What drives Abe in reckless dash?
Dissociative identity of Japan's postwar statehood unravels

Ichiyo Muto

Ultra-right revisionists coming to power in a major G7 county must certainly be an alarming anomaly in the global community. But this occurred as Shinzo Abe, ultra-rightist politician, took the helm of the state as Prime Minister of Japan in December 2012. Disappointed and disgusted by the shapelessness of the previous three years of the Democratic Party rule, Japanese voters then swung back to the support of the Liberal Democratic Party, the ruling party throughout most of the postwar years. But then they did not clearly realize that LDP had changed its nature from what they used to know, a broad-based conservative party, to something else, in fact a band of ultra-right extremists ready for political vandalism.

Since then, Abe's LDP has gone through two national elections, the first for the Upper House in July 2013 and the second a snap election which Abe arbitrarily called in December 2014 as a preemptive confidence vote on whatever schemes he wanted to carry through in the coming four year of the renewed term of the Lower House. With these done, Abe's LDP plus the coalition partner Komei, now has a secure majority in the Upper House and a two thirds majority in the Lower House so that Abe and his aides now seem to feel almighty expecting to stay long enough in power to accomplish their programmatic goal, change of the Constitution.

In his 2015 New Year message, Abe stated that the year 2015 will be a year of resolute execution of his reform: “Having won a vote of confidence I will carry on my reform project faster and more boldly.” Stressing that 2015 marks the 70th anniversary of the “end of the war,” Abe is eager to issue a new statement incorporating his view of modern Japanese history, replacing the 1995 Murayama statement, a self-critical official statement about Japan's imperial past. In the new statement, he said he “will tell the world what kind of country we want to build.” Asked what the content of the Abe statement will be, he hinted that he would not use the same words and concepts used in the Murayama statement, which is interpreted to mean that he would drop its key concepts – “colonization,” “aggression,” and “apologize.”
At a glance, the Abe government may look firm and secure. But in fact it sits on extremely shaky ground because its ambition, view of the world, and its doctrine are illusory and self-deluding as we will see later.

It should be clear that what is happening in Japan is not just a switchover from one conservative government to another, but a process somewhat comparable to passage from democracy to fascism in a series of countries in the 1930s. Abe’s LDP stated in their election platform that they would get rid of the postwar regime, meaning it will replace the postwar regime with a new regime of their design and making.

It is characteristic of the Abe group to describe their desired future always in reference to the past. “Let’s break away from the postwar regime!” and “Let’s get Japan back!” were Abe’s main slogans in the 2013 election campaign. By the “postwar regime” is meant the regime of the 1947 Constitution which they describe as imposed by the U.S. occupation, and so it should be replaced by a constitution “of our own making.” This is what getting “Japan back to us” means. Likewise, Abe and company is pledged to get back many other things – economy, education, national pride, patriotism, family ties, what not, which, they assume, were all lost under the postwar regime.

*The New York Times* aptly commented editorially:

Mr. Abe’s nationalism can be hard to decipher, because it is not directed against any country. It is directed instead against Japan’s own history since World War II, which he finds shameful. He wants to shed what he calls the self-effacing postwar regime and recreate a renewed patriotism. (March 2 2014)

Well said, but not perfect as Abe’s nationalism is getting its fangs to bite others. Abe wishes to get back the prewar status of Japan as one of the Big Five, a country with the power of force projection capable of intervening in world affairs. He captions this stance as “sekkyokuteki heiwa-shugi=積極的平和主義,” to be literally translated as “positive pacifism.” Stangely, the Foreign Ministry’s official English term for this concept is “proactive contribution to peace,” showing only willingness to initiate or participate in military action purporting to peace, like in most interventional U.S. military actions. (The use of “heiwa-
shugi” pacifism) is Abe’s typical beguiling usage of slogans, to make people believe that his is a kind of pacifism.

But before going to that aspect of the Abe doctrine, let us first examine what kind of statehood the Abe-LDP wants to bring about.

Ultra-right’s vision of a new statehood – LDP’s constitution draft

In April 2012, the LDP published its new draft constitution, disclosing what kind of statehood it was anxious to introduce. The key to this draft constitution, as I see it, is severing Japan from the universal norms worked out over decades and shared by the world community. This is done by uprooting the main pillars of the current constitution, people’s sovereignty, basic human rights, and pacifism.

The LDP’s will to do this is most dramatically shown by the deletion of the whole Preamble of the current constitution. The LDP drafters must certainly abhorred this part of the constitution most. The preamble begins with this:

We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this Constitution.

Government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives of the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people. This is a universal principle of mankind upon which this Constitution is founded. We reject and revoke all constitutions, laws, ordinances, and rescripts in conflict herewith.

This preamble is to be replaced by the LDP’s new preamble with this opening sentence:

Japan is a state with a long history and unique culture headed by Emperor as its symbol and is governed, under people’s sovereignty, on the basis of the separation of the three branches of government.
Note that there is no “we, the Japanese people” as the subject. Here the state of Japan is presented as a pre-existing entity headed by the Emperor and not an entity set up and defined by the people. Though “people’s sovereignty” is mentioned in passing, this definition of Japan of itself negates the notion of people’s sovereignty. Where Emperor is defined as a built-in element of the Japanese state, the people would have no chance to decide whether to abolish or continue the emperor system. The people then would no longer be sovereign. If the people are no longer sovereign, what will they be? Logically, they are there as the ruled, or subjects. The state rules and the people are ruled. Then it is the pre-existing state that is sovereign.

The NDP draft stunned not only progressives but also a bulk of conservatives who are not ultra-right and espouse democratic values. That is because the LDP draft negates the basics of constitutionalism. While the shared common sense is that the constitution is the fundamental law that prescribes the limits of government power, the LDP draft rejects this position and turns the constitution into the tool of the state to control the people. The current constitution under Article 99 stipulates that “the Emperor or the Regent as well as Ministers of State, members of the Diet, judges, and all other public officials have the obligation to respect and uphold this Constitution.” The corresponding clause (Article 102) of the LDP draft begins with “All people shall respect this constitution” before it goes to the public officials’ obligation. The LDP draft thus introduces a new passage captioned “people’s duties and obligations” stating that “the people should not abuse the freedoms and right and under any circumstance shall not act against public interests (koeki) and public order (oyake no chitujo), conscious that freedoms and rights require responsibility and duties.”

