

THE LAND QUESTION IN ZIMBABWE

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March 1994

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PUBLISHER: SAPES TRUST - HARARE

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADA	Agricultural Development Authority.
AFC	Agricultural Finance Corporation.
Agritex	Department of Agricultural, Technical and Extension Services.
AMA	Agricultural Marketing Authority.
APA	African Purchase Areas.
CAs	Communal Areas.
CFU	Commercial Farmers Union.
CMB	Cotton Marketing Board.
CSC	Cold Storage Commission.
CSO	Central Statistical Office.
DNR	Department of Natural Resources.
DPP	Department of Physical Planning.
DVS	Department of Veterinary Service.
DR&SS	Department of Research and Specialist Services.
ENDA	Environment and Development Activities.
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme.
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization.
GMB	Grain Marketing Board.
GoZ	Government of Zimbabwe.
HYVs	High Yielding Varieties (of seeds).
ICA	Intensive Conservation Area.
LSCF	Large-Scale Commercial Farms.
MLARR	Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement.
MLAWD	Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development.
NFAZ	National Farmers' Association of Zimbabwe (former representative body of communal area producers).
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations.
NLHA	Native Land and Husbandry Act of 1951.
NR	Natural Region (or Agro-Ecological Region).
SSCF	Small-Scale Commercial Farms (formerly African Purchase Areas).
TIL	Tribal Trust Lands.
TILCOR	Tribal Trust Lands Development Corporation.
TNC	Transnational Corporation.

TTLs	Tribal Trust Lands (also called reserves but now termed communal areas).
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence of 1965.
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development.
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme.
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union.
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African Peoples Union.
ZERO	Regional Network of Environment Experts.
ZFU	Zimbabwe Farmers Union (amalgamation of NFAZ and ZNFU).
ZNFU	Zimbabwe National Farmers' Union (former representative body of small-scale commercial farmers).
ZNHSCP	Zimbabwe National Household Survey Capability Programme.

PREFACE

This book is the product of collective effort to develop the intellectual capacity of indigenous people in policy research and advocacy. The research arose out of policy work at the Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies (ZIDS) in 1983, and continued at both ZIDS and, ZERO an NGO. ZIDS is a post-colonial socio-economic policy research centre, now integrated into the University of Zimbabwe. ZIDS was set up to advise the Government of Zimbabwe, various agencies involved in development (donors, multi-lateral UN institutions and NGOs), and popular organisations engaged in transforming Zimbabwe's economy. ZERO was established to develop indigenous perspectives and to mobilise expertise in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, in pursuance of policy analysis and advocacy on environmental and energy issues. These two organisations benefited in this context from the intellectual stimulus and collaborative inputs from other regional and Pan African research institutions. Notable among these are CODESRIA and SAPES Trust.

In a critical respect, the research work undertaken through the two Zimbabwean institutions reflected the challenges of developing research institutions in a newly independent African state which had inherited settler ideologies inimical to the free flow of development dialogue. The recent history of research in Zimbabwe is one of establishing research infrastructures and expertise. A key activity has been the collection of information about economic development among rural households in Communal Areas, which hitherto received little research attention. While political, anthropological and some demographic data had been assembled by previous colonial Governments, little data existed on the Communal economy and its specific constraints.

This research also reflects the author's involvement in policy analysis, planning and project analysis at international, regional, national and local levels. Various academic and consultative efforts were undertaken on the basis of field, survey and desk study during these years. At the level of research practice, the author undertook much of this work as a facilitator and advisor for various organisations, such as collective cooperatives, NGOs, farmers and business unions, government agencies, liberation movements, donors and multi-lateral development agencies. The work was thus undertaken to contribute to and as part of an identifiable interest group advocating far-reaching policy reforms in Zimbabwe and Southern Africa as a whole.

For, research undertaken in isolation from social realities and pressures not only suffers from methodological weaknesses, but from the limited opportunity it provides for social change. In reality, little research can be undertaken in social isolation, since research funding and community collaboration are essential components.

The specific objectives of this study are: to develop agrarian, rural and environmental methodologies that directly address the question of land reform and promote local interactive analyses with policy makers; and to link this research to a variety of national and regional institutional research efforts in order to develop a Southern African research agenda on agrarian reform. The challenge is not only to create rigorous and viable parradigms for development policy research, but also to find ways of making a more direct impact on those in charge of the policy formulation process.

This research experience has led the author to pose four broad questions in respect of land reform:

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1. What are the chances for increased land reform in Zimbabwe?
2. What are the specific needs of Zimbabwe's peasantry that land reform should address, and which economic processes need to be set in motion to make land reform effective?
3. Which institutional players will be needed to pursue the required land reform agenda?
4. What are the most appropriate approaches available to support the rural poor, through active research, responsive to their demands for change?

Hopefully this study attempts to answer some of these questions and provide a framework for further work on this and similar themes.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply indebted to various institutions for the intellectual support and working environment they provided me throughout the years in his research initiative on the land question. The Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies provided the base for the bulk of the research. I wish in particular to acknowledge the intellectual contributions and other support provided over the years by Thandika Mkandawire of CODESRIA, and Ibbo Mandaza of SAPES Trust. Various intellectual debates with these colleagues stimulated this research effort. I thank also my colleague Yemi Katerere with whom we founded the ZERO initiative, which contributed a wealth of experiences in advocacy on regional environmental matters of benefit to my own research work. My immense engagement in the ZERO process was rewarding. I am grateful to ZERO staff such as Carmel Mbizvo, Roger Mpande, Bheki Mabhoyi, Desire Matirikwe, Peter Ngobese and Dorothy Manuel for their support at various levels. Dan Weiner played a critical role through our collaboration on assessing land use issues at the early stages of this work. Phil O'Keefe of ETC, Guy Mhone of SAPES Trust, Kojo Seb. Amanor, Joselyn Alexander, Ian Scoones provided critical reviews on my manuscript at various stages. Tor Skalness and Arne Torslensen of Christian Michelsen Institute provided collaboration and facilities during the early conceptualisation of the book. I thank all these people whom I enjoyed working with.

Financial support for this research was principally received from ZIDS which carried me for 10 years. At ZIDS I especially thank Mavis Musakwa who provided typing services for the manuscript. Secondly SAREC financed the National Household Survey undertaken at ZIDS, and provided a grant for the various costs of analysis and writing up of the book. Thirdly HIVOS of Holland and the Stockholm Environment Institute, contributed through ZERO some of the costs entailed in the ZERO household and institutional

surveys of Mhezi Ward. Fourthly, the ETC Foundation (UK) provided academic and financial support during the write-up phase, while SAPES provided advised and editorial reviews. I am grateful to all these institutions for their support which enabled me to bring together a wide variety of experiences and data in the analysis of Zimbabwe's land reform.

Finally I am indebted to my wife Dede-Esi Amanor-Wilks who gave me editorial and moral assistance during the writing-up, my daughter Sibongile who provided secretarial support, my friend Di Mandaza who provided moral support, and my family as a whole who tolerated my pre-occupation with completing this work. There are numerous other friends whose small but significant contributions I also acknowledge.

As usual I bear the entire responsibility for the quality of information used here and its interpretation within the methodological framework presented here. Indeed, although many of the ideas presented here provided inputs to the research programmes of the various institutions I collaborated with, I only hope that they benefited from the experience as much as I did.

CHAPTER ONE: ZIMBABWE'S EMERGING LAND QUESTION

INTRODUCTION

Fifteen years after Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, the land question remains the most hotly and popularly contested policy reform arena. Some of the key issues of public concern include: the adequacy of the quantity and quality of land redistributed, the method and costs of land acquisition and redistribution, the efficiency of land use in both the large farm and resettlement areas, the suitability of those benefiting from land redistribution, the fairness and equitability of procedures for dealing with land demands, and the economic impact of land reform. Popular expectations for an egalitarian land redistribution programme, raised during the bitter armed struggle for independence, have not been fulfilled, while capitalist farming elites, predominantly whites, have reaped most of the benefits of post-independence economic reforms. This book examines how these and other questions have been addressed by the state and society, and what the prospects for resolving the land problem are.

After an apparent lull in public debate on land reform during the late 1980s, there has been renewed interest in Zimbabwe's land reform during the 1990s. The Land Acquisition Act of 1992 and the subsequent designation of land for acquisition, and the inception of a tenant farmer scheme which began to allocate acquired land to black farmers, have recently provoked acrimonious policy debate on land reform at various levels. Some of the debate reflects the instrumental theatrics of competitive politics among a variety of political interest groups and parties. For years, opponents of land reform have criticised the new land policy from conservative angles which obfuscate the fundamental economic and political rationale of land reform, while they still claim that "everybody agrees that Zimbabwe should have a land redistribution programme". Many proponents of land reform however remain locked in a moralist and populist framework which fails to emphasize the economic feasibility of land reform, while state rhetoric on the land question has not been backed by adequate and transparent justification of the necessity for reform. As Zimbabwe increasingly moves to a market-oriented economy and rapidly integrates further into the global economic system, wider economic and socio-political forces appear to govern the handling of land reform.

Thus, for some observers, "the only dispute is how Government has handled this complex problem". Opponents of land reform condemn the Government for over-simplifying the land problem. They suggest that public statements by President Robert Mugabe wrongly pose the issue as a contest between "greedy landowners and the majority of land hungry peasants". Indeed, some representatives of the rural poor perceive the land issue in such "simple terms". Many conservative critics and the landed reject the Government's

nationalist idioms and stated desire to resolve Zimbabwe's national question through equitable land redistribution. They doubt the need to resolve existing and potential racial conflict and intra-black class conflicts underlain by land hunger and associated inequalities. The Government's present liberal approach to land redistribution is particularly rejected by the white conservative critique in a manner which leaves little room for negotiating land transfers between white farmers and the Government. Various urban based middle-class elements criticise the manner in which the government has dealt with the selection of beneficiaries of the redistribution programme while some chiefs and local elites seek to control this process. Women argue that they are marginalised by the redistribution effort, as do a variety of other special interest groups. The peasantry in general continue to demand access to expropriated land.

Since the mid-1980s the Government has danced defensively about its land reform agenda until Independence Day in April 1993 when President Mugabe forcefully argued, in historical context, that land redistribution was fundamental and had to be implemented speedily. His speeches emphasised the important role that land plays in reconciling blacks and whites, in resolving the National Question by providing land rights for the majority and in guaranteeing the rural poor the basic means of their survival. Given the potentially explosive consequences of not addressing these issues in a controlled and fair manner, the President affirmed the central role that the state, as a sovereign entity, needed to play in land reform.

A comprehensive land reform policy based on a land redistribution programme, although not quite fully conceptualised by the state, assumes that it is the prerogative of the state to adjudicate over not only the rights of landowners, but also the land rights, needs and demands of the "voiceless" rural majority and other aspirant segments of society. There has however been limited consensus building around the multitude of questions which surround such land rights and demands. While land reform enjoys broadly based popular support, there remain numerous differences over its design, implementation and its legitimacy.

After a decade of a market-led and state-aided land redistribution programme, the Government sought, in 1990, a transparent legal and administrative framework for land expropriation and the compensation of land owners. Such an act was democratically enacted by Parliament in 1992. The Land Acquisition Act of 1992 seeks an administratively swift process for acquiring selected lands by minimising legal contestations over land

designated for acquisition, while clearly articulating the reasons for land designation. Individual farmers have explicit rights provided them to object to the designation of their land. As the "undesignation" of over 40% of the farms designated by 1993 shows, the Government felt morally obliged to rescind designations where it perceived valid contestations of the process by both white and black farmers. Moreover, various public and private political lobby processes and media debates have emerged as valid means through which suspected abuses of specific land designations and allocations are contested with promising state responsiveness.

Indeed the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 itself and the government's defensive public posture are a formal statement of recognition by the Government that the first decade and a half of land reform was far from satisfactory for various segments of society. The land supply side of the redistribution effort has been the least transparent and the most contentious issue around which future conflicts will rest.

This chapter sketches out the political and economic framework within which Zimbabwe's land reform policy is situated, then it discusses the methodological and contextual framework for assessing land reform, and finally it presents the layout of the entire book.

ECONOMIC NATIONALISM AND THE LAND QUESTION

The land policy of the 1990s emerges from a new political alliance between dominant members and representatives of the state on the one hand and black capitalists on the other. The policy reflects a new balance of power among various social forces pursuing economic nationalism within a liberal economic and political framework still predominantly guided by the state. Following initial attempts to consolidate the nation-state and the ruling party during the early 1980s, the ideology of these social forces tends towards promoting capital accumulation amongst blacks, in the name of economic "indigenisation". While there are growing fractures within this elite, which is bent on broadening the basis of the market economy, there is a discernible process of the class consolidation among black capitalists around their interest in access to land for agriculture, tourism and other business purposes. Both black and white capitalists and the peasantry or the poor, who are prospective losers in the land redistribution agenda, express concern over the efficacy of the programme in its present form.

During 1987 and 1990 Zimbabwe experienced a consolidation of the black business and middle class interests in favour of the ideological shift from socialism towards a more market-oriented economic management system. Various social processes prompted the

growth of such a black national capitalist coalition. These included: first, the political unity of the two liberation movements, ZAPU and ZANU, which essentially opened the way for greater freedom to bid for resource allocations among competing elites. Secondly a slow rate of economic growth during the recessionary 1980s saw increasing hopes among the elite that international investment could be harnessed. This was the only approach deemed by them to be suitable to improve the economy and address unemployment. These forces thus saw an accession to a multilateral induced Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) as a critical strategy for growth. Thirdly, indigenous business lobbies, coalesced around the Indigenous Business Development Council (IBDC), to design a development strategy and ideology, which instrumentalised black nationalist capitalists as a critical requirement for balanced economic growth based on internal investment and employment creation.

Black business people argued that local white capital, which had been protected over the last 80 years, had failed to develop an efficient investment programme and to deliver employment growth. Furthermore, they argued that black businesses were discriminated against in financial markets, and that their lack of access to land ownership deprived them of the collateral required to mobilize finances. Thus, the Government's land policy statement of 1990 promised to acquire land for redistribution to meet the interests of black capitalist farmers and productive smallholder farming community, as well as to alleviate land pressure in some communal lands. Therefore, in 1990 there was a policy shift which promised to support large and small black capitalist farmers and business persons. While this policy shift threatened to sideline the urban and rural landless and the poor peasants in rural areas, the extent of the Government's ability to alleviate the widespread social deprivation faced by this contingent upon unequal land distribution remains unclear.

Evidently the new land policy was derived from a strong black capitalist lobby comprising a few existing large-scale black farmers, (about 500 of them), small-scale commercial farmer representatives (about 8 500 of them) and representatives of the better-off farmers in Communal Lands (about 150,000 of these) all of whom formed the Zimbabwe Farmers Union. This capitalist lobby was also backed by aspiring black capitalist farmers employed in the public and private sectors, black business people established in business centres in communal areas, and those in urban areas who felt that access to land was a critical constraint to their enterprise development. Generally, the black lobby argue that land access for capitalist farming and business ventures are critical components of a wider strategy to expand economic activities and employment creation, and that this could lead to more effective use of land and labour resources.

The black capitalist lobby for land redistribution has gained some legitimacy among the public because while in broad terms it is supportive of the relatively unpopular market-oriented economic reforms (ESAP) it also promises to break the self-evident white economic monopoly power and widen the productive base of the economy. The lobby calls for greater competition in agriculture, for efficient land use and for the broadening of the land ownership base, given that white farmers underuse their land. The lobby also calls for "productive" and "capable" farmers to gain access to land and not those without the means and the skills to use land effectively, such as the landless and poor. While it has been argued that land designation may scare off foreign investors and therefore undermine ESAP, the current land policy however protects urban or industrial land and other related property rights, and mainly targets underutilised farm lands for expropriation.

Thus the current black lobby for land buys into ESAP in an ideological framework which concurrently threatens to marginalise the land requirements of the rural poor and seeks state assistance for black capital accumulation. Even the President of Zimbabwe recently pronounced that the leasing of large state leasehold farms formerly held by whites to capitalist black farmers fell within the "grain of the ESAP". His response to the doubts expressed by some critiques over the efficacy of the racial substitution formula for the development of capitalist farming, given that blacks are new to large scale farming, emphasizes the ideological and political importance attached to economic nationalism in the land reform process during the 1990s. However, most black capitalists pursue a market reform framework, for agriculture and other sectors, which would retain significant and selective state interventions in their favour, essentially modifying the ESAP framework.

For, the black economic nationalists and capitalists want the state to support their agricultural and wider business interests through state provided cheap credit, and through economic policy measures which remove their business constraints, and improve incentives for their businesses. The political leadership of the Government seems to fully back this policy thrust. Hence during the 1990s, the state increased the rate and pace at which it pursued the allocation of large state lease-hold farms to black capitalist farmers, including a few blacks in strategic positions within government and the ruling party. The resulting imbalances in gains apparent from these government reform measures, have tended to veer public opinion towards a perception that the land and economic reforms are intended to benefit the few blacks who "already have". Moreover, these processes foment the lingering prospect that the current policy reforms as well as the economic nationalism espoused, which are not necessarily based on popular demands, may generate wider public resistance to economic reform, particularly to the present land redistribution programme.

The Government's assertions, through senior nationalists President Mugabe and his Vice, Nkomo, that it is imperative to redress the inequitable land ownership structure of Zimbabwe because it is predicated on racial privilege for a few whites, acquired through conquest of black Zimbabweans in the 1890s, are testimony to the importance that nationalist and racial discontent has played in the rationalisation of land reform. Current debates on racism and economic indigenisation in Zimbabwe reflect the inequitable resolution of the national question in general. Reconciliation between whites and blacks, officially announced by Government in 1980, was interpreted by some people to mean a one-off process whereby whites are forgiven for their past oppression of blacks, and whereby unequal national resources allocations, including the fixed heritage of land, were to remain largely as they were before 1980. Fears by some that the economy would collapse if whites were pushed into sharing land had indeed led some bureaucrats to oppose the need to resolve the land question. However, the independence struggle and commitment to war were fundamentally fueled by promises to restore the land rights of the majority.

The white farming community itself has for 14 years not made concrete offers for a broad-based land redistribution programme. Instead they have encouraged the entry of blacks into their ranks, and proactively defended their rights to hold large tracts of land, basing their arguments on their current dominance of contributions to foreign currency earnings, agricultural GDP and to a lesser extent their importance as employers of about 25% of the formally employed. There has been little concern by white land owners and their representative, the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), to promote lasting reconciliation through a voluntary land transfer programme. Claims by large farmer representatives that they agree with the principle of land redistribution are not backed by concrete land offers, hence the poor negotiation climate over the land question.

Moreover, because, the CFU is frequently confrontational over land in the independent media, and because whites tend to portray the Government of Zimbabwe as an irrational demon, which "punishes those who have been productive through land expropriation" (see Newsweek, August 9, 1993), they have successfully alienated black capitalists from their cause, especially those blacks who still seek access to land. In this way, white opponents of land reform have negatively fuelled the racial question through their attempts to caricature black rule and through direct political point-scoring. For instance, white farmers and critics play the salient politics of belittling the low productivity of black peasants and commercial farmers, particularly black ministers, without considering the latter's constraints. Some of them had also initially insisted that ministers' farms be redistributed first, seeking thus direct confrontations with farming politicians and dividing the black polity.

This implied that white farmers were poised for political struggle, perhaps above principle, despite their weak political constituency. Given the economic power of the whites and intra-black competition for resources, future racial and class conflicts over land will be intense, as indicated by present debates, unless significant policy shifts occur. For, the state and black capitalists who have increasingly gained access to state owned farms and leases on parks and similar state lands, while increasingly distancing themselves from large white farmers, have also poised themselves against the land hungry, and the general middle classes which seek fair play in land redistribution. Only transparency in the design and implementation of a land policy, which covers all national land use categories, including agricultural, forest and parks lands, and which clarifies the racial and class basis and intentions of the expected reforms, can introduce sanity into the present posture of the various interests in land.

While they have a strong policy influence, white farmers exaggerate their political role. Evidently they demand that those farms which they identify for acquisition, through the Government established land designation committees, be the farms to be designated. These farmers believe that their parameters and not those set by state should decide on land redistribution, regardless of the wider land requirements identified through Government and other processes. Such demands by large farmers for greater decision-making powers than the state in land policy formulation basically contest the legitimacy of an elected Government's role in adjudicating the land problem. Essentially, large farmers and other opponents pretend that land grievances do not exist or are irrelevant to the land reform policy process. Most interestingly, to ordinary Zimbabweans these attitudes demonstrate an arrogance which only make sense in racist parlance, as many indigenous people have argued in the media. For instance, a recent characterisation of the African-American community of Los Angeles, addressed by President Mugabe on the land issue, as having "some incredible naivety" by a white critic of the Government Land Reform Programme (Financial Gazette, 7 October, 1993), seems not only to disparage the Government attempts to clarify its policy at the international level, but also smacks of deep-seated racist overtones.

Indeed many Zimbabwean blacks wonder why international donors, many of whom emphatically deny using land reform as a condition for aid, are not forthcoming with resources to facilitate land redistribution. The American state department, for instance, recently described Zimbabwe's land reform programme as racial! Perhaps most donors are unwilling to address this racially charged problem because of white resistance to land acquisition. An incessant white-led caricature of black rule and indigenous business efforts

in the private media tends to emphasize the racial polarization of the policy formulation process in Zimbabwe, especially on the issues of land and economic indigenisation.

There is no doubt that Zimbabweans need to squarely face the race problem, which has hitherto been taboo, due to prejudices and fears of sabotage by whites, and reprisals against whites. The call by blacks for their greater participation in the economy, through access to land among other things, is a rational political demand, which has therefore to be addressed by all those concerned with stability in Zimbabwe, and Southern Africa in general. A reasonable climate for white-black reconciliation can only be achieved through a more balanced redressing of the variety of land demands in Zimbabwe, in a manner which is transparent, equitable and focused on the productive use of land for agro-industrial and other development purposes.

Such opposition to land redistribution as is expressed by the CFU, individual farmers, opposition parties, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, white media writers and other individual blacks in the press, however, also needs to be examined critically. Briefly, the immediate reasons they give for their opposition to the land reform programme focus on the constitutional legality of compulsory land acquisition, the efficacy of its administration and the purported political motivation behind land acquisition. Some critics argue that the programme has no overall logic nor any economic rationality. Many of these opponents believe that the legal powers of the minister in designating land for acquisition are excessive and open to abuse. Therefore they argue for an unspecified legal dispensation which will control the Government hand, while (perhaps) giving land owners a larger influence in the land acquisition process, and allowing farmers to contest the individual designation of their land in courts. Whereas most of these issues are addressed later in this book, whereby they are tested against the views of the majority of Zimbabweans, the overriding concern of those opposing land redistribution seems to be that land reform should lead to the productive use of land, done through a fair selection of beneficiaries, which provides access to the capable and assists the poor.

However, many opponents of land reform have attempted to reduce Government actions on land acquisition to a mundane partisan quest by ZANU PF to gather votes from the rural masses. ZANU PF is said to be electioneering over the land issue. Scornfully, some also argue that the ruling party will at any rate not sway urban voters through land, because the latter are wrongly perceived to be preoccupied by the economic hardships arising from the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (e.g. employment), and not the need for land. Thus opponents of land reform have reduced the historic problem over land to a partisan preoccupation, thus providing fuel for the wider competitive politics among parties and

other Government opponents. Consequently, land debates have tended to be short-sighted and assume an incoherent political point-scoring game, which conceals the fundamental issues at stake. These debates miss the gradual land policy shifts that Zimbabwe has experienced since the 1979 negotiations for independence, as discussed below and in later chapters.

From Radical To Liberal Land Reform Measures

Any rational Government or ruling party, which was bent not only on securing rural votes, but also peace and economic stability, given the land history of Zimbabwe, would promote land reform. Some would encourage, as the odd parliamentarians (e.g. Lazarous Nzarayebani, MP Mutare Urban) threaten to do, the numerous and continuous attempts by so called "squatters" to pursue land redistribution through systematic land occupations. Instead the Government has forcefully or legally rejected radical land acquisition measures for 15 years. Government has also refused to institute a legal land claims process for all those who remember the expropriation of their land over the last 100 years. Rather, during the 1980s the Zimbabwean state pursued a rather conservative, market-led land acquisition programme, based on the Lancaster House Constitutional negotiations. This allowed for the speculative pricing of land acquired, given the absence of a land taxation policy, and the costly acquisition of marginal lands for redistribution to mostly poor rural people. As expected, without adequate state support, the resettlement programme underachieved at some levels as shown later.

Moreover instead of radical land reform, over the years the Government retained the colonial legacy of providing large white farmers with preferential access to economic incentives such as foreign currency for their machinery and other imports requirements, to the bulk of Government loans provided by AFC, protection from competition against cheap imports, provision of cheap electricity tariffs, subsidised internal market stability, lower fuel duties and a series of export incentives. Furthermore, few black farmers, small or large, have had access to most of the economic incentives, which the market liberalisation process implemented on an unequal economic terrain to ensure that large farmers would benefit before and after the implementation of ESAP. In fact, political sense dictates that the ruling party should long have begun redirecting its resource allocations to a more racially balanced mix of farmers. Even resettlement areas did not receive significant economic privileges, hence their relatively weaker output performance. This approach not only projected the Government's rather generous reconciliation policy stance, but also demonstrated the Government's care for large white farmers, a stance which required the repression of black demands for land and agrarian reform.

The Land Acquisition Act of 1992 is clearly a liberal market-oriented approach to land reform because it rejects land occupations and land claims by the erstwhile dispossessed rural masses and urban population which lacks land for housing, and because it tampers marginally with the freehold land market. Unlike during the 1980s, the Act is however intended to define the location and quality of land to be acquired through the designation mechanism. While it specifies that land acquisition will be compulsory for reasons of public good, the Act provides for "fair" compensation, especially when previous and current tax rebates on farm investments are added to current compensation prices. The absence of a land tax and extremely low rentals paid by lease-hold farmers also suggest that the losses incurred by those "losing" their farms, when computed historically, tend to be exaggerated by the critics of government policy. Inadequate compensation is thus not strong enough reason for resisting land redistribution, nor is the moral claim that farmer losses are vindictive valid.

The opponents of land reform have also sought to demonstrate that political rather than productive factors have been the basis of land designation. While some underutilised farms do have parts that are cropped or stocked it is insufficient to claim that the productive use of less than 50% of farms is valid reason for land not to be designated. Because, most large farmers have management and financial constraints which restrict their ability to fully use their large estates, the scope for the expropriation of underutilized prime lands remains wide as elaborated upon later.

Yet there is a strong economic rationale for pursuing land reform. Most of the land acquired by the Government was located in the more marginal farming areas, where white farm crop outputs are lowest, and where livestocking is below potential capacity. Indeed the new land policy identified 5 million hectares for acquisition on the basis of studies of land underutilisation. This would leave room for production growth in those areas, given that less than 2 million hectares are allocated to cropping.

But the economic rationale of land redistribution goes beyond the static numbers game of protecting currently cropped hectares from being transferred to blacks. Firstly, black output in resettlement areas has not been as disastrous as claimed by many, as statistics presented later increasingly show. Such output can be improved as small farmers gain access to financial resources, equitable access to input markets and expertise.

Secondly, the fundamental economic rationale is to broaden the income base of Zimbabwe, through an expanded farming structure based on increased access to land. This can widen

the markets available to industry and the rural service sector and increase food and raw material supplies from farmers. Agro-industrial growth can be achieved if underutilised land is made available for productive uses, and if the Government begins to allocate finance, foreign currency for imports and other incentives to black farmers and resettlement areas.

A long term and broader economic perspective suggests that land reform (as happened in South Korea, Japan, Taiwan etc.) can lead to an income distribution structure and rural employment benefits conducive to a growing industrial sector. The concentration of rural incomes among a few farmers in Zimbabwe is largely based on the unavailability of land to many landless black households, when most of the prime arable land is underutilised by large farmers. That does not make economic sense, as it indeed does not to allocate large estates to black capitalists who can not fully utilize these. The allocation of numerous smaller farms to black capitalist farmers and peasant households is what is required to develop a functional income distribution structure which can contribute to agro-industrial and other economic linkages which are necessary for a deepening development strategy.

A long term economic perspective on land reform also requires that the age and the skills structures in existing large farms be critically examined. For example, most white farm owners are ageing while their sons and daughters increasingly show less interest in farming as they migrate into towns, to South Africa and abroad. Many farms are managed by blacks and a string of skilled supervisors, who could be encouraged to manage their own smaller commercial farms in future. Indeed many trained black agriculturists have developed a lobby aiming to gain access to their own commercial farms. Land redistribution can be used to develop the future cadre of commercial farmers, which should be settled on viable farm sizes, ranging from 20 to 500 hectares, depending upon the land quality and enterprise, rather than on the huge estates of today.

The farming skills of blacks and the white heirs of small segments of their erstwhile larger farms should be mobilized now so as to stabilize and diversify future commercial farming. The Government policy to identify capable settlers for resettlement and to promote black capitalist farming is in fact based on a policy recognition of the need to build a sustainable commercial farming structure. Whether this logic is translated into a feasible agrarian reform project is what people eagerly await. Many opponents of land reform are sceptical about the Government's resolve to develop commercial farming among blacks because the bulk of the land and finances allocated to this project have been limited and concentrated on a few notables, to manage historically over-sized farms, which individuals can hardly utilize fully.

However, land redistribution, whether conceived in economic or political terms, cannot

reasonably overlook the need to provide access to land for the numerous peasants in overcrowded areas, the near landless and some "squatters". Parallel to the policy objective to settle capable farmers, redistributing land to other rural people in need is justifiable for economic and social reasons. Going by the most optimistic economic growth projection the economy cannot over the next 15 years employ all adults in urban areas or on existing commercial farms. Nor can the state afford to feed and provide free social services to all the rural destitute who are near landless, unemployed or squatting on the margins. Even "subsistence farming" which enables numerous rural peoples to feed themselves and their urban relatives, and which has been used to educate many, has a transitional role in the economy.

Indeed the government is regularly forced to feed the rural poor through drought relief at high costs, which could instead be invested in a comprehensive land reform and agricultural development project. These social security problems which face the majority of the poor peasantry in Communal Areas, as demonstrated in full later, justify land redistribution as a stepping stone for rural development and self-sustaining livelihoods.

