The Cold War and post-Cold War dynamics of Taiwan and East Asia in people’s security perspective

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Introductory note

This paper was originally written as a keynote speech for a specific occasion, an international forum that was held by the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan (PCT) in Taipei in February 2001, to discuss Taiwan’s international status in the post-Cold War era. The PCT is known as a strong advocate of Taiwan independence and democratization, and I had this specific audience in mind in organizing this paper. My concern was that the independence advocacy that had aptly expressed people’s aspirations in the democratization movement under the iron-fist rule of KMT was being subsumed, as Taiwan polity was Taiwanese and democratized, into a banal statist discourse. This discourse, I am afraid, has distanced itself from its original popular source and become the elite politicians’ discourse, indifferent to the everyday life and security of the people in Taiwan. I approached this problematic from the perspective of ‘people’s security’, which I discussed in my previous essay on the topic in Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, vol. 2, no. 1.

As the mutual relationships between East Asian countries had to be shaped overwhelming by the US Cold War rhetoric and material influences, discussing Taiwan with regard to the transition to the post-Cold War era required me to go, albeit in outline, into the basics of these relationships as well as the modes of US hegemony in this region both in the Cold War and post-Cold War settings. I felt that characterization of these diverse elements, if sketchy, was indispensable to discussing the topic, Taiwan today.

At my friends’ suggestion, I tried to revise the original paper to fit into the concerns of the general readership, with the different aspects mentioned more fully explained. However, I have found this difficult as it would require me to write a completely new article, or maybe a whole book. So I present this paper almost as it was written for the original PCT audience.

It is my honour and pleasure that I am given this opportunity to speak at this important international conference of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. Let me express my profound respect for your church’s consistent advocacy of, and struggle for, the rights and dignity of the people in Taiwan, including the rights of the aborigines, in the face of the harsh KMT government repression.

The topic given me is a big one and I do not feel equipped to deal with the whole range of the problems involved. I am also aware of the delicate nature of the question of the ‘international status of Taiwan’ if it refers to the ‘independence’ or ‘unification’ problematic. My concern is with the actual lives of the people in Taiwan, Mainland China and the rest of the world in the new situation that is taking shape after the end of the Cold War. In other words, I will discuss some aspects of the given topic from the viewpoint of people’s security, rather than the state security, and will try to define what we can, and should, do together as unprivileged people and peoples to bring about justice and peace to us all.
The Cold War and its aftermath

To discuss the post-Cold War world situation, we need to examine what the Cold War was. I understand it in terms of a specific historical mode of exercise of the United States hegemony in the post-Second World War period. The specificity was that, for more than four decades, the US hegemony had to be practised as the ‘free world’ hegemony demarcated by the Cold War frontiers. In assuming the global hegemonic role toward the end of the Second World War, the United States dreamed of integrating the whole world, not just the ‘free world’, under its specific system of global domination. The Bretton Woods system was so designed and the Marshall Plan was offered to East European countries, too. However, the Kremlin obstructed this scheme in 1947 and the Chinese revolution frustrated it in Asia in 1949, forcing US hegemony to stay incomplete and flawed. The world was territorially divided into the ‘free world’ and the ‘communist world’ confronting each other politically, ideologically, and militarily.

The end of the Cold War, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ‘transition’ of communist regimes to ‘market economy’, removed this obstacle. With this, the US has managed to return to the pre-1947 global hegemonic position. In the broadest sense, what we witness is a spiral return of the US to its original hegemonic logic and practice.

It seems clear to me that genuine efforts for social justice for the oppressed and exploited people and colonized peoples were there in the 20th century revolutions, from the Russian to the Chinese. But it is by now clear that these revolutions, having grabbed state power, while making profound changes in the old social order, committed vast injustices by suppression of freedom and violation of human rights of the very people they claimed to represent. These revolutions failed to develop alternative models of human society.

The world now is very, very different from the mid-20th century world. New problems have emerged, pressing for global solutions, while old problems stay unresolved, and they are intertwined into a huge mass of problems plaguing global society — ever widening gaps between the global rich and global poor, astronomic volumes of cash flow electronically changing hands for speculative interest, the rapidly destruction of the global environment, regional conflicts destroying people’s lives in many places, and the prevalence of money-oriented values everywhere, to name only a few. True, the Cold War-set barriers are gone, but neo-liberal ‘globalization’ from above, introduced as the organizing principle of global and national societies, is proving increasingly destructive to the overwhelming majority of the people as well as to our environment, as its prerogative is freedom of capital accumulation through ruthless competition, which undermines social solidarity.

Moreover, we witness that negative relations, idiosyncrasies and vested interests shaped in the cold war setting are being reorganized and reintegrated into this post-Cold War context, complicating the suffering of the people. Therefore, we need to return to the Cold War in order to situate ourselves properly in the post-Cold War situation.