Human rights bartered with allegiance to the state

The effort to sever Japan from universal norms is most blatantly manifest with regard to human rights. The LDP draft erased from the current text a whole article under Chapter X Supreme law. Simply dropped and not replaced are the following sentences:

Article 97. The fundamental human rights by this Constitution guaranteed to the people of Japan are fruits of the age-old struggle of man to be free; they have
survived the many exacting tests for durability and are conferred upon this and future generations in trust, to be held for all time inviolate.

Why is this passage bodily dropped from the LDP draft? The LDP’s Q&A on the LDP draft pleads that the current definition of fundamental human rights is based on the West’s human rights concept that human rights are conferred by God on human beings and therefore it needs to be changed. But the current Article 97 clearly attributes human rights to “the age-old struggle of man to be free, “ invoking no god, and so Q&A’s notion is out of the mark. But the Q&A says something interesting: “Rights take shape gradually in the history, traditions, and culture of the community, and so the definition of human rights needs to be based on the history, culture, and traditions of our country.” This may sound reasonable or harmless banality. But the recourse to history, culture, and traditions is here used to sever human rights in Japan from the universal norms “acquired by age-old struggle of people in the world.”

What then is the human rights concept particular to Japan? Satsuki Katayama, a prominent member of the drafting committee of the LDP draft, gives a clue to the reasoning behind. She twittered: “Let us quit the kind of human rights argument that the people are given rights from heaven and so there is no need for them to fulfill their duties. We formulated the preamble (of the draft constitution) so that people begin to ask themselves what they can do to keep the state in shape, instead of what the state would do for them.” (Katayama’s twitter, December 6, 2012)

Katayama is a Finance Ministry official-turned-LDP politician. To her human rights appear to rank on par with other kinds of rights which one can exercise only on condition that one fulfills collateral duties. For instance, without paying premiums, you have no right to receive pensions. Likewise, you have no human rights unless you fulfill your duties. In her case, the duty is to serve the state. If you do not serve the state, you are not entitled to human rights.

This type of approach, I notice, is not particularly Katayama’s, but is the shared idiosyncrasy of the Japanese ultra-right circles today, which is characterized by inward-looking posture, fear of being judged by the outside world, and almost infantile self-congratulation.

Human rights being no longer a value to be universally upheld, the LDP drafters, while guaranteeing freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press and all other expressions, feels no qualms in stating in the ensuing paragraph: “despite the preceding stipulation, conducting activities for the purpose
of harming public good and public order and forming association for that purpose is not permitted.” Who will decide on public good or public order? Certainly the state will, that is, the police will.

Forget history and rearm!

Now we come to Article 9, recognized as the focus of controversy over the constitution, which reads in full:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Despite this, Japan began to rearm in 1950 at the direct order from General McArthur, the supreme commander of the allied powers (SCAP), as a reserve force to provide rear support for the U.S. divisions fighting full war in Korea. This embryonic armed force, first called the Police Reserve Force, has since been expanded into full army, navy, and air force, called the Self-Defense Forces as a vital component of the U.S. military edifice. The SDF is by now an impressive modern military machinery, ranking fifth in the world in terms of military expenditure, about on par with the United Kingdom.

How this obviously unconstitutional entity can be justified under the pacifist constitution has been a chronic headache of the Japanese government, compelling it to invent one theory of justification after another. The theory used for some decades since 1972 is that Japan as an independent nation state has the inalienable right to self-defense which the constitution does not negate and that therefore maintaining means for such self-defense should be constitutional. This kind of approach was called interpretative amendment of the constitution. While the LDP government officially followed this line, rightists in and out of the LDP were not satisfied. For those who want to revive Japan as a full-fledged military power, the shortcut is to abolish article 9, and this is the line pressed by the rightwing Liberal Democrats and other conservatives.
The LDP draft deletes the part of article 9 reading “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized” and replaces it with the following: “the national defense forces are maintained to secure our country’s peace and independence as well as the security of the state and the people.” The national defense forces, according to the draft, will also participate in international collaborative activities conducted to secure peace and security of the international community.

This may give the impression that the LDP is simply planning to turn Japan to an “ordinary country” with legal regular national armed forces.

But just taking the matter at that abstract level, I am afraid, would miss the specificity of the nature of change that is implied.

To contextualize, let me return to the preamble.

The part of the preamble that says, “We, the Japanese people, …resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this Constitution,” is an expression of critical reflection, if brief, of the Japanese people about the past deed of the Japanese empire. The Japanese people themselves, forced or willingly, participated in the government action that caused vast sufferings and disaster to neighboring people as well as themselves. Now, they, the Japanese people, re-grasp the disaster as the consequence of the action of their government and in this recognition get determined that they will not allow their government to repeat the same thing, fully aware of their own responsibility to ensure it. The preamble implies that it is not the people in general but the people thus determined who “proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people” and “firmly establish this Constitution.”

The LDP draft, as earlier pointed out, scrapped the preamble as a whole, and replaced it with its own poor, abstract, and ahistorical text. It does mention history though but in these words and only in these words:

Our country has developed by overcoming devastation we suffered in the previous major war and a number of other large-scale disasters, and has come to occupy an important position in the international community and under the peace doctrine will promote friendly relations with foreign countries and contribute to peace and prosperity of the world.
Copying these sentences, I confess I could not suppress physical repulsion at the brazen nerve of the authors. True, “our country” too was devastated, but wasn’t that the end result of the rampage of the Japanese empire, colonizing, invading, destroying, killing tens of millions of other people, and in that process also causing the deaths of millions of its own people? If the proposed constitution grasps history in this ego-centric light, the regime based on it would lack a common ground to share not only with neighboring Asia but also with the greater part of the international community.

The point here is that the proposed change in article 9 will not just turn Japan to an ordinary country with a legal regular army, but will let emerge a country with a peculiar self-centered philosophy (if it is one at all) which lacks others and dismisses history except as history of its glory.

Contradictory legitimizing principles in a single state

But what is the motive force that propels the current drive for regime change? Is it because the security environment and other circumstances surrounding Japan have drastically changed? True, the rapid rise of China, waning U.S. hegemony, DPRK’s nuclear armament and other changes complete with the waves of neoliberal globalization do have impact on the steering behavior of the nation. But is it in reaction to these and other changes of environment that the regime change is pressed so impetuously? I do not take that view. I hold that the current move has its historical roots in the very make of the postwar Japanese state.