Resettling the poor peasantry with adequate state support to improve their agricultural productivity, on better quality land, has a wider economic significance. For instance, the peasants' currently unrecorded non-marketed output contributes significantly to national GDP, and has performed the vital function of reproducing labour for the economy, based on auto-consumption from small patches of arable lands. While the critics of land reform wrongly refuse to acknowledge the land rights of most such rural peoples, they can not argue that the so-called subsistence farming has no economic value or that it will not continue to play a vital economic function for decades until the country industrialises and absorbs more rural wage seekers. Thus, land redistribution needs to cater for the residential, commercial farming and survival needs of the rural and urban poor in a planned manner. The governments' land policy needs to carefully balance these various interests in land.

The loss of formal employment from large farms following their acquisition is frequently cited as an economic reason for not pursuing land reform. Critics of land reform suggest that the Government is particularly neglecting the plight of farm workers and migrant workers from other Southern Africa countries after farms have been designated. Surely this calls for the state to affirm the land rights of such workers in resettlement schemes or in Communal Areas. The repatriation of long standing migrant workers must be a choice, exercised in preference over land provided for such experienced workers. It can scarcely be argued that the imperative of providing acquired land to farm workers obviates the need for comprehensive land redistribution since these existing large farms already employ people.

Judging from the numbers currently employed by large farmers, present agricultural policy has diminished the capacity of these farms to generate the employment potential they have. In fact, "over-mechanization" and the underutilisation of land on large farms minimises the numbers employed. Displaced farm workers could use their skills to produce on their own plots sub-divided from large farms following their acquisition. Land reform could actually expand employment and self-sustaining opportunities in the agricultural sector.

Another critical distraction from a comprehensive land reform policy through land redistribution is based on attempts by both the state and conservative social forces to direct the focus of debate on the land tenure issues which affect Communal and Resettlement Areas. The economic argument, which is used as a pre-condition for further resettlement, is that communal and resettlement areas need to be provided with freehold land tenure or lease-hold title because dynamic investment and growth in agriculture is constrained by the lack of secure title or absolute land ownership rights. It is true that most Zimbabwean lending institutions over-emphasize assets as collateral for loans, especially fixed property such as land. Title deeds held on land are an advantage for those seeking loans in the present conservative money markets. The latter adopt conservative lending practises because they face little competition due to the discriminatory colonial regulations governing the banking sector in Zimbabwe, and the parochial tendencies of the banking elite.

International evidence suggests that farm investment and access to farm credit tend to thrive where tenure is secured through various types of titles including leases, permits and customary rights. While freehold tenure is useful for certain loans, farm developments and movable assets owned, as well as track record are equally important for farm credit schemes. Title deeds do not guarantee optimal farm investment as evidenced by the failure of most large scale farmers to fully develop or utilise their lands. Moreover many of the around 300,000 Communal Area farmers who realise and sell output surpluses use remittances and various forms of formal and informal credit to invest in the development of their farms. Their most pressing constraints include lack of good infrastructure, access to various inputs and technologies, as well as their confinement to marginal lands.

Small farmers without title deeds to land but with secure tenure, are known in many parts of the world to use credit at much higher interest rates than pertain today in Zimbabwe. The issue is to improve the accessibility and forms of delivery of the credit, inputs and equipment rather than land titling which at any rate is expensive and only implementable over many years. Selective provision of title deeds, leaseholds and secure land permits may improve investment opportunities in Communal and Resettlement Areas, especially as urban buyers seek rural land. But title deeds are secondary to appropriate agricultural and land

redistribution policies. Freehold tenure should be addressed in the longer term, based on thorough consultations with the rural population, and appropriate designs of the tenure system preferred by the majority. It must be recognised that further unregulated land alienation consequent upon blanket freehold titling or inappropriate leasehold arrangements could result in a more volatile land problem in the future.

Land redistribution should, however, not await the completion of a new land tenure system, although the immediate provision of secure tenure is necessary and possible for all the resettlement areas because the state controls that land. The politics of land rights, demands for access to land, state regulation of land use and provision of incentives for farming by the state, are interrelated problems, which require careful political and economic balancing, with the state playing a prominent facilitative role. To rush for land titling, while reducing the pace of land redistribution, is to risk the current relative political stability found in Zimbabwe. Yet, most significantly, the land titling debate distracts attention from the existing inequitable land holding structure dominated by a few white farmers and the increasing ascendance of blacks into these unchanged freehold and leasehold land structures.

THE POLITICAL RATIONALE OF LAND REDISTRIBUTION

A sustainable approach to resolving the land question is to subject the above land issues to careful examination by the majority of people, rather than to steamroll land policy through a few political and planning elites, a few intellectuals and some large farm holders because they control power, the media and dominate the intellectual resources of the nation. For, the direct interest of these elite segments of society in the policy on land is increasingly an obstacle to an equitable land policy formulation process.

Yet it is inconceivable that any ruling party, which secures a majority vote can sideline land redistribution in the next two decades. For the land question is an intrinsic, non-partisan issue that many Zimbabweans wish to see addressed. It makes no sense, however, to pretend that the land question is not a political issue, and that it should only be addressed following purely economic logic, particularly of a short term nature. The land issue is a political issue which has to be addressed with full cognisance of the political problems it evokes, but in a manner which optimises the economic benefits to the country. Therefore the ruling party need not apologise for the utility of resolving the land question in its bid to be re-elected, especially if redistribution targets economic growth among the rural and urban poor.

However, there need not be any apology either for improving the access of black capitalist farmers to reasonably sized farm lands given the present market liberalisation framework of economic management. Blacks who already own large farms need time and the necessary resources to improve their farming skills, land use practices and productivity. The acquisition of privately acquired black farms, apart from those wantonly neglected, should be calibrated according to specific state support policy measures scheduled to promote the growth of productivity on those farms. Failure by large and small scale black farmers to improve land use and productivity based on clear incentives should lead also to their farms being subjected to redistribution, because the overriding objective of land policy should be to improve farm productivity and land use where access to land has been improved. However, black capitalists need not be encouraged to occupy over-sized farms because they, like their erstwhile white counterparts, will be unable to fully utilize them. The political thrust of this argument is that "Affirmative Action" is necessary for black farming to grow, as well as to absorb black capital into agriculture, while more equitable access to land by small and large black farmers is essential for the political stabilisation of the country, given the diverse interests dependent upon and pre-occupied with access to land for farming, residence and survival. Yet if the land policy marginalises the urban and rural landless, and focuses mainly upon the elite it ceases to enjoy the political legitimacy argued for above. As this book will show, the land requirements of the rural poor deserve special attention in the land reform exercise.

It appears that the political problem facing Zimbabwe with regard to land, and similar resource ownership imbalances, is the absence of good faith on the part of the land owners in negotiating and redressing the land question. Landowners and other critics of land reform need to understand that Zimbabwe's national question cannot be resolved unless the majority gain access and rights to land for housing, farming and other enterprises. Presently, land is essential for the security of residence and livelihood of many. That all Zimbabweans cannot be commercial or peasant farmers is quite obvious. What is unclear is where and how the rural and urban landless can be accommodated economically and socially without land redistribution and industrial growth, given also that commercial farming has increasingly mechanised and shed 30% of its labour in the last 20 years.

Growing unemployment, coupled with lack of access to land for residence and for basic survival needs, let alone access to land for "serious farming", are the compounded problems that face Zimbabwe as a whole, not just the ruling party face. Access to land must be creatively planned to see Zimbabwe through the current economic transition while expanding output and the income base in the rural areas. In the final analysis, historic

grievances over land dispossession and the present inequity in land holding, are real political sentiments fuelled by the absence of alternative economic opportunities, given slow industrialisation in Zimbabwe, as in other parts of the developing world. This is a political problem which Government must face with courage rather than with doubts emanating from the pretentious "de-politicisation of the land issue" by politically motivated opponents of land redistribution.

Clearly the Government of Zimbabwe is playing a political balancing act intended to retain favour among various interest groups. First, there is the anti-land reform alliance which includes: the white large-scale commercial farmers themselves, because the state believes that many of them are a critical economic segment; the white banking and business interests which service agriculture, and which the state would not like to alienate through what could be deemed unreasonable methods of land acquisition; international capital for the same reasons as above, and some middle class blacks who do not have the faith that peasants or blacks in general could be efficient land users or farmers, especially in the sense of producing export crops, and because such blacks depend for their employment on white non-farm enterprise connected to white agriculture.

Second, the Government would like to satisfy particular Communal Area constituencies that it is delivering land to them, even if that land is agro-ecologically of a lower potential or if that land will accrue to the elite amongst them. Since crucial political constituencies which face extreme land hunger will settle for marginal land, the Government appears content to first deliver such land without going for prime lands and with little short-term losses in LSCF output. Meanwhile a few black capitalist farmers gain increased access to leasehold farms in these prime lands. This pattern of land acquisition thus serves to satisfy those who generally fear that the economy could suffer from the loss of specialised LSCF export production. But distributing marginal lands to the poor peasants also placates the critics of Government who protest that black capitalists will be the main beneficiaries of the land acquisition programme, although many critics have slowly seen through this political strategy.

Thirdly, the Government hopes to satisfy black capitalists and elites, by opening up land in growth points for business persons to acquire freehold tenure; by enabling local black leaderships in communal areas to "deliver" some land for redistribution during the electoral campaign; by allocating future leasehold land to medium-sized black commercial farmers derived from among trained blacks, retiring civil servants, middle classes and capitalists interested in farming. These black capitalist interests desire prime land, which the state will slowly allocate them from underutilised farms acquired and from state leasehold land.

They also would like freehold land tenure or leasehold tenure rights to be acquired through a cheap or non-speculative land pricing mechanism, which only land designation and government land price setting can deliver.

Through such a balancing act, the government has succeeded in dragging its feet on the land acquisition programme, while promising to satisfy both black capitalists and poor peasant households and minimizing the fears of white farmers. While this may ingratiate local white farmers and allay the fears of international capital, especially the conveyers of ESAP, and those few blacks who call for the status quo, it does not follow that the land hungry in Communal Areas and elsewhere have acquiesced in their demands for land redistribution. The latter continue to demand land, to "squat" on LSCF and state owned lands and to poach natural resources from such lands. As other urban classes perceive land redistribution as an essential component of a wider and sustainable development strategy they may increasingly promote the cause for broad-based land redistribution.

Therefore, Zimbabwe's land reform process reflects firstly the governments political balancing which tends to favour elites to the detriment of the rural poor. Secondly it reflects the economic rationale of government policy, which is that economic growth in Zimbabwe requires a stable large-scale commercial farm sector based on existing white farmers, and black small and large capitalist farmers to be developed over time. Thirdly, it shows that the dominant elements within the state still perceive the peasantry as a residual economic sector, out of which should grow some capitalist farmers to be supported through the land reform programme. Therefore, notwithstanding the wider political and economic claims of the rural poor for land redistribution, the current land acquisition programme is based more on the need to enhance capitalist accumulation, urban consumption and exports as required by ESAP, rather than food security, internal agro-industrial linkages and the social reproduction of the majority. This strategy requires a strong state which can countervail popular demands for land, while delivering some land to them.

THE STUDY CONTEXT AND FRAMEWORK

This study examines the above issues surrounding Zimbabwe's land problems and reforms since 1980, and assesses the prospects for future reform. The study approach is based on an interactive analysis of macro and micro level socio-political and economic forces at play in determining the nature, pace and emerging directions of land reform. A variety of information sources, including original field data, were utilised in the research in order to expose the failure of attempts to resolve the land problem and the sources of future pressures for land redistribution.

Current approaches to assessing the nature, progress and causes of land and agrarian reform in Zimbabwe are inadequate. For, they tend to conclude that land reform is not on the Zimbabwean state's agenda and that a rational public policy formulation process would and should only lead to a cautious and slow land redistribution strategy. Zimbabwean research on the potential for land and agrarian reform is weak on both empirical and theoretical grounds. This is because most research tends to concentrate on wrongly conceived issues and constraints pertaining to the supply side of the land question. Some of the presumed problems and premises which are said to restrict land redistribution include:

- i) the perceived limitations of land available for transfer, in terms of the physical quantities available;
- ii) the need to maintain a fixed quantity of available land supplies for state uses and control through its institutions which include the parks, forests, local authorities and parastatal investment agencies of Government;
- iii) the presumed macro-economic problems that could arise from anticipated changes in the agricultural supply of existing outputs such as food, exports, wood, timber and tourism if large scale commercial lands were to be redistributed;
- iv) the presumed strategic superiority of the existing patterns of contribution to formal agricultural employment and development dominated by large commercial farms, relative to a redistribution strategy's contributions to employment, growth and equity.

Some nationalist perspectives tend to justify the land supply limitation for state agencies and purposes, while the existing market dependence on private large farms justifies their continuing role. But such supply analysis has been based on inadequate empirical analyses of the real quantities of available land and the efficiency of land utilisation levels in private, state and peasant lands. A particularly difficult issue on the supply side has remained the nature of property relations - communal, freehold and leasehold - existing or intended.

The major analytic gap is the inadequacy of land demand analyses, especially at the local peasant household level. An understanding of the mass basis of the nationalist Government's particular form of land policy in general, and land reform in particular, is thus missing. Some research, based on poor empirical information, has already concluded that

there is no local level or mass based pressure for land redistribution. Others have argued that the Zimbabwean Government is alienated from the rural masses, whose lifestyle they resent and avoid, such that the Government is not committed to pursue rural development programmes, such as land redistribution, on behalf of the poor peasantry. And others, presuming no link between urban and rural classes in terms of social, political and economic relations, conclude that the peasantry is "on its own" in the search for an equitable land policy.

As discussed later, the existing analysis of peasant land demand has been focused mainly on descriptions of peasant land use inefficiencies, based on the comparatively lower yields in Communal and Resettlement Areas vis-a-vis large capitalist farmers, in a static framework. Such analysis, using inconsistent methodological comparative frameworks of output, does not identify the nature and causes of low physical production inputs utilised by peasants, and hence does not explain adequately their productivity profiles. Nonetheless, the studies have concluded that effective land demand by peasants is morally and economically weak because of their low productivity and because the increasing degradation of peasant lands makes them ineligible to land redistribution. The low effective land demand among large farmers, based on their established low land utilization rates has tended not to be accepted until recently.

Broader research on land demand has, however, also been limited to its agricultural purposes. This results in extremely narrow perspectives on the nature of pressures for land reform whereby the political analysis and economic rationality used to assess the policy formulation process, restricts the size and scope of the constituency which demands land reform. The urban poor's housing land demands, the natural resources demands of the rural poor, and the business demands for land and nature parks are thus obscured.

A key aspect is that debates about land reform have changed over time. In the first three years after Independence, the debate focused on the moral and normative basis of agricultural land "needed" by a given number of households; between 1984 and 1987, the debate tended towards specifically assessing the land use efficiencies of peasants and large farmers. Finally, between 1988 and 1993, analysis shifted towards a macro-economic framework based on the needs of the structural adjustment programme. The debates thus moved from a shallow demand analysis, through a narrowly based micro-level oriented framework, to a structuralist framework grounded in macro-economy and macro-political analysis of nationalism and land policy. This book reviews the literature on Zimbabwe's land reform, in order to gauge the scientific and ideological shifts in public policy formulation on land and their impacts on land redistribution.

In reviewing this literature it is necessary to say, first, that it is unsatisfactory to gauge the progress of and the need for land and agrarian reform from theoretical perspectives that, are not adequately grounded empirically. Second, macro-level economic analyses tend to overlook micro-level land demands because they do not consider the processes of rural social reproduction. Third, an over-emphasis on economic analysis tends to ignore the macro and micro level socio-political processes of land policy, and can lead to a conclusion that "land politics" and nationalism is irrational. Fourth, theories of policy analysis, especially with regard to land, which fail to understand nationalism and its continued need for popular support, grounded also in local territorial integrity and a stable social reproduction of society, contribute little to our understanding of either nationalism or of African policy formulation processes.

Finally, while the changing social forces and politics may well direct public policy analyses to topical and changing land-related issues, such as the roles of armed struggle, structural adjustment, political ideology and environment, the constant social fact of rural life remains the survival and reproduction of households. Although rapid rural to urban migration has already occurred and non-agricultural developments slowly progress, the pace of economic development in Zimbabwe and Africa is such that growing numbers of households will continue to depend for their reproduction on adequate access to land.

The approach of this book is thus based on the interactive assessment of land reform experiences and pressures at the national and local level, over two phases of efforts to redistribute land during the 1980s and 1990s. National level trends are interwoven with an analysis of household land demands and socio-political pressures for reform at the level of the locality and at a regional level, among a variety of Communal Areas across Zimbabwe's various agro-ecological regions. Although the book does not delve into the pre-1980 history and the current macro-economic strategy of Zimbabwe, it is understood that these aspects are crucial to an understanding of Zimbabwe's land question.

The broad problems of land and agricultural development in Zimbabwe's rural history are peculiar because of the white settler colonial history and the apparent robustness of its economy unlike that of the economies of most countries in Africa. Zimbabwe boasts a relatively balanced economic structure based on relative equal contributions to the Gross Domestic Product by agriculture, mining and industry. However, the formal economy is dominated by the capital of local whites, internationals and the state while land distribution and agricultural development remain unequal, (see Maps 1 and 2). Comparable to Western countries, the high yields per cropped hectare on parts of the land owned by

large-scale white farmers result in their overall output dominance and unequal control of agricultural resources and access to inputs. The problems of drought, environmental degradation, low productivity, hunger, landlessness, rural differentiation and market bias are broadly characteristic of Zimbabwe's peasantry, as elsewhere in Africa.

Zimbabwe's economic and political history bears some similarities with those of Egypt, Kenya, Algeria, South Africa, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique, because of white settler occupation and subjugation, which led to widespread land dispossession following military conquest in the 1890s. This process led to the rewriting of local customs and legislation, and the reshaping of

Map 1

local institutions and resource management practices among rural households. The peasants were located into land units variously labelled by different Governments as Native Reserves, African Reserves, Tribal Trust Lands and Communal Areas, depicting the ideological, political and historical struggle for a planning framework that at once described the peasants' "realm" and forcibly maintained an artificially separatist order and stability. Up to today, the rural local administration of Communal Areas which are separate from that of commercial farming areas, are still being amalgamated.

A key aspect of this history has been continued land grievances and the associated disarticulation of rural society, the rural economy and institutions. The traditional institutional aspects have received particularly slow and uncertain redress since 1980. There has been limited interest among politicians, chiefs and others in reviving and utilising traditional institutions, to develop an appropriate form of governance, in order to stabilize and improve rural social administration. This particularly applies to authority over land allocation and the re-organisation of land use. Some NGOS and local groups have formed new local "traditional" natural resource management institutions, which promise to improve rural natural resource use and controls, in the face of institutional changes leading to increased central government control of local resources and decision-making.

Since 1980 Zimbabwe has experienced vast economic change and improvements in the provision of rural social services, especially primary schools and clinics. Rural development has encompassed increasing access to potable water through boreholes and deep wells, the increased flow of general and technical information, increased access to agricultural inputs and the doubling of yields, until 1985, for segments of the rural peasant population. State investments in the improved marketing of surplus maize and cotton among about 25 per cent of households

Map 2

(300,000 of them) are seen as the key areas of success. Some measure of electoral democracy in rural local Government, increased dialogue between state and peasants through rural cooperation groupings, and the emergence of some independent political parties and NGO institutional arrangements are the main trends in political liberalisation since independence. These economic gains are now tested by the formal adoption in 1991 of an Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). However, since 1984, "home-grown" adjustment measures saw a declining trend in Government provision of services and land redistribution which generally led to declining rural incomes over the period. An export-oriented agricultural focus which relied on the large-scale farm sector (LSCF) thus dominated the entire independence period, leading to the retention of an unequal agrarian structure.

Understanding the Zimbabwean land problem however requires that detailed attention be paid to the complementary assessment of the land question from the standpoint of peasant households in Zimbabwe's Communal Areas. The intention is to fill a specific empirical and conceptual gap in land policy analysis, derived from the predominance of macro-level theoretic perspectives on the land question, and from an inadequate conceptualisation of the local level character of Zimbabwe's land question. The study explores the character and underpinnings of local demands for land reform, through an analysis of the socio-economic imperatives of household social reproduction and survival, and the commoditization of local production, consumption and labour processes. The local level studies also assess the process of land and natural resources degradation, local struggles for these resources, and the socio-political influences that such a local process bears on land policy formulation. Thus using both national and site level evidence the study develops a framework for understanding land demands and land policy formulation.

Essentially the book examines whether land reform in Zimbabwe is a superfluous agenda given the socio-political significance of Zimbabwe's one million land-dependent rural households. While macro-economic stabilization and adjustment, and macro-economic rationality in policy formulation, which are central to Zimbabwe's Economic Structural Adjustment Programme, appear to override the political demand for land reform, the study demonstrates how the material basis for rural household survival remains centred on improved access to land and the social use values of natural resources. Increased pressure on land and natural resources for household survival leads to increased commoditization of resources at all levels, increased illegal and informal bidding for and accessing of these resources, and expanded demands for changes in the legal, administrative and distributional framework of such resources. Because land provides a multiple set of values for a wide

spectrum of household needs, through its direct use and through the extraction of the natural resources it bears, local policy struggles remain focused on land reform.

To the peasantry, land reform is central to agrarian reform, because agrarian reform is predicated upon uncertain and inadequate external, mostly state led, investment in or provision of agricultural services and infrastructure. Also, such investment, while useful to the peasantry, is secondary to rural household autonomy, as the minimum household reproduction needs can be sought from land through strategies which avoid economic and "political" markets. These local processes, priorities and definitions are least appreciated in debates, research and policies undertaken both at the macro-level and in numerous local case studies.

The language and perspectives of land policy-making and planning also differ from that of peasants. The latter view land and access to it in a broader use value sense, while officials hold a narrower physicalist and agricultural cash-cropping statist perspective. Zimbabwe's nationalist politicians however, because of their peasant origin and the electoral support they gain from the peasants understand the wider political value and social significance of land. The waning political will to implement land reforms reflects a dilemma between a distorted liberal pluralist governance system and economic nationalist pressures played out through conflicts over the accumulation needs of a few white farmers and a new black bourgeoisie.

This book therefore emphasizes that the land reform expectations of the peasantry differ from those prescribed by the delivery targets of officials, academics and NGOs. These prescriptions, which are largely based on conservative land management strategies, have limited utility to the peasantry. The peasantry evades the mainly technical and bureaucratic state-led strategy of land reform. While the broader structural reforms of ESAP promise increased agrarian development through market incentives expected to benefit the peasants, the latter's hopes are pinned on immediate access to contiguous dispossessed lands and their natural resources. This is so because the rate and level of change based on state deliveries of alternative agrarian resources and market incentives to the peasantry is oblique.

The short-term survival needs of rural households require control over land as well as an autonomy which is built on complex socio-political arrangements and processes which defy the official technical prescriptions for land reform. The land and agrarian interests of the white and black middle and capitalist classes provide an equally complex and competing framework within which land policy formulation is balanced. This breeds a peculiar

definition of Zimbabwe's land reform, which can claim an exceptionalism only because of the white settler factor, although Kenyan experiences are relatively similar. While the demands of the elite are not the focus of detailed research here, their place in determining land policy is assessed as part of the overall land reform experiences so far.

Six premises which embody specific processes and levels of research substantiation are therefore explored in this study. These are:

- i) Land Reform has been limited in Zimbabwe, in terms of a variety of social and physical indicators, in spite of the initial existence of enabling legislation and political support for reform. New legislation provides for increased powers to undertake land reform despite the apparent lack of political will for reform, and macro rationalisations of inaction. New political pressures for land reform by a mainly black elite do not auger well for the pursuance of a more popularly based land reform.
- ii) While macro-level rationalisations and deterministic trends may not favour land reform, the growing rural realities of poverty and aggressive confrontations over land suggest that local pressure will have a determining role in re-placing land reform on the agenda. Growing disruption of social reproduction encourages demands for land reform.
- iii) The most critical pressures brought to bear on renewing land reform are derived from the significant impacts of the social and agrarian changes that have occurred in rural Zimbabwe since 1980. Changes resulting from post-independence agricultural economic policy and development shifts, demographic changes and shifting costs of social reproduction, define the social processes behind land reform. The precise social forces behind the pressure for reform include the growing social and regional differentiation of rural household incomes, production patterns and reproduction systems. Significantly, these structurally determined changes, which have not been alleviated by land distribution, have led to output and income gains among a small proportion of Communal Area households. Otherwise, most households experience unstable output and incomes, increased scarcity of land and biomass resources for social reproduction, and increased economic dependency on cash inputs and growing social dependency. Such pressures define the increased demand for land reform.
- iv) At the local level of analysis, loss of income opportunity, natural resources

commodification and social differentiation are expressed in growing awareness of the unsustainability of production systems, increasing extractive practices with regard to natural resources and increased transgression of state and private property rights. Socially, greater institutional and legal conflicts arise, leading to new forms of local organisation and demand for rural change particularly land reform.

- v) Broadly, Zimbabwe indicates a slow transition with continuity, based upon local communities building their own lives and environment within conditions not of their choice. This is reflected in the pressure to expand household entitlements.
- vi) At the structural level, Zimbabwe's Land Reform may be considered not to be unique. However, the specific social struggles evolving from the settler colonial history, cultural disarticulation and the nationalist struggle generate an exceptional land and agrarian reform policy formulation process.

The study explores the relationship between structure and human agency with respect to land, social reproduction and environment at the macro and local levels. It identifies those broad national and structurally determined agrarian changes affecting rural households and then explains how people respond to such "external" change through various forms of agency targeting their own social reproduction and mastery of their environment. This approach underscores the need to assess the land question at various levels, including: the national level for structural information; household level data providing local insight within a national context; in-depth local situational data entailing household conditions and processes; and local physical and institutional information at the specific site level. The purpose is to represent the existing conditions of rural peoples and their struggles for survival through land use and control. Such details at the local level were investigated in Makoni district (Map 3).

A series of data collection methods was used to derive the linkages between structure and agency and to isolate the variety of strategies used for rural household social reproduction. The methods used are shown in Figure 1.1.

FIGURE 1.1: DATA COLLECTION APPROACHES

Archival work to elicit the historical processes.
Secondary data compilation to document Zimbabwe's experiences in land reform.
Government statistics and records.
Interviews with officials at central and local levels in rural development oriented ministries.

Interviews with key informants and institutional players in the rural economy.

Random and stratified sample questionnaires of rural households at a national scale and within one ward of a district.

Interviews and discussions with local rural informants and households.

) Rapid rural appraisal techniques including observation,
d use mapping, counting and check-listing data.

Soils and climate data assembly and assessment.

Assembly of data on events/activities, plans and issues from local records, minutes and files.

Assembly of media-based information.

Participatory observation and investigation through advisory work, workshops and discussions.

Various studies undertaken by the author at different levels, using different methods, including extensive work in Makoni District between 1984 and 1988, provided the broad source of information used in this book (see Annex). The specific empirical data presented in this book was developed between 1989

Map 3

and 1993 through three key research activities: National Land Policy, Taxation, Tenure and Agricultural Policy Analyses; a National level Household Survey on Communal Area Production Systems; and the local survey of Mhezi Ward in Makoni District based on various Household, Resources and Institutional Surveys.

Figure 1.2: RESEARCH LEVELS, AREAS AND DATA SOURCES

LEVEL OF RESEARCH	STUDY AREA	SPATIAL UNIT	STUDY UNITS	DATA SOURCE
i) National	Zimbabwe	Country-wide (includes LSCF, State Lands & Communal Area)	National Policy Unit	National Statistics
ii) National	Selected Households	Provincial Communal	Communal Lands	a) 759 Households b) Official data
iii) District	Makoni District	District Areas for Peasants Rural Council Area for LSCF, Towns	District Council Area	a) Interviews b) Observation c) Rapid Appraisal d) Institutions
iv) Ward	Mhezi Ward	6 Village Areas Local Commercial and Admini. Centres LSCF Wards	Local Development Committee Area	a) Interviews b) Measurement & Observations c) Appraisals d) Institutions
v) Site	Household Allotments	Household home and cropping plus "commons" areas	Households Key Informants	a) 120 families b) 30 persons

The evidence presented in the following chapters is built on five levels of data sources and areas of research coverage, (Figure 1.2). Parallel to the data sources used for the Zimbabwe-wide coverage, the District and the Ward levels include multiple sets of information derived from observations and measurement, interviews and unstructured discussions, official and institutional records and data, and rapid rural appraisal data collection activities. In presenting such data, their specific sourcing is indicated in the text, while detailed methodological notes on the household questionnaires at the national and site level are presented in the annexes.

THE STUDY LAYOUT

The issues raised in this chapter are explored in further detail as follows: In chapter two, a literature survey attempts to define the context and definitions surrounding land reform in Zimbabwe, and assesses the settler colonial intellectual legacy and land imbalances. The chapter contextualises the Zimbabwe case on land and agrarian reform in the African scene by assessing the problems of rural differentiation and household reproduction in the context of rural dependency on land. International and local perspectives on land tenure, environmental conservation, sustainability and management, and on land-focused institutional structures related to resource management are also reviewed to capture processes of rural and agrarian change as these relate to the land question. This review concludes that land reform remains critical for Zimbabwe, and that a multi-layered analysis of various types of pressure for land reform needs to be pursued.

Chapter three elaborates on the conception of and approach towards land reform in Zimbabwe, elucidating the diverse political, social, economic and technical considerations entailed in the land debates and demonstrating the aggregate level demand and options for the supply of land. Chapter four presents the first experience of land redistribution through efforts undertaken between 1980 and 1989. These initiatives led by central Government, based on market-led land acquisition procedures and feeble attempts towards achieving a socialist transition in the black agricultural sector, achieved mixed results. The chapter demonstrates the relatively reasonable output results of the land redistribution exercise, even though mostly poor land potential areas were transferred mainly to peasants and in spite of the inadequate public agricultural support provided for resettled peoples to realise their full potential.

Chapter five then assesses the broad regional level demands for land in Communal Areas based on survey data. In that chapter it is shown how rural differentiation in terms of access to land, farm assets, incomes and the use of inputs, allows for a minority of households to secure for themselves stable social reproduction, various surpluses, and a capability to hold on to and manage effectively larger units of land. A third of the households are found to be near-landless and unable to effectively manage their small lands. These depend on supplementary wage incomes, as well as on other households for draught power and food. Broadly, young men and a growing number of women are found to be the most marginalised as they need land for their basic survival because their capacity to reproduce is restricted.

Chapter six investigates similar issues, with broadly similar findings at the local level, involving six villages in a ward located in Makoni District of Manicaland province. The chapter further identifies local strategies adopted to augment the degrading land and natural resources requirements of households for their social reproduction. These include increased commoditisation of local natural resources, transgressions into large-scale commercial farms (LSCF), small-scale commercial farms (SSCF) and resettlement farming areas to procure natural resources, wage-labour, and to supply commodities and bid for land.

