-1993 period, they turned a blind eye and used kid gloves on the many other squatter cases. This led landowners to attempt their own evictions of which were even more brutal than the state’s. However, the government has also used forced evictions to restrain land occupations, especially during the transition to the liberalised economic policy framework. The brutality with which these evictions were carried out, both by police and farmers, were reminiscent of colonial era evictions carried out in the decades prior to independence (Moyo, 2003). This was coupled with increasing violence by property owners, particularly white farmers, against illegal occupants, often with implicit or explicit state approval.
Land ‘self-provisioning’ or popular struggles for land have been circumscribed by the central government through its ‘squatter policy’, regular promises of land redistribution and other agricultural support schemes intended to improve the intensity of communal area land use and returns in situ. This approach has tended to be either state facilitated and formalized, or repressed by the state at various points in time (Moyo, 2000b; Raftopoulos, 2003; Alexander, 2003 and Marongwe, 2003). However, ‘squatting’ as a concept is problematic and manipulable because the term gains meaning within a particular moral framework that is codified as ‘law’ by the state. Shiku points out that Rhodesian law defined a squatter as ‘an African whose house happens to be situated in an area which has been declared European or is set apart for some other reason’ (Shiku, 2002). In any case, the squatter policy failed to stem squatting, mainly because of legitimacy problems at the local level. Instead demands for land redistribution grew among the poor due to growing poverty and the retrenchment of workers, as well as among the wealthier due to their expanding focus on accumulating capital through emerging markets based on land and natural resource uses.

The severe drought during the 1991-92 farming season led to extensive commercial farm retrenchments adding to the pressure on communal area land resources (Moyo, 2000b; Chitiyo, 2000). During this period the state had a legal framework to resolve the land question through compulsory land acquisition but did not succeed in using the instrument. The grounds for severe conflicts were created during this time, as captured in recent research on new land uses in the Mashonaland provinces (Moyo, 2000b).

**New Settlers versus Landlords and Farm Workers**

In the face of strong post-liberation war movements demanding access to land, the white farmers appear to have sought political solace through the opposition movements (Moyo, forthcoming). The economic decline in the 1990s, coinciding with threats of compulsory land acquisition, opened the scope for white farmers for the first time to take an open political path to protect their interests. White farmer participation in the constitutional politics of 1999 to protect their land rights took the form of support for the opposition MDC and mobilisation of farm worker to vote against the government proposed constitution in the referendum of February 2000. It was also alleged by the government that the farmers were responsible for financially supporting the MDC and various propaganda campaigns. Nevertheless, while Zimbabwe’s opposition MDC pursued a valid demand for democratization within a liberal electoral
and human rights framework, their ‘social democratic’ demands paid limited attention to the redistribution of land and natural resources and indigenous economic empowerment. Indeed they tended to present land reform as a non-political issue which ought to be determined by economic considerations alone.

When land occupations took place in 1998, farm workers tended not to take part in them and were instead co-opted by land owners, leading to violent clashes between then and land occupiers. The sporadic violence saw four farmers, 11 farm workers, and a policeman being killed. Many more people were injured. The intensity of the violence and how it was reported in the media became contested in propaganda campaigns, which suggested that the land occupations were widespread throughout the country. While the war veterans land occupation strategy in terms of scale, focus and distribution of land occupations has not been publicised, they tended not to refute the exaggerated scale of the occupations. Indeed the urban dimension of land occupations, which was intended to remobilise urban support for land reform and thus for Zanu PF also broadened the strategic focus of the “land movement” or the ‘land revolution’.

There were also alleged cases of buying or renting crowds by war veterans and the ruling party prior to the elections, with the twin objective of intensifying the scale of occupations (given the importance of the human element, to be left on an invaded farm) and also assisting in the election campaign. The war veterans were not initially in a negotiating mood as they sought an outright win-win situation with no compromise. This culminated in violent confrontations with farmers ganging up together with farm workers to evict the war veterans.

**International Dimension of Land Reform:**

**Conflict with UK**

The differences between the UK government and the GoZ focused on the former’s narrowly based principles, such as its poverty reduction approach to land reform and its approach to defining the economic benefits expected from land reform in Zimbabwe, *vis-à-vis* the latter’s contention that the central land reform issue was of redressing historic injustices and related social and racial imbalances (Moyo, forthcoming). Thus a narrow approach to social injustice and neglect of the need for racial balancing of land ownership, coupled with an emphasis on linking land reform to wider macro-economic and governance reform issues were the Achilles’ heel of UK stance. The GoZ argued that these were unprincipled negotiating positions since they merely served as delaying
and diversionary tactics vis-à-vis the UK’s colonial responsibility on land restoration.