For some years, I have been discussing the entity called the postwar Japanese state as a problem. By the postwar Japanese state I mean a specific historical formation of statehood that came into being through the defeat of the Japanese Empire and the subsequent occupation by the United States. This statehood, reflecting the circumstances in which it emerged, had a peculiar character, a dissociative identity, as it internalized three legitimizing principles, which are incompatible with each other. They are (1) the “free world,” or anti-Communist principle derived directly from U.S. hegemony, (2) the pacifist and democratic principle of the Constitution of Japan, and (3) the principle of continuity of statehood from the Japanese empire.

The “free world” or U.S. principle was by far the strongest and dominant defining element of the postwar statehood. After Japan restored independence in 1952 by
the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Constitution of Japan was supposed to become the single constituting principle of the Japanese state, but the matter was not so simple as the United States with its hegemonic power of control was practically internalized in the Japanese statehood. The relationship between Japan and the United States in the postwar years has never been a diplomatic relationship existing between two independent countries but one in which the will of one is internalized in the other’s statehood. The most striking aspect of this is the supra-constitutional presence of the unconstitutional armed forces created by the SCAP and organically integrated with the United States military strategy. The United States is not only a heavy military presence in the Japanese statehood through the security treaty and control of Okinawa as its military colony, but also a decisive factor in political and economic decision making by the Japanese state. Yet, Japan has not been a colony but an independent country. The Japanese ruling groups in the immediate postwar period adopted a strategy, half compelled but half by design, to imbibe the Pax-Americana principle with a view to using the fact of the U.S. imperial domination of Asia as a convenient frame for Japan’s inroads substituting for Japan’s own imperialism in prewar days. This strategy worked magnificently well for decades, enabling Japan not only to rapidly recover economically but also to evade the otherwise painful task of settling account directly with Asian peoples the Japanese Empire had trampled underfoot in wars and conquests. The U.S. dominated “free” Asia politically and economically under the banner of anti-Communism, and Japan came back to Asia under the U.S. umbrella as partner to the American anti-Communist crusade. Thus, the Japanese Asia policy was formulated not on the basis of the actual historical relationships modern Japan had with Asia but as a function of the U.S. Asia policy. The blatant example was Japan’s support of the American war in Vietnam. Japan invaded Vietnam but Vietnam did no wrong to Japan, yet in the 1960s the Sato government matter-of-factly supported the American war letting Japan be party to the American mass killings and destruction in Vietnam. The Foreign Ministry of Japan was often dubbed the State Department’s Tokyo branch.

Pacifist democratic principle – the constitution and people

Now let us go to the second principle, constitutional pacifism and democracy. Postwar Japan is legally constituted by the Constitution of Japan, but as we have just seen, it did not function as a complete system. Nor is the constitution an ideal,
flawless democratic canon from the genuine people’s sovereignty standpoint as it begins with Article 1 dealing with the Emperor. But it is an unambiguously pacifist and democratic canon compared with the 1889 Meiji constitution based on Emperor’s sovereignty. In 1946, the Japanese government-prepared gist of a new constitution leaked to the press appalled both the people and the SCAP as it was only a partial amendment of the Meiji constitution basically retaining sovereignty with Emperor. The SCAP rejected it and made its own outline draft, which served as the basis of the existing constitution.

Pointing to this, rightists have been attacking it as a constitution imposed by the SCAP and so should be replaced by a constitution made by Japanese. But the Japanese people welcomed it, particularly its pacifist clause, people’s sovereignty, and democratic rights. Though heavily repressed, Japan had active movements of workers, tenant farmers, and intellectuals as well as progressive and revolutionary parties, in the prewar time, and they all came back feeling liberated after the collapse of the prewar regime. This being the case, there was indeed little room for the ruling groups’ anachronistic concept accepted and welcomed by postwar society. Douglas Lummis, peace activist scholar of politics, pointing out that constitutions are by nature laws imposed on those in power, argued that the 1947 Japanese constitution was imposed jointly by the U.S. occupation and the Japanese people on the reluctant Japanese ruling groups. Setting the complex factors surrounding the making of this constitution aside, Lummis’ concise formulation here suffices to clarify the context in which this constitution was situated when it came into being.

But that context was short-lived. With the Cold War started, the constitutional peace and democracy principle and the U.S. hegemonic principle began to clash head-on. The Korean War followed by the San Francisco peace treaty cum the security treaty served as the decisive leverage to push Japan into the U.S. hegemonic system.

With this, the Japanese statehood came to internalize two legitimating principles which are incompatible to each other, one Cold War-oriented and the other pacifist. Analyzing this duality from the angle of legal system, respected progressive scholar of constitutional law Masayasu Hasegawa in the 1960s theorized that Japan had a ruling system allowing two parallel and contradictory legal systems to function, “one the constitutional system with the constitution as the supreme law linking to laws and orders and the other a system with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty as the supreme law linking to the Administrative Agreement and special laws based on
the agreement.” The two parallel systems, I argue, reflects the two principles legitimating the state in contradictory ways.

The bifurcation of the Japanese political world into two camps was the reflection of the parallelism in state legitimating principles. There formed two political camps, the conservative camp centering on the Liberal Democratic Party, identifying with the United States, and the progressive camp politically represented by the Japan Socialist Party backed by the largest trade union federation, the General Council of Trade Unions (Sohyo) with 4.5 million members. The Communist Party also acted as part of this camp while a large bulk of intellectuals used to identify with it. As an aggregate, they were for constitutional pacifism, against rearmament, against Japan’s commitment to U.S. military strategy, and warned against the LDP’s attempts to undermine Article 9. The LDP, anti-communist and loyal to the Free World cause, with big companies as the major patron but having a strong electoral base in the rural areas, continued to rule throughout this period as though it were a built-in ruling machinery, almost always securing majority seats in the Diet. The JSP plus other pro-constitution forces had at least one third of the Diet seats, enough to prevent the Diet from proposing amendment of the constitution.

The antagonistic relationship between the first and second principles was most open and visible in the four decades of the postwar period beginning in 1955. That year, the Japanese economy recovered to the prewar peak level, the two conservative parties merged into the Liberal Democratic Party, and the rightwing and leftwing Socialist Parties got unified into the Japan Socialist Party as the major opposition to the LDP.