Chapter seven assesses the local socio-political processes surrounding the land issue, including attempts by local and external organisations to develop various new controls and rules for the management of land. The land problems faced at the locality level show how new pressures on and for land evolve as a result of land bidding, new political structures and changing land uses.

In chapter eight we show how the changing macro-economic and political context of Zimbabwe from the late 1980's, leads to new policy efforts towards land redistribution, based on a new market perspective of land redistribution. Local and regional variations in demand for land, growing economic nationalism and political change offer insight for a new land policy. It is found that this new land policy cannot neglect the land requirements of the rural poor. Chapter nine concludes the study.

We now review some perspectives on land reform from the relevant literature.

CHAPTER TWO: PERSPECTIVES ON ZIMBABWE'S LAND AND AGRARIAN REFORM RESEARCH

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the specific perspectives on and approaches to the analysis of land reform in Zimbabwe, within the general and comparative framework of relevant research in the African and international context. The wider literature identifies social differentiation, environmental sustainability and local governance issues surrounding land control and use as critical elements of the emerging problem of rural poverty and social reproduction. These issues are examined through a review of the Zimbabwean literature in order to gauge the national perspectives on land reform, and to assess the conceptual and policy problems underlying the slow pace of land redistribution in Zimbabwe.

African Agrarian Reform: How Unique is Zimbabwe's Land Reform?

The Zimbabwean case for land reform is situated within the wider development debate and policy perspectives on agrarian development on the economically marginalised African continent. Land tenure and agrarian change processes remain pivotal concerns for African policy development, given the present poor economic performance of its predominantly agricultural economies. Inadequate understanding of these two processes, particularly the social relations underpinning land use, tends to contribute to the ineffective food policy management experiences of the last two decades and the growing environmental stress on the continent. Land reform is at the centre of the changing agrarian demands of the variety of unfolding social classes and forces of the 1990's. Topical concerns in contemporary land research in Africa include: the distribution and access to land, its ownership and use patterns, policy incentives for optimizing sustainable land use, legal and institutional frameworks and processes which govern land administration, the impact of markets on land use and changing rural labour processes and relationships to land. It has been argued that the institutional and policy capacities to deal with these issues need to be strengthened if Africa's agrarian problems will be resolved. Moreover, growing political conflict on the continent is plausibly associated with the failure of land and the agrarian economies to deliver basic survival.

Looking beyond land into the social relations of production, however, Africa's looming agrarian "crisis" is considered to be based mainly on policies which over-regulate rural markets through inordinate state intervention and macro-economic mismanagement. A sizeable majority of external scholars on Africa tend to consider national internal agrarian

policy deficiencies to be the key cause of Africa's agricultural and rural problems. Yet the most striking result of the African agricultural performance over the last three decades is the growing rural income distribution inequalities and broader social differentiation (Ghai and Radwan, 1983), consequent upon the expansion of rural markets and of global economic intergration. This suggests a deepening of the rural crisis which counterposes capital accumulation and poverty within the context of increasing land conflicts, which reinforce the pattern of poor agrarian development.

In historical perspective, these interpretations of the causes of the agrarian crisis reflect poorly on the African nationalist agenda, because it has delivered neither development nor peace. Instead it has generated greater social conflict and rural depression. This trend, particularly as it relates to increasing rural polarization, fundamentally queries all the African ideological rhetoric on socialism, humanism and egalitarianism.

African Nationalist ideologies and politics, though not the central focus of this research, need critical interrogation because of their flawed assumptions on the egalitarian nature of rural Africa. Nationalists have had an avowed commitment to promoting rural development with equity in the face of the reality of increasing rural differentiation, coming with little evidence of development. This raises a basic question: whether rural development historically can occur without differentiation? On a global scale some studies suggest differentiation is universal (van der Ploeg, 1990).

The emergence of rural differentiation as a major research concern in Africa begins in the late 1970's, as shown by the famous "Dar-es-Salaam" debates and more recent scholarly publications. This suggests that not only the nationalists, but also African and Africanist scholarship, may have been slow to detect growing rural polarisation and deepening poverty. The scholarship also suffered from misconceptions about the rural economy:

"While such sharp disparities in over-all income distribution are not too unexpected, it is often believed that incomes and consumption in the rural areas are relatively evenly distributed. This belief is founded on the assumption of land abundance, the role of the customary land tenure system in preventing landlessness and the widespread prevalence of subsistence production based on family labour (Ibid. p.10)

Case studies both of countries formerly considered to be agricultural successes such as Kenya, Malawi, Ivory Coast and Botswana, and poorly performing countries, such as Somalia,

Mozambique, Ghana, Nigeria and Zambia, reveal that the picture of rural equality is no longer valid, and that rural poverty, defined in terms of minimum baskets of goods and services consumed and proportional expenditure on food, has been increasing (Ibid).

The expectation that land availability, local indigenous systems of land administration, autonomous food production and family or kinship systems of labour organisation would mitigate rural poverty and differentiation, is notably repudiated in case studies. A growing body of literature identifies diversity, heterogeneity and social differentiation as key elements of social and economic conflict in the rural realm (Robinson, 1990; van der Ploeg, 1990). In Africa, the emergence of innovative capitalist farmers and rural heterogeneity based on accumulation of land control and access has received some academic comment, although its scale, pace, intensity and wider social impacts and causes have not been adequately treated.

Studies of rural differentiation processes occurring during the 1980's, suggest that a new generation of land concentration is emerging in the hands of retired public servants and urban elites. New social forces and interest groups emerging from earlier nationalist, political and administrative leaderships, traditional elites or, the new post-independence nationalists and middle classes exhibit a growing business culture, alongside the widespread variety of poor rural and urban groups. Depressed rural areas characteristically recur in various parts of Africa. Such rural social differentiation partly explains the growing demand for policies which promote a social change which can deliver broadly based urban and rural development.

The growing diversity of interest groups and their policy requirements, and the complexity of developing social change has so far been the preserve of those scholars preoccupied with constitutionalism, electoral and multi-party politics, democracy and "governance". Because of the centrality of land and agrarian policy to the lives of the majority of Africans and because of the socio-political diversity of the growing demands for associated reforms, research on land and agriculture needs to be critically concerned with the broader processes of rural governance. Land policy research has to contend not only with the technical diversities of land and its uses, but also with the variety of social forces contending for land and associated policy reforms.

The growing new and predominately economically oriented and articulate nationalists, who characterise themselves as "emerging" indigenous entrepreneurs, claim a social interest in generating national wealth and employment, (Moyo, 1992). Their specific interest, in Zimbabwe for instance, is to receive state support in the form of capital, technical services,

policy incentives and positive discriminatory legislation and regulations for indigenous enterprise development, and access to privatised parastatals.

In the land and agrarian sphere, these elites demand state support and credit for access to large-scale freehold lands dominated by the white minorities, agricultural support services and capital for black capitalist farmer development and access to agricultural parastatal procurement and distribution contracts. They demand access to freehold or long-term leasehold in communal lands for business in those rural centres designated for industrial and commercial development growth, and in selected farmland areas which are accessible to them. Moreover, they lobby for increased de-regulation of their business activities in Communal Areas. These new imperatives for a capitalist agricultural revolution, as opposed to the more classic land and agrarian reforms, present a double reform agenda for state policy formulation and for political balancing vis-a-vis the broader peasant demands for land and poverty alleviation.

Similar land reforms demanded and directed by post-independence "middle classes" and ruling groups have been noted in other parts of Africa. The Nigerian Land Use Decree of 1978 is a case in point observed by this author during field research there between 1979 and 1983. There, the state hovered between protecting the poor peasantry from land alienation and providing legal and material support to aspiring new capitalist farmers, a generation removed from previous export crop elites. The result seems to have been continued food imports and environmental degradation in new land frontiers in an economy slightly shielded by oil revenue and multi-lateral loans.

Will the African nationalist rulers finally abandon protecting the "masses" from land alienation and rural exploitation under a free market ideology and distant state? Or have they already done precisely that? Davidson, (1992) describes African Nationalism as a janus which fights to create liberty, only to destroy this by abandoning the social question through diktat rationalised through "national interests". Over 30 years of independence have produced ideological and social struggles for a change process caught between diametrically opposing forces of landed capital and agricultural development. Over-simplified models and methodologies used to interpret the logic of change and conflict underlain by these trends have tended to be the rule rather than the exception. This is a result of the imported cold war framework characteristic of many of the visible African and Africanist intellectual and political debates, especially among nationalist "developmentalists".

New methodologies are frantically being sought during this period, especially by radical writers, due to the perceived superiority of the free market and its ideology and its associated intellectual and political manifestations. And so, in such countries as Mozambique and Tanzania, rapid reversals of post-independence land policies and systems of land control and of agrarian services are being pursued. Notably, the liberalisation context has led to the "de-construction" of cooperative and state forms of organising production and marketing. Such land reforms are underguarded by the "de-communalizing" of communal lands, de-nationalisation of state lands, re-privatisation of former freehold lands, and the promotion of liberal agrarian market forces. The strategies and techniques used to pursue the above include mass land valuation and registration techniques, designed to engrave new land policy and legal frameworks. Similar approaches were used in some of the market-led land reform experiences of Latin America and Asia.

Population has remained a frequently cited explanatory variable for the African development crisis, usually in a negative sense of pressures on land and food resources, especially by traditional demographers, environmentalists and some aid agencies. Population growth and concentration has also been used in its positive sense of motivating innovation and change in agriculture by a few authors (Grigg, 1982; Boserup, 1965). The persistence of population policy debate and lack of successes to be found in the policy's rural programmes suggest that different approaches to the study of the nature and survival of Africa's rural populations are required. Thus the reproduction and growth requirements at the household level, within their agricultural and land context, deserve greater research attention.

Famine, droughts, environmental degradation and environmental stress are another theme which, since the Sahel droughts of the 1970's and Eastern and Southern Africa's dry decade of the 1980's, have acquired persistent currency in research on Africa's agrarian crisis. Debates on local survival and coping strategies, environmental conservation and natural resources management, appropriate technology, indigenous technical knowledge, water use and management, climate change linked to the woodfuel and the deforestation process, dominate some explanations of the agrarian crisis. Yet this focus of explanation alone, revolving essentially around the issue of local level natural resources management, reflects a somewhat overgeneralised characterisation of local socio-economic problems of household reproduction.

Meanwhile macro-level environmental policy frameworks do not account, even partially for local, particularly rural, "informal" natural resource uses and values in national accounts.

Academic responses to these conceptual and practical weaknesses are evident in the growing body of local case studies, with an integrative focus on rural lifestyles, survival strategies and, on local knowledge and management systems. Equally, macro-level research on integrating environmental and economic planning and development criteria has increased.

Productivity growth in Africa continues to lag behind Asia and Latin America, conjuring descriptions, in political economy, that Africa has missed the basic agricultural, let alone "green", revolution. Explanations of this technical lag range from the older dependency and unequal exchange theories (Amin, 1974), to the declining terms of agricultural commodity trade linked to the role of monopoly capital. The debt burden, cultural divergence and the presently popular notions of marginalisation, dis-empowerment and the absence of popular participation in development by the poor or the "masses" are the current explanations.

Yet pressures for policy changes abound in Africa through either multi-lateral bank influences or "home-grown" models of structural adjustment, promising to correct the root causes of slow growth: factor and price dis-incentives, state regulation, inefficient market allocation processes and the burdens of macro-imbalances. A decade of these policy shifts in Africa has yet to yield increased agricultural productivity, output diversification and stability, and improve incomes among the peasantry. The peasantry are increasingly dependent on state and donor relief and social services programmes.

Ever increasing technical assistance from abroad (Mkandawire, 1987) is testimony to a global effort to improve African agricultural policies and promote a development which has yet to materialise. This suggests the need for an improved effort to explain the agrarian problem, through more rigorous attempts to establish the nature and character of Africa's land and agrarian economy, and their role in macro-economic development strategy. The broad research gap is to improve the explanatory capabilities and prospects of current global development theories, upon which Africa's present agrarian crisis has been conceptualised. Southern African land and agrarian research has yet to face this research challenge as evidenced by the Zimbabwe land and agrarian reform debates discussed later. First, however, we review some of the international debates on environmental sustainability and local management systems to gain further insight into land management problems of relevance to land reform.

International Perspectives on Land Reform, Environmental Sustainability and Development

The Zimbabwean debate on land reform is critically influenced by regional debates on environmental and energy development, by the international debate on the role of the market vis-a-vis the state in land reform and by a broader international debate on environmental sustainability and development.

The Zimbabwean and regional literature reviewed below tends to have a parochialism based on views of the uniqueness of the Zimbabwean history of racist colonialism and armed resistance which led to independence. By the early years of the 1980s, international scholars espoused a perspective which rejected other earlier assumptions that socialist revolutionary armed struggle in Southern Africa promised substantial radical socio-economic change. Some scholars upheld the perspective that the Nationalist movements were in fact not revolutionary, having utilised traditional spiritual mobilisation methods (Lan, 1985), working with an unsophisticated peasantry and having used force to maintain rural support for guerrilla activities. Some have made the case that it is the structural determinants of the choices made by Nationalist leaders during independence negotiations which influence land policy, thus rejecting the broad perspective which emphasized the recent history of the Zimbabwe struggle. The latter had argued that it is petit-bourgeois and nationalist ideology which had had a wider basis in the liberation movement than previous scholarship recognised, thus misrepresenting the revolutionary character of ZANU PF, which had generated false expectations for radical change in Zimbabwe. Within this context the unfulfilled hopes for land reform have been viewed as a macro-level process of the cooptation of Zimbabwean nationalists.

But much of this literature demonstrates unresolved differences over the importance of external international level systems and ideas in influencing development, the different roles ascribed to history and interpretations of internal processes, and the poverty of dominant methodologies in the analysis of conflict and contradictions in the development process. For this reason, it is necessary to be cautious about the determining role ascribed to Zimbabwean peasants in shaping their environment, the country's history and the development process.

To provide an appropriate context to the history and development of Zimbabwe's agrarian framework and peasant reproduction, we briefly review relevant international literature and identify some of the crucial conceptual tools useful for this research effort. The literature is also used to develop an operational but systemic description of the type of social formation

of Zimbabwe's rural economy. The review also provides a framework for assessing the type of local land reform initiatives found in Zimbabwe and compares these with global environmental agendas that have recently emerged.

The most significant perspective to influence Zimbabwe land debates is the dependency theory literature of the 1970s (Rodney, 1972; Amin, 1974) which placed global capital structures, trade and institutional hegemony above national and local agency for development and change. Equally, radical modernisation theorists (Brenner, 1978) together with various World Bank theorists, have stressed the need for external investment and responsiveness to global markets as the key to dynamic change in countries such as Zimbabwe.

The international debates which are of specific relevance, therefore, to this research problem of the relationship between structure and agency in respect of pressure for land reform and community social reproduction are widely treated in the literature on political economy, modernisation perspectives, world systems and dependency, modes of production, environment and "resistance" in the Developing World.

A variety of relevant works have attempted to redefine political economy (Wolf, 1982) as a more complex process of interaction between global structures and local communities as opposed to the unidirectional structurally determined processes postulated by earlier modernisation theorists such as Brenner, (1978) Young, (1989) and Goldsmith et al, (1992). Some of these writings have been particularly concerned with the need to insert a conception of environmental change into the broad comparative works on development in order to distinguish the historical role played by environment in capitalist development.

It is argued that politico-economic relationships between environmental change and superstructural factors such as ideology and policy can provide a basis for linking structural analysis to the study of ways in which development processes in different societies influence environmental change at the material and phenomenological levels. Thus, the literature calls for greater attention to be paid not only to the external limits posed by resource availability but also to internal limits on development.

Thus international development debate during the 1970s and 1980s, contained significant differences, particularly the clash of conceptions about modes of production and their articulation in the world capitalist system. In this debate, some emphasised the existence of a unitary mode of production, resulting from the global homogenization process involving world markets and technology, while others argued for the existence of multiple modes of production disarticulated in the world capitalist system. Mandel (1978) provides a

compromise through his definition of a world capitalist system which articulates capitalist, semi-capitalist and pre-capitalist relations of production, interlinked by exchange dominated by the capitalist world market. The critical definitional distinction provided by Mandel here is based on the recognition of the heterogeneity of different societies in the world system as opposed to their concealment in the core-periphery dichotomy. This provides space for the study of local processes which determine development and environmental change, rather than leaving all to macro and global determinism.

In this respect, both the modernisation and dependency perspectives tend to have under-represented the influences of internal factors on development. The modernization perspective emphasizes the need for external inputs of technology and capital and deeper incorporation into world markets leading to inevitable social disintegration and necessary social transformation for development to occur. The dependency perspective at local and national levels tends instead to recognise only processes of socio-political and economic marginalization and enclosure (Goldsmith et al, 1992).

The tendency is thus for local or peripheral systems to be seen as experiencing only social disintegration. The ability or capacity of society to reconstitute itself socially and expand entitlements seems to be disregarded, in spite of the reality of the continued extraction of labour and capital from local communities. Essentially, research has yet to establish the variety of local socio-political and economic responses, which produce the heterogeneous patterns of social organisation and production and thus strategies of social reproduction found in the developing world.

Indeed some writers argue for a theory of local agency, centred around identifying the "weapons of the weak" (Scott, 1985) complemented by those who postulate notions of the village economy or "mixed, subsistence-based socio-economic systems" (Wolfe and Ellanna, 1983). This identification of "mixed" local systems is based on the continued existence of seasonality in food gathering, production and consumption of wild resources, household organised production, non-commercial distribution and exchange networks, traditional land use and property relationships and growing market oriented production.

Zimbabwe offers an interesting research case in that 100 years of settler colonialism, managed through a unique racist ideology, led to massive land dispossession and social engineering. This created the "economies of the reserves" (Amin, 1974). Communal Areas have thus been multiplied into disparate spatial units of rural socio-economic activity, as political and administrative units, property regimes and institutional frameworks which continue to exist as remnants of colonial history. While Communal Areas on the surface

appear as peripheral spatial zones or economic regions of the dominant Zimbabwean capitalist economy, they are in fact an integral part of the Zimbabwean labour, capital and resource markets.

Their identification as "communal" in terms of property relations has already been queried, while their typification as "traditional" and non-commercial farming areas needs further interrogation. To what extent are Communal Areas passive "enclosures" which are "marginalised" and totally dominated by external forces which, through policy and markets, determine the forms and direction of local production and reproduction?

Close examination of development processes at the local level in Zimbabwe is required to identify such processes as the changing property relations, particularly those associated with land: the purposes of production and access to the forces of production, the emerging forms and patterns of market relationships, changing social organization at household and larger levels in relation to production, resource access and distribution, and local power relations.

As the literature attests, these processes need to be examined in relation to the existing complex reality (O'Riordan, 1971) which tends to abound with a diversity of interests based on evolving heterogeneity, spontaneity reflected in local adaptiveness, collectivity of problems and the immeasurability of future costs and benefits. It is perhaps this complexity which has fueled the recent global environmentalist obsession with diversity of the biological and socio-cultural environments.

In this vein, various researchers on land reform decry the ineffectiveness of the homogenised state-led reforms in Latin America. They suggest that market-based changes in access to land and capital markets have been the most successful while state-led reforms have resulted in negative income and production distribution patterns. A related international theoretic vein has proposed the reform of "common-property" land markets as the best route to increased productivity and resource management (Bradley, 1992). This approach has been welcomed by various scholars and policy makers in Zimbabwe and by various environmentalists and even the Zimbabwe Farmers Union, as a necessary means for improving the productivity and maintenance of currently held land and natural resources. Essentially the debate for land privatisation in Communal Areas calls for a halt to land distribution until local management efficiency can be guaranteed in Communal Areas through reforming property relations. Interestingly, black kulaks and middle classes seem to support this approach, justifying it in terms of the international acceptability it brings.

The international debate on environmental sustainability has had a more complex impact on

local Zimbabwean intellectual exchange because of its tendency to relate to capital and because of its social and environmental relationships in both inter-generational and intra-generational contexts. The implicit policy and planning frameworks for sustainability require a look forward beyond 50 years, a timescale which little of the literature follows, except in the case of wildlife and bio-diversity conservation. Global warming, in particular, has tended to question the present importance placed on equity in the environment and development debate, emphasising instead low input agrarian development in spite of the crisis of social reproduction in African rural areas. Much confusion abounds in Zimbabwe in relation to these debates, given that they reinforce the anti-reform conservation agenda in the face of increasing popular demand for land distribution and access to and control of natural resources for immediate survival and tourism-related income.

Within this framework, the SADC debates are essentially arguments for developing larger integrated markets, investments and planning across countries on the basis of free-market economic policy and open access to foreign investors. The SADC focus has been on developing the large scale energy, water and tourism potential of the region, attracting external capital which has recently been somewhat reduced. Policy and planning by SADC is excessively technically focused on soils, water and energy, and scattered project-wise and sectoral among countries, while agricultural and land issues are reduced to food security problems on a regional scale. Most critically, the institutional basis of SADC itself is weak, because of the limited commitment of finances and expertise by SADC Governments to the various arms which organise for environmental and rural sustainability.

The international literature on environmental sustainability is of particular interest to Zimbabwean researchers because, while influential in current debates concerning the reversal of environmental degradation in Communal Areas, the definition of sustainability in Zimbabwe tends to be confounded by remnants of colonial conservation ideology. The literature is also of interest because the global sustainability agenda has sharp contradictions in its theoretical and practical applications.

Epitomised by "Our Common Future" (1987), the global sustainability agenda contradicts itself by promoting economic growth while pleading for a change in the quality of such growth without stating how this can be achieved. The agenda challenges all to address the basic needs of the world's poor and yet calls for the stabilization of the global population. It sets out to conserve and enhance natural resources but plans to reorient technology which the Third World has resisted because of the lack of evidence on the accessibility and affordability of new technologies. Essentially, Brundtland proposes that environmental

cost-benefits be fitted into economic analyses, and yet this has so far only been partially achieved in micro-economic analyses at the project planning level and not at the macro-economic level.

The UNCED conference in Brazil, which was a report back on Brundtland's sustainability agenda reviewed by the global community, produced Agenda 21 bearing little relationship to the above challenges set out by Brundtland. Of interest here is that, first, Agenda 21 is dominated by Northern interests which ignore questions of equity and access to resources. Second, although Agenda 21 does move from food security to a consideration of land problems, its concerns are with maintaining the quality of land and bio-diversity rather than with questions of land ownership, distribution and access. The social reproduction crisis in the developing world is thus relegated to a cross-cutting marginal status to be treated through the usual poverty alleviation programmes of the last few decades.

The global environment debate has, however, raised deeper questions concerning social processes in the response to the changing environment and levels of development. The literature opens the way for analysis of complex environmental problems not only at the global level but also at the local and regional scale. Some of the literature on common property resources, for instance, provides specific conceptual tools for dealing with local resource management problems, similar to the problem of household social reproduction in Communal Areas. While the conceptual relevance of the "Tragedy of the Commons" (Hardin, 1968) has been thrown into question - in terms of the rarity of "open access" systems, the widespread existence of local resource use rules and the applicability of its over-exploitation logic - other useful concepts have emerged from the debate.

Common property resources, also termed public goods, are those which are not individually owned although they can be individually utilised, where multiple users have autonomous rights to their use and in which groups of users have the collective right to exclude external users (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987). As mentioned earlier, in Zimbabwe's Communal Areas, some of the land and related resources are based on similar management regimes.

On the other hand, "open access" resource systems have been given formal but poorly validated recognition in Zimbabwe's Communal lands. Properly defined, open access property regimes are those where no constraints limit resource exploitation, for example in situations where individual users of the common property resources are profit-maximisers with little respect for broader societal goods; where users have the technical capacity to exploit the resources at rates which surpass biological rates of renewal; or where the community is unable or unwilling to create effective institutions to regulate use of resources.

Open access resource management systems are not the only variant of property systems found in local areas (Ibid). Another system implied by the above is control and management of resources by the state through various arms of Government at different levels. A third but rarely found property regime in present nation-state systems, which many liberal scholars argue for, is the fully autonomous local level management system. And, finally, there are different variants of co-management property regimes.

According to some writers, co-management implies different levels of power sharing over resource management between users and Governments, based on varying degrees of cooperation. The latter range from the minimal level of co-management involving basic information sharing and consultations, to a second level of protracted dialogue and cooperation. Further up the ladder, co-management involves shared decision-making through established committees and management boards, and finally the highest degree of co-management involves equal partnerships in decision-making.

These specifications of co-management and property regimes can be used to improve the analysis of site level processes of household interaction with land and natural resources, and their reproduction. Such analysis can be focused on testing the local system's efficiency in terms of minimising conflict, its stability as reflected by its adaptability to change and technical interventions, its resilience based on its capacity to absorb difficult events and its equitability viewed as a commonly held perception of fairness in the system.

Research also needs to look at class interests embedded in such local systems, including questions such as (Blaikie 1985) the types of groups and classes involved; their sources of power within or outside the state, the different ideological perspectives utilised to analyze resource problems and the level of local unity in the struggle for resolving given resource problems. Some of these concepts seem to have growing, albeit partial, application in the Zimbabwean literature on land reform, as elaborated below.

Zimbabwean Definitions and Premises of Land Reform

In the Zimbabwean context, the term "land reform" has been focused on the legal acquisition of rural freehold land for its redistribution to black farmers based in Communal Areas. Between 1980 and 1992, this was done through market-based purchases on a willing-seller/willing-buyer basis. More recently, land acquisition has been broadened to include "designated lands", purchased through administrative price-setting, irrespective of the willingness of sellers. The latter approach to land transfer has been adopted since

1992. The government first purchased designated farms in late 1992, as part of a package to recompense 600 peasant households displaced by the construction of the Osborne Dam in Makoni District. However, land reform in Zimbabwe has also entailed the changes of policy in terms of land allocation powers in Communal Areas, natural resources management regulations, access to lease hold land, state farming, collectivisation and the administration of rural areas.

Focusing first on land redistribution, between 1980 and 1992, the government acquired up to three million hectares from large-scale commercial farming areas (LSCF) and re-settled 56,000 families on this land mainly as individual farm enterprises. Approximately 5000 of these households were settled on a cooperative enterprise basis. The LSCF, which consists of some 4,000 white farmers with average farm sizes of about 2,000 hectares each, now hold approximately 33 per cent of Zimbabwe's fertile highlands, amounting to some 11 million hectares. Land reform is viewed as a means to restructure this ownership so that more than 900,000 peasant households can acquire a "fair" proportion of these highlands. The focus of land reform analysis is the need to improve the agricultural capacity of peasant households.

Resettlement planning deliberately focuses its objectives on realising minimum agricultural incomes (GoZ 1982, 1985, 1992) based on crop and livestock enterprises, while general provision has been made recently for settler households to obtain woodfuel energy from resettlement land allocated to them (GoZ, 1992). It is also vaguely presumed by government officials (personal interviews, 1992) that peasant households will desire water for household consumption, grass, poles and mud for housing, as well as edible fruits and herbs from woodlands found in these resettlement areas. Resettlement planning has no recognisable policy framework or land use plans for the development or sustainable use of resettlement area woodlands. In fact, various interest groups have publicly criticised resettlement for its environmental insensitivity.

From an official point of view, however, land reform is a predominantly agricultural policy instrument (GoZ plans 1982, 1985), even though the non-farm peasant household survival goods, found in nature and embedded in land, are the presumed benefits of land reform.

The broad premise explored in this book is that land can be identified as the critical constraint on household reproduction in Communal Areas. Given the limited non-farm employment opportunities in Zimbabwe, with unemployment at over 30 per cent of the economically active population among Zimbabwe's total 10.5 million population (GoZ, 1991), household survival for close to one million families depends on access to income from land.

This trend is expected to prevail in the medium to long term (5-15 years), since formal employment growth has limited prospects, at less than 3 per cent a year, even under a high growth scenario (SATEP-ILO, 1990).

The significance of land for peasant households, in the absence of alternative infrastructure and services provision in Communal Areas, has been identified by Moyo, 1992 as entailing the following:

- i) Land as store-house of nature for reproduction of future generations - not necessarily specifically defined.
- ii) Land as agricultural production tool for subsistence food and exchange incomes to meet broader subsistence needs and for re-investment.
- iii) Land as receptacle of direct household utility needs - water, woodfuel, organic fertilizer, medicine, shade, fruit, housing and home, game meat, etc.
- iv) Land as potential investment in water development for irrigation, tourist development, woodlands enterprises, for trading specific natural resources as commodities.
- v) Land as social and political territory of governance and community reproduction.
- vi) Land as security or collateral in financial transactions.

For most Communal Households, land represents a moral and spiritual endowment, an "endowment entitlement" which can derive exchange or normative entitlements based on the increasing or decreasing value of the land in relation to changing user pressure and technological applications.

With time and changing markets, the significance of land has varied. Especially during the 1980s, land pressure increased as ranching, tourism and farming simultaneously expanded while the demand for wood-based resources for fuel, crafts and construction have increasingly been met by natural resource privatization and commodification. Rural people have lost out as Government has not addressed their entitlement to land and land products.

One school of land reform which has received official attention in Zimbabwe is based more on the "internal land use and tenure reorganisation" of Communal Lands. It has been

argued that nationalist calls for land reform dealt a blow to the more rational reorganisation of Communal Land use, although the government (1989) has purportedly committed itself to land use reorganisation in communal areas through a model of villagisation (Karimanzira, 1989) and through grazing schemes. Out of more than 150 Communal Lands within Zimbabwe's 55 Districts, less than 10 per cent have so far been reorganised, suggesting that this form of land reform is only a technical ambition. The government itself admits to not having committed sufficient resources to land use reorganisation (Karimanzira, 1989), while field evidence suggests popular resistance to such land use planning (ZERO LMNR Project, 1992).

Land reform in Zimbabwe is also associated with the modification of so-called Communal Tenure towards some form of transactable freehold and/or leasehold (GoZ Land Reform Seminar, 1988). Many scholars have begun to record the absence of true "communal tenure" especially in the croplands and residential areas of Communal Areas (Cheater, 1990; Moyo, 1992; Scoones, 1992). It also emerges that many of the communally-held grazing lands are not truly common property regimes of the "open access" genre (Murphree, 1990) although intrusion by "foreign" or external land users is a growing concern. Moreover, given current demand for land, encroachment on grazing land as a result of new family allocations is believed to be rapidly diminishing the common property or communal element of Communal Areas. It has been argued that the desire for freehold land rights has been intrinsic to Africans in Communal Areas and that as such, the concept of "communal" is a colonial and post-colonial legal and social construct of little relevance to present reality (Cheater, 1990). The Communal Lands Act in fact names the President of Zimbabwe as trustee of Communal Land, while the Lands are administered through elected District Councils, which replaced chiefs as land administrators during colonial days (Moyo, 1992).