In turn the UK government and other donors argued that the GoZ’s land reform approach was unacceptable because of the following alleged weaknesses:

- the process of land identification for compulsory acquisition was not transparent and its outcomes were unfair especially for single farm owners and those fully utilizing their land;
- that compulsory acquisition did not differentiate between those who had recently (since 1980) bought their land from those landowners who had gotten land illegitimately through historic expropriation, and that there were now very few of the latter;
- that the compulsory land acquisition instrument undermines property rights, whereas land could easily be delivered through the market on willing seller-willing buyer principles;
- that political opponents were being targeted for compulsory land acquisition or land occupations;
- that the GoZ tended to allocate rather small budgets for land reform although it was a political and policy priority;
- that the government controlled state lands are not being offered to resettlement, suggesting little commitment to land redistribution; and
- that the beneficiary selection process was not transparent and discriminatory on political grounds, and favoured elites.

The GoZ in turn saw these arguments as a sign of the British government refusing to acknowledge that colonial land expropriation was the main problem and that the legitimacy of white farmers’ land rights and the existing land market was questionable. Furthermore that the UK was reneging on promises made at Lancaster House Agreement to finance land acquisition. And, that the various problems faced in market land reform were being ignored by the UK, to the detriment of land redistribution.

The reaction to this debate by the GoZ was the constitutional amendment of 2000 which absolved the GoZ from compensating for land and that it would create a fund in which the former colonial power may deposit requisite monies to compensate for the soil. The GoZ would only be obliged to pay for improvements, and even here it may deduct from the sale price the value generated from previous government subsidies, which had accrued to landowners. In this way the impasse between the two parties remained for four years, during which the FTLRP implemented partly as an assertion of GoZ sovereignty on land property rights.
An attempt to acquire land for redistribution to smallholder farmers in 1997 through the gazetting of 1,471 farms was the epitome of the land reform programme (Moyo, 2000a). The state had already transferred over 3.5 million hectares to some 70,000 families. In retrospect, the question that lingered was whether this bid for land acquisition signified a final resolve to tackle the land question once and for all. However, most of the farms which were listed for acquisition were de-listed by the government for various reasons outlined below. The main reason given by government for delisting farms was the need to conform to or adapt land acquisition policy to the objectives of the broader government land tenure policy. That policy aims to uphold the general principle of “one man, one farm”, whereby the commercial land ownership or tenure rights of each Zimbabwean who already holds land are protected if they hold one reasonably-sized farm. This meant that as much as 69% of the identified farms may have been identified mistakenly because they were wrongly thought to be multiple-owned or due to problems with the existing land records. A total of 430 farms were de-listed on the grounds that titleholders owned only one farm. There were 894 single farm titleholders on the original acquisition list, so de-listings on this basis accounted for 48% of singly-owned farms. In addition, about 109 farms were de-listed because they were held by indigenous (black) owners. This figure accounts for 82% of the originally listed farms under black titleholders.

A third issue concerned the productivity of the listed farms. Many analysts feared the consequences of acquiring productive farms, especially those on which investments were committed and promising. They believed that such land acquisitions contradicted government policy on attractive private investment, and so the farms should be de-listed. This reason for de-listing did not prove a major consideration. A few such cases of de-listing occurred, including established and new plantations (coffee, tea, timber), mining and tourism projects. But only 50 farms covering 179,085 hectares fell into this de-listing category, and over 55% of this land was held by parastatals. While this issue had attracted much criticism, the privately-owned area of such land affected by the identification process was in fact relatively small. A fourth reason given for de-listing farms was to protect and promote the wider development contributions that the farms offered. A few farms were de-listed following the pleas of local officials who argued that they offered jobs and services. The final reason given by the government for delisting farms was of social nature. Churches and social clubs are significant landowners in Zimbabwe and
it was ruled that their social benefits should not be undermined by land acquisition process and only four farms were affected in this case. Of the original identification list, 847 farms remained after the de-listing exercise. Of the remaining, 500 farms were struck off by the administrative court in early 1999. The legal procedures required in the compulsory acquisition were so cumbersome and time-bound that the authorities could not cope. This frustrated some elements of the ruling party, while others saw an opportunity to further slow down a process they felt was out of control. The delays in implementing land redistribution due to legal or financial constraints to acquisition have tended to fuel land occupation strategies led by either community leaders or politicians and pressure groups.

The re-emergence of radical land reform in Zimbabwe since the mid-1990s, and the re-launching in 1997 of the resettlement programme in Zimbabwe, coincided with the demise of its structural adjustment programme, and marks the dramatic change in the dialectical political and economic relations between the peasantry and the state, vis-à-vis urban constituencies. Poor economic results and the failure of the state during and at the end of the economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP) in 1996 to raise consistent external financial support from the international financial institutions (IFIs) meant that the state would not to live up to its development promise. Failure of the 16 year experiment with both corporatist and neo-liberal policy regimes, to contain the social development and accumulation expectations of various classes, led to significant cracks in political and economic institutions (Bret, 2003) and significant domestic political conflict within and outside the ruling party and the state, and the breakdown of international relations with Zimbabwe. The ruling party, facing the cumulative erosion of urban jobs and wages, associated de-industrialisation, and land demands by the poor, resuscitated its liberation promise in the context of competitive electoral politics and increased inter-class competition over diminishing domestic and external resources and opportunities. Land reform as potential instrument for restructuring of the economy its accumulation model became the only integral and broadly legitimate resource that could be used for both trans-class accumulation and survival as part of the economic indigenisation thrust and contestations of nationalist ideology.