The contradiction between the two systems gave rise to a series of hot issues: the U.S. military bases, the security treaty, constitutionality of the Self-defense Forces, U.S. bases in Okinawa, Japan’s involvement in U.S.-initiated military action and the like. Confrontation on these issues between the LDP government and the opposition had to be sharp, often uncompromising. The most critical moment came in June 1960 when Nobusuke Kishi, grandfather of Shinzo Abe, notorious for his prewar and wartime records, tried to force through a new security treaty with the U.S. which he had signed earlier in the year. Kishi became Prime Minister only eight years after he got out of Sugamo prison where he was detained as class A war criminal. His scheme to strengthen Japan’s military role in the U.S. strategy by the new treaty met strong opposition from Japanese people who felt in Kishi’s design war and fascism coming back. There was a general public feeling that hard won
peace and democracy should be protected at all cost. Thus hundreds of thousands of protesting people inundated the central part of Tokyo paralyzing police control. President Eisenhower was slated to come to Tokyo to celebrate the enforcement of the new treaty and was on his way to Tokyo, but Kishi had to ask him to cancel the visit as his police had no confidence in its ability to guard him. Kishi barely managed to get the treaty ratified by calling in police into the Diet hall to physically oust the protesting opposition members. But he and his cabinet had to resign en masse.

The ruling groups had to learn that frontal attack on the peace and democracy should be evaded as far as possible. They did two things – getting a large bulk of U.S. bases moved to U.S.-ruled Okinawa and shifting focus of politics to economic growth.

Anyway, the 1960 struggle dramatized the presence of the peace and democracy principle at work in Japanese society and its incompatibility with the “free world” principle.

Precisely speaking, the principle, still abstract in the text of the constitution, was worked into a living principle through the historic action of the people. It will be further enriched in the 1965-75 decade by new radical movements that arose under the impetus of the Vietnam War.

Empire’s continuity – the actor behind the curtain

What about the third principle of continuity from the prewar empire? Compared with the first and second, the third principle could not be openly declared. Japan surrendered to the allied powers accepting the Potsdam declaration, adopted the new constitution, regained independence by accepting the decisions of the Tokyo tribunal, and became a loyal partner to the hegemonic United States. There appeared no room for the empire to come back.

But the past did not go away so easily. It managed to survive

In this context Emperor (Tenno) and the emperor system is worth special mention as they constitute the most tricky and therefore intriguing part of the story. It is well known that in mid-August 1945 the single gravest concern of the wartime leaders and generals discussing surrender was whether Japan’s “kokutai” (statehood understood as the essence of the state) would be preserved after surrender. By “kokutai” they had in mind only one thing: the Emperor system.
What happened under General McArthur’s rule, however, was beyond the expectation of any of the Japanese rulers. Not only was the emperor system preserved, but Hirohito himself was encouraged by McArthur to stay on as Emperor. What could it mean that Emperor Hirohito, the supreme commander of the Imperial Army and Navy, was retained in the same throne bearing the same Tenno title? Does it mean that the prewar kokutai was preserved intact? Of course this was American, particularly MacArthur’s decision. The United States needed Emperor Hirohito to facilitate its victor’s rule over the defeated country. Despite his obvious war responsibility, Hirohito was not indicted, nor brought to the Tokyo tribunal where some of his loyal men were tried and put to death by hanging. In exchange, Hirohito pledged full allegiance to the American empire, even going to the extreme of advising McArthur to keep holding Okinawa indefinitely as U.S. military base to stop Communists’ advance. Against this background, the emperor system was honorably inscribed into Chapter 1 of the new constitution.

In this process, the postwar emperor system came to embrace all of the above said three mutually contradictory principles within it, America, Constitution, and the Past (including the imperialist past). In this sense, the postwar emperor system embodies the essence of the postwar statehood.

But as such, the postwar emperor system by its new mode of being has become the unique and most effective apparatus to keep the imperial statehood alive. I mean that the exoneration of the person of Hirohito from war responsibility and war crimes made it difficult for anyone to prosecute those others who were responsible for war and colonialization crimes. As long as the supreme commander of the war is not penalized, how can his subordinates who followed his order be prosecuted and penalized? When he died in 1989, we remember Hirohito being praised all over as a man of peace, ending the war by his “holy decision.” It was as though with him all surviving war criminals were exonerated and elevated to men of peace. The emergence of a pro-American emperor system thus arranged a haven for the adherents to the past imperial glories. As such, it served as the most effective official custodian of the continuity principle.

Did the Empire really continue? The notion of the continuity of the empire may often betray common sense of the people who witnessed the fall of the empire. In reality, the Empire in 1945 crumbled in front of the people. That came as a definite visible break from the past. There was no room for justification, let alone glorification, of the imperial past. Prof. Miyazawa Toshiyoshi (1899-76), an influential mainstream constitutional scholar, in 1946 published a theory that the
change of government in Japan in August 1945 was a revolution in the legal sense because with the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration Japan's sovereignty was shifted from the Emperor to the people. The new constitution, Miyazawa argued, was established by the Japanese people who had become sovereign on the basis of the August revolution though as a matter of formality, it was established as an amendment of the Meiji constitution. This has since become the canonical theory of constitution.

Despite all this, I argue, the identity of the prewar Japanese empire was retained in the postwar state as a defining principle of statehood though it could not be declared as such. This principle was of course incompatible with the two other principles that negated the authenticity of the empire. But it was kept alive and was activated wherever possible.

Since it survived in a sort of underground status, its presence can be corroborated mainly by circumstantial evidence.

Evidence, however, is more than circumstantial in the area of public education where the state’s will to implement the third principle has been, and is, openly manifested and put into action in blatant ways.

Take the Ienaga history textbook case for example. Prof. Saburo Ienaga, historian, in 1962 sued the Ministry of Education for unconstitutionality of the history textbook censorship. He wrote a high school history textbook, which was presented to the MOE for authorization. MOE censors demanded changes in Ienaga’s critical descriptions related to a wide range of topics: Nanjing massacre, Japanese soldiers’ atrocities in China, 731 Unit for human bacteriological experimentation, Korean people’s resistance to Japanese rule, and “mass suicide” forced by Japanese soldiers during the Battle of Okinawa. The Ienaga court struggle consisted of three major lawsuits, which in aggregate lasted for 35 years from 1962 to 1997. It should be remembered that the positions the MOE took in confronting Prof. Ienaga were identical with those now taken by ultra-rightists.