There are therefore, three different basic premises about the nature of the land issue, addressing entitlement, technical reorganization and the legal entity of land. Yet, by definition, "Communal Lands" are an administrative category for broad rural policy and planning. Some administrative aspects of Communal Area land reform were carried out in 1982, when chiefs were disempowered as land administrators. Technical aspects of land reform through land use reorganisation have so far proved unviable. What remains is mounting pressure for further legal reform of land ownership, particularly in "growth points" or business centres (Moyo, 1992; Grierson and Moyo, 1993) and among the leadership of segments of the peasant farmer's union (ZFU, 1991). However, most observers consider that the effective implementation of freehold tenure, including land registration and titling, is an enormous challenge which could take decades to complete (Bruce, 1991) given the shortage and regulation of land surveying professionals (Moyo, 1992). In the medium to

long term (5 to 15 years), land reform in Zimbabwe remains primarily a question of transferring land from a minority white LSCF group to blacks, based on their presumed historical and social entitlement to land access.

Social Reproduction of Peasant Households and Nature

Land is critical for the social reproduction of households in Zimbabwe's Communal Areas. The concept of social reproduction is founded on the analysis of community survival and reproduction, based on households as the lowest level of economic disaggregation. Such analysis explores the ways by which households maintain and enhance their sustainability, through subsistence, income generation and other forms of direct and indirect consumption activities. Sustainability is viewed in terms of inter-generational and intra-generational household and community reproduction.

Such a perspective captures Communal Area demographic cycles and economic trends, since the social system lacks a social security framework to cater for the young (below 15 years) and the old (above 55 years), and where land which allows social reproduction is transferred mainly through marriage and death over 40 year cycles. Land maintenance and enhancement are critical elements of social reproduction and these are complemented by other specific resource requirements with shorter life cycles. These include livestock with about 5 year cycles, and other household and farm assets with life cycles between one and 20 years. In addition, social reproduction is complemented by family migration and remittance investments into Communal Areas. Off-farm activity and incomes are as critical to social reproduction as is the degree of exchange entitlements derived from agricultural and natural resource production activities. Thus incomes from various sources of wages and petty trade based on rural resources and formal sector transactions are an important supplement in household reproduction.

This perspective on community and household social reproduction undergirds the need for land reform as one element in the process of fulfilling and expanding local endowments and other entitlements. More specifically, the social reproduction perspective adopted here could enable researchers to move beyond mere consumption analysis towards developing a new theory for demand analysis in harsh physical and economically peripheral environments such as Zimbabwe's Communal Lands.

However, social reproduction in Communal Areas is intricately related to the sustainable reproduction of nature in Communal Lands. Increased access can be viewed in terms of increased productivity of the natural resources themselves in Communal Areas, or through

access to new land and natural resources. Such new lands can be found in the privately held LSCF areas, in state lands which are predominantly nature parks (for forests and wildlife), and in the few under-populated Communal Lands of Northern Zimbabwe.

The LSCF areas are the main subject of debate on land reform. Few researchers and officials recognise the need for redistributing state lands. Over the last five years, however, Zimbabwe has seen growing peasant and elite entrepreneur demands for access to state forests and parks (Moyo, 1992). On the otherhand, government policy aims to keep peasants out of illegal or legalised access to the same lands, (GoZ, 1989), by litigation and force. Aside from new land transfers to communal households, the potential for increasing the productivity, let alone the sustainability, of Communal Areas tends to be viewed with scepticism given the observed levels of land degradation there (Whitlow, 1985) and the absence of large scale state support for investments in lands development and productivity.

The lack of investment in the sustainable reproduction of Communal Areas underlines the definitional perspective of this book. That is: nature is not "naturally" given but always controlled, created and recreated, depending on given but changing land use demands and control of access, and depending also on levels of technology and environmental mastery. In Zimbabwe's Communal Areas, peasant households do not have adequate capital and access to technology to help improve the productivity of nature which meet their sustainability requirements. Peasant households cannot return to their original land husbandry, as is idealistically frequently suggested.

A racist ideology of nature conservation, evolved in colonial times to justify minority control of land which excluded blacks, has been used to justify preferential allocation of infrastructure and financial resources to the LSCF (Moyo, 1986). This preferential allocation of state finances continues to apply to the reproduction of nature in state lands, and in parks and forests, because of the immediate commercial and macro-economic value of the crops and landuse system, under the present narrow consumption structure based on extremely unequal incomes and macro-economic resource allocations. Essentially, demands for land reform are considered by some researchers to mirror this discrepancy in investment in the reproduction of nature, and in access to the national resource base controlled by the state and LSCFs.

The land reform debate has been held more at the macro-level of aggregate land transfers, rather than in terms of the demands, needs and expression at the community or household level. Where demand for and pressure on land can easily be identified at site level, with local fights over land such as in "squatting", "poaching" and fence cutting, the associated

attempts to achieve household sustainability are rarely directly extrapolated into a broader discussion on land policy reform.

So far, the above discussion has provided the scope and definition of the debates on land reform, and has argued for the need to establish micro level analysis of demand for land which is central to household sustainability. The specific literature reviewed below explains the broader research and theoretical gaps in the analysis of the interrelatedness of land reform, environmental and household reproduction, and sustainability.

Current Approaches to Land Reform and Agrarian Change in Zimbabwe

Fifteen years after Independence in Zimbabwe, most research on agrarian change and rural development suggests that, despite the bitter liberation war over land in the 1970s, land reform is neither necessary nor desired in Zimbabwe. This perspective is largely derived from macro-level analyses of the political economy of agrarian change in Zimbabwe and some comparable international experiences. The concerns of radical structuralists and the free-market proponents of macro-economic adjustment in Africa tend to converge in their identification of a "rational" policy-making process towards land reform by the post-independence Government of ZANU-PF, because it has been minimalist in approach.

This identification is based on aggregate evidence which portrays general growth and diversification in agricultural output among Zimbabwe's large and small scale farmers, in spite of limited land redistribution. Furthermore, nationwide demands for land reform are deemed to be feeble. The general impression gained in the literature is that Zimbabwe's peasantry has improved its socio-economic conditions on the basis of agrarian changes resulting from positive agricultural and socio-economic policies since 1980. Moves by emerging black elites to acquire landed property and maintain their new privileged access to agrarian resources, in the context of their acceptance of free-market principles, are widely seen as attesting to a rational abandonment of previous radical demands for land reform. This overall situation is thus generally believed to explain and justify the lack of agrarian and land reform.

Initially, much of this literature rationalised the lack of land reform in terms of the losses of output and employment that would result from land distribution (Kinsey, 1983), and in terms of the presumed resource use efficiency of large-scale commercial farmers, and their organisational effectiveness (Skalness 1989 and Herbst 1990). The presumed efficiency of the LSCF was successfully queried (Weiner et al 1985, Moyo 1987) and gradually accepted by policy-makers, including the government in 1989 and the World Bank in 1991. However,

macro-economic analysis, particularly from the World Bank, saw the need for structural adjustment and macro-economic balancing as the key obstacle to continued growth (1990) and argued that the evolution of freer agricultural markets in Communal Areas (GoZ 1991) was the key to growth, obviating the need for radical land reform. Land reform was considered only viable and necessary as a market-driven process in order not to undermine the critical contribution of the LSCF to the country's foreign exchange and GDP.

Another conservative macro-economic view supporting this position is in the legislative review of ownership to improve the efficiency of land markets. This has been proposed through the need for relaxing controls of freehold land sub-divisions and sales (Strasma, 1991), relaxing Communal Area land controls by the State and introducing private tenure (Bruce, 1991). To this end, the GoZ has established a Land Tenure Commission expected to recommend legal alternatives to tenure in Communal, Resettlement and Small Scale Commercial Farming Areas, in order to improve productivity.

In essence, conservative analysts perceive a problem with past and existing agricultural incentives, rather than with a need for land redistribution. Present trends of output growth in Zimbabwean agriculture are considered remarkable for a developing country, even though such growth among peasants has tapered off and is accompanied by reduced state investments in infrastructure and marketing facilities - a component of the ESAP policy. Such analyses neglect the importance of material constraints such as land, infrastructure, water and markets to the future development of Communal Areas.

Radicals have viewed the above justification for limited land reform as peripheral to the more central problems of World Bank and western hegemony (Stoneman, 1988; Cliffe, 1989) and a geo-political stratagem directed at liberalising the perceived radicalism of Southern Africa (Moyo, 1989). The need to generate racial harmony and positive lessons for Namibia and South Africa have also been considered to be crucial macro-structural political imperatives for slowing down land reform (Moyo, 1990), even beyond national political balancing.

However, radicals have long doubted the reality of the Zimbabwean agricultural success story (Cliffe, 1989), and suggest, with partial evidence, the growing unsustainability of Communal Area agriculture and its uneven development (Moyo, 1986). Rural differentiation, unemployment and resource gaps at the macro-level were increasingly seen as major reasons for a renewed land reform policy (Moyo, 1989). The specific socio-political pressures from such rural differentiation (Moyo, 1992) and their environmental consequences, have only recently received scholarly attention. Most recent

work on rural differentiation (Cousins, Amin and Weiner 1992) remains locked up within a limited agricultural sector oriented analysis, and rigid purist neo-marxian attempts to define the peasant class character and modes of production.

Some radicals see the ill-conceived embrace of the "dualism thesis" implied in most of the above (Bond, 1993), to be a major weakness of this radical literature. Bond argues that the redistribution literature has itself failed to perceive the fundamental importance of overall structural reform. Without structural reform, most of the present contradictions of resource access (finance, land and services) are considered by Bond to be unresolvable. His alternative "capital over-accumulation and crisis" perspective is put forward as the determining factor in explaining the slow pace of land reform, given the need of Zimbabwean capital in the 1980s, and the associated interests of the World Bank, to maximise returns from urban real-estate and exports (Bond, 1993). The policy and pace of land reform are thus seen as structurally sub-ordinated to finance capital's short-term exigencies.

Indeed, the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) lobby against land reform has tended to call for economic stability through sensible land policy which does not undermine the role of land as collateral for bank lending (CFU, 1990). The leading banks in Zimbabwe have themselves occasionally warned the government that an expropriative land policy would undermine not only their capital base, but basic human rights.

In the light of this, most structuralists find it enigmatic that, in April 1992, the government and parliament passed a bill giving the legal power and instruments for forceful acquisition of LSCF land at prices determined by government land valuers. This contradicted the perceived conservative attitude of the Government towards land acquisition. Thus, most observers saw the government action as political posturing, which could only be directed at the black elite.

A problematic strand of the macro-economic debate in Zimbabwe focuses analysis on the behaviour of the state, which is perceived as an organic hegemonic entity responding to formalised public pressure from visible agrarian lobbies. Various authors (Bratton, 1989 and 1990; Stoneman, 1988; Moyo S, 1992; Drinkwater, 1991) have criticised state behaviour from right and left-wing viewpoints for its lack of rationality, its collaboration with international capital, its hegemonic aspirations, its abandonment of the worker-peasant alliance behind it, for its responsiveness to large farmer lobby and for its conservatism in inheriting colonial planning practices. Essentially, this literature implies a voluntaristic behaviour by a state which has lost interest in the peasantry or which has a pragmatic world

view. The theoretical and empirical adequacy of this view has not been critically examined, especially in terms of the precise nature of the state itself, and the forms and processes of decision-making in respect of the nature and influence of agrarian interest groups.

Many scholars (Herbst, 1990; Skalness, 1989; and Bratton, 1989) have pursued their analysis of state behaviour from the "rational choice" perspective and the "interest groups" liberal institutional analysis and New Political Economy frameworks focusing on the policy demand perspective. Whereas much of Africa's agricultural policy has been criticised for its structural weaknesses, the interest group theorists explain the presumed policy weaknesses in terms of inadequate farm interest organisation and ineffective lobby. The above-cited authors find Zimbabwe to be unique, because of its well established Commercial Farmer's Union (CFU), which they consider to have effectively persuaded the government against land reform (Bratton, 1989 and Skalness, 1989). While Bratton (1985) tends towards the view that small farmers are also effectively organised, others (Moyo and Skalness, 1990) suggest that the peasants are weakly organised, and perhaps their representatives are more inclined to lobby for the interests of the upper peasantry or kulaks. On the surface of it, one may conclude that the constituency for land reform is weak and that the state is not obliged to act on it, especially if policy influence is examined in terms of formal lobby and organisational procedures, which meet accepted norms of legality.

However, the most significant attempt at land distribution occurred during 1981 and 1983, when peasant squatting was at its highest, particularly in Manicaland, resulting in an official policy of "Accelerated Resettlement". Thereafter, the state decided to force squatters off LSCF and state lands, having decided to play its traditional security role of protecting private property rights.

Peasant action has not effectively responded to state eviction practices, in spite of the reoccurrence of poaching. Whether the weak peasant response can be explained by organisational weakness, poor strategy and tactics, or passiveness is an issue which is also inadequately treated in the literature. Recent studies have begun to describe some forms of peasant agency, although the political economic framework of these studies seems unstructured. The research problem here demands a theory of peasant agency in respect of local governance issues and the socio-political linkages found in the micro and macro behaviour of the state and society. Most significantly, the New Political Economy perspectives on state responsiveness to the demand for policy change are extremely weak in conceptualising the repression of policy demands which are not articulated through formal western style advocacy procedures.

A particular weakness of the literature on the state and agrarian reform is the lack of understanding of the macro political significance of land as a symbol of sovereignty for a state founded on a liberation struggle over land dispossession. The desire of the Government to control land and other property, and to regulate or control multiple land claims so as to minimise the risk of anarchy, tends to be viewed as congruent to the settler colonial ideology and policy. Proponents of this view of state agrarian conservatism and of the state's alienation from peasant property and its preoccupation with "statist" solutions, seem to hold a populist perspective of state land management behaviour. More in-depth analysis of the role of the state in agrarian change is required. In particular, insights on the real political and economic interests of the state's administration and political organs are needed (Moyo, 1989). Again this research problem reflects the tendency of the literature to be focused on the macro-economic concerns in its analysis of the rationale for land reform and advocacy for land reform.

Another relevant emerging school of thought, based on household level social surveys, has in the last few years begun to identify the deepening poverty in Zimbabwe's Communal Areas as a moral basis for agrarian reform. This literature, working upon a historically shallow empirical data base vis-a-vis Zimbabwe's peasantry in Communal Areas, is pre-occupied with the empirical description of the peasant agrarian system. Numerous such baseline surveys, including some by this author, have tended to be weak in articulating the pressure for agrarian change on a national scale and within local communities such as at the district or ward level.

Whereas social differentiation within Communal Areas has been noted (Moyo, 1986), the focus of scholars has been to define the physical and group character of differentiation, rather than to articulate its underlying social processes and to identify its impact on land reform or influence on agrarian policy. A major gap here has been the failure to link material shortages in Communal Area land, subsistence resources and incomes to household social reproduction and environmental degradation, as a set of social processes which drive demands for land reform.

The Zimbabwean literature on rural politics, social anthropology, local environmental practices and natural resources management, has attempted to understand local agency with reference to such broad issues as demands over land, nationalism and democracy. Because of this literature's weak appraisal of the agricultural production base and processes of social reproduction, its tendency has been to divorce local action for change from local reality. This literature broadly concludes that the Zimbabwean peasantry is passive and lacking a political consciousness, despite the fact that the peasantry has positive survival

strategies and local resource management skills.

The local social response to agrarian changes and pressures brought to bear on the political elite, tend to be neglected by most researchers for various reasons. First, the literature tends to base its explanations for the current slow process of land reform on the assumption that present policy-makers and politicians have simply adopted wholesale the technical and planning conventions and objectives of the pre-independence era. A co-optation thesis is used conveniently to explain the lack of progress, in place of a deeper analysis of both the nature of agrarian change and socio-political pressure on the ruling elite.

Second, the approach towards analysis of local demands has tended to focus on the formal organisation of both local communities, through for example NGOs, and on the formal agendas of state sanctioned local governance structures, such as WARD Committees, Party Branches and Development Groups. This approach has tended to neglect detailed analysis of responses to socio-economic hardships through emerging patterns of resource use and non-formal socio-political pressure arising in communities with restricted land-based resources. These processes can best be understood from detailed site level studies which go beyond the household survey and formal organisation.

Third, the literature has been preoccupied with a technical critique of present formal and legal planning approaches which have an inherited focus on land use reorganisation, natural resource conservation and promoting cash-crop development, rather than on the assessment of the influence of local social reproduction imperatives on the emergent planning practice. The literature thus abounds with examples of the failure of the Government of Zimbabwe to implement various rural development schemes such as villagisation, afforestation, grazing schemes and cooperatives but neglects the study of local land and natural resource demands or requirements. This limits the analysis to an identification of the inappropriateness of policy and planning instead of the concurrent analysis of the "models of best practice" adopted by local planners in the context of local survival requirements.

Moreover, the literature has a restrictive analytical viewpoint regarding local perspectives on the meaning, uses and requirements of land reform. The tendency has been to perceive only the cropping and cattle grazing requirements of land and associated natural resources, rather than to combine these land uses with the broader social and physical reproduction requirements of communities (Moyo et al, 1993). Indeed, numerous locally based single resource studies have been undertaken in the past: household energy supply gaps, tree-growing (Beijer Institute Studies, 1985; Haney, 1984; de Toit, 1985; Campbell, 1993),

water supplies (Moyo, 1989) and grazing land. These studies were conducted in isolation through farm-survey studies by the University of Zimbabwe's Faculty of Agriculture on cash-cropping, marketing and alternative drought-tolerant cropping, and on the agricultural resource base of Communal Area households (Moyo et al, 1990).

The tendency of this literature has been to analyze the demand side problems of rural households by segmenting their land uses and land and natural resource requirements into particularities of need, rather than to integrate analysis of their resource consumption behaviour and reproduction. Hence the analysis of household demands for land and natural resources in general has tended to be omitted in assessing policy and planning directions.

Present directions in Zimbabwe's reform of land relations are affected not only by local demands for land among the peasantry, but also by a convergence of interest in access to private freehold land among Zimbabwe's black elite. This includes a growing "kulak" or "emergent small farmer" class, as well as the black middle-classes and small business people with interests in rural, agricultural, commercial and other enterprises. These social forces requirements compete with the land demands of the poor households, in a manner which compounds the policy formulation process for land reform. This process is assessed further below.

Agrarian Differentiation, Social Reproduction and Environmental Degradation in Communal Areas

Current national policy debate on land reform, agricultural and rural development treats Communal Areas as socially and regionally homogenous entities, inspite of the mounting evidence on rural differentiation. For instance, the ruling ZANU PF party prides itself in having delivered opportunities for rural development to the Communal Areas in general, since 1980, through social services, appropriate agricultural policy and services and associated rural development schemes, with little attention paid to the differential access to these benefits. The ZANU PF president and the party indeed relied on popular rural votes for winning three successive elections, claiming that it is the rural economic interests, rather than urban pressure for economic policy change, that shape the dominant policy outlook. The adoption of enabling legislation for land reform including the 1990 constitutional amendments to the bill of rights in respect of land expropriation and the promulgation of the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 have been cited as key concessions to the peasantry in general.

The Government argued for land reform on the basis of absentee and foreign land ownership, the high cost of land purchases, and the need to restrict land ownership to Zimbabweans. State intervention in the land markets, through land acquisition and controlled land prices, was however justified on grounds of ensuring that both small and "emergent" large black farmers with proven farming skills gain access to land as if rural differentiation was not problematic, at the level of economic strategy and politics.

The new land policy was thus intended to guarantee local access to land for the improvement of small farmers and aspiring black capitalists. It was seen as necessary to avert land pressure and environmental degradation in Communal Areas, to alleviate growing unemployment in rural areas and to broaden economic participation among blacks (Mangwende, 1990). Critically, however, unlike the previous policy stance on land reform, landlessness or poverty are not key policy targets for accessing land since only those farmers with proven skills and capacity to use the land effectively would be chosen. This contradicts the political emphasis placed by ZANU PF on meeting the needs of the rural poor in Communal Areas.

Presumably the broader ESAP induced agricultural policy reforms are expected to meet the needs of the rural poor against which only the frequent droughts (four in twelve years) are considered to be critical threats. Apparently the Government believes that fulfilling the land-owning aspirations of the rural elite is a necessary response to the widening rural social differentiation and that such a strategy could produce a trickle down effect via employment and existing kinship income distribution systems, which would benefit the rural poor. In addition, the Government estimates that the peasantry as a whole will benefit from better income distribution following improved agricultural commodity pricing, resulting from its Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP).

Thus the macro-economic development strategy surrounding land reform is to improve the living standards of the majority of the poor through wider economic reform towards market-oriented economy and the narrowing down of the beneficiaries of land reform to a small class of better-off black farmers, rather than emphasizing income re-distribution at the level of broadening the scale of producers through widespread land redistribution.

Furthermore, both ESAP policies and the literature on rural differentiation have yet to clarify the nature of linkages between the emerging uneven rural social structure and

differentiation process on the one hand, and household, community and environmental reproduction on the other hand, in relation to the diminishing land resources upon which the peasantry depends. However, if we are to assess the efficacy of structural adjustment and elitist land distribution policies, in meeting the macro objectives of improving standards of living and output, there is need to address the nature and impacts of agrarian and social differentiation in Zimbabwe's Communal Lands, on social reproduction and environmental degradation therein.

Peasant reproduction strategies within Communal Areas, it is contended, influence both the nature and extent of land reform required in Zimbabwe and the effectiveness of ESAP in the agricultural and social sectors. The state thus plays a mediatory role over land reform demands within its formal economic reform policy framework, in relation to local demands for land and state support within the context of a diminishing capacity of rural households and communities to reproduce themselves and their surrounding nature. Local demands are however influenced by the nature of social differentiation which we examine next.

Some studies on Zimbabwean rural development have established the existence of rural social and regional differentiation in the Communal Areas. These emphasize that surplus crop production and marketing in Communal Areas over the independence era tended to benefit less than 25 per cent of Zimbabwe's peasantry, particularly those in the highveld provinces of Mashonaland and Midlands. Thus out of the over 900,000 households in Communal Areas, less than 250,000 families realised income gains from post-independence agrarian policy (extension, credit, marketing), while less than 60,000 households gained from land distribution (Moyo, 1992). In broad terms therefore, agricultural economic policy has proceeded in spite of the rural differentiation process.

These studies have been able to explain on a partial basis that rural differentiation thrives on unequal control and access to resources in Communal Areas. Some studies emphasize land access (Moyo et al, 1990), others stress livestock ownership and incomes from remittances and non-farm enterprise (Cousins, Jackson) in various years. Access to farm energy, draught power and variable inputs (Moyo et al, 1991), access to extension services (Mutuma et al, 1990), woodfuel security, access to agricultural markets and services, and access to credit (Moyo, 1987) have also been noted as influential factors in social differentiation.

Another key aspect of rural differentiation is found in household engagement in non-farm enterprises. Recent studies of small scale enterprises suggest that there are over 400,000 non-farm enterprises in Communal Areas, performing one or other beneficiation-type manufacturing and trade, suggesting that close to 40 per cent of Communal Area

households depend on non-farm incomes (excluding urban remittances) for their social reproduction. Much of this non-farm production has been found to be based on agro-processing and the processing and sale of natural resources (Helmsing, 1987; Mhone, 1992).

By far the most frequently identified factors in Communal Area social differentiation are land access and cattle, even though more recent work identifies asset accumulation and social skills as critical (Moyo et al, 1990). Access to other factors of production which explain differentiation but have received less attention, include location and land quality (Moyo et al, 1990), access to water and woodfuel, and technology transfer.

However, the literature on rural differentiation lacks an integrated treatment of household and community reproduction and the impact and dependence of their reproduction strategies on land and environmental quality. The latter in turn has tended to depend on potential access to adjacent non-Communal Area land and natural resources, opportunities for resettlement or illegal squatting and improved access to water (Moyo, 1992).

Most crucially, the literature reveals gaps in the understanding of the causes of rural social differentiation, the resultant variations in reproduction strategies and the precise nature of intra-community institutional and social contradictions consequent upon growing differentiation. The nature of local mediation within a differentiating social structure and the local processes of political pressure have thus tended to be glossed over. Instead a general critique of formal legal and institutional constraints to local development and resource management have been characteristic (ZERO, 1992). The micro-economic empirical work pursued in this book attempts to integrate the process of social differentiation in its broad sense, with the analysis of social reproduction problems and demands for land in the context of a degrading environment.

Land Reform, Environmental Pressure and Governance

Although environmental pressure and degradation are central to the need for land reform, many Zimbabweans writers have cited resource conservation and poor peasant land husbandry as a valid rationale for slow land redistribution, and for changing land tenure systems in Communal Areas towards freehold control. This perspective raises further questions on the relevance of local governance systems in the control of natural resources, although interest in the latter has been focused on symptoms of the environmental crisis in Communal Areas.

Much of the literature on environmental degradation has either focused on measuring the quantities of soil erosion (Dankwerts, 1987) and the time-frame of deforestation, or commented on the quality of specific natural resource management practices in Communal Areas (Scoones, 1988; Campbell et al, 1993). Research has tended to neglect the broader livelihood and survival strategies developed by peasant households within their environment. In this latter vein, without greater land distribution, technology transfer and investment in water development in Communal Areas, the reproduction of nature in these areas remains threatened. Incentives for alternative rural production activities to the extensive land and natural resources degrading requirements of Communal Area Agriculture are thus critical for sustainable development.

Some studies, including Bradley (1992) Moyo (1992) have pointed to the increasing "poaching" in the use of land and various natural resources outside Communal Areas as the prevailing means for rural survival inside "besieged" Communal Areas (Moyo and Katerere, 1987). Models for "resource sharing" and placing natural resource management in the hands of Communal farmers are all indicative of academic and policy interest in environmentally sound, albeit idealistic alternatives which can enhance social reproduction in Communal Areas.

Specific policy interventions such as rural afforestation, tree planting, grazing schemes and erosion management (streambank cultivation, dambo cultivation control and river basin management) have been promoted by the government, NGOs and external donors to halt the growing environmental damage in Communal Areas. These schemes have tended, like their prevalent wildlife conservation counterpart schemes, to be focused more on physical protection and reconstruction than on household or community centred sustainability. Lacking economic incentives, environmental projects have received little popular support (Moyo, 1990) due to their neglect of the material socio-economic needs of the peasantry. The core problem of defining the necessary material basis for household and community reproduction on a sustainable basis has received little treatment in the research on land reform, social differentiation and environmental degradation.

As the international perspectives on environmental sustainability reviewed earlier suggest, there is need to investigate local governance systems, and to develop a clear vision of how their physical and technical attributes are mediated within communities, as these have a determining role for sustainability (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987). In the Zimbabwean context, historians, anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists have researched local natural resource systems, with a focus on the physical and technical attributes to the neglect of the wider governance and economic systems which influence resource management.

(Campbell, 1992). Equally, local institutional and socio-cultural structures have tended to be ossified by social scientists around concepts which presume communal, traditional and household types of relations, and which perceive the typical traditional and formal NGO organisational framework as the main operative processes. This calls for in-depth analysis of the institutional framework of local systems, in order to identify the complexities of the variety of hierarchical and vertical organisational frameworks which impinge upon household reproduction. In practice this entails examining critically the role of central and local Governments, sectoral representatives of Governments, various NGOs, various Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and various institutional forces in natural resource management at the site-level, in order to understand the evolution of local governance rules and procedures.

This is important, for there is a need to distinguish not only the multiplicity of decision-making levels in a given system, but also to distinguish between the ways in which decisions are made and the way in which operational rules are implemented in managing resources at both site and household levels (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987). In the Zimbabwean situation, the roles of peasant households in resource management therefore need to be understood in relation to institutional processes which go beyond kinship levels, to the ward and district levels, and the ways in which these relate to central and macro-level processes of policy making and institutional control.

Some of these political processes have been addressed somewhat inadequately by the Zimbabwean studies on the liberation war and resistance to rural controls. Kriger for instance, found that the peasants' world-view in Mtoko District emphasized internal political and structural conflicts as the key development problems. Thus, wider scale grievances such as those over land alienation and colonial oppression, tended to be subsumed by immediate fears of ZANU PF - which for Kriger seems to constitute the crucial external factor (ibid)! Yet, the involvement of peasants in the guerilla war and their motivations to participate are presented in an unstructured manner. Her local study of Mtoko does not adequately assess the institutions, resources and socio-political structures of the peasant communities consulted, such that local history, the basis of internal differentiation, and the struggle for household reproduction are given casual treatment.

Overarching interest by the resistance literature in the formal role of peasants in grand events such as the guerrilla war has led to the neglect of the role of peasants in influencing land policy. The complex processes of peasant agency around local land shortages, which in aggregate have a national significance, has thus been under-researched. The methodological challenge then is to understand how local identities, grievances and

struggles for reproduction and growth interact with wider national struggles and identities. Although Kriger's and others' research has led to interesting findings on the existence in Communal Areas of multiple identities or interests at the local level, they seem to contradict commonly held local perspectives on how the colonial experience coalesced multiple identities into common struggles and unity, locally and nationally. Nationalism, evolving around land alienation and local political controls during colonial and later periods, remains a central issue around which local unity in struggle seems to have been achieved.

But the problem with research on nationalism is that it is vaguely understood by most scholars to be an external construct which local communities do not hold. This is because notions of "country" or "nation-state" have been understood to be secondary to atavistic or cultural nationalism which characterise peasant ideology and without which peasant agency cannot emerge (Ranger 1985). Again, there is an implicit rejection of national common cause among diverse communities or districts, unless this can be traced through blood, totem and spiritual genealogy, through which natural unity, once established, justifies national unity, nationalism and the nation-state. Otherwise peasants are considered to be anti-state by definition and anarchic in a wider national context, because they want no external controls from the post-independence state (Kriger, 1992).

Research interest in "local control" has also been growing in various Zimbabwean studies of natural resources management, indigenous technical knowledge and on land tenure. This is particularly the case in the debates on autonomous private property regimes in situations where either common property or state property regimes are deemed to decrease resource use efficiencies. The critique of statist controls of natural resources and land has also generated recent interest, during Zimbabwe's monetarist and privatisation period of the 1990s, where decentralised pluralist local governance systems are believed to be stimulated by local and freehold property regimes. But such analyses are based on scanty empirical data on the role of local institutions, politics and socio-political change in determining property relations, although some of the studies have examined how traditional or lineage power systems regulated land and other resource use in the past.