Japan and the Cold War

Talking about East Asia, it is obvious that after the defeat and collapse of the Japanese Empire, the regional configuration was shaped overwhelmingly by the Cold War, specifically by the US Cold War strategy. It was the US strategy that organized postwar East Asian continental peripheries into the forefront of the anti-Communist crusade as the most vital part of ‘the Great Crescent’, as its main architect George Kennan named it. The US organized South Korea, Japan, Okinawa and Taiwan into its Cold War system through separate bilateral arrangements with them. They were thus positioned differently in the same strategic design, like horses pulling one cart driven by a single driver.

As for Japan, the US first wanted a demilitarized Japan incapable of emerging once again as a military threat to the US hegemony. Simultaneously the US wanted to revive Japan as a
viable capitalist economy to serve as America’s showcase of modernization and capitalist development to the rest of Asia, which found itself in turbulent and potentially revolutionary processes.

It is interesting to note that in its strategic postwar design, the US first schemed to ‘return’ to postwar Japan what Bruce Cummings called the ‘hinterland’ to facilitate its East Asia grand design. Cummings quotes a 1948 CIA report as stating: ‘As in the past, Japan for normal economic functioning on an industrial basis, must have access to the Northeast Asiatic areas — notably North China, Manchuria, and Korea — now under direct, indirect, or potential control of the USSR’ (Cumings 1984).

This design assumed a capitalist China ruled by the Nationalist Party (KMT) where Japan was to be allowed a special access, if not with the previous colonial privilege, under the control of the United States. But this was frustrated by the Chinese Communist victory in Mainland China in 1949. With this and the subsequent breakout of the Korean War in 1950, the Cold War became entrenched in East Asia with the ‘containment of China’ as the central theme.

To use Japan effectively for the Cold War purposes, demilitarization of Japan was halted and a ‘reverse course’ with harsh repression of labour and other progressive movements began. Immediately after the Korean War broke out, the US decided to remilitarize Japan with the establishment of a national police reserve force (later the Self-Defense Forces) as its reserve army in the rear of the Korean battlefront. Once dissolved Zaibatsu companies were allowed to return in this circumstance and once purged war criminals were called back to public life. Having to abandon its earlier plan of giving Japan a Northeast Asia hinterland, the US decided to allow Japan to march south for hinterland. The Japanese ruling groups rode on this strategy and began economically to expand southward, using ‘war reparations’ as the vehicle for entry into Southeast Asia. The basics of postwar Japanese economic expansion in Asia were thus laid in the Cold War framework.

In this setting, Japan–Taiwan relations were a strategic factor. In arranging a peace treaty with Japan, the US pressured Japan to choose the KMT government as the representative of China and Japan followed this. Then Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru sent a letter to Washington promising that Japan would not sign a peace treaty with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) but was prepared to sign a treaty with the KMT government in Taipei. In April 1952, the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed together with the US–Japan Security Treaty, allowing the US to keep its troops in Japan. The US did not invite either Beijing or Taipei to the peace conference while India and Burma refused to sign the treaty, protesting against the treatment of China. Soon after the signing of the San Francisco Treaty, Japan separately signed a Peace Treaty with the Republic of China government in Taipei. This signalled a definite commitment of postwar Japan to the US China containment alliance.

Historical ties thus developed between the KMT and Japanese politicians, involving all kinds of corrupt relations on both sides. It should be noted here that the pro-KMT pressure groups facilitated by the anti-Communist alliance consisted of rightist politicians not concerned at all with human rights or democracy in Taiwan. They were pro-Chiang Kai-shek because they were enthusiastic cold warriors. Their top organizer and leader was Kishi Nobusuke. Kishi was one of the highest ranking officials of the ‘Manchuko’ puppet government carrying out colonial ‘nation building,’ and then served as the Minister of Commerce and Industry of the Tojo Cabinet that opened the Pacific War. After the war he was arrested and imprisoned as a Class A war criminal. After release, he returned to politics, rapidly climbed the ladder of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, became Prime Minister in 1957, and stayed there until he was overthrown in 1960 by the largest popular protest movement in postwar Japan against his conclusion of a new military treaty with the United States. He was a totally corrupt politician with close underworld (yakuza) connections, adept at turning all his contacts, particularly those he re-established with Asian countries, into private money. Kishi posed as a great friend of Taiwan which he regarded as one of the most
lucratives sources of illicit political funds. Kishi and other pro-Taiwan bigshots were the personages who believed in the continuity of the Japanese Empire, no repentance of Japanese colonialism and wars of aggression against neighbouring Asia. They were pro-Chiang Kai-shek because the generalissimo, they used to say, displayed the essence of ‘high oriental morality’ by stating that China did not seek vengeance and so waived war reparations from Japan. Using this comfortable phrase on all available occasions, the ‘pro-Taiwan’ conservative politicians absolved themselves of their responsibility both for the Japanese empire’s aggression of China (because the Taipei government was speaking for the whole of China) and for the colonial rule of Taiwan (because KMT was ruling Taiwan). This was a convenient duality that helped erase the problematic of, and thus justify, Japan’s 60-year colonization of Taiwan. To them, Taiwan as such, let alone the people in Taiwan, did not count.