The MOE in fact proved a major custodian of the continuity principle. Since the 1950s, public education in fact has been turned into an open arena of uncompromising political and ideological struggle waged by the MOE against the Japan Teachers’ Union. While the MOE showed open hostility to JTU’s peace education based on the Fundamental Law of Education, truckloads of rightists would mobilize to molest JTU’s every annual conference on education studies.

Why was education chosen for this kind of battle? Probably because the state bureaucrats who knew they could not openly state the empire-glorifying position
thought that they could inculcate it into the Japanese minds through education. In 1982, the MOE censors erased the expression “Japan’s invasion of China” and replaced it with “Japan’s advance into China” in a history textbook. As this was leaked to the press, strong protest came from China and other neighboring countries. After all, keeping textbook contents secret to the outside world was impossible, but then an LDP leader said there was a traitor who had leaked the story to foreigners.

Faced by strong protest, the Japanese government then had to apologize and introduced a new textbook censoring rule, called the “neighborhood clause.” That clause reads, “In dealing with modern and contemporary historical matters involving (Japan’s) relations with neighboring Asian countries, necessary considerations are to be paid from the viewpoint of international understanding and international cooperation.” This is a condescending posture, showing some gesture just to satisfy neighbors while not changing their original position that invited protest. The imperial continuity principle was kept intact.

The continuity principle was openly declared and applied in dealing with the “normalization” of relationship with the Republic of Korea for “normalization of relations.” In the long dragged on negotiations with the Republic of Korea, Japan stuck to the position that the treaty of Korea annexation in 1910 was lawful and valid at the point of signing. Kan’ichiro Kubota, Japan’s chief negotiator, during the negotiation in 1953, told the Korean side that Japan had brought much benefit to Korea by planting trees in the mountain, building railways, expanding paddy fields in the 36 years of its rule, rebuffing the Korean demand for reparation for the killing of patriots, violation of human rights, super-exploitation of labor and all other damage done to Koreans. The talk was suspended.

The negotiation dragged on because of this fundamental difference, and after all, under the strong pressure of the United States that needed Japan-Republic of Korea cooperation to back its war in Vietnam, the normalization treaty was concluded despite strong protest movement in Korea and Japan. Then the 1910 annexation treaty was only vaguely described “already null and void” reflecting the Japanese position that it was valid when concluded. There were no words of apology for colonization, nor reparation mentioned.

By and large, however, the imperial continuity principle had to stay behind the scene whose presence was to be confided only into the loyal Japanese ears.

Postwar statehood – four-in-one formation
How could the three principles coexist in single statehood? Can a single state have more than one legitimating principle, especially if these are incompatible with each other? But precisely that improbable set of affairs characterized the postwar Japanese statehood. The only eventuality, in such a case, would be, and in the Japanese case happened to be, that none of the three was allowed to assert exclusivity though the American hegemony was by far the strongest. But then the principles are compromised and eroded, losing their status as principles. What prevails there in lieu of principle is opportunism. The paradox of the postwar state is that it elevated opportunism to the height of principle.

In its prime, the postwar state thrived by juggling conveniently the three mutually contradictory principles of legitimation to ensure stability of rule. The U.S. hegemonic principle was the overarching frame but not necessarily omnipotent. The LDP was not happy about the constitutional constraint on military buildup, but ruled the country more or less comfortably under that constitution. The conservative camp and progressive camp were at loggerhead on issues involving U.S. pressure for Japan’s increased military role, but the LDP was able to use the presence of the pacifist opposition as its bargaining counter in negotiating with the U.S. over the degree of military commitment. Opportunistically playing one principle off against another, the LDP administration was able to rule without bothering to mobilize the public politically and ideologically in a strong sense.

There, economy largely worked as politics, in fact as the fourth factor constituting postwar statehood. I mean the statehood as described was underpinned by a specific national territory-centered mode of capital accumulation. There Japanese capital regarded the Japanese territory as its home production base from which to extend its activity centrifugally into the world. This ensured stability inside the country with the big companies operating on the Japanese style of labor management characterized by life-time employment integrating chains of subcontracting firms employing two thirds of the work force. This system plus pork-barrel politics using the national budget allocation toward the countryside constituted the core of social integration and ensured the long-term stable rule by the Liberal Democrats. The mutually contradictory three principles of the state were kept in certain dynamic equilibrium to help the statehood stay in place. The LDP mainstream adept in handling state affairs on this basis was called the Conservative Mainstream (hoshu honryu).
But by the middle of the 1990s the delicate balance amongst the three principles and one factor began to be disrupted, signaling the beginning of the end of the postwar statehood. Three major factors were at work to cause this: (1) seismic change in the global situation as symbolized by the end of the Cold War, Gulf War, and demise of the Soviet Union; (2) neoliberal globalization putting an end to the Japanese postwar mode of capital accumulation; and (3) collapse of the progressive camp as the chief bearer of the pacifist and democratic principle.

Watershed – mid-1990s

The mid-1990s represented a treacherous juncture. On the one hand, the peace and democracy forces felt that some of their long-pressed demands became achievable, and on the other hand, the ultra-right forces felt time came to launch an open, public offensive to reinstate their empire continuity principle as the state principle.

A positive side of this period was that the LDP rule began to sway and some new political groups with certain liberal tinge emerged largely through splits and regroupings of LDP members. This led to the formation of successive short-lived coalition governments, one of them a surprise LDP-JSP coalition government headed by JSP chairperson Toshiichi Murayama as Prime Minister (June 1994-January 1996). Temporarily, illusions spread that progressives could bring about major policy changes through partnership with the government.

The year 1995 being the 50th anniversary of Japan’s defeat, momentum was there to push Japan to state its position in relation to its imperial past. Left parties, quite a few politicians and intellectuals pushed for the passage of a unanimous resolution by the Diet critically reflecting on the past, but opposition to it from LDP rightists was very strong, and so the contents of the prepared text had to be miserably watered down in the process of drafting. When it was finally presented on June 9 to the Lower House of 509 members, only 230 attended, who passed the resolution. This development mirrored the right-lopsided power relationships at the parliamentary level prevailing by that time. The Upper House did not even table the resolution.

Progressives rolled back, and finally, Prime Minister Murayama, on August 15, the day of Japan’s notification of surrender, managed to issue an official statement defining where Japan stood in terms of its imperial past. This was endorsed with
the unanimous consent of the cabinet members including LDP members. The relevant part of the statement reads as follows (official translation):

During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound mourning.