The general peasant resistance literature tends to simplify the relationship between the state and local organisation into a simple oppositional or bi-polar mode of interaction, where the presumed dominant structure (the state) dictates the content and direction of developments, including that of land and natural resources use. Hence the perpetuation of commonly held notions that state and local institutions are disconnected entities which co-exist only or mostly in direct conflict. These research problems arise from the weak empirical treatment of local rural institutional arrangements and their influence on national

policy and legislation. Thus, little analysis of the organisational forms, objectives and capacities of state, traditional and "modern" institutions at the local level has so far been carried out. Therefore, Zimbabwean understanding of local agency on issues such as land reform is limited by its weak understanding of the development of rural civil society. Theories and methodologies which reflect on the nature of state and local institutional mediation, based on empirical conceptualisations of African rural power relations, emerging social structures and economic differentiation within the peasantry, are glaringly absent from contemporary rural research; even that which focuses on the local level.

Thus, two research themes are of particular relevance to this study of the land question and household agency: socio-political power systems and household reproduction, including tendencies towards social differentiation in the material conditions of households. While both state and traditional systems of power, mainly lineage leaders and spirit mediums, have been studied, little work has been done on emerging post-independence rural social-political systems.

Interestingly, this research gap has been compounded by the tendency in many local studies to deduce "internal" social forces from the indirect study of ossified traditional power structures and epiphenomenal symptoms of local conflict in rural areas. For instance, local power has mostly been examined indirectly through rigidly defined structures and symptoms of social differentiation among rural households (Cousins, et. al. 1992), rather than through direct observation of rural economic processes and land bidding. Equally, the formal and legal role and status accorded to chiefs and lineage elders by the state has been taken by researchers to be the key element indicative of power structures in rural Zimbabwe.

Moreover, whereas Kriger (Ibid) laments the absence of studies on the local grievances of rural people, particularly regarding unfair or oppressive local internal structures, her research provides scanty descriptions of village power systems and social differentiation. Other studies on social differentiation, however, tend to painstakingly examine household ownership of land, cattle, agricultural surplus production and marketing channels and household labour hiring practises in attempts to establish rural class profiles as their research goal. Focusing on material or capital accumulation and prospects for expanded household reproduction and surplus value realisation, these studies conclude that, while there are signs of social differentiation emerging in Communal Areas, there is no clear cut rural class structure evident. This literature wrongly suggests that internal power structures based on material accumulation are not well developed, as the empirical evidence later shows.

Yet most studies of traditional and spiritual power systems within Communal Areas suggest that spirit mediums and lineage headships, derived through "ascriptive", hereditary and "appointed" mechanisms (Lan, Ibid), are the key internal structures which hold sway on local land and resource controls, in spite of their demotion by the Government. Indeed ZANU-PF are considered to have successfully coopted these power structures in the war of the 1970's, while the state's ability to retain legitimacy and to sustain state power in Communal Areas is suggested to depend on continued support by these mediums (Lan 1985). But rapid social and economic changes in Communal Areas, as discussed earlier, suggest that the local power systems, mechanisms of power building, and the nature and direction of their interests are also rapidly changing, alongside legislative and state policy changes.

Yet studies of local natural resources management and of local traditional systems' for instance, Nhira and Fortman 1993), however, seem to have faith in traditional local power structures. They seem to believe that the control by such authorities of land, its allocation, guaranteeing its fertility and rain-making for agricultural production and, the local control of natural resources are feasible, albeit decaying arenas of village or Communal Area power relations. Thus spirit mediums, masvikiro, and lineage heads are identified as leaders of central internal power structures around which struggles with the colonial state for control over land and natural resources hovered. Spiritual, mythical and ritual processes are thus considered to be key influences on household land access and land use decisions and practises. Yet, spiritual and cultural atavism aside, changes in demography, natural resource quality, land availability and the basic requirements for household reproduction are strong indicators of the shifting basis of rural power, given that material considerations are central to the maintenance and stability of local powers and governance systems.

Similarly, over the last 15 years, various changes in the Zimbabwean states' policy interests and objectives regarding land, agriculture and rural development in general have triggered changing land use incentives, thus introducing a more complex relationship between state, local power systems and rural households. New sets of organisations representing state, NGO and rural households' interests in land, seem to have generated changing socio-political and institutional processes, mostly organised around the control of the use of these resources. Yet past rural research based at the local level, especially surveys carried out before 1987, do not exhibit an empirical grasp of the complex institutional setting within which local demands for land arise in Communal Areas. Nor do they capture the new and emerging power blocks of rural civil society, and the associated negotiations for resources and land control evolving among rural peasant households.

But the counter-posing of "modern" and "traditional" institutions and associated power struggles are common conceptual differences found in the modernisation and development literature. The problem is that many studies with a rural institutional focus have tended to idealise local traditional power and knowledge systems, such that preserving their identity is considered to be necessary for political stability (see for instance Lan, Ibid). Yet other researchers seem to idealise those progressive struggles by the youth and women aiming to smash traditional power systems, particularly patriarchy, (Kriger, Ibid). As happened with the modes of production theories, de-constructing abstracted institutional constructs can lead to the tautology that local is better than central by definition.

Thus, there is ample space to examine the wide array of institutional developments in between these two extremes of internal or local and central or external party/state structures. Moreover, the vision of a monolithic state, identified in Zimbabwe around such institutions as Agritex and the District Administration needs to be retested. For such a perspective may miss the heterogeneous character of the states' role, including its' negotiated involvement in local administration, local power issues, and in critical matters surrounding land. Rigid analyses of state power, of local fear and its influence on local processes, may be missing the more subtle mediation processes adopted by the state and by local leaders. For instance, what cooptation mechanisms are used by the state at the local level, to integrate 'traditional' and other power systems? Or, what is the role that NGOs and other community based organisations play in coopting rural households into new systems of landuse, power and negotiation? These issues have yet to receive research attention, with particular reference to the land question.

The role of land and its use in the programmes of most of the post-independence rural development institutional arrangements seems to be a central problem that requires greater examination. It is through the analysis of the changing economic, socio-political and institutional arrangements in Communal Areas that emerging demands for land and the changing regulation of land use can be understood. Demands for land can be expected to be articulated by socially differentiated Communal Area households through various media, including: private, individual expressions and institutional expressions in a process of local agency which combines cooperative and conflictual relations with the state.

Conclusion

Most studies concluded that there is continuity in the negative state behaviour vis-a-vis traditional institutions and social relations affecting rural household interests during the

post-independence period. However, it is only through detailed macro-level and micro-level interactive study of the land issue that this conclusion can be tested. An examination of the complex changes in the socio-political and institutional setting of Communal Areas since 1980, and how these have affected land access and use are thus central questions for this study. Continuity with significant change seems to characterise more accurately the land question at the national and local level since 1980, given that the impacts of post-independence policies on economic growth has been thinly spread.

The complexity of the research questions explored in this chapter suggests that the research framework of this work needs to take adequate account of the existing heterogeneity, variability and uncertainty of a changing society such as that of rural Zimbabwe. This emphasizes the importance of testing the following specific conclusions:

- i) that while land reform has not been fully addressed by policy in Zimbabwe, and while the literature has not fully analysed land reform, the land issue itself will not disappear.
- ii) that despite the global romanticisation of the peasantry's environmental practices, their material conditions will not improve without large scale interventions in land reform and Communal Area investment in land development.
- iii) the Zimbabwe Land and Agrarian Reform case is exceptional only in respect of its specific historical experience of settler land exclusion, its cultural specificity and the liberation struggle.
- iv) regional options for resolving the sustainability crisis, through SADC, are far removed from local problems, being based on state-level institution building. Such institutions provide an inadequate institutional framework for rural development. Essentially they exclude land reform and local organisation for this purpose.
- v) the international pressure for market-based solutions to land reform is founded on a theoretical stance which excludes people. In the Zimbabwean context, the debate contrasts the relative effectiveness of private real estate practice vis-a-vis the state as the trustee of real estate.
- vi) research needs to explore and fill the gaps in the literature on the role that people or communities play in building their own land futures.

vii) the above conclusions suggest that there is need for change in the scale of analysis on land reform development and sustainability from the international and national level to the local level and to inform upwards the premises upon which appropriate policy can evolve.

viii) based on the above, it is necessary to study the nature and process of rural differentiation in Zimbabwe with particular reference to the sustainability of rural household reproduction systems. This could open up our analysis of the broader problems of land reform.

The following chapters now address these and other issues beginning with the land policy formulation process in Zimbabwe during the 1980s.

CHAPTER THREE

ZIMBABWE'S LAND REFORM EXPERIENCE

Introduction

This chapter examines Zimbabwe's experiment with land reform since 1980. It discusses Zimbabwe's approach to land reform within a comparative context and assesses the dynamic changes in perceptions of the land problem and in the debates about land issues at the central level. It focuses on a macro-level analysis of the problem of land, national level debates on land reform, aggregate patterns of land distribution and the national level supply and demand considerations in the emerging land reform policy.

A key argument developed here is that the issue of land policy in Zimbabwe has been focused mostly on an inadequate analysis of availability of land for distribution, and an inaccurate assessment of the demand for land and related issues. This gap is reflected in the failure of policy to take into account the precise nature of land use and productivity in the LSCF, Communal Areas and Resettlement Areas. Empirical and other secondary data presented here demonstrate the economic rationality of land redistribution. This is substantiated by evidence of the underutilisation of LSCF lands and the developing productivity of small farmers, especially where their access to agricultural production resources has improved since 1980. A strong macro-economic case for land redistribution exists when various national problems, such as growing unemployment, retrenchment consequent upon the structural adjustment programme, capital and labour resource-use efficiency, and food security are taken into consideration.

The chapter also shows how land reform is essentially a political problem which the state is forced to address as nationalist pressures mount. Pressures are based on the local struggle for the equitable distribution of the national heritage and access to the normal state support to agriculture which accrues to landowners. However, the growing influence of Zimbabwe's new black bourgeoisie places greater pressure on the state to redistribute land, although this may lead to neglect of the land reform requirements of the rural poor.

Demand for land among the rural poor in Communal Lands is given brief analytic attention in this chapter in the context of the politics of land tenure, land "occupancy" or squatting and resettlement. However, the national politics of land reform reflected in the emerging land policy and some outstanding concerns of the rural poor and the public are a key issue. The changing attitude of the government to the rural poor and the LSCF, and its autonomous use of

state power to address land reform is explored in depth throughout this chapter.

Land Reform and the Zimbabwe Experience

Land reform embraces a variety of policy problems ranging through political, economic, social and environmental issues. In its most specific sense, land reform refers to:

"..... a change in the legal or customary institution of property rights and duties, which define the rights of those who own or use agricultural land. Ownership.... conceived of as a bundle of rights representing varying degrees of control over things: the right to possess, use, manage, earn an income from, lend, transfer or sell, as well as to pass these rights on to others. Land Reform seeks to alter the distribution of any or all of these rights. In this sense, it has been employed to refer both to the outright redistribution of the entire bundle of rights over land to those who cultivate the soil, as well as a single adjustment of the conditions under which a tenant, or other cultivator, gains access to the land (for example, the amount of rent in cash or kind, the security of the tenancy arrangement or land use right, or the obligation of tenants and owners to one another) (Putzel, 1992, p.3).

The term "agrarian reform" was increasingly used in place of "land reform" in policy debate among opponents of land reform in Asia from the 1960s, to shift the focus from land redistribution to land settlement and productivity programmes within existing property institutions. However, among advocates of redistributive reform, "agrarian reform" tended to canvass broader changes of rural relations in agriculture, such as the provision of credit, extension services, marketing and inputs reforms, in addition to land distribution.

The terms land and agrarian reform in Zimbabwe have meant different things to various interest groups over time. The state, which has played a significant role in defining land tenure structures and land distribution, has embarked upon a variety of land reform programmes since the 1940s. During the early 1950s, for instance, after decades of land alienation from indigenous peoples and transferring the same land to white settlers as private freehold property, the colonial state embarked upon a land tenure and husbandry reform in the 'reserves' among Zimbabwe's peasantry. The Land Husbandry Act was intended to "revolutionise African farming" by providing for "fixed" landholding rights in place of so-called communal rights, on uniform land sizes within given agro-ecological regions. The Act also sought to restrict land use rights through the control of access to land, levels of cattle stocking and land management. It was also intended to create permanent urban workers with restricted land rights in the reserves, and end labour migration.

Various Land Tenure Acts institutionalised the land ownership and distribution rights of the

state, freeholders and "tribal" peoples. The colonial state also promoted land settlement schemes for peasants into less populated Communal Areas during the 1960s and 1970s, as well as small scale capitalist leasehold and freehold farming schemes from the 1930s. All of these colonial programmes were indeed land reforms, albeit of a conservative nature and without popular support since they were implemented by and in the interest of the minority white settler regimes.

The post-colonial state also implemented a land reform programme, officially referred to as the Resettlement Programme. This programme involved the physical movement of peasants from Communal lands into formerly white farm lands acquired by the colonial state. In addition, the state provided some credit, extension services and marketing facilities to both the resettled and Communal Area peasants. Thus, while the government has never had a programme formally referred to as "Agrarian Reform" or "Land Reform", its programme would qualify in most definitions of land reform. Although land and agricultural resources reform in Zimbabwe were not structurally far reaching, the approach was nevertheless redistributive, unlike the legalistic tenancy reforms undertaken in parts of Asia, which provided full property rights to those already cultivating the soil. While these land reforms in Asia were re-distributive they did not involve the physical movement of people. It is mainly in its approach to land redistribution that Zimbabwe differs from experiences of land reform elsewhere.

Land reform has been undertaken in China, Japan, the Soviet Union and numerous other countries of Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe over the last seven decades. Putzel identifies three basic approaches to land and agrarian reform in these countries: conservative, liberal and revolutionary or radical reforms (1992, p.8). Modern land reforms are a global post-colonial product of national liberation and the socialist revolutionary struggles which escalated in the 1940s. But differences in the types of revolutionary movements and independence struggles, including varying ideologies, degrees of state power and control over the defeated classes, led to the emergence of different forms of land reform.

Conservative reforms are undertaken through market-based principles and procedures of land transfer and access, with limited state intervention in support of land and agricultural resources supply and demand. They involve little change in the social relations of agricultural production,

given that agrarian power structures remain largely unchanged. Revolutionary approaches involved the overhauling of existing agrarian power structures and relations of production, with comprehensive redistribution of land and agricultural resources being undertaken. Land transfers are undertaken compulsorily without compensation, and the new state, representing the interests of the would-be beneficiaries of land reform, tended to be heavily involved in creating new agrarian structures and policies. The Liberal approach to land reform combines market principles of land acquisition with varying degrees of state intervention, leading to the partial compensation of landowners.

Both the revolutionary and liberal approaches challenge the private property rights of landowners to land and natural resources, and consider land redistribution to be central to rural change. But the liberal approach is based on the belief that monopoly power, in most newly independent nations, reflected in the concentration of control over land and agricultural resources, prevents the free operation of markets in land, labour, agricultural inputs and produce. Land redistribution is considered necessary since monopoly power is:

"... an important source of poverty and allocative inefficiency in the rural sector. Landowners have easy access to credit, since they possess land collateral or have political connections to both banks and Government, so they engage in capital investments such as labour-saving mechanization. Land redistribution is considered necessary... to top the greater efficiency of small-owner cultivators in a labour abundant and capital-scarce economy, and to alleviate poverty" (Ibid, p.11).

Liberal reforms, however, are intended to strengthen the institution of private property in most spheres, even though land is treated as a special case subject to particular restrictions, since it is a finite natural endowment. Liberal reforms have promoted compensation for compulsorily acquired land, but at rates as low as 50% of the market value in order to ensure the fiscal viability of the reforms. This succeeded as long as landowners were not treated disparagingly.

Zimbabwe's land reform experience traverses the three approaches to land reform with minor variations related to the actual achievements and the clarity of its objectives in land policy. During the liberation war, prior to 1980, the liberation movement had a revolutionary approach, which encouraged sporadic and scattered attempts at land occupation by peasants, promising no compensation to landowners. Chief Rekai Tangwena and other groups of peasants pursued this approach through so-called "squatting" and the "illegal" grazing of cattle on lands belonging to the LSCF sector. The continued poaching of wood, fruits, water and other land resources in

independent Zimbabwe is predicated on this revolutionary approach, whereby peasants pursue the land redistribution agenda in spite of the state's land reform policy. The attempt by the liberation movements to gain "liberated zones", which had begun to bear some fruit in the late 1970s, was part of Zimbabwe's short-lived experience with revolutionary land reform.

Squatting still occurs, except that the post-independence government made it illegal because of its constitutional compromise which guaranteed protection for rural private property. Indeed, up to 1983, LSCF lands occupied by squatters were at best purchased by the state, especially where the owners had abandoned their lands or were unwilling to sell to the Resettlement Programme. At worst, the state forcefully removed "squatters" from such lands. The state refused to address direct community land claims as a matter of policy, although not always in practice, preferring to address those land needs identified through the settler selection procedure of the Resettlement Programme.

Thus, Zimbabwe experienced a conservative land reform approach between 1980 and 1989, and has been moving towards a liberal approach since 1990. This issue will be discussed in detail in the final chapter. The first period was conservative because of the government's commitment to acquire land on a basis of "willing-seller-willing-buyer" involving a market compensation approach, adjudicated by independent courts. However, the state intervened in the land access side of the land transfer process, by providing land to settlers and retaining ownership of such lands. The reform approach was also conservative because it extended the Government's landowning and land control traditions outside the LSCFs.

The second phase of the land reform experience, which involves compulsory land acquisition and a state-determined land pricing mechanism for the compensation of acquired lands, and which intends to provide both black capitalist and small farmers with land, can be considered to be a liberal approach to land reform. During both phases of land reform, however, the attempt to change the LSCF monopoly over agricultural inputs, marketing, credit and agro-processing resources, has not been significant, although the state attempted to increase peasant access to these resources. The changing approach to land reform in Zimbabwe reflects the changing perceptions of the land problem, its dynamic politics and the move towards an emerging liberal, but extensive, land reform programme.

Changing Perceptions of Zimbabwe's Land Problem

Perceptions of Zimbabwe's land problem have varied largely in relation to the changing consensus on the rationality of land re-distribution or land supply viz-a-vis the demand for land. Such perceptions have ranged from political and egalitarian moral objectives of land redistribution, technical objectives of land use optimisation, to economic objectives to improve agricultural resource use efficiency and macro-economic objectives of improving the national development strategy through an appropriate and efficient agricultural production and output structure (Moyo and Skalness, 1990). The Zimbabwe land debates in turn emphasize different objectives for land reform, depending on the perspectives of their authors or the interest group which is served. While many perceptions of the land problem have overlapping understandings of the objectives of land reform, the tendency has been to overlook or over-simplify the issue of demand for land.

During the early 1980s, for instance, the land question tended to be defined in simple moral and political terms. According to these terms the post-colonial state had to return lost lands to the peasantry, particularly the landless and displaced poor. Land redistribution was also considered necessary to reward the rural masses who had sacrificed their livelihoods for the liberation war. Further, the peasantry had suffered neglect under the colonial regime's racist agrarian policies, which saw their fate bound to the supply of cheap labour to capitalist farms, mines and industry. The Government of Zimbabwe initially pursued land reform as part of its "socialist" transformation strategy intended to develop an economy which was experiencing a slow growth (GoZ, 1986).

But land distribution was not formally treated as an element of a comprehensive rural and agricultural transformation strategy. The Government aimed to improve peasant production while maintaining commercial farm output (GoZ, 1986). Thus, by 1983, land redistribution was justified mainly on egalitarian grounds, given that 6 700 white farmers controlled 47% of the agricultural land compared to 700,000 peasant households which held mostly marginal lands. Although 8 500 small-scale black commercial farmers held four percent of agricultural land, there was consensus among many officials and politicians that blacks had been marginalised in agriculture mainly because of the land ownership structure. Yet, by 1986, about 450 blacks had acquired large-scale commercial farm lands, although they faced problems such as lack of

management skills and indebtedness resulting in inadequate land utilisation. Subsequently, the land problem was increasingly seen as one of land use optimisation.

From the late 1980s, the increasing demand for cheaper and greater access to land by black capitalist farmers and business people changed the character of expectations, particularly among the middle classes, and the politics of land reform in Zimbabwe. Political and economic liberalisation led to a land policy shift in favour of redistributing land to "capable" farmers. By focusing public attention on the land requirements and problems of capitalist farmers, policy shifts tended to disregard the initial rationale for land redistribution: to alleviate poverty and to improve the utilisation of land in an ailing economy where the majority depend on land for their survival.

However, the problem of land in Zimbabwe today remains polarised between the two broad racial interest groups. The first grouping is made up of the majority black landless or land-poor and emerging black business interests, for whom access to land is a critical need, albeit to differing degrees of intensity. Some blacks require rural and urban land for basic residential purposes, while the majority depend on land for their basic material survival, and a few need access to land for their business and economic ventures, including agricultural and non-agricultural enterprises. In political terms, these black interests are represented through loose formal and informal alliances of different class interests in various organisations, including the ruling party, Government, opposition parties, farmers' unions, NGOs, and labour unions. Still buttressed by morally validated nationalist claims for the redress of past land alienation, these groups have presented disparate arguments for state intervention in the land markets for land redistribution.

The second interest group, largely represented by white farmers, professionals and other business interests, including some black business interests, dismisses land hunger as an excuse for a "ruinous land grabbing policy" (Latham, 1993). They argue that land redistribution is predicated on an economically irrational preference for small-scale black farmers over large scale commercial farmers, because of the political gains envisaged from this by the ruling party. State intervention in land markets is regarded by them to be economically irrational, while the designation of land for acquisition is said to undermine the confidence of commercial agriculture and the viability of farming. Compulsory land acquisition is considered to be a

breach of free enterprise principles and the human rights of white farmers, which will scare off foreign investment. Land resettlement is also regarded as environmentally damaging because of the presumed destructiveness of small farmers. The dominance of this anti-reform lobby in terms of access to the media tends to encourage an incomplete picture of Zimbabwe's land problem. The limited consultations and the lack of transparency in the government's approach in implementing its land policy and redistribution plans tends to reinforce this distorted picture of Zimbabwe's land problem. The land issue remains focussed on the structure of land tenure and on ownership, rural poverty, the resulting agricultural production disparities, and the uneven role of interest groups in land policy formulation.

The Structure of Land Control and Access

In the 1990s, the land issue remains significant because over 70% of the total population live directly off the land and because 60% of the economy's industrial activity and growth depends on agricultural performance, which is very variable because of regular cycles of droughts. Zimbabwe's land problem hinges on the inequitable access to productive agricultural lands and existing patterns of land tenure. An understanding of the broad quality of Zimbabwe's land and the history of land tenure is essential to the appreciation of both land grievances and the agricultural problems arising from the concentration of prime arable lands among a few large-scale commercial farmers.

Zimbabwe is divided into five natural regions on the basis of soil type, rainfall and other climatic factors (see Map 1). The types and value of farm output in Zimbabwe varies significantly among these five natural regions. Regions one and two are the intensive cropping zones, while four and five are suitable for live-stocking (Box 3.1). While natural regions form the basis of Government land use planning, available official data on land use patterns by natural region are inadequate except for the large-scale commercial sector.

The historical process of land alienation which led to present patterns of land tenure is well documented (Moyo, S. 1987). Land alienation was mainly carried out over a 55 year period, between 1910 and 1965. In 1911, the Communal Areas held only approximately 22% of Zimbabwe's land, while the British South Africa Company held 50% of the land (under some variant of "state" property), and private white individuals held 20% of the land. By 1931, whites held 50% of the land under freehold, while the state held approximately 23% of the land, small-scale commercial (black) farm areas held 5% and the Communal Areas held 22% of the

land. By 1965, however, the Communal Areas had increased their holdings to approximately 40% of the land, Purchase Areas (black small-scale commercial farm areas) held below 3% and the state held approximately 15%, while the large private farmers held 45% of the land. Through resettlement, the distribution of land and tenure changed during the 1980s, although to this day most of Zimbabwe's high quality land remains in LSCF or state hands.

BOX 3.1: ZIMBABWE'S AGRO-ECOLOGICAL ZONES

Region I: This is a specialised and diversified Farming Region of about 700,000 ha. Rainfall is relatively high with more than 1,000mm per annum of precipitation in low lying areas with an altitude of lower than 1,700mm and more than 900mm per annum at greater altitudes: Precipitation is received in all months of the year. Relatively low temperatures and high rainfall enable forestation, fruit and intensive livestock production. In frost-free areas plantation crops such as tea, coffee and macadamia nuts are possible.

Region II: This region is characterised by Intensive Farming. Rainfall is moderately high (750-1,000 mm), but is confined to the summer months. Two sub-regions have been defined within this region. Sub-region IIA receives an average of at least 18 rainy pentads per season and is normally reliable, rarely experiencing severe dry spells in summer. The region is suitable for intensive crop or livestock farming systems. Sub-region IIB receives an average of 16-18 pentads per season, but is subject to severe dry rainy seasons. Crop yields are affected in certain years, but not frequently enough to justify shifting cropping practices away from intensive farming systems.

Region III: Semi-Intensive Farming is practised in this region (7,290,000 ha.). Precipitation is moderate (650-800mm), but its effectiveness is limited by severe mid-season dry spells and high temperatures. Conditions for growing maize, tobacco and cotton production are marginal. Livestock production, fodder crop farming and the farming of cash crops with good moisture retention are the suitable farming systems in the region.

Region IV: This is a Semi-Extensive Farming Region of about 14,780,000 ha. Rainfall is relatively low (450-600mm) and is subject to periodic seasonal droughts and severe dry spells during the rainy season. Low and uncertain rainfall make cash cropping risky except for drought-resistant crops and soils with better water retention. Farming systems are suited to livestock production with some intensification possible with drought-resistant fodder crops.

Region V: This is an Extensive Farming Region with an area of about 10,440,000 ha. Rainfall is too low and erratic for reliable production of even drought-resistant fodder and grain crops. Included in this region are areas below 900mm altitude, where the mean rainfall is below 650mm in the Zambezi Valley and below 600mm in the Sabi-Limpopo valleys. Cattle or game ranching are the best suited farming system of the region.

Source: Vincent and Thomas, 1961

Land tenure patterns in Zimbabwe thus changed frequently over 15 year cycles, from massive land dispossession of peasants to the reallocation of "new" lands to peasants by the state as population pressure and political pressure mounted. The state played a key landholding and allocation role, redistributing land between peasants, black small-scale commercial farmers and large white farmers. Lands held by the state were at times held as "unassigned" land, or reserved for forests and nature, leased out to commercial and small farmers, held as urban land, or used for state agricultural development.

The Rhodesian and Zimbabwean states have thus been the real estate agent and trustee serving the interests of various classes, with prospective white land seekers maintaining the privilege of access to land on freehold property conditions.

Indeed, the colonial state attempted to create a small class of landed black small-scale commercial farmers, under a Native Purchase Area scheme. Leases-to-buy were offered to blacks from among the "elite", but with little technical and financial support, compared to that offered the whites. This scheme had a limited agricultural impact as shown later in the Makoni District case study.

Land tenure changes also occurred through colonial resettlement schemes. Between 1930 and 1975 over 120,000 families were resettled, mainly moving from the dry southern provinces (Masvingo and Midlands and Matebeleland in the 1940s and 1950s) going to the north-western and northern provinces in the Gokwe area, Mashonaland Central and Mashonaland West. Moreover, during that period, "private" household "resettlement" into communal areas of an unknown quantity occurred in the same regions, through local chiefs allocating land to soliciting households. These tenure processes created a land transfer tradition that has received little official and academic attention over the years.

For instance, land-centred conflicts have been developing in Communal Areas, due to the increased "immigration" of "outsiders" or "foreigners" in a long-standing tradition of land tenure bidding. Here the role of the state as mediator, trustee or real estate agent, has tended to be marginal, and not recognised by chiefs, while new district councils with land administration rights in Communal Areas (since 1982) have faced resistance from local elites.

The commonplace fact that chiefs and headmen in Communal Areas receive "gifts" or money in return for some land allocations has only recently been recognised, (see Cheater 1990 and Bruce 1991), suggesting an incipient land market, although the scale, and the administrative and implementation costs of such land transfer processes have to be quantified. The existence, among black Zimbabweans in Communal Areas, of an ideology of and material quest for private landed property (Cheater, 1991) and hence land markets, thus contradicts official perspectives on Communal tenure. In spite of the dominance of the state in structuring land tenure, problems of land access have led to locally managed forms of land tenure, administration and

distribution within Communal Areas. This has led to different forms of land-centred conflicts and ideological discourses, reflected on a national scale in demands for the redistribution of state and large-scale commercial farm lands.

The evolution of Zimbabwe's land problem is also associated with the emergence, in the 1930s, of white environmentalism. Related to fears of growing soil erosion, a range of land use controls and regulations were introduced in Zimbabwe's Communal Lands. These centrally directed controls and regulations of land use, administered by white district officers and collaborating chiefs or headmen, generated political resistance, due to the increased insecurity of land tenure in Communal Areas, among other things such as labour recruitment pressures. The enforcement, first of physical bunding and other soil conservation measures such as forced tree planting heightened tensions in Communal Areas. In the 1950s, land use reorganisation under the Land Husbandry Act led to widespread insecurity of land tenure within Communal Areas, and among urban workers dependent on and expecting to retire into Communal Areas. Conservation works, crop husbandry "recommendations" and land use reorganisation, not only compelled additional labour allocations in Communal Areas, but attempted to impose restrictions on the land use rights of peasants. This process generated various changes in land tenure norms within the so-called "Communal" tenure systems, and generated national level land tenure insecurity among blacks, leading to resistance to land management programmes, and further calls for the return of alienated lands.

The liberation war, population growth and increased movements of households within Communal Areas generated new political and administrative demands for access to land security of tenure, and local control over land use. From 1980, resettlement and the promotion of Communal Area maize and cotton production and marketing were the major response of the government to rural unrest. Insecurity of tenure also emerged in large-scale commercial farms and state lands threatened by squatters and poachers from Communal Areas. However, in spite of some land transfers, the pattern of land distribution in Zimbabwe retains a racially biased character in terms of the quality of land available to whites compared to that available to blacks in agriculture.