The Cold War alliance between Japan and Taiwan (KMT government) represented the worst, most reactionary, and totally corrupt relations at the Japanese end that certainly had a great stake in the upkeep of the KMT dictatorship in Taiwan, which ruled by terror.

Overlapping historical processes and their evolution

Taiwan, it seems to me, compressed two overlapping historical processes into one, the Chinese civil war between the KMT and the CCP and the Cold War between Washington and Moscow–Beijing. The civil war in itself could have had its own resolution if let alone. It could have resulted in a Taiwan province of the People’s Republic of China or a resumption of open hostilities between the KMT and CP across the strait leading to one or the other’s settlement. In either case, the Taiwan people would have lived in an entirely different historic circumstance than today.

However, the Cold War, superimposed on the logic of civil war, created a peculiar circumstance for Taiwan. It forced Taiwan to become a territory contested between Washington and Beijing–Moscow, not just between KMT and CCP. The cross-section of this dual relationship led Taiwan to an absurd and impossible status that was as real as it was fictitious. Real because after the outbreak of the Korean War, the US Seventh Fleet went into the Strait, protecting this ‘free world’ territory from invasion by Communist China. The US went to the verge of nuclear air attacks on Mainland China in 1958, and pumped massive military aid to bolster its forefront anti-Communist citadel in East Asia. It was also real since, with US backing, KMT established its iron fist rule over the population, ostensibly to champion the anti-Communist ‘free world’ cause. But all this was based on a fictitious assumption — that the KMT government in Taipei legitimately represented the whole Chinese people. The extent of the power of the Cold War logic was demonstrated to the world as the United States succeeded by all procedural stratagems in keeping the KMT government as the legitimate representative of China in the United Nations.

It should be noted here that the Cold War logic on the ‘free world’ side was met by people’s reactions in different forms in different countries. In Korea, the people aspired and struggled for national unification as the country had been arbitrarily divided by the big powers and then ravaged by the war. In Okinawa, the US military rule, with a massive American military presence, called forth a movement for ‘reversion to Japan’ to enjoy the benefit of Japan’s postwar Peace Constitution. In Japan itself, the Cold War logic made scandalously visible the discrepancy between the war-renouncing constitution on the one hand and the rapid military build-up and military alliance with the United States on the other. The postwar Japanese peace movement opposing reminilization and the US military presence emerged to straighten out this discrepancy on the basis of the pacifist principles of the constitution.

In the Taiwan setting, ‘independence’ seems to be the key word that in political topology corresponded to Korea’s ‘national unification,’ Okinawa’s ‘reversion to Japan,’ and mainland Japan’s ‘constitutional pacifism.’ I observe that the independence slogan brought forward in
the 1970s by the popular movement was synonymous with democracy in Taiwan, while it also expressed opposition to mainland China’s ambition to militarily take over Taiwan. It seems to me that ‘independence’ in this case largely, if not exclusively, meant Taiwan society’s autonomy from the rule of the KMT conqueror dynasty. If so, independence in this sense meant independence within Taiwan. This struggle gained strength as the local Taiwanese bourgeoisie developed and accumulated its power through close integration into the transnational business networks.

However, prior to the end of the Cold War, this political context changed as the US virtually ended its China containment policy, in 1971, with Kissinger’s visit to Beijing, and officially terminated it in 1979 by recognizing the PRC as the only legitimate government of China. This removed the most blatant part of the Cold War fiction, that the KMT government represented the whole of China. Japan followed the US in 1972 by normalizing diplomatic relations with Beijing and abrogating the 1952 peace treaty with the KMT government.

This was a blow to the identity of the Taiwan KMT state. The United States agreed on the ‘one China’ principle, which not only negated Taiwan’s representation of the whole of China but also suspended its international status. The Cold War continued and even culminated in the 1980s with the US and the Soviet Union threatening an outbreak of a full nuclear war. Now it was the Soviet Union that had to be contained. Ironically, the United States made its about-face over the China–Taiwan issue precisely for the new Cold War convenience of encircling the Soviet Union with communist China’s backing.

Economically, the 1970s was the decade when US multinational corporations arrived in full force in East Asia and when Japanese capital, backed by the government development assistance, made rapid inroads into East and Southeast Asia, organizing vast networks of subcontracting systems. On this basis, in the 1980s, East and Southeast Asia rose to the status of a major global centre of capital accumulation. The ‘miracle growth’ of East Asia commenced. While Japan grew into an economic superpower, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore attracted global attention as prospering ‘four little tigers’ with incredibly rapid economic growth. The Cold War containment largely lifted, China switched from the self-reliance strategy to ‘opening and renovation’, then to ‘market socialism’, joining the Pacific basin economy. Taiwan successfully participated in this regional division of labour, achieving an amazing 8.3% average growth throughout the 1980s. Taiwan became an economic entity that no country could ignore. In this process, Taiwanese entrepreneurs, many of them small export manufacturers subcontracting with US or Japanese firms, tremendously contributed to the enhancement of Taiwan’s economic position, enriching and bolstering themselves against the KMT/state-owned industries and the KMT monopoly of political power.