It was not just a matter of statement. With the repressive Cold War structure crumbling in a series of Asian lands, Asian victims of Japanese imperialism, women who were made Japanese military’s sexual slaves called “comfort women” among them, opened their mouths, filing lawsuits, demanding the Japanese government’s apology and redress. Inside Japan movements to support them spread broadly.

But did the Murayama statement mark Japan’s decisive step toward postwar Japan’s belated decolonization? Far from it.

In the post-Diet resolution hubbub, the Liberal Democratic Party’s History Review Committee on June 30 published its report justifying Japan’s war records, titled “General Review of the Greater East Asia War.” The committee formally set up in 1993 in the LDP consisted of 105 members including quite a few top LDP leaders such as ex-prime ministers, ex-education ministers, and major intra-party faction leaders. Shinzo Abe’s name is there as an active young member. The committee met 20 times to go through the modern history of Japan and published in June 1995 a 444-page report, titled “General evaluation of the Greater East Asia War.” The central message of this work was that the Greater Asia War was not a war of aggression but a war to liberate Asia from colonialism and also for Japan’s survival and self-defense. Studies contained in it denied the truthfulness of the Nanjing massacre and “comfort women” stories, claiming overall that there was no major war crime committed by Japan. The report urged “a new struggle on school textbooks” to get descriptions of Japan having waged war of aggression removed.
from them, proposing a movement to disseminate this view of history and get it accepted by society.

The publication of this revisionist report escaped media attention. But it was in fact an exorbitant act for Japan’s ruling party to openly advance an interpretation of history that frontally clashed with the Japanese state’s postwar commitment to the international community. It would be unimaginable for a German ruling party to produce a history review justifying the acts of the Third Reich. But the Japanese ruling party did it without inviting public furor as though there were nothing special or extraordinary in it. This is a striking piece of evidence showing how far the third principle had silently infiltrated the Japanese mind by that time. Not that people positively followed that line, but they had become lenient to it.

The surge of the right in that period could occur only against the backdrop of the downfall of the progressive camp. Socialist Murayama was picked as prime minister only for coalition convenience. And in exchange for the post, he had to renounce his party’s basic policy of opposing the security treaty with the U.S., recognized the SDF as constitutional, and dropped opposition to nuclear power plants.

Since 1955, the core of the progressive camp was the four million strong General Council of Trade Unions (Sohyo) closely connected with the JSP. But gradually Sohyo’s power was eroded as pro-management unions began to increase their share in the private sector, leaving Sohyo with public sector unions. Since the 1980s, the government began to privatize the public sector, in 1987 cutting up the Japan National Railways into six private companies, destroying in this course the militant National Railway Workers’ Union. Privatization of public corporations was then accelerated, eroding Sohyo’s power fast. Finally, in 1989 Sohyo was absorbed by the pro-management union center Rengo. The JSP was left alone with its own poor organization. Besides, the disappearance of the “Socialist Camp” and socialism as inspiration of social change had demoralizing effects on movement activists.

Big business in this same period made a bold change of course. In 1995, the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations, the big business headquarters, in a historic statement titled “Japanese Management in the New Era,” declared abandonment of their much lauded Japanese management style, discarding the life-time employment and seniority-wage system in favor of full labor liquidity. The
labor market should be deregulated so they could get “exactly the quantity and quality of labor we need any moment we need it.” This policy was swiftly put into practice with the backing of the LDP government, generating a large bulk of dispatch workers and other precariat, widening gaps between the rich and poor, and disintegrating social stability.

This change of tide opened a space for the ultra-rightists to make a full debut. They launched a concerted offensive for the official adoption of their imperial glory principle as the state principle. In 1997, almost all the rightist forces, religious to secular, intellectuals to street storm troopers, for the first time came together and formed a large coalition, Nippon Kaigi (Japan conference) to promote their cause. Yasukuni Shrine was the spiritual center of the rightists. Nippon Kaigi organized its parliamentary contingent, which expanded rapidly transcending party borders, now boasting close to 300 members. Rightist intellectuals created a new textbook production group, spreading a grassroots campaign demanding deletion of textbooks’ reference to “comfort women” and later on to get a new textbook they produced adopted by local education boards for use by local schools. Revisionist history books, cartoons, comics began to flood bookstore shelves. Rightist and revisionist discourse to a large measure succeeded in mainstreaming itself. Internet provided anonymous right-leaning grassroots with an expanding arena of slanderous, racist, sexist language. Later, stocktrooper groups like Zaitoku-kai, a virulent racist group threatening and vandalizing minority communities, sprang up and began to take action, largely with the acquiescence of the authorities.

LDP digs own grave: Koizumi reform

The postwar state then entered its last phase, a process of disintegration, which proceeded by stages. The main force that undermined the postwar statehood was the wave of neoliberal globalization that decomposed the fourth factor of the postwar statehood, the territory-based mode of capital accumulation. It undermined not only the progressive labor movement and traditional progressive camp, but also the political base of the Liberal Democratic Party. In the long stagnation of the Japanese economy in the 1990s, manufacturing companies moved their plants to China and other Asian countries, causing plant closures and dismissals in the name of “restructuring.” Under the new Keidanren policy, public control on labor was eased to the benefit of employers, rapidly increasing the share
of casual workers, notably part-time women, indicating feminization of poverty. From 1998 through 2011, the real wage dropped from 100 to 92 while the big firms’ retained earnings trebled from 90 trillion to 270 trillion yen. Big companies’ aggregate ordinary profit continued to grow, jumping from 17.8 trillion yen to 34.8 trillion yen between 2009 and 2013. The gap between the rich and poor widened fast. Gini coefficient rose sharply from 0.28 in 1980 to 0.31 in 2000 and continued to rise.

As the century changed, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006) dealt a fatal blow to the postwar state formation at its economic base. A maverick populist with unique agitation skill, Koizumi carried out a thorough deregulation and privatization program, presenting it as though his was a struggle on behalf of the people against bureaucracy sticking to vested interest. Koizumi extended the dispatch worker system to the manufacturing industry, producing a large bulk of precariously employed working population, “working poor” as journalism named them. His focus was on privatization of the national postal service in order to marketize its huge postal savings for global financial interests. The postal service entailing numerous post offices based in local communities, it was also a major political base for LDP organization. Very strong resistance to the Koizumi reform was there from within his own party. Confronting the opponents, Koizumi roared “I will destroy the LDP if it resists my reform!” Calling a snap election, he effectively got rid of all his intra-party opponents by standing rival candidates in their electorates. By the end of his term, the traditional base of the LDP rule had been devastated.