Thirty nine million hectares of colonial Rhodesia were divided by the Land Tenure Act (1969) in equal amounts between Africans and Europeans. In the European areas, about 15.6 million hectares had been allocated for farming, with the land being owned privately by individuals or

companies (both local and transnational). After independence, land categories were redefined as the large-scale commercial farming sector (LSCF), small-scale commercial farming sector (SSCF), communal areas (CA), resettlement areas (RA) and state lands (Table 3.1). The Communal Areas, formerly the "Native Reserves" and then "tribal trust lands", today account for 16.4 million ha or 42% of land in Zimbabwe, with 74.2% of this land located in the poorest rainfall zones of Natural Regions IV and V. The Communal Area population in 1988 was 5.1 million persons and 1,020,400 households, representing a population density of about 31.1 persons per square kilometre.

The LSCF Areas, formerly the European Areas, comprising about 4,660 large commercial farms in 1993, presently occupy 11.2 million ha (29 percent of agricultural land), following the transfer of 3 million hectares to resettlement areas. These farms employed 227.6 thousand permanent and casual workers in 1988, with a population of 1,571,300 in 1982 growing at 3.0 percent per annum. Freehold title to the land in the LSCF is governed by the Roman-Dutch Law, of the Cape Colony, of 1891. The large-scale commercial farmers are represented by the Commercial Farmers' Union (CFU), which has a black and white membership, the majority being white.

The average farm size in the large scale commercial farming areas, including individual and company farms, is 2,406 hectares nationwide, while individual farms average 1,402 hectares. As much as 34.6% of this land is in Natural Regions I and II, 21.5% in III and 43.9% in Regions IV and V (Table 3.2). Whereas private individual farms account for 59% of the total number of large-scale commercial farms, they hold only 34% of that land. Thirty eight percent are large company firms, accounting for over 61% of the large-scale commercial farm land (Table 3.2). The state owns up to 2% of the large-scale commercial farms, which are leased out to white farmers and a growing number of blacks.

The Small-Scale Commercial Farming Area (SSCF), holds an area of 1,238,700 hectares located mainly in natural regions III (35.4%) and IV (38.2%), comprising 8,653 allocated farms on an area of 1,074,767 hectares, with an average farm size of 124.2 hectares. Of this total, 564,800 hectares were allocated under agreements of lease and purchase, and 484,000 thousand hectares were deeds of grant and transfers. This leaves 379,800 hectares, of which 177,400 hectares were transferred for resettlement by 1985, leaving around 202,400 hectares vacant or unallocated.

TABLE 3.1: OWNERSHIP OF LAND IN THE LARGE-SCALE COMMERCIAL SECTOR

TYPE OF OWNERSHIP	NUMBER OF FARMS	TOTAL AREA	AVERAGE FARM SIZE
Individual Ownership	2,739	3,841,050	1,402
Company	1,784	6,842,259	3,835
Central Government	33	54,513	1,652
Local Government	4	14,304	3,576
Parstatal	18	353,006	19,611
Cooperatives	10	10,422	1,042
Other	72	97,832	1,359
TOTAL	4,600	11,213,386	2,406

Source: Central Statistical Office: 1981]

Resettlement Areas are those agricultural lands acquired through the Land Resettlement Programme initiated in 1980. The Government's initial goal was to resettle approximately 17,500 families on about 1.2 million hectares of large-scale commercial farm land over a five-year period. In 1982, the targeted number of settlers was raised to 162,000 families on 10 million hectares of land. By 1993, Resettlement Areas held 3 million hectares, occupied by 58,000 households, with over 200,000 hectares vacant and another 200,000 hectares undergoing acquisition.

TABLE 3.2: LAND DISTRIBUTION BY FARM SECTOR AND NATURAL REGION, 1988

('000 ha)

Natural Region	Communal ^a		Large-Scale ^b		Small-Scale ^c		Resettlement ^d		Parks and ^f								Total Area ^h	
			Commercial		Commercial				State Farms ^e		Wildlife Areas		Other ^g					
	Areas		Farms		Farms		Areas		State Farms ^e		Wildlife Areas		Other ^g					
	(ha)	(%)	(ha)	(%)	(ha)	(%)	(ha)	(%)	(ha)	(%)	(ha)	(%)	(ha)	(%)	(ha)	(%)		
I	135,0	0,8	202,2	1,8	7,3	0,6	30,0	0,9	10,0	2,0	50,1	1,0	265,4	17,8	700,0	1,8		
II	1 270,0	7,8	3 687,0	32,8	222,2	17,9	590,0	17,9	10,0	2,0	25,0	0,5	55,8	3,7	5 860,0	15,0		
III	2 820,0	17,2	2 405,4	21,5	438,3	35,4	1240,0	37,8	160,0	32,0	545,9	11,0	-319,6	-21,4	7 290,0	18,7		
IV	7 340,0	44,9	2 429,1	21,7	473,3	38,2	810,0	24,6	60,0	12,0	2514,1	50,3	1153,5	77,2	14 780,0	37,8		
V	4 790,0	29,3	2 489,7	22,2	97,6	7,9	620,0	18,8	260,0	52,0	1843,0	37,2	339,7	22,7	10 440,0	26,7		
TOTAL	16 355,0		11 213,4		1 238,7		3 290,0		500,0		4978,1		1494,8		39 070,0			

a. Adapted from Chavunduka (1982) and Statistical Yearbook (1987).

b. CSO data as of September 30, 1988; excludes 198,082 ha of farms that are inactive.

c. Based on data by natural regions in Weiner et al. (1985, p.259) less areas acquired for resettlement-Vuti (29,856 ha, NR II), Chenjiri (56,871 ha, NR III), Copper Queen (40,958 ha in NR III and 48,342 ha in NR IV), and Mshawasha (1,381 ha, NR IV). The total areas includes approximately 230,000 ha not yet settled (MLARR).

d. 2,743,3 ha acquired for resettlement from 1979/80 to 1988/89 plus 543,7 from former state land (MLARR).

e. ADA estates held 498,535 ha in 1988/89 (ADA Planning Unit).

f. Adapted from Chavunduka (1982) and Annex C.

g. Difference between sum of land across tenure categories and total land area.

h. From 1987 Statistical Yearbook (p. 141).

i. Percentages are of column totals.

Between 1980 and 1993, four Resettlement Model Schemes were planned for and implemented. These models were established as follows:

Model "A"

This model provides for a nucleus village settlement bounded by individual arable holdings and communal grazing lands. Each settler is provided a residential stand of approximately 2 500 square metres. Each family is allowed five hectares of arable land in agro-ecological regions one and two, while those in drier regions are allocated double this amount of arable holdings. Each family has land grazing rights equivalent to 5 to 15 livestock units on 20 hectares in Natural Regions one and two, and 200 hectares in the driest regions. Three of the 5 hectares are expected to be ploughed once the rest are fallowed.

Land tenure is based on 3 permits: one for residence, one for cultivation and one for pasturing stock. The Rural Land Act which confers the government powers to lease or alienate state land, enshrines the above land tenure permits. The Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development has rights to terminate or replace any of the 3 permits without notice and for any reason, provided that compensation, as determined by the Minister, is paid. The period of validity of the permits is not specified, although such permits were initially granted for 5 year periods and new permits were issued later. No land use plans are specified, although the major thrust in this scheme is crop production, with incomes originally targetted at \$400 per year. Female heads of household can have land tenure permits in their own name, with priority given to widows.

The schemes are provided with schools, clinics, feeder roads, boreholes and marketing depots, (although their adequacy and effective maintenance is questionable). Extension and Resettlement officers advise settlers on cropping and other farm practises.

A typical scheme averages about 500 families on around 20,000 hectares depending on agro-ecological potential.

Model "B"

This scheme involves 50 to 200 members living in a village and using the farm land and infrastructure collectively. These schemes were planned for farms with intact infrastructure deemed suitable for optimising large-scale economies. Settlers register as a cooperative and

are required to share profits, although they can individually own livestock and operate home gardens of 0.5 hectares. Borrowing is done collectively and equipment granted by the government is collectively owned. Ex-combatants and ex-farm workers initially received priority in the selection of cooperatives, although other categories of settler cooperatives were selected. All adults, including women and the offsprings, are members.

Land tenure is based on a permit issued to the cooperative society for an unspecified period. Such a permit can be revoked by the relevant Minister if she or he deems that the land holding has not been used beneficially, if the group is de-registered as a cooperative, if the membership declines below 50 members or if the cooperative is not financially viable. Legislation restricts the settlers right's to erect buildings without the Ministers consent, to and engage in commercial or industrial operations on the holding, to cut indigenous trees.

Recommended land uses on Model B tend to be intensive high value enterprises such as irrigated crops, horticulture, piggeries and so forth.

Model B schemes received less attention in terms of social infrastructure provisions and extension services such that the cooperatives tended to solicit these from NGOs.

Model "C"

This model was based on individual settler plots averaging 10 hectares in sizes, surrounding a core estate owned by the state farm authority, Agriculture Development Authority (ADA). The ADA provides research, training, credit, input supply and marketing services to the settlers, who produce a common crop with the estate. One variant of Model C, the "Zhunde", entails the cooperative ownership and production of the core estate. Only a handful of these schemes were tested with outgrower numbers ranging from 50 to 200 settlers.

Model "D"

This model, intended for Natural Regions IV and V, provides ranching land for use by Communal Area communities, with access to the lands for each community rotated every 3 to 4 years, while the Communal Area grazing lands are allowed to regenerate or recover from pressure. The communities are expected to contribute to the running costs of the managed or paddocked ranch lands. Less than three such schemes have been tested successfully, particularly in Matebeleland South. A variant of this model resettled up to 3 414 settlers by 1993 on 260,000

hectares of ranch land, pending the settling of 4 000 more families. The model is currently under review as various communities are opting for a variety of versions of access to the ranch lands.

The State was involved in direct productive farming prior to independence. State farm lands occupy 353,006 hectares through 20 estates, producing horticultural products, cotton, milk, beef and wheat. These operations are managed by a parastatal - the Agricultural Development Authority (ADA), formerly the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority. ADA's mandate is to produce strategic commodities, ensure national food security, and promote rural development by venturing into farming enterprises in outlying lands which have not attracted commercial investors. The parastatal also implements the Resettlement Model C, whereby outgrowers around estates are involved in specialised production of tea, coffee, wheat and milk and the pilot livestock Resettlement Programme, known as Model D. ADA also temporarily manages newly purchased lands awaiting resettlement.

Additionally, the Zimbabwe state holds title to 20% of national land, managed by the Forestry Commission, (a parastatal), and the National Parks Authority, (a Government department). The Forestry Commission operates 15 plantations, whose average size is 5,000 hectares, located mostly (80%) in Manicaland province, and 23 demarcated forest areas or indigenous woodland reserves, averaging at least 15,000 hectares each, located mostly (80%) in Matebeleland North province. Although centrally controlled, the Forestry Commission has individual managers on the plantations with restricted autonomy regarding operational plans and land use. The indigenous estates are controlled by a divisional manager using centrally derived plans. Parts of the forest areas and plantations are used for agricultural production, such as livestock grazing and fruit growing.

The Parks Authority holds 10 parks located mainly in the two Matebeleland provinces. These are centrally controlled but have individual managers who also lease segments to private operators for tourist exploitation, while Parks staff maintain and control resources use.

Both the Forestry Commission and the Parks Authority are land "leasees", through legislation enabling them to manage and utilise the state lands, but without any legal lease contracts. During the late 1980s, the Forestry Commission bought some land on a title deeds basis: this amounts to less than 1% of its land. The forest lands are mostly surrounded by Communal

Areas, adjacent to land settled by over 100,000 families spread around 15 districts in mainly two provinces. Thus, these lands face "resource sharing" pressures from communities who demand lease rights or undertake resource poaching and squatting. The Parks tend to be buffered from Communal Areas by lands belonging to the Forestry Commission, the large-scale commercial farmers and District Councils. However, they also face wildlife poaching from both "professional" poachers who are after selling and by communities who poach for food. State lands have also expanded through District Councils control of increasing quantities of woodland areas in Communal Areas, as promoted by the Campfire or wildlife management programme. There are growing land-centred conflicts between District Councils and communities over rights to exploit natural resources on these lands and the right to the proceeds from tourism and hunting operations carried out in them.

Perceptions of Zimbabwe's land problem have therefore tended to change, as inequitable land distribution remains and black entry into the large-scale commercial farming sector exposes weaknesses in black agriculture such as slow growth in productivity, failure to penetrate high value commodity production and the slow adoption of technology. Increased state controls over various lands, land hunger, and rural poverty have also led to new land-based conflicts, as the changing use-value of land, including tourism uses, changes the nature of the demand for land in the wider rural and urban population.

The Land Reform Debates

State Controlled Land Transfer

The adoption by the Government of Zimbabwe of a conservative approach to land reform has been predicated upon a legalistic and technicist philosophy, which required orderly and state-led land transfers. The approach sought to control land occupations by peasants or the landless, and indeed criminalised informal land occupation and the exploitation of natural resources on state and large-scale commercial farm lands. A system of selecting those in need of resettlement, based on social criteria of landlessness, displacement and unemployment, was established. This system thus ruled out various individual or community demands for land restoration on the basis of historical grievances such as land removals and a rejection of the legal basis of the landholding rights of the large-scale commercial farms and the state. Legal land restoration claims, based on normative or moral criteria, such as inequitable land

ownership structures, were also precluded.

Central Government thus sought to reserve for itself the legal right to determine land requirements among the indigenous peoples, the nature of land to be transferred and the beneficiaries. However, local communities tended to resist such control with the complicity of local party and parliamentary leaders. This procedure for resolving the land problem, as well as the additional state powers to control land use in non-freehold areas, were enshrined in the Lancaster House Constitution and various legislative instruments such as the Land Acquisition Acts (1982, 1985 and 1992), the Land Tenure Act, The Communal Lands Act (1982), and The Regional Town and Country Planning Act (1985). Existing legislation did not bind the state to investigate or openly debate land-centred grievances, except through parliament, which in a dominant ruling party system, led to minimal public sanction of land policy. Nor was state control of land transfer processes popularly challenged substantively, by either squatting or local criticism. State law enforcement agencies and government development discourse tended to be used to deflect any challenges.

The Government of Zimbabwe had also adopted a technical approach both in its criteria for settler selection and land acquisition. The resettlement programme depended on District Councils and officials to identify land needs and problems, such as "squatting", defined mostly in terms of population pressure on land and volunteers for resettlement. State land acquisition procedure initially relied on land available on markets, and later on changed to compulsory expropriation. The compulsory process targeted lands no longer needed by the owners then those lands deemed by state officials to be derelict, followed by lands which were unused and underutilised, and then those lands owned by absentees, foreigners and multiple-farm holders.

In theory, land acquisition was rationalised and guided by the perceived levels of land utilisation and output in the large-scale commercial farm areas. Indeed such Government thinking dominated social and academic debates on land reform in Zimbabwe, given that the rigid legal-bureaucratic land transfer procedures closed other criteria and options of land supply. Large-scale commercial farm land use efficiency became the focus of arguments among those promoting or resisting an expanded or radical land reform programme. The technical issues of land use optimisation, and the economic criteria of land and agricultural resource use efficiency, remained central to land debates. Studies attempted to compare the levels of land utilisation,

input-output structures and land productivity between the large-scale commercial farms and Communal Areas to justify or negate land reform. Only later did the macro-economic concerns of employment development, technology efficiency and the income distribution effects of land redistribution feature in land debates. The analysis of demands for land lagged behind the land use and productivity debate.

The Land Use and Productivity Debate

There has been widespread controversy over the relative efficiency of land utilisation in LSCF, SSCF, Communal and Resettlement Areas. Those resisting increased transfer of LSCF lands argued that land utilisation rates in the LSCF were optimal and that land utilisation in the other sectors was inefficient in terms of productivity and environmental sustainability. Those who promoted increased land transfer, however, argued that land utilisation in the LSCF, particularly on prime cropping lands, was sub-optimal, and that small farmers were capable of increased and diversified output. The latter also argued that high land productivity in the LSCF had been achieved through systematic state support and subsidies for research, water development and infrastructure, over five decades of white settler state control (Phimister, 1988).

Peasants and small scale farmers, and, later, resettlement farmers, had received minimal state support. From the 1930s up to the present, macro-economic and agricultural policies protected LSCF access to capital, technology, foreign currency and commodity markets. Discriminatory agricultural commodity pricing, state marketing, state credit, import regulations, access to foreign currency and irrigation support were and are key policy instruments used to favour LSCF productivity growth. Nevertheless, the LSCF had failed to achieve optimal levels of land utilisation, due to the high capital and management costs of operating farms averaging 2 000 hectares per owner, with some owning multiple farms.

Only after the influential study by Weiner et al (1985), whose results were adapted by the World Bank in 1990 (see Roth, 1990), did the government and others acknowledge that less than 50% of net prime agricultural arable lands in the LSCF sector were adequately utilised (Table 3.3). Even this level of arable land utilisation was based on generous allowance for crop and land rotations and a further 20% of land for the "squaring" up of arable fields, using the LSCF mechanisation norms of land assessment. The World Bank study, which had deducted land redistributed during the 1980s, and which had assessed the level of grazing land use

efficiency (Table 3.4), concluded in 1990, that the LSCF sector could supply 3.5 million hectares of its current 11.2 million hectares for redistribution without risking present levels of LSCF production (Roth, 1990). The World Bank suggested that such land should be transferred through market forces rather than Government intervention (World Bank, 1991).

TABLE 3.3: EFFICIENCY OF ARABLE LAND USE FOR CROP PRODUCTION

	TOTAL AREA (000 HA)	ARABLE LAND (000 HA)	ARABLE LAND (%)	CROP AREA ^d Planted (000 HA)	CROPPING EFFICIENCY (%)	NET ARABLE LAND (000 HA) ^e	NET CROPPING EFFICIENCY (%)	ADJUSTED ^f CROP AREA (000 HA)	ADJUSTED CROP EFF. (%)
	A	B	C=B/A	D	E=D/B	F	G=D/F	H	I=H/F
Mashonaland West	1 886,0	760,6 ^a	40,3	184,6	24,3	650,3	28,4	270,2	41,6
Mashonaland Central	732,6	307,3 ^a	41,9	105,4	34,3	262,7	40,1	152,7	58,1
Mashonaland East	957,8	522,1 ^a	54,5	97,6	18,7	446,4	21,9	139,1	31,2
NR I	202,2	27,9	13,8 ^b	11,7	39,7	23,9	49,0	12,1	50,6
NR II	3 686,9	1047,1	28,4	379,1	36,2	895,3	42,3	556,0	62,1
NR III	2 405,4	574,9	23,9	48,4	8,4	491,5	9,9	74,9	15,2
NR IV	2 429,1	10,1 ^c	0,0	8,9	88,1	10,1	88,1	10,2	101,0
NR V	2 489,7	102,5 ^c	0,0	52,3	51,0	102,5	51,0	53,1	51,8

- a. Adapted from Weiner et al. (1985) less land acquired for resettlement, assuming that 1988 totals contain the same proportion of arable and non-arable land as in 1981.
- b. Percentages for natural regions are adapted from Vincent, Thomas and Staples (1962, p.170).
- c. Arable land is irrigable land times a cropping intensity of two.
- d. Crop area in 1988-89, CSO.
- e. Arable land less 10 percent for squaring of fields, tree lines, roads, homesteads and pockets of inaccessible land, and less 5 percent for mechanical conservation measures.
- f. Crop area adjusted to include recommended fallow rotations.

TABLE 3.4: GRAZING LAND EFFICIENCY

	TOTAL AREA (000 HA)	CROP AREA PLANTED (000 HA)	CROP AREA LESS FODDER (000 HA)	UNUSABLE LAND (000 HA)	GRAZING AREA (000 HA)	LIVESTOCK UNITS (000 LSU)	GRAZING AREA/LSU (HA/LSU)	LOW RISK STOCKING STRATEGY (HA/LSU)	MOD. RISK STOCKING STRATEGY (HA/LSU)	HIGH RISK STOCKING STRATEGY (HA/LSU)
	A	B	C	D	E=A-C-D	F	G=E/F	H	I	J
Manicaland	760,7	43,6	40,0	152,1	568,6	67,5	8,4			
Mashonaland	3 576,5	387,7	343,2	715,2	2 518,1	570,9	4,4			
Midlands	1 689,1	18,1	15,6	337,8	1 335,7	215,8	6,2			
Masvingo	2 406,7	41,8	40,7	481,3	1 884,7	153,5	12,3			

Matabeleland	2 780,4	9,4	6,8	556,4	2 217,5	254,4	8,7			
NR I	202,2	11,7	10,5	40,4	151,3	23,3	6,5	3-4	2	1
NR II	3 686,9	379,2	334,1	737,4	2 615,4	545,3	4,8	3-4	2	1
NR III	2 405,5	48,4	43,3	481,1	1 881,1	295,7	6,4	6-8	3-4	2
NR IV	2 429,1	8,9	6,2	485,8	1 937,1	196,6	6,5	8-10	4-5	3
NR V	2 489,7	52,2	52,2	497,8	1 939,7	101,2	19,2	10-15	5-8	4
NATIONAL	11 213,4	500,6	446,3	2 242,5	8 524,6	1 262,1	6,8			

World Bank: Agriculture Sector Memo; 1991

Indeed, a look at the growth in the volume and value of LSCF output since 1980 (Table 3.5) shows that, in spite of losing 3 million hectares to the resettlement programme, the LSCF had in fact realised increased crop diversification and higher output values. The LSCF had moved towards producing more export crops, such as tobacco, beef, horticultural products and wildlife ranching for tourism (Moyo, 1990). Remarkably, the cropped hectareage of the LSCF had hovered constantly around 650,000 hectares from the mid-1970s up to the 1990s, illustrating the positive change in output following land redistribution and reflecting inefficiencies within the LSCF sector.

TABLE 3.5: TRENDS IN CROP AREA IN THE LSCF, 1975-88

YEAR	CEREAL ^a /	INDUSTRIAL ^b /	FODDER ^c /	TREE ^d /	OTHER ^e /	AREA TOTAL LSCS
1975	48.3	35.3	2.7	0.9	12.9	590.6
1976	47.9	33.8	3.3	0.9	14.1	566.4
1977	47.9	34.7	2.6	0.8	12.0	574.8
1978	46.7	38.3	2.3	0.8	11.6	563.5
1979	45.4	40.0	2.3	0.9	10.7	542.2
1980	47.3	39.4	2.0	0.6	9.5	574.8
1981	57.7	30.3	1.8	0.7	8.8	599.9
1982	54.8	33.8	2.0	0.6	9.5	585.0
1983	48.2	39.1	2.5	0.7	10.2	548.4
1984	44.0	42.5	2.6	0.8	9.9	531.9
1985	47.9	39.3	2.4	0.6	-	541.1
1986	-	-	-	-	10.2	-
1987	38.5	47.5	2.9	0.8	10.3	484.8
1988	40.5	45.6	2.4	1.1		500.6

Source: Roth 1990

a. Include maize, sorghum, wheat, barley, mhunga, rapoko, and other grains.

b. Includes tobacco, coffee, cotton, groundnuts, soyabeans, sunflower, sugarcane, tea, and other industrial crops not specified.

c. Includes lucerne, other legume hays and silage.

d. Includes citrus fruits (orange, grapefruit, mangoes), deciduous fruits trees, strawberries, tropical fruits (banana), avocado, and tree nuts.

e. Includes edible dry beans, sunhemp, nyimo, sweet potatoes, potatoes, onions, peas, tomatoes, other vegetables, garden flowers, shrubs, seedlings, and planted pastures.

Adjusting to the liberation war, economic crisis and impending independence during the 1970s, and then land reform, the LSCF had changed its allocation of land and labour uses, through commodity shifts and labour shedding by increased mechanisation. Concurrently, the Communal Areas responded during the 1980s, by increasing their production of labour intensive commodities and their share of marketed maize and cotton. The introduction of minimum wage legislation in the 1980s influenced the switch to capital-intensive production in the LSCFs, whilst the accessibility of commercial marketing channels in the Communal Areas, as well as availability of hybrid maize varieties, positively contributed to the increased market share of the Communal Areas (Tables 3.6 and 3.7).

These tables show how Communal Area maize yields almost trebled during the 1980s from a low level of about half a tonne per hectare, how the more favourable agro-ecological regions performed better, how yields among other crops in Communal Areas began to improve, and how Communal Areas began to catch up with LSCF yields in crops such as cotton.

TABLE 3.6: AVERAGE LARGE-SCALE COMMERCIAL DRYLAND YIELDS BY NR 1974-75; 1983-84

NATURAL REGION	MAIZE KG/HA	SORGHUM KG/HA	COTTON KG/HA
IIa	5,423	2,480	1,731
IIb	3,731	2,349	1,370
III	2,482	2,016	1,210
IV	1,970	N/A	N/A

Source: Mackenzie, 1987 (from Agritex Crop Yields No.6)

Production changes among the agrarian sub-sectors reflect overall increases in crop production, while the national beef herd declined during the 1980s by 21%, due to drought and low prices rather than because of land redistribution.

Indeed, LSCF arable land utilisation did not grow beyond the 15% mark in a ten year cycle, suggesting that changes in LSCF land use tended to focus on expanding extensive activities such as cattle and wildlife. But the growth in peasant outputs suggest increased cultivation

of marginal lands. Whereas the CFU has argued that the growth of extensive land use in the LSCF is the most viable under the existing economic climate (CFU, 1993), public and official sentiments are that even low yielding maize and cotton production on these underutilised lands by small farmers would improve overall national land use efficiency.

TABLE 3.7: YIELDS IN A POOR AND GOOD RAINFALL SEASON AND MAXIMUM YIELD RECORDED: NATURAL REGION V FROM 20-25 PLOTS

	1983-84 POOR RAINFALL _a / KG/HA	1984-85 GOOD RAINFALL _a / KG/HA	MAXIMUM YIELD _b / KG/HA	1983-84 AS % OF 1984-85 KG/HA
Pearl Millet	467	2,205	2,971	21
Castor Bean	300	777	1,677	39
Cowpea	489	783	1,803	62
Groundnut	232	759	2,370	30
Sunflower	350	759	1,601	46
Soyabean	122	729	2,133	17

Source: Ashworth 1990

_a/: CSO rainfall records for Beitbridge station: 1983-84; 253.1mm (84.2% of average); 1984-85; 393.3mm (130.8% of average).

_b/: Maximum yield refers to the maximum achieved on any one of the farmers' plots. This data reflect trends not precise measures.

The debate shifted between the micro-economic approval of the individual LSCF farm level income gains, from adding livestock and wildlife to their core crop enterprises in prime lands, and macro-level interest in foreign currency attained by these land uses, to concerns that the net gains in national income distribution and purchasing power achieved by resettling farmers on such extensively used lands were more desirable.

But these arguments tended to neglect the more fundamental rationale for redistributive land reform. For instance, the potential self-employment, food security and industrial raw materials which could be derived from the more intensive use of LSCF arable lands is arguably a sound and economically significant land use objective, which the present land reform policy seems intent on pursuing. Yet the technical arguments over land use efficiency, due to their physicalist focus on land use and productivity, tended to overlook the more fundamental macro-economic allocative problem of improving capital, technology and labour utilisation and productivity in a labour abundant, capital scarce and foreign currency constrained economy, such as that of Zimbabwe. Unemployment levels in Zimbabwe

exceeded 30% of the labour force by late 1991, with Communal Areas supplying the bulk of the new entrants to the labour force. The LSCF employs 300,000 or 25% of the formally employed in Zimbabwe. This employment level has remained static over twenty years, due to the mechanisation of LSCF production and the slow expansion of its cropped area (Moyo, 1990). Per capita incomes among the self-employed farming households in Communal Areas are reportedly below the poverty datum line (CSO, 1992), suggesting that disguised unemployment remains. This tends to confirm the need to expand agricultural employment, through increased land use intensity and the rationalisation of capital-labour deployment ratios in the LSCF. The downstream demand effects of expanded household food-security and cash incomes to be realised from redistributing underutilised LSCF lands should therefore not be ignored in Zimbabwean land use and productivity debates.

In addition, the input-output ratio and the efficiency of capital-labour utilisation norms of the LSCF are known to be inferior to those of the small farming households in Communal Areas, in spite of the lower land productivity or crop yields there. Yet land debates in Zimbabwe tended to ignore the question of national and farm level agricultural resource use efficiency.

The general focus of most research has been to dismiss small farmer productivity potentials, on the basis of the average yield realised in Communal Areas (Tables 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10). Such analyses also tended to ignore the effects of marginal lands, technology and capital constraints, and the capital-labour deployment efficiency of small farmers.

Table 3.8: AVERAGE COMMUNAL FARM YIELDS FOR MAJOR CROPS, 1982-1988

CROP	1982 KG/HA	1983 KG/HA	1984 KG/HA	1985 KG/HA	1986 KG/HA	1987 KG/HA	1988 KG/HA	1989 KG/HA	% AVE.	COEF. OF VAR. %
Maize	595	271	400	1,394	1,200	600	1,400	1,150	876	52.3
Sorghum	250	157	240	360	440	200	780	410	355	56.2
Cotton	529	500	700	846	870	600	850	800	712	21.3
Groundnuts	396	125	130	400	400	313	540	450	358	44.4
Soyabeans	429	500	429	600	600	350	1,100	606	606	44.5

Source: CSO Statistical Yearbook 1987 for years 1982-1984; CSO Crop Forecasting Committee for 1985-89

TABLE 3.9: AVERAGE COMMERCIAL FARM SECTOR YIELDS FOR MAJOR CROPS 1982-1989

CROP	1982 KG/HA	1983 KG/HA	1984 KG/HA	1985 KG/HA	1986 KG/HA	1987 KG/HA	1988 KG/HA	1989 KG/HA	% AVE.	COEF. OF VAR. %
Maize	3.83	2.20	3.02	4.84	5.67	4.00	5.50	5.24	4.29	29
Sorghum	2.11	0.98	1.82	3.59	3.00	2.30	3.00	2.50	2.41	34
Cotton	1.86	1.68	1.89 0.88	2.06	2.25	2.25	2.15	2.01	2.02	10
Groundnuts	1.35	0.85	1.64	1.00	4.00	3.21	3.04	-	2.05	65
Soyabeans	1.83	1.43		2.09	2.00	1.70	1.85	1.9	1.81	12

Source: CSO Statistical Yearbook 1987 for years 1982-84; CSO Crop Forecasting Committee and AMA Situation reports for Subsequent years

TABLE 3.10: COMMUNAL FARM YIELDS FOR MAJOR CROPS AS A PERCENTAGE OF LARGE-SCALE COMMERCIAL YIELDS 1982-89

CROP	COMMERCIAL YIELDS AVE. 1982-1989 T/HA	COMMUNAL YIELDS AVE. 1982-1989 T/HA	COMMUNAL % OF CF	RATIO CF:CA <u>a/</u>
Maize	4.29	0.876	20.4	4.9:1
Sorghum	2.41	0.355	14.7	6.8:1
Cotton	2.02	0.712	35.2	2.8:1
Groundnuts	2.05	0.358	17.5	5.7:1
Soyabeans	1.81	0.606	33.5	3.0:1

Source: Ashworth (1990)

a/: CF = commercial farm; CA = communal farms

TABLE 3.11: SMALL FARM CROP YIELDS BY NATURAL REGION 1983-84 AND 1984-85

YEAR/CROP	NR II	NR III	NR IV	NR V	ALL REGIONS
<u>1983-84:</u>					
Maize	2.34	0.96	1.44	0.01	1.45
Cotton	1.62	1.55	0.86	-	1.56
Groundnuts	1.41	0.41	0.51	-	0.80
Sorghum <u>a/</u>	0.45	0.91	0.79	0.16	0.32
Pearl Millet	1.25	0.47	0.90	-	0.84
Finger Millet	0.28	0.67	0.40	-	0.46
Tobacco Burley	3.25	0.71	-	-	1.49
<u>1984-85:</u>					
Maize	3.6	2.65	2.49	2.00	2.89

Cotton	1.78	1.61	1.14	-	1.66
Groundnuts	0.73	0.80	0.60	0.13	0.70
Sorghuma/	0.07	0.25	0.04	0.13	0.14
Pearl Millet	0.81	1.07	1.13	0.23	1.04
Finger Millet	0.68	0.87	0.99	0.45	0.89
Tobacco Burley	4.14	-	0.75	-	3.89

Source: MLARR, Farm Management Research Section, Economic and Markets Branch. Second and Third Annual Reports of Farm Management Data for Small Farm Units (the term used by MLARR in these reports for Model A resettlement farms and communal area farms). The surveys were conducted on 899 individual small farms (communal and resettlement) over the four natural regions. NR I was not included.

a/ while it is not mentioned in the source reports, sorghum yields are probably negatively affected by inter-cropping in many cases.