In the aftermath of the 1971 shock, the KMT reacted by harsh repression against the rising Taiwanese bourgeoisie–popular force coalition. But it was clear that the strong-arm response and KGB-type social control alone would not help. The Presbyterian Church of Taiwan, reacting to President Nixon’s visit to Beijing in 1972, issued a historic declaration on national politics ‘Guo-she Sun-yen’ demanding that the future of Taiwan be self-determined by the Taiwan people and that democratization be promoted. In its subsequent human rights declaration in 1977, the church, warning against the danger of Taiwan being militarily annexed by China, reiterated the position of the earlier statement and urged measures to turn Taiwan to a new independent state. The KMT vehemently reacted to this, cracking down on the church leaders.

Self-determination, it seems to me, then had two meanings — the Taiwanese people determining their own fate vis-à-vis the KMT dictatorship, and rejecting the imposition of the CCP rule by military annexation.

The years from the Gaoxiong incident in December 1979 to the lifting of the martial law in 1987 represented the period of contest between the KMT and the popular opposition. In hindsight, it was a period of transition. (We from Japan were watching the struggle in Taiwan
in this period with respect and admiration. Quite a few human rights groups and networks were formed in Japan to support the struggle in Taiwan. Also quite a few Asia solidarity groups born in the 1970s were concerned with the Japanese companies’ exploitative and abusive treatment of workers in the free trade zones in Taiwan. Activities to support the Taiwanese people’s struggle for human rights emerged in Japan for the first time in this period although the Cold War alliance was much stronger.)

The transition was to the ‘Taiwanization’ of Taiwan. That involved the paradox of the KMT itself being Taiwanized. I am not chronologically tracing here the Taiwanization-cum democratization process that was carried out by President Lee Teng-hui in the 1990s under the people’s pressure that dismantled much of the internal legacies of the civil war and removed cold war fictions. By the very nature of the structural duality, Taiwanization of necessity had to entail democratization. But it did not free Taiwan from the inherited paradox.

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) founded in 1986 as the political mouthpiece of the Taiwanese declared that Taiwan should be a sovereign independent Republic of Taiwan not belonging to China. A referendum should be held to decide on this matter.

However, there was no denying that Taiwan, by that time, was already an independent sovereign state in the sense that it was not a colony of any foreign power. DPP leader Shih Ming-teh in 1995 declared that Taiwan was already an independent country and that therefore there was no need for a DPP government to declare Taiwan independent. Even Lee Teng-hui himself admitted this, and acted accordingly, seeking Taiwan’s seat in the United Nations. Taiwan is, in fact, an independent state carrying a heavy weight in the international capitalist economy. It ranks among the rich economies of the world, with over $10 000 income per capita, the third largest foreign exchange reserve in the world following only Japan and the PRC, and enormous investment overseas. On the other hand, it is a society suffering from all kinds of new and old problems plaguing other industrial and post-industrial societies.

The Taiwanization–democratization process culminated in the victory of DPP leader Chen Shui-bien in the March 2000 election that put the DPP into the ruling position of the Republic of China. The ousting of the KMT from the ruling position has created a unique situation. My point here is that the historical civil war simply evaporated, rather than settled. The Chinese civil war was fought by the CCP and the KMT. The Republic of China was founded as KMT’s party-state, and so was the PRC as the CCP’s party state. Given this nature of the ROC statehood, a ROC without KMT certainly means a different statehood. Seen from this angle, although Chen decided to inherit the title of the Republic of China, the presidential election in substance was a referendum to decide the nature of the Taiwan state. Beijing could settle the civil war with the KMT, but not with the DPP. The ROC under the DPP is an entity Beijing has to talk to on an entirely new basis.

I argue therefore that the independence agenda has run its course. For the well-being, security and dignity of the people in Taiwan and China as well as neighbouring peoples, I believe there should be a new approach, one, that is appropriate in the post-cold war world where the 19th–20th century notion of sovereign nation statehood and nationalism are being shaken to their foundation.

PRC — dangers and opportunities

What about the People’s Republic of China? Certainly the suspended status of Taiwan is largely due to China’s negation of an independent Taiwan. While it says it seeks a peaceful solution, it refuses to abandon the option to use force against Taiwan in the event of Taiwan officially announcing independence. Beijing uses its enormous weight in world politics to get its terms accepted by other countries that need good relations with China. It is still fresh to our memory that prior to the 1996 presidential election in Taiwan, China conducted a threatening military
exercise on the opposite side of Taiwan, apparently as psychological warfare to influence the election outcome.