On retirement, Koizumi named Shinzo Abe as his successor. Under Koizumi, the influence of the rightist forces inside the LDP had grown quite strong. Anyway, it was a dazzling victory for the rightists. Surrounded by his ideological cronies, Abe set out to put his program into practice first revising the Basic Education Law, the education version of the constitution, with emphasis on patriotism. But already then, his revisionist stance invited American suspicion. In the Upper House election in July 2007, his LDP suffered a shattering defeat to the Democratic Party of Japan. To everyone’s surprise, Abe abruptly resigned in September immediately after he delivered a long policy speech at the Diet. The two successive LDP governments were extremely unpopular, each lasting only for a year. Conversely, the Democratic Party of Japan was on the rise.

DPJ government – passage to Abe
It looked like the dawning of a new bright day after the long, long night of the LDP rule. The DPJ won a landslide victory winning 308 seats in the general election in August 2009. DPJ president Yukio Hatoyama representing the party’s liberal wing became Prime Minister. The DPJ said in its election platform something liberal, ecological, and mildly left, such as “from concrete to human beings” (critique of the LDP land development model), review of the Status of Force Agreement with the U.S. (reflecting Okinawa’s demand), and steps to walk away from interests of big business. At the outset Hatoyama declared opposition to the U.S.-Japanese plan to construct a new U.S. base in Henoko in Okinawa in exchange for the closure of the old and risky Futenma base and promised he would get the base relocated to somewhere outside of Japan or outside Okinawa. This was welcomed as a bold proposal. His public approval rate maintained a 70% level.

But the party soon betrayed public expectation as it had no principle to abide by and lacked unity on such strategic issues as the amendment of the constitution, military bases in Okinawa, nuclear power, and security treaty. It was an amalgam of heterogeneous political tendencies from pacifists, socialists through neo-liberal enthusiasts, liberals, pro-American defense elites, to veritable rightists who were conveniently united for the sole purpose of taking power from LDP. Isolated within his own party, Hatoyama abandoned his Futenma base plan and resigned as prime minister. It became clear at that point that the dominant U.S. and Japanese interests would not allow the new government to seriously challenge the status quo.

Naoto Kan, believed liberal with civic movement background, succeeded Hatoyama as Prime Minister.

Then on March 11 2011, the great earthquake and tsunami hit the Northeastern Japan, causing the catastrophic meltdown of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plants. How this shook the Japanese state and society from its foundation needs full analysis, which I cannot undertake here. The disaster laid bare the ailing core of the Japanese state and society where the nuclear and electric power industry is situated. This core was dealt a very heavy blow and its inside exposed as the majority of the people raised their voice against it, demanding abolition of nuclear power. But the nuclear business jointly with the whole big business world soon mustered its full strength to counterattack with the backing of the LDP, the U.S., and international nuclear interests. Kan was a weak leader but managed to adopt the policy of getting rid of nuclear power by 2030 and ordered the halting of
operation of the Hamaoka nuclear plant sitting in a strategic location between Tokyo and Nagoya.

But Kan, too, resigned serving only one year as intra-party fights intensified and the nuclear power industry’s pressure mounted. In September 2011, the third DPJ Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda entered the scene. A right-leaning DPJ leader, Noda rescinded Kan cabinet’s no nuclear power by 2030 policy and astounded the world by officially declaring that the Fukushima nuclear plant had been already brought under control. He also is the one who, panicked at Shintaro Ishihara’s provocation, brought relationship with China to a crisis by nationalizing the disputed Senkaku Islands. Tokyo Governor Ishihara, who I deem to be a professional agent provocateur, was arranging for the purchase of the islands by the Tokyo metropolitan government for the sole purpose of inciting trouble with China.

In December 2012, Noda dissolved the Lower House for reasons no one understood. Voters massively forsook the DPJ for the LDP, which happened to be under Abe’s baton. He was not particularly the voters’ choice.

What does this development mean?

When the DPJ won in 2007, I pointed out that the DPJ inherited ruins of the postwar state and therefore unless it had certain principle whereby to remove the debris and rebuild, the DPJ government would be only transitory. I meant that there should be a process of realignment to create a new political force based on the best principle saved from the pile of debris. But that has not happened so far.

Instead, the Abe group emerged triumphant, setting out to destroy the pacifist and democratic principle and let its obscurantist revisionist principle to prevail.

Let us examine whether this attempt has a future.

Inevitable consequences – fabrication of realities

Earlier I asked what is the force propelling Abe and his group in their reckless drive. Let me here go back to my earlier account that the postwar statehood had within it built-in contradictions amongst three state legitimating principles whose clashes were contained for half a century. This is a twisted formation with torque at work. And the body thus composed is now unravelling, letting the revisionist principle spring out. And this is at once the process of disintegration of the postwar statehood. Abe in this sense is a product of the postwar state’s disintegrative evolution. It is, therefore, a historical, grounded process, and not one conjured by
some group’s whim or ambition. The postwar state from the outset had that poisoned spring built into it.

Since state legitimating principles matter here, the Abe drive, in its essence, has to be ideological, or even metaphysical in nature. Of course it is a world of power politics and so the realities matter. Abe, too, must interact to changing realities. The point is that for Abe type politics the abstract principle has to come first to set the course of action. Policies are to be directly derived from what the principle demands, rather than thrashed out through interaction with given realities. In this case, the principle is such a miserable, indefensible, ugly one, so much so that for anyone having a modicum of intelligence hoisting it would be unimaginable. But still it is a principle in status and is actually hoisted as such in dead earnest by the official rulers of a big country.