The last phase of high intensity and high profile land occupations began in 1997, although many scholars, political analysts and some of the media, seem to conveniently forget it by focusing on the analysis of the Zimbabwe land conflict from the occupations that followed the constitutional referendum. In September 1997, the more high profile community-led land occupation approach seemed to emerge and isolated
land occupations started to occur, with the explicit aim of redistributing land from white farmers to landless villagers and war veterans. These occupations augmented existing low profile land occupations, which had remained throughout the country. They came in waves, starting with just about thirty cases in 1997, mostly on farms, which had been identified for compulsory acquisition (Moyo, 2000a). The squatters later ‘agreed’ to ‘wait’ for their orderly resettlement and in some cases were evicted by the government in 1998. Then a new wave of high profile and high intensity land occupations arose, from a handful in February to just below a thousand cases by 2000. The scale and form of land occupations in Zimbabwe has been the subject of a propaganda war in the media and on the Internet. The key thrust of the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) on land occupation was to exaggerate the scale of such invasions. Police records and field evidence suggest that when all the invasions were counted including ‘re-visits’ or repeat invasions following withdrawal by occupants, the maximum number has been about 800. However CFU data has placed pre-election occupations at about 1,700 while its post-election figures in December 2000 stood at about 685 occupations and declined to 450 farms by April 2001. About 250 of the latter cases involved formal allocations of land to settlers by government on land, which was being processed for compulsory acquisition. Data from the war veterans’ list did not go beyond 1,000 farms occupied. Available information bulletins suggested that about 300 farm occupations had been marked by violence, and serious human rights abuses, including rape and torture. This covered the period both before and after the June elections (see CFU internet reports). Interestingly neither the war veterans and the ruling party, nor the government refuted this public image, which literally multiplied by two the scale of land occupations.

The origins of the land occupations and their control is contested. The first few occupations of February begun in Masvingo under the local leadership of a few war veterans and local communities, only to be followed in late February by a controlled and orchestrated country-wide land occupation movement led by the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA). It appears that the ZNLWVA and ZANU (PF) only gained full control of the occupations around May

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2 I have referred to these rising cases as ‘prematurely’ resettled land because one school of thought in the government argues that once the it has began processing land acquisition orders in the administrative courts, it is only a matter of time for such a farm to become its property, notwithstanding the bottlenecking that farmer litigations bring.
2000 as numerous localised and contradictory waves of them emerged between February and then.\footnote{Interviews show cases where local chapters of war veterans led occupiers and/or some community led occupations exhibited different forms of discipline with regard to: focusing on unused land; local coherence or linkages to district level or provincial structures of ZNLWVA; absence of violence; defiance of government officials and ministers; land use or production strategies; formation of local associations for development; urban participation etc.}

The Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) of the Government of Zimbabwe was essentially the product of the failure by various parties, including the Government of Zimbabwe, the large landowners, civil society, land advocacy groups and the international development assistance community to come to agreed terms of a collaborative and internationally financed land reform (Moyo forthcoming). It changed in focus and approach over seven years from 1997, in line with the decline of the economy, deteriorating relations between the Government of Zimbabwe and international community, and with the escalating domestic confrontation between the Government of Zimbabwe and domestic political opposition forces led by the MDC. Increasing political differences among these parties led to the gradual radicalisation of the scale, pace and method of land acquisition by the state, which adopted the strategy of mass land acquisition, which begun in 1997 when 1,471 farms were targeted for expropriation (Moyo, 2000a). The critical domestic social forces that influenced this strategy were the interrelated processes of both a partial political rebellion led by war veterans and an alliance rupture between two factions within the ruling Zanu PF party, and the emergence of widespread labour unrest and strikes organised within the framework of an opposition-political-party-in-the-making, which emerged two years later as the MDC (Moyo, forthcoming). The economic recession and its negative effects on wages and inflation, as well as the increasingly limited opportunities for and factional competition over accumulation among the indigenous classes, across their current political party affiliations, combined to generate new political aspirations and alliances, and new forms of advocacy for change in civil society and among political parties.

Analyses of the FTLRP process in 2000 tend to conflate the land occupations, which occurred on 1,000 farm properties, hardly amounting to two million hectares, with the official Government of Zimbabwe’s FTLRP land acquisition and land allocation programme. These were not one and the same thing, although the former were and became a critical instrument of legitimising the need for the latter, and for putting pressure on landowners to release land for its expropriation without legal
Official categorization of the new agrarian structure now defines two sub-sectors, A1 and A2 farmers. In substance, the former includes largely smallholder farmers with individual arable fields and common grazing lands, held under permit and customary tenure. These comprise communal areas, A1 resettlement and past model A settlers. The A2 subsector comprises remaining black and white large scale farms, small scale commercial farms, new farms settled under the A2 scheme, and larger estates. This sector has relatively larger landholdings than the A1 sector, albeit well below the average farm sizes of the former LSCF. Land in the newly resettled A2 scheme is mostly held under leasehold tenure. It comprises farmers who are expected to be largely self-financing and engaged in credit markets, and their outputs are expected to be predominantly for the market.