For the CCP–PRC the continued existence of the KMT–PRC was not acceptable as long as it followed, as it did, the logic of the single, sovereign state of China. This is the mirror image of the earlier KMT–ROC stance. My view about this issue is that the notion of exclusive, sovereign rights of a nation state has already become outmoded, that the experience in the 20th century has proved that the assumption of national identity as the unitary and exclusive organizing principle of a whole community does not come to grips with its actual pluralistic composition. If this plurality is ignored and the nation statehood is taken as the sole universal form of the existence of human societies, oppression of minorities by the majority is unavoidable, as with Tibet and Kosovo. Conversely, if the minority, in fighting the rule by the majority, simply claim its own exclusive nation state based on the assumption of its ‘genuine’ unitary identity, the ideology that leads the struggle would negate the plurality of its own society and can easily lead to ethnic cleansing excluding new minorities. Albanians are a minority in Yugoslavia but the majority in Kosovo where Serbians are a minority. Ruthless conflicts and bloodshed with which the world today is tragically replete are embedded in the modern nation statehood itself.

Keeping this in mind, we must take into account the fact that we, at the beginning of this new century, still live in a world saddled by the nation state system and we still have to find ways to live with it while modifying it and encouraging alternative modes of organization of our societies to emerge, grow and crack it, albeit locally. The challenge here is for us to find new ways to break this dilemma by finding a new solution each time we face the statehood problematic. The historic complexity of the China–Taiwan relationship calls for precisely a new productive formula of the solution and I am sure that will certainly help other communities resolve their similar problems and avoid disastrous consequences.

I observe that the CCP–PRC is in a deep crisis of eroded legitimacy despite its apparent economic success earned by incorporation into global capitalism. The ever-widening gaps between rich and poor, as well as between the prospering areas and impoverished areas, mass unemployment due to the privatization and restructuring of the state sector, and irreparable damage being done to an already fragile environment, are aggravating contradictions that characterize most countries of the South. Official corruption is so rampant and institutionalized that the party leadership now has to admit that the party is losing people’s confidence. But what is peculiar to China as well as to other ‘transition economies’ is that a crass capitalist drive is being carried out by the Communist government whose legitimacy is in its claim of a worker–peasant government. Therefore, this capitalism has to be called ‘market socialism.’ My friends in Beijing told me recently that ‘class’ was now one of the most sensitive words to use, as it automatically casts doubt about the legitimacy of the present regime.

The CCP leadership is obsessed with the fear of disintegration of the statehood as its prestige is lost and legitimacy eroded. If Taiwan is recognized as an independent country, Beijing is afraid Tibet and Inner Mongolia, and perhaps Xinjiang, may follow and the whole situation might get out of control.

All this generates both dangers and opportunities. The dangers, of course, are that a desperate Beijing could venture a military solution to conquer and annex Taiwan. The opportunities are that circumstances, both internal and international, force Beijing to be pragmatic. Beijing, in practice, is rather cautious and flexible. It went as far as proposing and implementing the ‘one country, two system’ solution for Hong Kong. However, I am not saying that this should be the universal solution also applicable to Taiwan. Anyway, Hong Kong was a British colony and Taiwan not a colony of any country. Tibet is yet another case. The solution should accordingly be different.

But before going into this question further, let us go back to the post-Cold War US hegemony.
Globalization and its military umbrella: Japan readied to go to war

During the Cold War, the US military presence overseas was ostensibly to protect the ‘free world’ from Soviet Communism. But after its Cold War enemies have gone, the United States still keeps its powerful forward-deployed forces in East Asia. In Europe, NATO was expanded eastward, and new so-called ‘Star Wars’ systems are proposed to be introduced.

The Pentagon now puts forward the key strategic slogan of ‘Shape, Respond, and Prepare’. Its key concept, ‘shape’, means that the US military is instrumental in shaping the world to maximize US interests in the 21st century. ‘A National Security Strategy for a New Century’ made by the Pentagon in 1997 states:

We seek to create conditions in the world where our interests are rarely threatened, and when they are, we have effective means of addressing those threats. In general, we seek a world in which no critical region is dominated by a power hostile to the United States and regions of greatest importance to the U.S. are stable and at peace ...

While the capital globalization drive is promoted by the composite power centres of the world such as the WTO, IMF and other multilateral agencies as well as by multinational corporations and the Northern governments, this whole process is ultimately guaranteed and protected by the hegemonic US military force. But that military strategy is in the service of the US national interests, too. In other words, the globalization process is mentored by US military unilaterism.

The Pentagon in June 2000 disclosed a key ‘defense guidance document,’ entitled Joint Vision 2020 that envisioned Asia, not Europe, as the prime focus of the US global strategy in the coming decades and revealed that already more attack submarines were deployed to Asia than to Europe and more war games and strategic studies were done as Asia is the hypothetical war theatre.