TABLE 3.12: COMMUNAL FARM SECTOR CROP YIELDS 1987-88 CROP SEASON

COMMUNAL AREA NATURAL REGION	BU*	CHI	CHZ	CHW	KAN	MUT	NYA	ZVI	ALL AREAS
	IV	II	III	II	II-III	IV-V	IV	V	
CROP	T/HA	T/HA	T/HA	T/HA	T/HA	T/HA	T/HA	T/HA	T/HA
Maize	0.78	3.05	1.34	3.67	2.77	1.15	0.44	0.57	1.76
Cotton		2.94	-	0.30	0.55	-	0.72	-	0.71
Groundnuts	0.73	0.22	0.20	0.59	0.37	1.30	0.40	0.17	0.46
Sunflower	0.26	0.46	0.18	0.45	0.14	0.60	0.48	0.13	0.36
Pearl Millet	0.18	-	0.71	-	-	0.49	0.27	0.23	0.24
Finger Millet	0.60	0.37	0.64	0.68	0.90	0.13	0.38	0.22	0.44
Bambara N	0.56	-	-	0.42	0	0.45	0.47	0.13	0.38
Soyabeans	-	0.23	-	-	0.27	-	-	-	0.22
Tobacco B	-	-	-	0.60	1.05	-	-	-	0.79

Source: MLARR Farm Management Survey, 1990 (unpublished)

Note: Yield data have been rounded.

* = Selected Communal Area Abbreviations.

TABLE 3.13: INPUT/OUTPUT ACCOUNTS AND EFFICIENCY RATIOS FOR COMMERCIAL AND COMMUNAL FARMING AREAS

YEAR	TOTAL OUTPUTS Z\$	TOTAL INPUTS Z\$	VALUE-ADDE D Z\$	RATIO OF OUTPUTS TO INPUTS	TOTAL OUTPUTS Z\$	TOTAL INPUTS Z\$	VALUE-AD DED Z\$	RATIO OF OUTPUTS TO INPUTS
1974	369	145	224	2.54	108	7	101	15.43

1975	385	165	230	2.33	106	8	98	13.25
1976	415	178	237	2.33	107	8	99	13.37
1977	404	197	207	2.05	108	9	99	12.00
1978	430	210	220	2.05	75	8	67	9.37
1979	452	231	221	1.96	104	8	96	13.00
1980	607	298	309	2.04	147	11	136	13.36
1981	817	428	389	1.91	266	19	247	14.00
1982	871	475	396	1.83	272	31	242	8.80

Source: Weiner et al, 1985 (from CSO, Production Accounts: Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, 1974-82). Note: Inputs include labour.

While data on yields demonstrate the fact that productivity in the LSCF is superior, they also show that rainfall and soils account for a critical proportion of these productivity differences. Dryland yields in the LSCF tend to be lower in natural regions similar to the Communal Area conditions, while the overall average yields levels of the LSCF areas tend to increase when the use of supplementary irrigation facilities is taken into account. However, under dryland farming conditions, without supplementary irrigation, there are diminishing returns to fertilizer use. Thus, because the peasants tend to use less fertilizer than the LSCF, accounting for differences in yields of up to 200 percent, (Ashworth, 1990), their overall yields remain comparatively inferior to the LSCF.

But when the addition of value based on the ratio of the capital yields from outputs in relation to costs of inputs deployed are assessed (Table 3.13), it is evident that the economic efficiency of small holders is greater than the LSCF (CSO, 1987). Increased values of outputs over time in the LSCF sector have been matched by increases in the costs of inputs, of foreign currency and finance. Value addition improved faster in Communal Areas during the early 1980's due to their use of hybrid seeds and small quantities of fertilizers. Yet, marginal rainfall and the slow development of irrigable land potential in Communal Areas, ensured a limit to the net improvement of their yields. Without increased investment in fertilizer use among Communal farmers at appropriate application levels, together with water development, the prospects of improving their yields are poor. Such investments required macro-level reallocations of fiscal support and incentives towards small farmers, as well as land redistribution. However, such macro-economic reforms were not central to the land reform experience of the 1980s.

The Zimbabwean experience with land reform between 1980 and 1990 was thus largely cautious, being mindful of both the above debates which argued against land redistribution,

and because of the legal constraints to a radical land acquisition programme. Indeed the Government of Zimbabwe was cautious over changing agricultural support policies, which favoured the large-scale commercial farmers, suggesting that the Government valued the economic role of large-scale commercial farmers. The nature and extent of land redistribution is discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF LAND REFORM: 1980-1989

Zimbabwe's land reform programme between 1980 and 1989 was conservative firstly because land acquisition was pursued through market procedures, which retained existing land concentration structures. Land reform was premised on building a non-racial model of society, with minimal political upheaval, in the aftermath of the liberation struggle of the 1970s. Following the political take-over by liberation movements of Lusophone territories in Southern Africa, global counter-insurgency diplomacy led by Henry Kissinger of the U.S.A had in the mid-1970s sought a reconciliatory resolution of racial conflict, through negotiated settlement rather than armed struggle. Armed struggle was understood to lead to total take over of state power and to expropriation of land from white minorities as had occurred in Mozambique and Angola, (Rossitter, 1988). It was feared that the displacement of whites in Rhodesia would lead to the spread of socialism there and provoke pressures for a similar transformation in Namibia and South Africa, (Palmberg, 1978).

The Lancaster House Compromise

Success in bringing the liberation movement represented by Zanu and Zapu to negotiations with the Rhodesian regime of Ian Smith and Abel Muzorewa was achieved in 1979 at Lancaster House in the United Kingdom. These constitutional talks confronted major differences over the manner in which the restitution of the land rights of Zimbabweans would be resolved. Zimbabwe's Lancaster House Constitution resulted in a major compromise by the liberation movements. Indeed, diplomats heralded the compromise as a sign of the mature leadership of the liberation movement (Vance, 1980), while others felt it was not sufficiently radical (Mandaza, 1987). Cyril Vance (1980), former American foreign secretary, had emphasized the benign character of Zanu, led by Robert Gabriel Mugabe, as follows:

The extent that the new Government of Prime Minister Mugabe in Zimbabwe can provide opportunities for their people, which makes it possible to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the African masses while at the same times creating conditions which facilitate the retention of the white minority, should significantly strengthen the forces of peaceful change in South Africa.

But if the Government is unable to satisfy the legitimate aspirations.... and if chaos and confrontation should erupt it will probably only strengthen the feeling in white South Africa that this is what will await them if some form of equitable power-sharing arrangements is established there as well, (pp 1-2).

Cyril Vance considered the goal of the negotiations to be to achieve a peaceful, democratic means of transition from white minority rule where the "interests of all" were protected. Significantly, it was felt that Zimbabwe was not " beholden" to a foreign power, it "...wants nothing to do with the Soviet Union", and had chosen to build a free democratic policy and a mixed economy in the face of the "opportunists and ideologues who could claim their day". Instead of attempting the "disastrous", by experimenting with a Marxist model, the leadership of Zimbabwe had "...a pragmatism and African nationalism (which) far outweigh(ed)... (their) Marxism." (Ibid, pp3-8). Hence "Mr Mugabe's objectives (with the many refugees) is to put them on a farm to cultivate ...". Thus, his "... experiment of majority rule with the protection of the white interests is a very, very bold experiment". The "disaster" that occurred in Mozambique, after the Portuguese were thrown out "..... had influenced Mr. Mugabe to realise that it was a great mistake not to give the white population a real opportunity and a real basis to be prepared to stay and give their lives to the development..." of Zimbabwe. Apparently, Mugabe, who "... in the administration of Zimbabwe, was a pragmatist, ... (had concluded)... that the large ranches should be retained, industry developed and private enterprise should be encouraged to enter the country". (Ibid p.6).

Zimbabwe's reforms were of wider geo-political significance because they offered "...an opportunity of seeing develop a great country which can influence the whole future of Southern Africa... should it fail...there is no doubt that the Russians can and will move in". Therefore, Zimbabwe was "...in a position to use money in such a way that they can become an important factor in helping the development of the whole of that region". The "Kissinger billion", which had been peddled around 1976 as the "Zimbabwe Development Fund" of 1977, was thus part and parcel of the "commitment to assist Zimbabwe - if a certain result was achieved... namely a democratic transition to majority rule... in... a pluralistic society" (Ibid, p.4). However, such a fund never materialised. Instead, the British Government became the key donor for the land redistribution programme, on terms and at a scale not generally satisfactory to the Government of Zimbabwe.

The U.S. policy framework, which saw the whites as being "there to stay" and sought solutions through them, was somewhat also premised on the notion of the whites supporting the U.S. to gain a comparative geo-political advantage in the region (NSSM, 1969). This policy, intended to develop diplomatic rapprochement with the whites and provide them material support, also increased economic support to the majority-ruled states to soften the "diplomatic impact of the

new policy" (Rossitter, p.49). The "under-consumption" thesis, which postulated that using legal changes towards increased black participation in the region's economy could open up the market of 200 million, as the removal of racism in the U.S. had done, provided a theoretical rationale for a conservative approach to reform in Zimbabwe (Palmberg, 1978).

Zimbabwe's land negotiations completely left out the option to buy out or eject the white settlers as this was somewhat over-shadowed by the desire to keep white settlers actively involved (Palmberg, 1978). An earlier plan to evacuate white Rhodesians to Bolivia had been exposed and was now seen to be counter-productive to Western hegemony. The "Kissinger billion" was "...to provide for Governmental purchase and redistribution of large white owned holdings of fertile farm land, an essential component of national reconstruction in a country where the white, 4% of the population, occupied most of the commercially viable land" (Rossiter, 1988). To foreclose radical agrarian reform before the actual negotiations, (between 1978 and 1979), the Muzorewa/Smith regime had commenced a cooptation process, whereby middle and upper class suburban lands, large-scale commercial farm lands and related finance to purchase these were opened to blacks for private acquisition. Staple foods of the black population were subsidized and a land distribution programme, of a total of 4 million hectares, was proposed (Government of Rhodesia, 1978).

The Lancaster House negotiations produced a constitution which secured, for the whites, unhindered citizenship rights; a bill of rights which precluded the expropriation of private property, secured freedom of expression, movement and dual citizenship; a restricted executive power, disproportionate white parliamentary representation, and protection of white civil servants' employment and pensions. It provided a ten year grace period during which the constitution could not be amended, while the independence of the judiciary was entrenched to guarantee white rights (Patriotic Front 1979, Constitution, 1979).

Market Restrictions on Land Acquisition

The specific restrictions on land reform were contained in chapter 3 of Zimbabwe's Constitution, dealing with "The Declaration of Rights". Section 16 provided that:

"No property of any description or interest or right therein shall be compulsorily acquired except under the authority that:

- a) requires the acquiring authority to give reasonable notice of the intention to acquire the property, interest or right to any person owning the property or having any interest or right therein that would be affected by such acquisition;
- b) requires that the acquisition is reasonably necessary in the interests of public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town and country planning, the utilization of that or any other property for a purpose beneficial to the public general or to any section thereof, in the case of land that is under-utilised, the settlement of land for agricultural purposes;
- c) requires the acquiring authority to pay promptly adequate compensation for the acquisition;
- d) requires the acquiring authority, if the acquisition is contested, to apply to the General Division or some other court before or not later than thirty days after the acquisition for an order confirming the acquisition; and
- e) enables any claimant for compensation to apply to the General Division or some other court for the prompt return of the property if the court does not confirm the acquisition and for the determination of any question relating to compensation and to appeal to the Appellate Division."

Additionally, the constitution required that any law on land acquisition provide that a court may "...in fixing adequate compensation, ignore any reduction in the value of such land, interest or right resulting from any unusual or extraordinary circumstances existing immediately prior to such acquisition." Even under emergency or disaster conditions, the above provisions could only be contravened where reasonable notice of acquisition was given, and affected persons were enabled to object in writing to such acquisition. In any case, the acquiring authority was still required to apply for legal entitlement within thirty days, so as to enable the General Division to be satisfied that acquisition was justifiable in such an emergency or disaster. The return of property, when possession was no longer justifiable, was expected. Otherwise, prompt payment of adequate compensation for the possession, or for failure to return such property and/or for damage to the property and enablement of claimants to apply for compensation, was specified. The provisions for the compensation of "loss of ownership or enjoyment of a piece of land or a substantial portion thereof", required unhindered remittability of compensation within a reasonable time for individuals who are "citizens of or ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe", as well as for companies or shareholders.

Forfeiture for land dereliction was also circumscribed, although contravention of land rights was allowed only for as long as was necessary for the purpose of the conservation of natural resources of any description or for "...agricultural development or improvement, which the owner or occupier of the land has been required and has without reasonable or lawful excuse refused or failed to carry out." The Government's rights in respect of the acquisition of interests related to minerals or water (underground or public) were also circumscribed as provided above. This entrenched 'bill of rights', enshrined the sanctity of private property in

general, and singled out land for special protection. Therefore, the concept of landed property in Zimbabwe, based on the Torrens System, not only guaranteed title in registration but also guaranteed the "deeds", providing for the indefeasibility of the solum, and ensured the legal standing of landowners to claim compensation for damage at a justified rate, and with immediate payment for land at a considerable percentage above market prices, if and when ownership rights were "taken" away.

However, the negotiated settlement did allow for change. It allowed blacks to gain access to private landed property, setting the framework for the aspirant black "middle classes" to acquire land. This created black interest in large-scale commercial farm land, sowing the seeds for the disaggregation of the liberation movements' "interests" in land reform. Moreover, the constitution, in recognition of previous land tenure legislation and acquisition modalities, accepted the dual land system whereby "Tribal Trust Lands" were to be held in "communal" ownership, under the trusteeship of chiefs. This situation was changed in 1982 by the introduction of land control by elected District Councils. Land laws were modified slightly by 1986 to allow the Government of Zimbabwe first option to buy land on offer, and to acquire land deemed to be underutilised, albeit through complicated criteria of measurement for the level of under-use. Thus, the Lancaster House constitution was instrumental in restraining land acquisition throughout the decade.

Land Taxation

Notwithstanding the conservatism of Zimbabwe's constitutional framework, the Government of Zimbabwe was by itself cautious about developing other measures which could promote land transfers from large farmers. For instance, the unchanged restrictive regulation of rural land sub-division, provided for in the Regional, Town and Country Act (1975), maintained the Rhodesian planners' notion of large-scale farm holdings. Thus, commercial farm 'viability' began with farm sizes above 300 hectares and land transfers through sub-divisions were restricted. Moreover, land taxation, which was proposed as an instrument which could facilitate sub-divided transfers in 1984 (Green and Khadani), had not been adopted by 1993.

Throughout the 1980s, the Government of Zimbabwe studied various internal and external proposals for land taxation. A Government Tax Commission, led by foreign experts, as well as local academics and the World Bank, had urged the adoption of a land tax. In 1985, the

Chelliah Tax Commission recommended the institution of a land tax based on the rated value of output in the large-scale commercial farm sector and a nominal "flat land tax" for communal areas. The latter would pay a tax of Z\$1.00 per cropped hectare (or 0.05% of rated value of output) and be charged for livestock units (Z\$0.50 per unit), rather than a tax on pastures. The commission recommended abolishing the existing "poll taxes" in Communal Areas, and that taxes be paid through labour contributions to infrastructural development, given the financial constraints to Government investment in such facilities.

State land holders, such as the Forestry Commission, the Parks Authority, the State Farms Authority (ADA), Cold Storage Commission farms and others were not to be taxed according to most of the proposals. Even an official position paper of the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) had in 1990 accepted the principle of land taxation, provided that Communal Areas and Small-Scale Commercial Farms were also taxed and state farms were abolished (CFU, 1990).

The Tax Commission had advised that the land tax be primarily directed at generating revenue, in order to redistribute wealth and, secondarily, to stimulate higher land utilization large-scale commercial farms. The use of land tax as a land redistribution mechanism was not recommended by the Tax Commission, perhaps because direct land acquisition was in progress, and because its rating of land productivity and land use in the large-scale commercial farms was positive. However, the Commission had concluded that there "...is still room for increasing yields through technological improvements". By 1989, Government Ministers began to openly endorse the idea of, "...making it costly to hold on to land for speculative reasons", and the use of land taxation as a means of controlling rising land prices (Chidzero, 1989). Indeed, Government thinking during the early 1990s, in the drafting of a land tax bill, is focused on the objective of bringing more land into productive use, rather than primarily as a means of generating revenue.

The land tax bill was being formulated in 1993 and is to be administered by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development, rather than the Ministry of Finance as proposed by the Chelliah Commission report. The bill specifies land tax rates and collection procedures. The revenue generated is not to be directly targeted back to agriculture or Local Government land related expenditures. The World Bank had proposed that the land tax be paid to, and merged into the budget of amalgamated rural authorities of communal and large-scale commercial farm areas, thus replacing the service rates paid by large-scale commercial farmers

to their rural councils (Strasma, 1990). But present Government thinking appears to be opposed to the use of land taxes as a means of generating development revenue for the Local Government councils and land resettlement, or as a primary tool to force land transfer. It appears the Government intends to use the land tax to optimise land use in the residual large-scale commercial farm areas, after land redistribution.

Land taxation has, however, been dogged by the absence of acceptable criteria to evaluate the efficiency of "environmental" land uses such as wildlife ranching, woodlands conservation, forestry development and broader eco-tourism. Apart from the complexities of assessing the values derived from such land uses, especially the environmental and aesthetic "externalities", there are political and moral divergences on the basis of land use values to be considered. Farmers argue that, on the basis of financial rates of return and general income generated, these land uses are optimal. In the absence of adequate disaggregated land use data, the intended land tax objective could be confounded by the current expansion of game ranching. Whether to use the land tax instrument to discourage such land uses, whether to administratively regulate them, or whether to use land designation to acquire such lands, remain unsettled options, since peasant outputs in such marginal lands are also constrained. Indeed, wildlife enterprises are being promoted for peasants through the Campfire Programme within marginal agro-ecological zones.

Land utilization within the various state lands, constituting 18% of Zimbabwe's land, is also considered by some to be sub-optimal. It has therefore been suggested that land tax and land transfers should also take place on state lands. Taxing state lands may provide incentives to state land managers to optimise land use. Elsewhere, taxing state lands has led to the adoption of land use strategies and income transfers which improve community benefit streams (Strasma, 1990). Moreover, incomes generated from the taxation of state lands could be channelled directly into rural development, and hence reduce the community incentives to "poach" resources from state landed resources. But Government leaders appear to object to state land taxation, and to the idea that blacks in the large-scale commercial farms be taxed, on the grounds that blacks have not yet had the opportunity to accumulate the means to invest in optimal land usage.

Most proposals for land taxation so far, and the existing rural council rates, have not been specifically focused on forcing land holders to sell land for redistribution because taxation levels

are low. The Chelliah Commission proposed that potential output be established, and a percentage of this be taxed. Currently, rating of the capital value of unimproved land is used only by three rural councils in large-scale commercial farm areas. Variations in land quality and irrigation related improvements are not taxed in these councils. The approach to land taxation based on rating assessed capital values of whole farms has not been popular with rural councils. Most large-scale commercial farm rural councils simply levy service rates based on declining rateable amounts with increasing farm sizes. The Tax Commission had proposed that the Ministry of Agriculture use soil capability classifications and farm plans to establish standard productivity for average arable and grazing hectares as a means to rate outputs. Thus, "the rated output of different types of land and in different [agro-ecological] regions could be expressed as a proportion of the standard and, accordingly, the sizes of different farms can be expressed in standard "maize hectares", and values may be derived by applying the maize price of a base year. The standard hectare, by using the un-irrigated maize output as an index, would thus not affect farmers' choices of optimal crop mixes and promote increases in productivity through irrigation. Progressivity could be moderately applied to size."

The Tax Commission thus recommended marginal land taxation levels, rating output values at 1-2% of standard hectare outputs of small to large standardized farms, with unusually large farms realising marginal tax rates of up to 4% of rated output value. The computed average tax rates were found to range from 0.04% to 1.03% of potential gross margins. Levying criteria were designed such that taxes did not exceed land rents, but would put pressure on "satisfying" farmers to utilise their lands more efficiently. Moreover, tax rates would be adjusted annually to cater for unusual occurrences such as droughts, flooding and fluctuations in farm break-even points.

The Land Tax Bill, presently under discussion proposes to derive a "standard hectare" from a bundle of crops, in order to gauge average output value, minimizing the effects of high value crops such as tobacco and flowers. Four to five crops are to be utilized to derive an index of the rated value of output centred largely around maize. A further difference, from the Tax Commission's proposals, entails the computing of the average value of the actual gross-margins of the crops on a standard hectare, based on observed and potential cropping and yield patterns, in small administrative localities, developed around Intensive Conservation Areas. A similar or standard hectare index is to be derived for grazing lands. Significantly, present government thinking is to levy only on non-cropped arable land. This departs from the

marginal utility concepts implicit in the Chelliah Commission's proposals. Utilising the "standard hectare indices" for each locality, tax rates up to 5% of output value would be applied to the un-cropped arable land of a given farm. Farmers will be required to produce farm plans and cropping data for the Government to determine taxable hectarages.

The major problem remains the inadequacy of data. Agritex has calculated the actual and potential output in all wards or Intensive Conservation Areas based on existing weak production and soils data. Farm plans will require a variety of approaches to valuation if they are to be available in the near future.

This shows that the use of land taxation as an ancillary measure for land redistribution was neglected during the first conservative phase of the land reform programme in Zimbabwe and may only become feasible after 1995, when farm plans have been developed by farmers for most large-scale commercial farm holdings. Indeed, the problem of inadequate planning data and resources to implement such a land tax could restrict the effective implementation of the proposed bill.

Land Policy and Legislation

The government relied for its initial land reform programme solely on purchasing land available on the market. This land policy, cast within a transformatory socialist framework, remained vaguely focused on the broad objectives of "... achieving an acceptable and fair distribution of landownership", "... integrating the commercial and communal agricultural sector into a national system...", and encouraging a variety of production systems to include collective cooperative and state farming (GoZ, 1982). By 1985, the government had passed a new Land Acquisition Act, which allowed it the right of first refusal on all large-scale commercial farm lands for sale. Later, this legislation was changed again to lengthen the period required of the government in exercising its right of refusal from thirty to ninety days. But the constitutional constraints limited the government's ability to determine the acquisition pace and the quality of land acquired.

In practice the government continued to be steadfast in its defense of the property rights of the large-scale commercial farms throughout the post-independence period. Squatters were regularly and forcefully evicted from large-scale commercial farms and state lands, while

unsanctioned grazing and the use of natural resources on these farm lands as well as cattle rustling were strongly dealt with by the state and the law. Although it has been suggested that some politicians encouraged peasants to "squat" on state and large-scale commercial farm lands (Alexander 1993), the official position had mostly been to evict squatters, with most cases brought to the courts decided in favour of large-scale commercial farm landowners. It was only between 1980 and 1983 that "occupations" of large-scale commercial farm land, through "squatting", were somewhat formally tolerated by the creation of an "accelerated" Resettlement Scheme intended to accommodate "squatters" and other displaced persons. But the government decided which squatters deserved such resettlement and which land to settle them on. This was not always successful as squatters continued to gain access to resettlement land, through their selection by local politicians and officials.

The government's conservative land policy could also be implicitly read from its farm purchase loan programme. Government promoted the acquisition of large-scale commercial farm holdings by blacks through loans provided by the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC). Taking into account those farms which had been acquired through the AFC between 1978 and 1980, and those supported during the 1980's, over 400 large-scale commercial farm (LSCF) holdings were acquired by blacks. Numerous blacks also acquired urban farm plots for horticulture while others held onto SSCF lands. This indeed constituted a market based land transfer programme *par excellence*, given its focus on freehold transfers to blacks for large-scale commercial farming, even though loans were made available by the AFC for such purposes. Moreover, the government further encouraged blacks in large-scale farming by increasingly leasing some of its state leaseholdings in the LSCF to blacks. This aspect of land policy - the promotion of black commercial farming by the state through private land transfers - was hardly documented in official land reform statements during the 1980s.

The ruling party's Central Committee, which tended to have much influence over government policy organs, had in fact stipulated a leadership code which limited landholding by Zanu (PF) leaders to 50 acres. 'Leadership' covered such a wide range of people that it included most officials and politicians. This code, publicly debated in the mid-1980s, had ushered in a policy framework which generally opposed black entry into large-scale commercial farming. Until 1990, critics of the land reform programme had decried the fact that Government ministers and high ranking civil servants were among those that owned LSCF holdings. It was increasingly argued that the land redistribution programme had been compromised and become fully

conservative because of the conflict of interest inherent in increased LSCF holdings by politicians and officials (Moyo and Skaines, 1990). Private land transfers contradicted land policy pronouncements, since the government's socialist orientation in land policy was not reflected in the land transfers to the state farming sector and cooperatives. Collective cooperatives had gained access to 176,000 hectares, while state farms held over half a million hectares. In all, less than 5% of land transfers had accrued to these two sub-sectors during the 1980s, suggesting that the socialist aspect of land policy was more rhetorical than real.

Moreover, by 1988, the Government had reduced its land acquisition budget by over 50%, from over Z\$11 million in 1987 to exactly Z\$4 million (GoZ estimates, 1988/89). The major cutback was on collective cooperative farm land transfers, while the state farming agency, the Agricultural Development Authority, remained with 20 LSCF estates. Even before the new land policy of 1990, Government thinking had begun to lean towards dismantling collective cooperatives into individual holdings, purportedly because less than 15% of the arable lands held by collectives were cropped (Derude, 1987). The lack of social cohesiveness of collectives and the lack of support for the collective idea among some Government officials, and other factors spurred the policy shift towards "de-collectivisation".

Nonetheless, the state expanded its ownership and control of land throughout the 1980s. The land acquired for resettlement was redistributed to settlers under usufruct permits, wherein the state retained ownership of the land. The land rights of settlers were restricted particularly by provisions which allowed the state to revoke permits, (Derude, 1982, 1985). Settlers whose land use and land management practices were not satisfactory could have their permits revoked, as could settlers whose spouses were formally employed since resettlement then was intended for the unemployed and socially deprived. Land tenure insecurity was thus commonly viewed by settlers as a problem in Resettlement Areas. By adding state farm lands and resettlement areas to the lands held by the state, the government managed, during the 1980s, to substantially expand its landholding portfolio.

Land policy during the 1980s also changed towards increasing state control over land and natural resources utilisation in Communal Areas. The Communal Lands Act of 1982, by repealing the Tribal Trust Lands Act of 1979, removed the powers of chiefs and headmen in land allocation, and transferred these to elected District Councils. Fifty-five district councils were created in Communal Lands in place of the more than twice as many former African Councils.

These new councils in theory demarcate land for cropping and grazing, regulate crops grown and determine soil and natural resources conservation measures. Traditional leadership was also guaranteed a place in the decentralised participatory planning structures, promulgated by the Prime Minister's Directive, (GoZ, 1984). These leaders could also be elected into council. Their juridical powers over civil matters was removed during the first half of the 1980s. Since most civil conflicts and disputes tend to evolve around land and its use, state appointed "Community Court" officials gained legislative power, in theory, over land. In practice, 'traditional' leaders often retained control over courts.

The District Councils Act of 1957, amended in 1980, also provided greater powers to councils to create Natural Resource Committees in Communal Areas, and, through these, to regulate land use. In 1988 a Rural District Councils Act, intended to amalgamate the hitherto segregated white LSCF rural councils with Communal Area district councils, was enacted. It provided further powers to the new councils to protect commonly used or held lands from being damaged by individuals and to collect compensation for such damage. All of this legislation essentially increased the state's administrative control over land and natural resources allocation and use through the Minister of Local Government and his appointed officials. Indeed, the district councils were enabled, by amendments to the Communal Lands Act in 1985, to levy rates on peasant households for services, amenities and facilities provided by Government, and to approved land use plans developed by central Government planning agencies. In general these legislative changes tended to be ignored in various localities.

By the mid-1980s, the government had also begun to broaden its land policy to include the intensive re-planning of land use in Communal Areas. Thus, legislative changes in Communal Areas increased the relative authority of central state organs over land and natural resources, and therefore its instruments for implementing land use reorganisation in Communal Areas through proposed "internal land reforms" in Communal Areas. The focus of land use reorganisation remained, as had been the case with the Land Husbandry Act of 1951, to regulate and demarcate land use, particularly by separating arable, grazing and residential lands. Land and natural resource management practices could then be prescribed for these land segments, and responsibility for resource conservation defined. However, during the 1980s, the difference with the colonial era was that communities were expected to 'participate' in land use planning, while the state offered to provide water and other services at centralised residential sites. But local participation, "villageisation" and the provision of rural services

were not widely experienced during the period, because the government did not allocate adequate financial resources for this agenda.