Contest (Moyo and Yeros, 2004). The initial land occupiers were estimated by the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) to be well below 20,000 families in 2000, and these become the core of beneficiaries in the A1 scheme which had been designed in 1998. Most elements in the Government of Zimbabwe saw the formal FTLRP process as a means of addressing the needs of the land occupiers on the 800 farms which the Government of Zimbabwe listed in June 2000 for expropriation. The official land acquisition process was intended to bring the occupations into line with policy and land expropriation laws, and to contain the further propulsion of legally directed and motivated land occupations, by proposing the four year agenda to redistribute land for A1 beneficiaries, and from 2001 for the A2 commercial farming scheme (ibid.).

There were some real fears that the occupations had gone out of control in terms of conflict on the ground and in terms of the scale of land occupied, and at any rate the internal political power struggles that they yielded, the community mobilisation contradictions encountered and occupier-landowner-farm worker conflicts that arose from them in various localities were issues that brought about intense dialogue and negotiation. This process was reflected in dialogues between war veterans and the Government of Zimbabwe, and within the context of the ruling party. Initial resolution of these difficulties was to some extent based on expectations that after the elections there would be a lowering of political conflict in general, and that formal redistribution of some of the farms would reduce the now entrenched land occupation tensions. If negotiations with the UK government (April 2000) and with the UNDP (June 2000) yielded fruit, it was thought, then the mild fast track would proceed as planned. But the political tensions did not recede by July 2000, instead there was escalation of the confrontation in the media campaigns of both parties, and in the ‘strike’ actions (stay-aways, farm operations shutdowns, etc.) of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and of landowners, and in Government of Zimbabwe initiatives.
to physically contain these. Indeed it appeared that the campaign for
the 2002 presidential elections was launched by both the MDC and
Zanu PF immediately after the parliamentary elections. Donor support
was not promising either as the GoZ ignored the overtures for condi-
tional support to land reform.

Sensing that a point of no return had been reached in the land reform
dialogue with landowners and donors, and given the MDC electoral
rhetoric of de-legitimising the fast track land reform process, the GoZ
finally decided to fully “go it alone” with an up-scaled and even faster
FTLRP, from August 2000. This was reflected in the attempt to expro-
priate 3,000 farms by the end of 2000, up to 5,000 farms at the end
of 2001 and over 6,000 farms by the end of 2002. Thus during August
2000 and mid 2003 there was hardly any dialogue between the
Government of Zimbabwe and the International Community, except for
a UNDP land reform review mission in late 2001 which reported in
early 2002 that was inspired by the Abuja Commonwealth agreement
of September 2001. Other minor forms of bi-lateral dialogue over the
delisting from the expropriation list of farms owned by foreign nationals
of the key members of the international community, continued but with-
out final agreement on the delisting until late 2003.

The radicalization of land expropriation began in earnest with the fal-
ter of compromise and negotiation in 2000. The UNDP report repre-
senting the views of most donors, was however not accepted by the
Government of Zimbabwe in 2002, given its proposed slower track land
transfer process, unclear funding processes, and the conditions for improved
governance that it required. Thus seven years of dialogue over support
to land reform had failed and the Government of Zimbabwe proceeded
on its own to expropriate 90% of the LSCF land in staggered fashion,
bedevilled by ‘successful’ landowner litigations, and accompanied by spor-
adic violence and forced evictions on the white lands (ibid.).

In the end the Government of Zimbabwe approach of state-led mass
land expropriations stimulated and accompanied by land occupations led
by war veterans, mobilised various social classes in support of land redis-
tribution (Moyo, 2001, Bernstein, 2004), in a process phased over 5 years
from 1997 and it took 3 years from 2000 before the Government of
Zimbabwe could declare its completion.

By the end of 2002, ‘fast track’ land reform had compulsorily acquired
some 10 million hectares of land — approximately 90 percent of white
commercial farmland — and redistributed most of it to 127,000 peasant
households and 8,000 middle capitalist farmers. In the course of this
rebellion, national elections were manipulated and civil society subjected
to violence, resulting in over 100 politically-related deaths in 2000/02
period. Violence would also lead to deaths on the farms (including six white farmers and 11 farm workers) and would also involve cases of rape and torture.

**Impacts of Land Redistribution**

A full analysis of the new agrarian structure is not possible here (see Moyo, forthcoming). In what follows, we provide a condensed overview. Our data derives from the Presidential Land Review Committee (PLRC) which reported in July 2003. The Committee was appointed by the President in response to continuing pressure from within the ruling party to establish the facts on the ground, including the status of farm workers and the mis-appropriation of land by elites.