At the beginning I said that the Abe government sits on shaky ground. It does precisely because of the principle he upholds. Some of its consequences include:

(1) Abe’s imperial glory principle (“Abe principle” heretofore) is incompatible with the principle of U.S. hegemony as it justifies the Greater Asia War as a war to liberate Asia and for Japan’s self-defense, which the U.S. angrily rejects; yet, Abe not only cannot cut ties with America, but must count on closer partnership with it for the achievement of his goal. On the U.S. part, it openly criticized Abe on issues such as Yasukuni, “comfort women,” and other signs of revisionism, but it still needs Japan’s deeper commitment to its Asia-Pacific “pivot” strategy and so it seems to have basically and conditionally accepted Abe. The U.S. however does not allow Abe’s Japan to go it alone in its relations with China as it has entered into a special big power relations of cooperation and rivalry with China over the control of the Pacific (which I call composite hegemony) and has no intention to allow Japan to jam it by its arbitrary independent action. In this sense, Abe is still under the spell of the postwar statehood.

(2) The Abe principle precisely because it justifies what Japan did to China forecloses friendship with China and so dictates a certain foreign policy package excluding close relationship with China. The outcome is Abe’s “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” doctrine, purporting to create an arc of “value-sharing nations” to geopolitically contain China, an arc that starts in Scandinavia, passing through Europe and Middle East and then India and Southeast Asia, and ends in Japan. Abe repeatedly boasts that he is making his world strategy watching a globe placed in front of him.
Besides the Abe principle does not tolerate a China standing as equal with or even superior to Japan, the great leader of modern Asia by birth.

Abe must be dead serious in pursuing his fantasy. Within two years of his office he has visited more than 50 countries in all continents except China (until the 2014 APEC) and except the Republic of Korea (to now), Japan’s second and third biggest trade partners. Wherever he went accompanied by a large host of businessmen, Abe was enthusiastic to sell construction and other projects, notably Japan-made nuclear plants, and at once never failed to demonstrate his “proactive contribution to peace” approach hinting at China’s rising power as a menace to all.

Is there such an arc now encircling China? Hardly. It is clear that China encirclement, let alone containment, under Japanese leadership is a pipe dream. It is only wishful projection of the past into the future.

This being the case, the effort to fulfill the requirements of the Abe principle of necessity ends up in fabrication of reality, which means conjuring virtual reality. Then one begins to work on the virtual reality. There is no other way because Abe being Prime Minister, the virtual reality he has shown to the public has been shown as hard reality. And I suspect Abe himself may begin to believe it is the hard reality. Political language then loses contact with the earth and begins to hover in the air. But at a certain point, the reality will retaliate. And not necessarily in a benign manner. I am afraid that process may be already under way.

(3) To live and let live in virtual reality, one must stay in a secluded universe. As I pointed out earlier, the Abe-designed new statehood is featured by a break from universal norms. This does not mean closure of the country. Seclusion means a conceptual process whereby external development is reinterpreted into a version easily and comfortably swallowed by the insider’s stomach. This is what is happening. Now increasingly Japan is retreating into its own world, shunning critical eyes from outside. If it is criticized from outside, that is because misunderstanding is still there, or else spite or jealousy toward Japan is working. Generally, Japan is loved, its exquisite culture adored, manga appreciated by the youth everywhere, technical finesse of “washlet” marveled at by gaijin residents, etc.– these and other minor self-congratulations inundate TV channels every day while violent xenophobic internet messages rush in tens of thousands to critical public speakers speaking straight.

(4) Last but not least, the “Abenomix” economic policy package, despite all its motto in favor of women, local communities, agriculture, is intended to turn Japan into “a country where enterprises can operate more comfortably than in any other
country.” (Abe policy speech, Lower House, Jan. 28, 2013). Under his Abenomix, he says he is pulverizing the “bedrock” of regulations binding medicine, agriculture, education, and labor so he will open them fully for free competition. Note that there is no mention of the people and their life as the main frame of reference of political program. Though any further analysis cannot be done here, this may require redefinition of national interest away from interests of the people living in the territory to mean an aggregate of earnings by Japan-linked capital. Likewise, the nation will be redefined not as the people living on the land but as those whose life and activities are integrated with activities of capital that enjoys the world’s most comfortable environment.

Can all this be a firm ground on which a state and the people are based?

Alternative perspective

From the nature of the development we have seen so far, one inescapable conclusion is that we must defeat and bury their principle. Since their principle is bound tightly to the American hegemonic principle, the knot must be neutralized. What is needed is a surgical operation to gorge out the root of the disease and not palliative treatment. That is because the seed of the disease was embedded in the postwar statehood right from its inception. And a corollary of this is that the struggle against it should be a struggle by another principle.

Is this a fundamentalist notion? It is not. It is rather a historical approach. Because, as earlier analyzed, the postwar state had a positive principle, constitutional pacifism and democracy as one of the legitimizing principles of the state. Rather than the text of the constitution, I am referring to the principle of pacifism and democracy as endeared, invoked, put into use, enriched, and thus appropriated by the people and remade into an acting principle wielding actual moral power to influence the course of event and conduct of government. This principle showed its clear incompatibility with the U.S. imperial principle as well as the imperial continuity principle.

The pacifist principle has been defeated for now as the Abe group came up triumphant, but it is not dead. Rather, its essence cannot be denied wherever there is people’s resistance. It is alive and implemented in the midst of the current situation in Japan. Despite the muffling social effects as well as growing use of state and non-state violence on them, the people are unfurling actions and activities on all major issues – nuclear plants, military buildup, war preparation,
and fascistic laws. Okinawa people are in uncompromising confrontation with the
Japanese state against dual colonization by Japan and the United States, now
poised to appeal to the right of self-determination.

Probably we need now to do two things.

First, we need to evaluate critically our past movement to identify its
weaknesses because we actually failed to defeat and overcome the two unwelcome
principles. Second, we simultaneously need to develop and enrich the pacifist and
democratic principle into concrete perspectives and proposals addressing the
national, regional, and global situations. I am sure that if we take up the pacifist
principle and begin to imagine and design along it, there is a broad vista opening
up to help ease and resolve tensions, for instance, in Northeast Asia, and that will
tell us who to meet to discuss what. This is easier done than said. A lesson from the
Abe disturbance should be that we are at such a time of change as requires our
going to the principle, use it, test it, and enrich it as the necessary base for
perspective-guided action.

End

---

i English translation of the LDP draft constitution as well as the LDP Q&A on it is by Muto.
ii C. Douglas Lummis, “Constitution is an order given to the government.” Heibon-sha, 2013, pp. 71-73
iii Moto, Hidenori, “Significance and challenges today of the two legal systems theory” in Sugihara, Yasuo et. al ed.,
iv Miyazawa, Toshiyoshi, “The principles of the Constitution” Iwanami Shoten, 1967