Already in 1995, the Pentagon made definite its post-Cold War East Asia and Pacific strategy on the initiative of Joseph Nye, then Assistant Secretary of Defense. The strategy centres on the continued US forward military presence in East Asia, most of them in Okinawa, mainland Japan and South Korea. This strategy, according to its architects, emerged through rejection of other possible options. Then Secretary of Defense Cohen confided, ‘we explicitly considered options to reduce our forward-deployed military capability, and we explicitly rejected such options.’ Called the American leadership strategy, it was adopted pushing aside several other alternatives ranging from troop withdrawal through creation of a loose Asian security arrangement to a NATO-like regional alliance.

Central to this strategy are alliances with Asian countries. ‘Reinforcing our alliances to identify their new basis after the Cold War is at the heart of the strategy’, Nye wrote. In fact, under this strategy, the United States is ‘re-entering’ Southeast Asia by concluding the Visiting Force Agreement with the Philippines and conducting large scale bilateral military exercises with Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries.

However, the ‘lynchpin’ of this strategy is the alliance with Japan. ‘The US–Japan security relationship is fundamental to the pursuit of American security objectives both worldwide and within Asia ... This alliance was crucial during the Cold War. And now that the Cold War is over and we are faced with new security challenges everywhere, it remains the cornerstone of our strategy in the region’ (Defense Issues 1996).

Curiously, after the Cold War confrontation was over, the United States parcelled out for Japan a heavier military role than even at the height of the Cold War. Following the 1996 redefinition of the US–Japan security alliance, a new military arrangement, entitled the US–Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, was made in 1997. This bilateral arrangement obligates Japan to mobilize its public and private resources, personnel, facilities, and services as well as its military force to join American military operations to be conducted in ‘areas
surrounding Japan’. North Korea was specifically mentioned by Nye and other designers of this arrangement as a ‘clear and present danger’ to ‘have important influence on Japan’s security’, a case that will trigger American military action in which Japan is to participate. But of course it is clear that a military conflict in Taiwan Strait is assumed as a possible trigger for US–Japan joint military action although the Japanese and US governments quibbled on this point considering China’s strong reaction.

One alarming development connected with this is that using the momentum of the alliance redefinition, the Japanese ruling groups are now freeing the postwar Japanese state from its constitutional constraints. The postwar constitution has a pacific clause that bans the military and denies the state the right of belligerency. The conservative forces find now the opportune time to delete this clause and change the postwar state into a ‘fully-fledged’ war-capable state with a large army deployable overseas without excuses, the right of belligerency, greater powers of the Emperor, and curtailed democratic gains of the people. Revision of the constitution has been already placed on a mid-term political agenda.

In this political climate, rightwing intellectuals who launched campaigns glorifying the Japanese imperial past are making inroads into mainstream media, attracting a sizeable number of young people with calls for national pride. They publish popular books, hold rallies, and write energetically for the media demanding that mention of ‘comfort women’ in school textbooks be erased, claiming that the Rape of Nanking and other atrocities by Japanese soldiers had been fabricated or grossly exaggerated by the postwar progressives. They do this campaign to ‘rectify the masochistic view of history’. Kobayashi Yoshinori (2000), a popular cartoonist, joined this campaign and published a cartoon book Discussing War, which glorified patriotism and Japanese war history, with this crude message: ‘Will you go to war? Or do you stop being a Japanese?’ Half a million copies of this book have been sold. Curiously at a glance, both the reintegration with the US strategy in disregard of ‘national pride’ and the fanning of crude nationalism are escalating side by side. In fact, the economic globalization and military integration with the US inevitably work to undermine the basis of the nation state and generate the state’s need for artificial revival of nationalism.

What alarms us is that Taiwan is brought in as a key element of the co-prosperity sphere campaign. Ishihara Shintaro is a case in point. Using anti-American rhetoric, he authored the well-known book, Japan that can say No — and this person poses as a great friend of Taiwan. Now he advocates a new version of the Greater Asia Prosperity Sphere centring on Japan and excluding ‘Communist China.’ An outspoken populist rightist now serving as governor of Tokyo, Ishihara refuses to have relations with Tokyo’s sister city Beijing and dares to call China by a pejorative prewar name, ‘Shina’. Speaking as governor of Tokyo at an army ceremony, he urged the Japanese military to mobilize to put down ‘violent disturbances’ that, he said, ‘third country people’ (a discriminatory label of Koreans and Chinese) would start in the event of a major natural disaster hitting Tokyo. Reminded of the massacre of Koreans and Chinese by police-instigated vigilantes during the 1926 great earthquake, many Tokyo citizens and foreign residents protested but he did not cancel his statement. In Taiwan, he seems accepted as a great friend of Taiwan by Taiwan political circles. In fact, he was invited to Chen Shui Bien’s presidential inauguration.