In Table 3 below, we seek to estimate the emerging agrarian class structure. This is by nature an imprecise task, and more so in the absence of new census data and household surveys. But the task remains essential, and its objective is to capture the differential capabilities (and vulnerabilities) of capitalists in the accumulation process. The basic criterion is land size, which is then adjusted to account for tenure type, agro-ecological potential, and technical capacity. Tenure type becomes particularly significant in accounting for the disadvantages of Communal and A1 tenure in the mobilization of resources. Agro-ecology varies in Zimbabwe between five Natural Regions (NR I-V), from the more fertile lands of relatively lesser hectarage per farm and intensive cropping, to the less fertile lands of larger farm sizes and extensive cropping (small grains) and livestock/wildlife management. The level and type of technology thus also differs across the natural regions.

The ‘peasant’ category refers to petty-commodity production on Communal and A1 resettlement land; this now accounts for 98 percent of total farms, on 72.8 percent of total land. There is class differentiation within this category, which is not captured here, and which is driven *inter alia* by agro-ecological variation, off-farm incomes, and local political power. Whether under adverse or positive economic conditions, this differentiation is expected to continue, as is the operation of informal land markets under the aegis of traditional authority. It is notable that the institution of chiefdom has not been challenged in the process of mobilization for land reform.

While ‘small capitalists’ historically comprise below 10 percent of the peasantry in communal areas and they employ substantial non-family labour from other peasants and the remaining landless there, we have not segmented them into the category due to insufficient data. We may only note here that they would be of great political significance, as they are likely to return to dominate the Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union, together
## Table 3
Emerging Agrarian Class Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farm Class</th>
<th>Land Tenure</th>
<th>Farms/Household Numbers</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Hectares (million ha)</th>
<th>Area % of Total</th>
<th>Farm Size (ha)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smallholder</td>
<td>Communal</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
<td>16.400</td>
<td>16.400</td>
<td>16.400</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Old Resettlement</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>3.700</td>
<td>3.700</td>
<td>3.700</td>
<td>51</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>140,866</td>
<td>4.236</td>
<td>4.236</td>
<td>4.236</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Sub-total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,312,866</strong></td>
<td><strong>98</strong></td>
<td><strong>24.336</strong></td>
<td><strong>72.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
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<td>Small to Medium Scale Commercial</td>
<td>Old SSCF</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>1.400</td>
<td>1.400</td>
<td>1.400</td>
<td>175</td>
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<td>Small A2</td>
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<td>1.429</td>
<td>1.429</td>
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<td>110</td>
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<td><strong>Sub-total</strong></td>
<td><strong>21,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.829</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.5</strong></td>
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<td>Medium-Large A2</td>
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<td>Black LSCF</td>
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<td>White LSCF</td>
<td>1,377</td>
<td>1.200</td>
<td>1.200</td>
<td>1.200</td>
<td>871</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Sub-total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,317</strong></td>
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<td><strong>3.000</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
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<td>Church</td>
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<td>0.041</td>
<td>641</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corporate Estates</td>
<td>Parastatal</td>
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<td>0.600</td>
<td>0.600</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Sub-total</strong></td>
<td><strong>960</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.041</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.1</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>33.445</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Moyo forthcoming.
with the small capitalists on A2 land. What we have also done tenta-
tively is merge the ‘small capitalist’ category with that of ‘middle capit-
alists’ as there is much overlap across the natural regions. Generally, small capitalists range from 30 to 100 hectares, and middle capitalists from 40 to 150 hectares, and they employ substantially more hired labour than provided from their own family. The important point to note is that there is likely to be ongoing reconfiguration of these two categories, as the two compete. Notably, middle capitalists have great advantage in the land bidding and accumulation process, by virtue of their better access to other means of production (credit and technology), to contacts and information, and to the policy-making process itself.

‘Large capitalist’ farms range from 150 to 1,500 hectares, depending on natural region, and enjoy even better access to economic and political resources. At present, middle and large capitalists are in political alliance under the banner of ‘indigenisation’, seeking to appropriate the remaining land and also to tailor the agricultural policy framework to their needs. Their vision is of a differentiated agricultural sector, in which middle/large capitalists specialise in the production of high-value commodities for export (tobacco and hybrid beef) and peasants in the production of grains for domestic consumption. The contradictions between small and middle/large farmers and between internal/external orienta-
tion will thus accentuate as they bid over public and private resources (infrastructure, water, credit) and policy instruments (interest rates policy, foreign exchange allocations). It is important finally to note that there is a significant process of reorganization of capital underway across the economic sectors, by which the emerging agrarian bourgeoisie is joining forces, economically and politically, with the nascent indigenous bourgeoisie in transport and retail, and most importantly with finance, which has seen the emergence of a dozen new indigenous institutions. Together, they recognize the significance of agricultural production and distribution to their own reproduction.

The picture therefore that is emerging is of a significantly broadened home market, including a larger peasantry and a larger black capitalist class. Further research would need to examine three interrelated process: agro-industrial re-organisation and consolidation of the black capitalist class; differentiation within the peasantry, including the trajectories of rich (small capitalist) and poor (semi-proletarians) peasants; and the labour process which underpins both the above and which will continue to be characterized by functional dualism. This process will become more entrenched, the more that black capital, together with its downsized white counterpart, succeeds in re-entrenching a disarticulated pattern of accumulation (Moyo and Yeros, 2004).
Land Reform and Production Impacts

A major agricultural production shift occurred during the FTLRP period, and this affected the major crops and livestock differently, particularly those produced by large-scale white farmers. The 4 main LSCF field crops (wheat, tobacco, soyabean, and sunflower) experienced both reduced area plantings and output volumes (30-70%) indicating partly the low uptake and use of land in the Highlands, especially among A2 farmers (Moyo, 2004d; Moyo and Sukume, 2004). The fall in the average yield of wheat reflected the deficiencies in the use of irrigation resources among new farmers, many of whom were producing their first ever wheat crop. The average yields for soyabean have also been on the decline, given that much of it was produced by new farmers with limited inputs. Sunflower production, mainly an LSCF preserve, recorded the sharpest decrease of 87% in the planted area between 2002/3 and the 90s average, leading to an equal drop in its volume of output during the FTLRP period. Again this pattern led to shortages of cooking oils and related products on the market and broader based food insecurity (Ibid.). This has meant that production of wheat and oilseeds in particular have deteriorated, and occasioned the current trend of food insecurity. The performance of the main plantation and other export crops (tea, coffee, citrus and forest products) was less affected because these areas were not redistributed during the FTLRP, because of policy and legal protections directed at agro-industrial estates.

The main crops (maize, small grains, groundnuts, cotton) produced by smallholder (communal and resettlement areas) farmers for food and cash experienced reduced output despite the marginal increase in the areas planted. The decline in the volume of maize output resulted from the crop failures occasioned by consecutive droughts during the FTLRP and reduced fertiliser usage. The production of small grains declined reflecting the decreased profitability occasioned by low prices (Ibid.).

Wildlife based tourism is an important land user, whose output in terms of tourist visits and numbers of private wildlife ranchers, declined during the FTLRP. Fifteen percent of national area (5.8 million ha) comprises state parks and forests, and since these dominate wildlife based tourism, land redistribution had a marginal effect on them. But some of the LSCF conservancies were redistributed to both A1 and A2 settlers. In general tourist visits declined to 30% capacity due to the negative publicity on Zimbabwe during the FTLRP, the conversion of some private wildlife conservancies to mixed farming operations and wildlife poaching. Production patterns of forest products on woodland, plantations, and gazetted forests, which cover about 2.1 million hectares of
Zimbabwe, mostly in Matebeleland, Mashonaland West and Manicaland, were also less affected by land transfers, as 42% of these belongs to the state and 54% to private concerns. The national population of beef cattle decreased during FTLRP as a result of increased beef cattle slaughtering and sales which reduced the LSCF herd size by about 65%. However, since 1997, there has been an increase in the national herd size due to the increases in the smallholder sector, although beef off-take and revenue in these areas is relatively lower than in LSCF areas, due to various livestock management deficiencies. These changes affected domestic and export beef supply scene, as 85% of the officially marketed beef and most of the exports had been derived from the LSCF (Moyo, and Sukume, 2004).

The dairy industry declined in terms of both milk production, number of producers and total dairy herd. National milk production declined over the past five years, dropping by an average 23%. There has been a general shortage of milk and milk related products on the domestic market, particularly in the 2002/3 period. The production of small livestock also declined.

The optimal utilisation of available technologies especially for the peasantry was constrained by limited access to inputs, such as machinery, equipment, and infrastructure, seeds, fertilisers and chemicals, thus limiting the areas planted to most crops at the back of droughts which scorched planted crops. The failure to utilise existing experienced farm labour, due to new farmer capacity limitations and conflicts with farm workers was also a missed opportunity. The capacity of public agencies to meet the increased demand for agricultural knowledge services (extension, research, market information, etc.) was limited because agencies such as AREX and Veterinary services were overwhelmed by the changes and under financed. These services, which are free for peasants, could not be met by the state, while the private sector did not expand their agricultural services or their coverage to new farmers. The financial resources required to enhance production were limited, with private sector unwilling to shoulder the risk of new farming operations, without financial security, while GoZ support schemes were inadequate. This mainly affected the old and new smallholders who were not able to

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5 Of the 155,853 ha set aside for exotic plantations, at least 110,000 hectares are planted. At least 71% of the planted area is under pines, 13% under eucalyptus, and 16% under wattle.

6 GoZ policy is to maintain the current large estates under exotic forest plantations, in which new indigenous actors/producers enter plantation farming through corporate of equity redistribution.
finance their operations, given that their own savings are limited. (Moyo and Sukume, 2004).

**Land Reform and Employment Impacts**

Overall, the FTLRP has resulted in gains in commercial agricultural employment irrespective of the status of the farm workers, whether they are former or ‘new’ farm workers (Chambati and Moyo, 2004). In the old LSCF, there were at least three managerial jobs per farm (husband, wife and one hired professional manager). If the farm managerial jobs are reduced to only husband and wife, because the hiring of professional managers is still rare in new resettlement schemes, managerial jobs seem to have decreased due to the absence of these in the A1 sector which was allocated the majority of farms.