Ishihara is not an isolated case. Cartoonist Kobayashi has just published Discussing Taiwan, which includes his interviews with Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bien and praises Taiwanese former Japanese soldiers for retaining the ‘Japanese spirit’ intact. This book, it is said, has sold in 240 000 copies. Fukada Yusuke, a businessman turned novelist and non-fiction writer, has co-authored with a Taiwan independence activist and writer resident in Japan, Jin Meiling, a book entitled, Our Enemy is China: Japan should Enter into Alliance with Taiwan. His message is: ‘Stop subservience to China called Japan–China friendship!’ (Fukada and Jin 2000). In his own summary of the book, Fukada recommends that Japan ‘not be trapped in the fiction of friendship with China, but should establish alliance with Taiwan that shares with us the
Japanese spirit’. According to him, the Japanese spirit is very much alive in Taiwan because Japan was guided by high ideals in its colonial rule of Taiwan. Lee Teng-hui is extensively quoted to substantiate this kind of argument and to justify and idealize the Japanese colonial rule.

Beware of these ‘friends of Taiwan’ in Japan. It is extremely dangerous for the Taiwanese people to ally with them. They are rekindling nostalgia for the imperial past, regarding Taiwan as still part of the Japanese empire.

**Will a new version of China Containment help us?**

With George Bush stepping into power with his anti-China staff, the East Asian strategic context is likely to be remade. It is premature to predict exactly what Bush’s Asia policy will be like, but there are a few areas requiring our attention and intervention.

1. **Basic policy toward China**

One thing repeatedly stated by Bush indicates that the Clinton administration’s way of looking at China as a ‘strategic partner’ will be abandoned and instead China should be seen as a ‘peer competitor’, something the Pentagon documents have repeatedly pledged not to permit to emerge. Is Bush going to revive the NMD system, frozen by Clinton, to outweigh China’s missile capability? Certainly there will not be a simple return of the Cold War type containment policy since that will go against the interests of multinational corporations now rushing to the vast Chinese market, but a fierce power battle over the hegemony in the Asian-Pacific theatre may emerge, threatening military confrontation over the Taiwan Strait. The redefinition of China as the target of a new containment certainly will heighten the tensions over the Taiwan Strait.

2. **Alliance with Japan**

The strong anti-China pressure groups in the US Congress were charging Clinton with belittling the importance of an alliance with Japan (and Taiwan) by treating China as the most important partner of the United States. Closer alliance with Japan in political and military terms will encourage the rightwing anti-China chauvinist trends in Japan and accelerate Japan’s remilitarization.

3. **Theatre Missile Defence**

Is Bush going to press the TMD deployment in Japan (against North Korea) and Taiwan? If so, it will certainly be a decisive act on top of the above to draw a new line of confrontation with heavy political and military implications, reversing the trends toward the autonomous solution of historical problems in East Asia as exemplified by the rapprochement in the Korean Peninsula.

How is Taiwan reacting to this problem? What stance are the Taiwanese people’s movements taking toward this development? The answers are, of course, yours. But I am in a position to express my concerns since the Taiwan–PRC issue, as an integral part of the interlinked Asia relationships, affects not just the people in Taiwan and mainland China but also those in other North and Southeast Asian countries.

I believe that the crucial point involved is whether the issue of the status of Taiwan can be resolved autonomously through negotiation between the parties involved. To try to resolve the issue riding on the US neo-containment policy, I am afraid, would mean heightened tensions
between Taipei and Beijing. That choice in turn would require Taiwan’s increased dependence on US deterrence as well as Taiwan’s own military build-up. What will ensue will certainly be an arms race over the Strait, and once such a race starts, it will follow its logic of escalation.

Such an eventuality would turn Taiwan into a pawn in the US hegemonic game. Taiwan has already experienced betrayal by the Big Brother more than once — in 1960, when Washington stopped military aid, and in 1971 when it opted for Beijing at the cost of Taipei. Moreover, it will jeopardize autonomous problem resolution processes launched in Korea.

Worse still, in such an eventuality, the Taiwan Strait issue is likely to become the rallying point of the worst imperialistic forces in the United States and Japan. A new anti-China alliance in Asia headed by the US but breeding Japanese hegemonic ambitions would generate a new danger to everybody, including the people in Taiwan.

It seems to me that the Chen Shui-bien government, the precious gain of the Taiwanese people in their decades-long struggle for democracy, has a historic advantage to negotiate a favourable and mutually beneficial settlement with Beijing. First, it is free from the legacies of the Chinese civil war and thus can freely set terms of negotiation. Second, its negotiating position is strengthened, ironically, by the fact that the United States is eager to use Taiwan as its pawn in the hegemonic game with China. Beijing knows that Taiwan is in a position to agree or disagree with the Washington policy of containment depending on how Beijing would react. Taipei certainly has a US card.

Here, whether Taipei can trust Beijing or not has little to do with autonomous settlement. The PRC leadership, as I said earlier, has to be pragmatic in trying to counter US hegemony for its own benefit. Although I cannot exactly gauge its importance, a recent report from Beijing may give a glimpse into Beijing pragmatism. A Chinese government spokesperson in charge of Taiwanese affairs told visiting Japanese Democratic Party President Hatoyama Yukio that ‘China has neither said that “one China” means the People’s Republic of China, nor has it said that it means the Republic of China’ (Asahi Shim bun, 14 December 2000). This reminds me of the June 2000 Kim–Kim summit in Korea. The North–South joint declaration recognized that ‘a proposal for the federation of a lower stage advanced by the north side and a proposal for confederation put forth by the south side for the reunification of the country have elements in common.’ The case with Taiwan is, of course, different, but the Koreans have set an example to the rest of us by showing a way to an autonomous solution.