The new farm structure (including A1, A2, remaining LSCF, old resettlement, state farms and communal areas) represents a total of 3,172,842 farm worker jobs, excluding ARDA estates. The new farms alone account for 356,040 farm worker jobs. According to these estimates of farm labour rates, therefore, the FTLRP is expected at least to have created an additional 40,000 farm jobs in A1 and A2 resettlement schemes. These estimates are conservative ones as at late 2003. Since then, more farms have been allocated and land use and uptake rates by A2 farmers have increased. Recent estimates indicate that the number of A2 farm allocations have reached 15,000 (Ministry of Lands and Land Reform, personal communication) and labour rates have increased to about 10 workers per farm (Magaramombe, 2003). At current estimates of A2 farm allocations and average labour rate of 10 workers per farm, this sector alone represents 150,000 jobs although as short contract work. This implies that on the macro-scale more new jobs appear to have been created, although losses could have been recorded among the former farm workers.

The redistribution of land from the minority LSCF sector to the majority small and medium farmers also entails the redistribution of income which, in turn, leads to enlarged demand patterns for goods and services, resulting in the creation of additional jobs in the non farm rural business sector. Evidence from other sub-Saharan countries, subsistence agriculture with low population densities and undeveloped rural infrastructure shows that for every ‘new farm job’ created, 0.3 non-farm jobs will be created downstream. Applying this to Zimbabwe implies that

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potentially an additional 51,000 non-farm jobs will be created as a result of the FTLRP, everything else held constant.

However the poor macroeconomic performance of the country, characterised by hyperinflation and negative interest rates, implies that incomes from new farm jobs have been severely eroded, limiting the multiplier effects on the demand patterns. This, in turn has an impact upon the capacity of the agrarian reform to create downstream non-farm rural employment. On the other hand, the hyperinflation has decreased the new farmers demand for agricultural inputs in the presence of limited government input schemes, greatly diminishing potential agricultural production and rural incomes.

Resource Poaching and Environmental Degradation

Resource poaching has always been in existence, even before the FTLRP. It became a problem mainly due to the harsh economic climate prevailing in the country. The adverse economic conditions resulted in “increased migration back to communal areas, resettlement areas, and small-scale commercial farms where population pressures were already placing a heavy burden on the fragile ecosystems and scarce natural resources (Reed, 2001). What has increased significantly with the onset of the FTLRP is the amount of poaching on private farms especially the ones abandoned by owners. The FTLRP has given newly resettled farmers and their neighbours more access to those highly valued natural resources on previously well protected private property. There is widespread fish poaching in dams located on former commercial farms, with the fish being sold in both urban and rural areas. Kinship ties, weak tenure arrangements and the desire to earn extra income have forced the newly resettled farmers either to ignore the presence of poaching or to actively participate in poaching activities.

In the initial stages of the FTLRP there were reports of rampant natural resource degradation before settlers knew whether they were going to remain in the area permanently or not. Some of this confusion persists up to the present day. There was a lot of cutting down of trees that would subsequently lead to soil erosion and siltation. Sizes and acreage of farms in which trees have been cut vary across provinces. Masvingo Province has the highest acreage of trees cut. Matabeleland South, Mashonaland West and Mashonaland Central recorded as low as 134 hectares, 453 hectares and 118 hectares respectively. The main reason behind the high levels of cut trees was the failure of the government to implement a policy to increase woodlots (Moyo, Mushayavanhu and Gwata, 2004). The government had a plan for establishing communal
woodlots, averaging about 0.8 hectares per household in the A1 resettlement schemes, in its initial policy but this plan has not been implemented due to a number of factors. They include the low priority placed on woodlots by government, lack of resources, and unforeseen factors such as farm occupations. Had this policy been implemented, felled trees could easily have been replaced.

Since the launch of the FTLRP, a number of game ranches and conservancies have been gazetted for compulsory acquisition by Government. These properties had a thriving plains game population, dominated by impala, warthog, kudu, eland and duiker, which has been affected by the poaching of wildlife and losses of wildlife habitats due to the occupations. Preliminary results of a survey conducted by the Parks and Wildlife Authority (PWLA) on gazetted game ranches showed that there had been significant wildlife population reductions, largely due to poaching. However, actual empirical data on the poaching levels is limited. This is partly due to the cessation of record keeping of wildlife numbers by most farmers on gazetted ranches, the non-reporting of poaching cases to the police or the PWLA, the disruption of monitoring of endangered wildlife species such as the rhino and cheetah, and weak monitoring of illegal activities and law enforcement by the new farmers. Unlike in CAMPFIRE areas, where there is community peer pressure on members to desist from poaching, no similar structures exist on resettled farms. Consequently, wildlife on these properties (especially those under the A1 model) is suffering from the ‘tragedy of the commons’.

Soil erosion is reported to be present in some of the fast track land reform areas. For example, the Natural Resources Board Draft report gives figures ranging between 2 and 20 hectares as having been affected by sheet, gully and reel erosions. The report rightly concludes that “there is very minimal erosion on the newly resettled farms”, but the long term effect of settlement is yet to be studied for any meaningful conclusions to be made. Marimira (2002) cited by (Moyo et al. 2004) suggests that low erosion rates on the farms are largely attributable to heavy campaigns by officials involved in the resettlement programme to discourage farmers from cutting trees and practicing other environmentally unfriendly activities.

Overgrazing has been reported by the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to be a daily occurrence in the newly resettled areas and there are conflicts between those people who want to grow gardens and those who want to graze their animals. The concern is that, currently, nobody really knows how much livestock people are grazing in these areas. Settlers in the self-contained A1 plots, who are supposed to graze their livestock on their allocated plots, sometimes move onto common graz-
ing areas. This increases pressure on the commons. The situation arises, in part, from the fact that carrying capacity issues were not taken into account in resettled farms and it will ultimately will result in the tragedy of the commons, a major problem already faced by Zimbabwe’s communal areas.

The DNR has also reported that stream bank cultivation is occurring in the resettled areas. Farmers are planting on areas near riverbeds, causing siltation of rivers and streams. The reports, however, do not give an indication of the extent to which degradation of natural resources in the resettled areas is occurring.

Land degradation is also caused by the huge squatter problem, which is also symptomatic of the old resettlement schemes, such as those established in the early 1980s (Moyo et al. 2004). Many of the squatters settle along game corridors, in conflict with CAMPFIRE project and planners’ objectives. They also allocate themselves land set aside for grazing. The squatter problem has also surfaced in peri-urban areas, causing a lot of headache for planners and policy makers alike. In communal areas, squatters are largely confined to grazing areas, thereby adding tension to the already NR strained areas and people. For example, squatters in the Mid Zambezi Resettlement area are young locals and nationals of neighbouring countries who were retrenched from mines and large scale commercial farming areas.

Gold panning occurs on a widespread basis within most of the resettlement areas and results in various forms of environmental degradation. Most of the gold panning activities occur within and on banks of river channels but may spread long distances from the river channel within the basins of the affected rivers. Gold panning leads to considerable land disturbance as it involves the digging up of river channels, banks, paleochannels and their flood plains as well as surface trenching using picks and shovels. The most noticeable effects of these operations are the siltation of rivers and dams, deterioration of water quality, the reduction of grazing areas for domestic and wild animals, and an overall reduction in biodiversity. People have been practising gold panning for some time, especially during droughts and particularly after the introduction of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1991 (Mukamuri and Campbell, 1998 cited by Moyo et al. 2004). The FTLRP has brought with it a general increase in the activities of gold panners around the country. Gold panning is seen to be more lucrative than farming mainly because of the instant income returns compared to agriculture. Most of the gold is sold to unlicensed dealers, contravening the Gold Act. In the gold panning areas, serious conflicts and contradictions result between gold panning and farming activities.
Conclusion

This article shows that land and natural resource conflicts result from grievances over and struggles for access to land and natural resources by both the poor and emerging capitalist classes. The current land and natural resource redistribution in Zimbabwe has addressed its worrisome legacy of historic injustice and social and racial inequities, and broadened the base of economic participation. Land redistribution transformed the racial distribution of land and rural power, while significant losses in agricultural production and capital stock occurred. A level of uneven distribution of land and natural resources between peasants and elites still obtains. Land concentration among black elites, to the exclusion of the poor and ‘remote’ communities, generates further conflict. The destitution of some ex-farm workers remains a key concern. Issues of democratisation and ‘rule of law’ need to be resolved in the context of the new property rights and their distribution, and the new agrarian production and rural power base, vis-à-vis urban forces.

During the build up to the 2005 parliamentary elections, mainly pitting Zanu PF against the MDC, the land question has remained on the agenda. While the former has rallied electoral support as a reward for redistributing land and related water resource, the latter has tended to emphasize the loss of food security and jobs as a sign of land reform failure. However since land was redistributed the resistance of landowners and farmworkers, and the aggression of land occupiers has been of marginal importance to the run-up to the elections. Even the MDC has acknowledged a decline in politically motivated violence (MDC, 2005), let alone resource based violence, and its linkage to elections. The land conflict that remain include the continued litigations by landowners opposing compulsory acquisition, sporadic eviction of some settlers deemed by government to be ‘illegal occupiers’, and the challenge of repossessing the scores of multiple farms held by elites. In this way the electoral conflict in Zimbabwe has become less focused on land and violence but on broader questions of the extent that ‘free and fairness’ of the elections and human rights practises.

An important lesson to be learnt from the political independence settlements in the settler territories of the sub-region is that, by not sufficiently addressing the problem of inequitable land and natural resources ownership, the downstream entrenchment of unequal racial economic opportunities, ensuing from such control in economies facing slow employment growth, are likely to fuel agitation for radical land reform. The existing and potential natural resource-use conflicts are the result of a multiplicity of factors that must be fully understood before the search for possible
solutions. However in addressing such conflicts, policy makers often focus upon the immediate causal circumstances for which they provide technical or administrative solutions, which are inadequate as they address only the symptoms and not the deep seated causes. These include social, economic and political influences upon both the management of natural resources and the demands that are placed upon them.

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