For people’s security

However, all that is a matter of state level diplomacy and we know that we, at this meeting, are not state representatives. We are not governments, but common people without the physical power of coercion. Instead, we can have moral power, enabling us to intervene for justice as did the Presbyterian church in the 1970s and 1980s, braving KMT persecution. As people, we can influence the state and bring in a desirable government by vote and other means. But that is not all. We as people retain our own position and can act as people, not necessarily through the state. The state and its army have their own logic and interests to defend, and although they claim that they protect the people, in the final analysis they do not. Not only do they not, but they more frequently direct their guns at their own people and never hesitate to kill. That was what occurred in the 28 February Incident and in the white terror period in Taiwan, in the Tiananmen Incident in Beijing, during the Battle of Okinawa when Japanese soldiers killed Okinawans as spies in cold blood, and throughout the postwar period in the Philippines, Indonesia, Burma, East Timor and Korea. We should have enough lessons to draw about this from the century of war and revolution that was the 20th century.

In summer 2000, we had an international conference in Okinawa on people’s security, as a response to the G8 summit held there. Based on the experiences of Okinawan people struggling against a heavy military presence and through exchange of people’s experiences
from Asia and North America, we stated in our Okinawa Declaration that ‘state security contradicts people’s security. The military doesn’t protect people, it destabilizes societies’. We said further in the declaration:

We work to create people’s security clearly differentiated from the security of the state by coming together, building alliances beyond borders of race, religion, ethnicity, nationality, gender, sexual orientation, economic and social status, and transforming the structures that perpetuate and sustain injustices and inequalities. People themselves, particularly those socially oppressed and suffering from lack of security, are the main actors in creating people’s security so they can live in justice without fear and anxiety. People’s security is based on human rights, gender justice, ecological justice, and social solidarity. It calls for demilitarization. Our means to achieve it is non-violent.

War is to kill and destroy, and the arms race is to prepare to kill and destroy ever more efficiently. This is a very simple fact any person understands if he/she is not carried away by the logic of the state. And if people on both sides refuse to kill and form themselves into a power that makes it impossible for the states to mobilize, no war is possible. I am convinced that a state-level arrangement to demilitarize the Taiwan Strait through an autonomous settlement of the Taipei–Beijing issue can be facilitated by the people’s pressure we can bring to bear on the governments concerned. If people on both sides of the Strait refuse to fight, the governments cannot make war. Creating such a situation is the task of the people’s peace movement. The initiative can be taken by the Christian church, other religious groups, secular groups, minorities, women’s, children’s and any other groups of concerned people.

For people’s security in Taiwan, China, Korea, Okinawa, Japan, and the rest of East Asia, we need to work together to demilitarize Asia. From Japan, we join this common effort by strengthening our network to resist the current militarization process. Let us work together for our common agenda beyond borders.

Notes

1. This was a myth fabricated by the Japanese ruling groups. In negotiating terms of peace with the KMT government, Japan refused to include in the peace treaty with the ROC any phrase referring to Japan’s obligation to pay reparations. The ROC proposal was that the treaty preamble would include Japan’s obligation for reparations, conceding however that considering the difficult Japanese economic conditions at that time the ROC would demand reparations in service, instead of money and materials. The Japanese government envoy Kawada Isao, former President of Japan’s Taiwan Colonization Company, refused to accept any mention in the treaty text of Japan’s obligation to pay reparations, including in service. The ROC thus had to agree, for the sake of friendship, to state in the attached protocol that it did not seek reparations from Japan.

2. I owe hints of this comparative perspective to a discussion entitled ‘Taiwan — world capitalism and the memory of the empire’ (Impaction, No. 120, 2000), specifically remarks made there by Marukawa Tetsushi and Tomiyama Ichiro.

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Special terms

Asahi Shimbun 朝日新聞社
Discussing War 戦爭論
Guo-she Sun-yen 國是宣言
Japanese spirit 日本精神
Gaoxiong incident 高雄事件
Manchuko 滿州國
Shina 支那
Taiwan Colonization Company 台湾拓殖会社

Author’s biography

Muto Ichiyo 武藤一洋 was born in 1931. He is a writer on political and social affairs, and has been engaged actively in the anti-war movement and other social movements since the 1950s. He is the author of 10 books, including Critique of the Dominant Structures (1970), Base and Culture (1975), Unmasking the Japanese State (1984), Reinstating Political Thought (1988), Vision and Realities (1998), and Problematizing the Postwar Japanese State (1999). He has been teaching at the sociology department of the State University of New York at Binghamton since 1983. He is the founder of the Pacific Asia Resource Center and is currently co-president of the People’s Plan Study Group based in Tokyo.