Thus, land policy and legislative changes during the 1980s, operating within the Lancaster House Constitution's restrictions, were conservative in character, as they retained the integrity of land markets in the LSCF. State intervention in land markets through land taxation were sidelined, while those policies involving increased state ownership and controls over land flourished. Private LSCF land transfers to blacks were condoned and even supported through loans, in spite of the Government's socialist rhetoric, while collective cooperative land transfers increasingly became disfavoured. The major programme of land redistribution was focused on individual smallholders, as discussed below.

Land Redistribution in the 1980s

Land redistribution during the 1980s was based officially on the resettlement of people who had been displaced by the war: the landless, the poor, the unemployed and the destitute. It had been estimated by the government in 1981 that no more than 18,000 households needed resettlement on 1.5 million hectares over five years. This was scaled upwards in 1982 to 35,000 households and, in 1983, to 165,000 people on 5 million hectares (Auditor General, 1993). Official policy documents do not specify how these land redistribution requirements were computed. However, the government's Riddell Commission of 1981 had estimated landlessness and land shortages five times greater than the largest official targets mentioned above. At least 30% of the then 700,000 Communal Area households in 1980 were considered by some experts to reside on "over-populated" lands (Whitsun Foundation, 1983). While estimates of the number of unemployed or underemployed people vary, it is plausible that the figure continued to hover above 1 million persons throughout the 1980s. During the early years, government land redistribution targets appear to have been based on perceptions of the amount of land available for purchase, and therefore redistribution, by the Ministry responsible for land acquisition.

But the government has never formally computed the actual demand for land, in terms of numbers of households requiring land for different uses, including residential, arable or grazing lands, in different regions of the country. While local district officials have formally been required to keep registers of people opting for resettlement in Communal Areas, the reliability

of these registers is suspect. In 1993, the director of the resettlement programme announced that there was a waiting list of over 300,000 households (Herald, 1993). Yet, resettlement also tends to be perceived negatively by households which fear relocation in distant places, or who perceive it to involve the compulsory cultivation of hectares larger than are desired by some Communal Area households (Field Interviews 1993). Thus, the figure of 300,000 is probably an underestimate of those desiring land, assuming it were available under different conditions.

The government also attempts to informally gauge the demand for land through the records of squatters in the various districts, although these are not systematically collated into national aggregates. It has been estimated from local Government figures that there are at least 500,000 squatters throughout Zimbabwe's rural areas. Squatting is also common in the rural-urban fringes, while urban areas now face a housing backlog of close to 700,000 units. It is evident that present and future urban housing backlogs will have to be met through expansion into rural lands, particularly in the LSCF areas, because these surround Zimbabwe's main urban centres.

Since direct land claims were ruled out of the government's land reform programme and because national censuses of land requirements have not yet been undertaken, estimating the demand for land has always eluded government planners. According to the Auditor General, the government had set itself a target of acquiring 5 million hectares by 1985, and a further 4 million hectares by 1990, to match its target of resettling 162,000 families. In the end, the government seemed to use its settler selection procedures to minimize the official estimation of land demand. Indeed, around 1986, settler selection had become even more strict as it then focussed on master farmers. All of these approaches to determining the demand for land for the Reform Programme suppressed and minimized official estimates of real demands.

Moreover, the institutional framework of the government land reform programme was not effective in gauging demand or implementing reform. Nineteen ministries were involved in the Resettlement Programme, principally the Ministries of Agriculture, Local Government, Health, Transport, Education, Construction, Social Welfare. These brought into play a complex variety of objectives and targets. An inter-ministerial land identification and advisory committee, a land selection committee, a land acquisition committee, the Government Valuations office, a technical sub-committee and the Department of Rural Development (Derude) constituted the key organs for implementing the policy. Diverse institutional perceptions of the demand for

land, or the need for land to alleviate social and political problems, and other rural development issues, complicated land demand target setting. Some departments emphasized the welfare needs of communal households, while others emphasized farming objectives in their reviews of land needs and selection criteria.

In the 1980s, the document "Policies and Procedures of the Intensive Resettlement Programme", specified its objectives to include:

- a) relieving population pressure on (over-populated) communal lands;
- b) extending and improving the base for productive agriculture in the peasant farming sector (through individuals and co-operatives);
- c) improving the standard of living of the largest and poorest sector of the population of Zimbabwe;
- d) promoting their well-being as well as economic production through expansion and improvement of infrastructure and services;

A subsequent revision of this document in 1983 saw the inclusion of somewhat long-term objectives stated thus:

- Resettlement should eliminate the country's dependence on the numerically small large-scale commercial farm sector and be in a position to play a similar role to that of the commercial sector at that stage in the sphere of agricultural investment, employment, production, yields, food security, foreign exchange, etc.
- Fully realise autonomous self-management units by the settlers themselves with Government workers only playing an advisory role.
- To achieve the socialist transformation of agriculture (DERUDE, 1983).

With these varied objectives and targets, a variety of resettlement models and rather complex institutional arrangements for pursuing land reform, the implementation of the Resettlement Programme met with mixed success in terms of land acquisition, settler selection and placement, performance and impacts. The actual performance of the land reform exercise between 1980 and 1990 is further discussed below.

Land Acquisition, Settler Placement and Production

Bureaucratic and political conflicts over Zimbabwe's land reform tend to focus on the adequacy of land acquired for resettlement, in terms of the amount and quality of land procured, as well as on the use of such lands in relation to the fiscal viability of the land reform. Clearly the government did not meet the land acquisition and settler placement targets it had set for itself during the 1980s. On this basis, most critics of the government judge land reform to have been a failure. But the CFU and some external observers deem land acquisition for resettlement to have been more than adequate. For instance, the British ODA (1989), Durevall (1991) and Herbst (1991) regard land redistribution to have been successful because of the fact that within less than 10 years, 56,000 households, representing 300,000 to 400,000 people, were resettled, and that the LSCF had shrunk by 15 percent. These figures are considered indicative of a phenomenal achievement by global land resettlement standards.

The government purchased 2,780,863 million hectares from the LSCF in the 1980s (Table 4) at a cost of over Z\$76 million, or just under USD 13 million at 1993 exchange rates. Over 70 percent of this land was purchased during the first 5 years of the 1980s. The government also added 2,247 hectares of state land and 541,770 hectares of forfeited derelict lands to the Resettlement lands, bringing the total land available for redistribution to 3,324,880 hectares.

TABLE 4.1: LAND PURCHASED FOR RESETTLEMENT

FINANCIAL YEAR	LAND PURCHASED (HA)	AMOUNT PAID (\$)
1979-80	87 415	1 699 750
1980-81	223 196	3 517 198
1981-82	900 196	18 803 158
1982-83	939 925	22 009 187
1983-84	159 866	4 536 168
1984-85	75 058	2 966 849
1985-86	86 187	4 444 610
1986-87	133 518	3 898 335
1987-88	20 319	874 200
1988-89	63 917	2 807 335
1989-90	91 266	10 508 100
TOTAL	2 780 863	76 164 890

Source: Auditor General's Report, 1993

The problem, however, was that over 44 percent of these lands were in the marginal Natural

Regions IV and V, while another 37 percent were located in natural region III. Thus the total hectarage of the prime lands acquired amounted to less than 19 percent of the total Resettlement lands (Auditor General, 1993). Moreover, over 8,000 hectares of land acquired under a directive from the Minister of Lands in the early 1980s at a cost of \$230 000, were deemed to be unsuitable for resettlement. According to the government this pattern of land acquisition was a result of the restrictive legal land market conditions and the rising land prices (Mangwende, 1990). Indeed, by 1987, the government had slowed down not only land acquisition but also the resettlement programme as a whole, again reportedly due to the quality of land and the size of land blocks available on the land market. Thus, over 235,000 hectares of land acquired for resettlement nationwide were not yet resettled by 1990, in spite of the land demand evident in provincial resettlement "waiting lists" (Table 4.2).

TABLE 4.2: LAND ACQUIRED FOR RESETTLEMENT BUT NOT YET OCCUPIED

PROVINCE	AREA (HA)	COST (\$)
Manicaland	2 137.00	496 600
Mashonaland East	9 234.22	1 970 500
Mashonaland Central	9 987.00	1 644 714
Mashonaland West	11 161.70	280 000
Midlands	15 202.00	812 400
Masvingo	1 954.00	79 300
Matabeleland North	9 444.00	449 500
Matabeleland South	176 868.00	3 308 455
TOTAL	235 987.92	9 041 469

Source: Auditor General's Report, 1993

However, according to real estate agencies (Duravell 1991), land price increases were quite rapid during the decade. While from 1974 to 1979 estimated real land prices had declined by 40 percent, during the 1980s they more than doubled, in Zimbabwean dollar terms. In U.S. dollar terms, real prices shot up by 40 percent, with the difference indicative of the large devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar. These increases reflected the high demand for land, increased farm investment, and speculative pricing during the 1980s (Duravell, 1991). Broader evidence suggests that land price increases were higher in the higher rainfall areas in the Mashonaland provinces than in other parts of the country.

Settler placement on acquired land by early 1989 amounted to only 47,678, out of a planned

total of 69,011, based on existing acquired land. Over 80 percent of the settlers were resettled on the Model A Scheme. This entailed individual arable holdings of 5 hectares, a small residential plot and access to grazing land ranging from 10 to 30 hectares per household, depending on the agro-ecological conditions. Less than 900 households had been planned for and settled on Model C schemes, involving household out-grower plots on state farms. Few of the close to 8,000 households which had been planned for resettlement on the Model D or grazing schemes had been resettled by 1993. The pace of resettlement was fast in the first four years of the 1980s, with around 10,000 families settled per annum, only to slow down to less than 5,000 families settled per annum during the late 1980s, (Cusworth, 1990). This reflected massive political pressure for access to land in the first few years, during a period when the government's control of state power was weak, which was a period when its hegemony over leftist intellectuals, ex-combatants and party leaders, as well as peasant communities was still uncertain.

The provincial distribution of resettlement was uneven, with Masvingo, Midlands, Manicaland and Mashonaland provinces averaging around 400,000 hectares distributed per province and around 6,000 settlers per province. Manicaland had resettled over 13,000 households by 1989, while Matebeleland North and South saw less than 2,000 settlers placed per province on much less land. Out of the land acquired among the provinces, Mashonaland Central and the two Matebeleland provinces had settled the fewest people on the acquired land capacity. Land abandonment in the Mozambique border area during the liberation war in the late 1970s, and intensive peasant LSCF land occupation in the early 1980s, had placed pressure on the resettlement programme in Manicaland province. Meanwhile, political conflict over Matebeleland up to 1986 had slowed resettlement there. Indeed, local studies suggest that local Government and political leaders leased large tracts of lands for their state-supported cattle fattening enterprises in the Matebeleland provinces, while the Resettlement Programme was halted by political conflict (Alexander, 1992). The Mashonaland provinces, which hold most of the prime arable lands, were never planned for large-scale resettlement (Table 4.3 and 4.4).

TABLE 4.3: NUMBER OF PEOPLE RESETTLED BY MAY 1989

PROVINCE	NO. OF HECTARES	SETTLERS PLANNED	SETTLERS PLACED	% OF CAPACITY
Manicaland	542 872	15 062	13 656	90.67
Mashonaland Central	394 784	11 407	6 337	55.55

Mashonaland East	212 120	6 982	5 578	78.89
Mashonaland West	393 053	7 762	6 606	84.11
Masvingo	403 246	5 469	5 180	94.72
Matabeleland South	150 591	1 620	1 262	77.90
Matabeleland North	263 889	2 752	1 986	72.17
Midlands	546 547	17 957	7 073	88.89
TOTAL	2 847 102	69 011	47 678	80.79

Source: Auditor General's Report, 1993

TABLE 4.4: PLANNED TARGETS OF PEOPLE TO BE RESETTLED

PROVINCE	MODEL "A"	MODEL "B"	MODEL "C"	MODEL "D"	TOTAL
Manicaland	12 750	1 485	827	-	15 062
Mashonaland Central	2 292	1 515	-	7 600	11 407
Mashonaland West	5 858	1 124	-	-	6 982
Mashonaland East	6 519	1 243	-	-	7 762
Masvingo	5 299	170	-	-	5 469
Matabeleland North	1 620	-	-	-	1 620
Matabeleland South	2 701	51	-	-	2 752
Midlands	16 951	1 006	-	-	17 957
TOTAL	53 900	6 594	827	7 600	69 011

Source: Auditor General's Report, 1993

The overall costs of resettlement during the 1980s were slightly over Z\$200 million in constant prices (Ministry of Agriculture, 1989). The British Overseas Development Agency contributed half of this amount. The resettlement costs per settler averaged around Z\$4,000 in constant prices, inclusive of land acquisition, infrastructure and development costs. These costs amounted to less than 0.5 percent of the total government annual budget. Thus, the government did not make a great financial commitment to land reform, when compared, say, to its annual maize subsidies to private grain millers and consumers, which stood at over one billion Zimbabwe dollars per annum until 1993.

A study by Cusworth (1990) concluded that land utilisation rates in the individual settler schemes varied widely. The majority of settlers cultivated no more than 60% of their arable holdings while others cultivated more land than was allocated to them for cropping. Given that these areas are mainly in areas of unreliable rainfall, it is not surprising that resettlement

farmers cultivate larger proportions of land available to them than LSCF farmers located in prime lands. Grazing lands tend to be utilised less in the resettlement areas since over 50 percent of the settlers do not own cattle (Derude data, 1992). The majority of the resettlement schemes produce maize and cotton for own consumption and sale (Derude, 1992). Cusworth (1990) found that they contributed up to 1.2 percent of marketed crop outputs on 2.5 million hectares, with their average yields amounting to half those of LSCF farmers and twice those of their Communal Area counterparts (Table 4.5).

TABLE 4.5: MAIZE PRODUCTION PER HECTARE IN AGRICULTURAL SUB-SECTORS

YIELD KGS/HA	1983/84	1984/85	1985/86	1986/87
Commercial Farms	2 600	5 500	5 000	3 600
Resettlement Areas	1 115	1 205	1 709	742
Communal Areas	600	1 500	1 300	500

Source: Cusworth, 1990

The collective cooperatives were found, in a local study, to have the lowest rates of land utilisation, at less than 14 percent arable land cropped, and with yields per hectare barely above those realised by Communal farming households (Moyo, et al, 1989). Resettlement farmers on the whole have been found, in various surveys, (CSO, 1988/89, Cusworth, 1990 and Ushewokunze, 1991), to realise incomes around the Z\$1,000 per annum mark, at least 20 percent above communal incomes and close to the planned targets of \$1,500 per family.

State agricultural support to resettlement areas grew extremely slowly. Extension worker/household ratios hovered around 1:850, more or less similar to Communal lands, while marketing infrastructure in the form of collection depots are reportedly below the level of access found in Communal Areas (Fieldwork). Credit was initially granted to below 10 percent of the resettlement farmers. In 1991, less than 5,000 households received mostly short-term loans for inputs. Altogether, however, resettlement areas were not a prime target for government agricultural support. Indeed, even the government has admitted that it underfunded settlers, who in any case, because of their poverty, had no means to establish reasonable productivity levels (Mangwende, 1990).

Yet most of the resettlement lands located in Natural Regions IV and V had not been

significantly cropped by their previous LSCF holders. CSO Agricultural Census data shows that those LSCF districts falling within natural regions III, IV and V cropped well below 200,000 hectares throughout the 1980s.

TABLE 4.6: SUMMARY OF LOANS GRANTED IN EACH PROVINCE (1990/91 SEASON)

PROVINCE	LARGE SCALE COMMERCIAL												SMALL SCALE COMMERCIAL				RESETTLEMENT SECTOR				COMMUNAL SECTOR				TOTALS			
	Number		Value		Number		Value		Number		Value		Number		Value		Number		Value		Number		Value					
	Granted	Granted	Granted	Granted	Granted	Granted	Granted	Granted	Granted	Granted	Granted	Granted	Granted	Granted	Granted	Granted	Granted	Granted	Granted	Granted	Granted	Granted	Granted					
	Actual	As a % of	Actual	As a % of	Actual	As a % of	Actual	As a % of	Actual	As a % of	Actual	As a % of	Actual	As a % of	Actual	As a % of	Actual	As a % of	Actual	As a % of	Actual	As a % of						
	Prov.	Prov.	Prov.	Prov.	Prov.	Prov.	Prov.	Prov.	Prov.	Prov.	Prov.	Prov.	Prov.	Prov.	Prov.	Prov.	Prov.	Prov.	Prov.	Prov.	Prov.	Prov.	Prov.					
	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total					
Masvingo	74	2 10.15	76	184	6 0.51	4	251	8 0.25	2	2 834	85	2.50	19	3 343	9 13.41	6												
Manicaland	154	4 24.61	82	76	2 0.26	1	1 166	27	0.93	3	2 995	68	4.10	14	4 391	12 29.90	13											
Midlands	74	1 5.48	56	125	3 0.77	8	811	16	0.52	5	4 097	80	3.07	31	107	14 9.84	4											
Mashonaland East	165	4 34.06	88	56	1 0.22	1	734	17	0.97	3	3 264	77	3.45	9	4 219	11 38.70	17											
Mashonaland West	294	3 54.79	86	197	2 0.90	1	1 293	12	1.18	2	8 814	83	6.54	10	10 598	29 63.41	28											
Mash. Central	265	4 60.68	90	102	2 0.76	1	358	5	0.83	1	6 091	89	5.01	8	6 816	19 67.28	29											
Matebeleland*	107	5 5.36	73	21	1 0.21	3	45	2	0.03	1	2 095	92	1.70	23	2 268	6 7.30	3											
TOTALS	1 133	3 196.13	85	761	2 3.63	2	4 658	13	4.71	2	30 190	82	26.37	12	36 742	100 229.84	100											

Source: AFC Bi-Annual Statistical Digest, 1991: Harare

* Two Provinces

Land transfer had thus not displaced production, since 50% of the settlers had introduced cattle on these lands, and were able to at least feed themselves. Thus resettlement tended to ease the annual social welfare burden faced by the government in providing regular drought and nutrition relief in some Communal Areas. Without access to irrigation resources, however, it is not surprising that resettlement yields were below those of the LSCF, and that their production for markets was not diverse. The combination of redistributing poor quality land among poor rural households and low levels of state agricultural support services and investment reduced the chances for resettlement areas to perform better than the average LSCF area.

Conclusion

What ostensibly began as a socialist-oriented land reform programme, implemented on the basis of market forces of land supply, ended up as relocation of the poor onto the margins of the LSCF. Public pressure, especially from professionals, the CFU, and Government officials, thus forced the government to rethink its land reform policy by 1989, in view of widespread expectations that Resettlement Areas could improve their production capacity.

This new land policy formulation process is discussed in detail in chapter eight. We first discuss in the following three chapters, the nature of the land problem in Communal Areas at a regional scale in the next chapter and at the level of the locality in the subsequent two chapters. Such a discussion will reveal the demand side problems of land policy formulation in Zimbabwe, given the overwhelming but inadequate focus on supply side issues of land policy as discussed in chapter three and four.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE COMMUNAL AREAS' LAND PROBLEM

Introduction

As mentioned earlier, most debates on the land question have been focused on national land supply issues to the neglect of the concrete land problems facing rural households. Therefore, this chapter examines the land problems confronting Zimbabwe's rural households. The purpose is to explore the nature of Zimbabwe's land question at the sub-national or regional level, and concurrently at the agricultural sub-sectoral level as represented by "Communal Area Farming". Through a national household survey of demographic features, resources and assets available, as well as agricultural production and incomes, the chapter investigates the significance of land, its use and its distribution in Communal Areas. This analysis enables us to understand the fundamental logic of the requirements and use value of land among Zimbabwe's peasant households, and to trace the nature of social differentiation and agricultural growth associated with land problems in Communal Areas. A variety of social and economic processes operative in Communal Areas are examined in order to explain the emergence of rural differentiation, household reproduction constraints associated with land and the nature of future land demands.

The Communal Areas as Regional and Economic Sub-Sector

The Communal Areas constitute a distinct sub-national regional entity based on the specific administrative and political demarcation of rural lands, which historically separated them from LSCF and state land areas or zones. Formerly known as "reserves" for the various "tribal" population "groups", they were governed, through chiefs, sub-chiefs and village headmen, by white "District Commissioners", reporting to a Minister of Native Affairs. The liberation war was waged through guerilla campaigns sustained in the Communal Areas. The return to lost lands was a key aspect of rural mobilisation in these areas (Moyana, 1984).

There are 173 Communal Areas located within 55 district council areas, now in the process of amalgamating with LSCF rural council areas. The Communal Areas occupy 42% of Zimbabwe's land area, with over 85% of them located in Natural Regions III, IV and V (see Table 6.1). The current Communal Area population stands at approximately six million, comprising

approximately one million households, having grown from a population of around 3 million in the 1960s, comprising less than 500 thousand households. Thus just over 75% of the rural population and approximately 56% of Zimbabwe's total population reside in the Communal Areas (CSO, 1992).

The average population density of Communal Areas stood at 25.7 persons per square kilometre in 1982, with the highest density of between 31.6 ppkm² and 80.5 ppkm² found in those few Communal areas located in natural regions I, II and III (Thomas, 1992). The provincial distribution of Communal Area populations varied widely (Table 5.1), with Manicaland and Masvingo containing the highest densities at over 80 ppkm, the two Matebeleland provinces having the lowest densities (11-17 ppkm²), and the rest falling in between.

Such Communal Area population variations among provinces reflect de-population and substantial movements of people due to land alienation differences and the prevalence of tsetse-fly in the northern Zambezi belt.

TABLE 5.1: DISTRIBUTION OF COMMUNAL LAND (KM²) AND POPULATION ('00s) BY NATURAL REGIONS

NATURAL REGION:	I	II	III	IV	V	TOTALS							
PROVINCE	AREA	POP ^N	AREA	POP ^N	AREA	POP ^N	AREA	POP ^N	AREA	POP ^N	AREA	POP ^N	ppkm ²
Manicaland	1 002	807	3 577	1 812	4 192	1 551	6 858	2 138	3 876	1 398	19 505	7 706	39.5
Mashonaland Central			3 410	1 796	1 853	390	10 253	1 148			15 516	3 334	21.5
Mashonaland East			4 738	2 739	1 380	519	7 693	1 619			13 811	4 877	35.3
Mashonaland West			2 595	995	5 376	1 461	2 490	271	2 718	87	13 179	2 814	21.4
Matebeleland North					1 065	116	20 203	2 671	8 310	621	29 578	3 408	11.5
Matebeleland South							8 817	2 033	15 458	1 998	24 275	4 031	16.6
Midlands			64	31	10 563	3 224	13 004	3 449	2 910	907	26 541	7 611	28.7
Masvingo					2 423	1 221	8 588	4 285	9 934	2 640	20 945	8 146	38.9
TOTALS	1 002	807	14 383	7 373	26 852	8 482	77 906	17 614	43 206	7 651	163 350	41 927	25.7
Pop ⁿ density (ppkm ²)	80.5		51.3		31.6		22.6		17.7		(Ave) 25.7		
Area as % of total	0.6		8.8		16.5		47.7		26.4		100.0		
Pop ⁿ as % of total	1.92		17.59		20.23		42.01		18.25		100.0		

Source: Thomas (1992)

NOTES:

1. Data compiled using the Department of Agritex map "Administrative Area (ha)", showing boundaries as at October 1990, the published Govt. of Zimbabwe map "Natural Regions and Farming Areas", showing boundaries as at July 1993, and population data from the "1982 Population Census: A Preliminary Assessment" produced by the Central Statistical Office, Harare (1984).
2. Figures for both land area and population ignore Small-scale commercial farming areas which occupied 4650 km².
3. Figures ignore *Mafungabusi Forest Area* which occurs in NR III in Midlands Province (*Cheziya Gokwe District*), occupying 821 km² and holding 7 873 persons (9.6ppkm²) in 1982.

Wide intra-regional variations of the population of Communal Areas between provinces are found, with, for instance, provincial population densities within Natural Region IV ranging from 3.2 ppkm² in Mashonaland West to 41.1 ppkm² in Masvingo (Thomas, 1992, p7). Generally, Mashonaland West records low population densities in both Natural Regions IV and V, due to its long perimeter straddling the Zambezi river. However, over the last three decades, following Government resettlement schemes, the eradication of tsetse-fly and voluntary migrations, there has been a north-bound movement of Communal Area populations from the provinces located in the south.

The African reserves were created gradually from 1894, beginning with the Gwayi and Shangani reserves in Matebeleland, and moving on to create the Mashonaland reserves. The process of settler occupation entailed the alienation of fertile agricultural lands, the seizure of cattle, the expropriation of wildlife hunting rights and the creation of exclusive forest reserves. The rest of the lands were devoted to African Reserves. While the indigenous population was sparse at the turn of the century, with densities below 3 person per square kilometre, as population grew and land alienation ensued, black people's access to fertile and arable lands declined rapidly, and so did the natural resources. By 1980, land use experts were arguing that over 66 per cent of the Communal Lands had excess populations of more than double their assessed carrying capacities (Whitlow, 1980).

Indeed, the Communal Areas have been increasingly marginalised through their densification, consequent upon the "distribution incongruity in space" (DIS) between population density and land potential (Mehretu, 1991). This phenomenon arose not from voluntary or spontaneous avoidance of certain areas because of their physical shortcomings, but because of land alienation and forced migrations (Ibid, p.4). Yet the Communal Areas are also unfavourably located in terms of the density of roads, railways and urban centres (see Map 5). Thus 20 of the 55 District Councils Areas are locationally marginalised, at the remote extremities of Zimbabwe's boundaries (Ibid, p.8). Furthermore, Communal Areas are fragmented, among and around LSCF and state land areas, into approximately 30 discontinuous territorial units (Mehretu, 1991, p.8), unlike the LSCF rural council areas, which dominate the highlands, prime arable lands and major transport infrastructure routes in a relatively continuous land mass.

The economic marginalisation and densification of Communal Areas have thus played a critical role in the accentuation of environmental degradation in those areas. The main aspects of environmental degradation found in Communal Areas thus include: land degradation, deforestation, siltation, veld over-grazing, stream-bank degradation, and the general loss of bio-diversity (Gore, et al, 1992). These forms of degradation have been

closely associated with population density, poverty, the lack of various infrastructures, low levels of investment and receding entitlements in Communal Areas (Ibid). But high population density in relation to the low agro-ecological potential of Communal Lands remains a key factor in growing environmental degradation (Mehretu, 1991).

The Economic Position of Communal Areas

It is this overall pattern of poverty, environmental degradation and economic marginalisation of the Communal Areas which prompted the "dual economy" thesis regarding Zimbabwe's development structure. Broadly speaking, the "dual economy" perspective, propounded by many authors, emphasized the primacy of the colonial state's sanctions in targeting development towards the white "sectors of the economy through its discriminatory allocation of various factors of production, particularly land and capital". By expanding its control over land, labour, financial and technical resources, the colonial state systematically extracted cheap labour from the African reserves through various taxes exacted on a growing peasantry, and it reduced economic incentives for agricultural production through the regulation of produce markets. Colonial policies also restricted industrial and commercial development in Communal Areas, through a variety of regulations, as a way of protecting the settler enclave economy (Grierson et al, 1992). Thus earlier spurts of agricultural growth in the Communal Areas, which competed well with the LSCF sector, particularly in food markets had by the 1940's been strangled by colonial policies (Schmidt, 1992).

Therefore, before 1980, as many researchers observe, the logic of economic development foisted on the Communal Areas, was primarily one intended to promote the reproduction of cheap labour at minimal cost to the state. The "Reserves" were nurtured to supply labour to settler agriculture, mining and industrial capital. They were not nurtured for economic growth as other regions and economic sub-sectors were. According to Bond (forthcoming), this development logic was generated by the demands of finance capital, particularly during the period of rapid industrial growth experienced between 1930 and 1970. After this period, the demand for labour saw a sharp decline, with LSCF agriculture shedding 30% of its labour force between 1972 and 1982. These trends thus undermined the colonial economic logic for Communal Areas, necessitating, in an increasingly hostile political environment, a new development strategy for the Communal Areas.

After independence, the Zimbabwean state promoted a variety of policies aimed at redressing the economic imbalances which affected Communal Areas and sought a new development logic there. Agricultural policies removed discriminatory marketing and

produce pricing, doing so in favour of Communal Areas. Output marketing infrastructures were established, some credit for peasants was provided, and agricultural extension services were expanded in Communal Areas (GoZ, 1991). Rural development policies initiated included the resettlement of Communal Areas to decrease land pressure, land use reorganisation, population planning, the development of off-farm activities, primary water supplies, small-scale irrigation schemes, road construction, and rural electrification (Ibid).

Currently, the government is also reviewing its industrial and commercial policies, with a view to deregulating enterprise development in Communal Areas, increasing its financial and technical support to small-scale enterprises in Communal Area business centres, providing title deeds for business stands there, de-protecting large-scale enterprises and allowing the free-marketing of farm produce in Communal Areas (Grierson, et al, 1992). These policy changes indicate the government's acknowledgement of the need for economic growth in Communal Areas, and reflect a shift from the "dual economy" logic.

But the Communal Areas continued in the post-1980 period to face legislative strictures on land administration and use as discussed in greater detail in chapter nine. The principal problems identified by rural people were: the overwhelming authority provided to the Minister of Local Government, Urban and Rural Development in the control over allocation, use, conservation and exchange of land; the exclusion of traditional leaders from land allocation and land use controls, with these now resting in elected district councils; the absence of an appropriate land tenure system, particularly for business transactions; the restricted rights of local peoples in the exploitation of wildlife and forest resources, and the absence of adequate compensatory measures for the loss of land rights and property when local lands are transferred for public use.

To these legislative and administrative strictures on land control, access and use in Communal Areas, must be added a host of substantive land problems confronting households in Communal Areas. These issues are explored through a discussion of the household level survey data presented below.

Household Land Holdings, Land Use and Reproduction

Moving beyond aggregate national analysis of the land question, Communal Area households have heterogeneous social relations of production, and control of, access to and uses of land. Diversity in household capacities and strategies to reproduce their farming

conditions and their families is, among other things, strongly related to the wider structuring of Communal Areas in terms of their location, the demographic patterns, agro-ecological potential, capital accumulation, and production practices and outcomes. Thus household data on landholdings, land uses and land requirements provide a rich basis for conceptualising Zimbabwe's land problem.

The demographic structure of the 759 Communal Area households surveyed, more or less slightly typical of most poor rural communities in the developing world, establishes the primary structural factor governing Zimbabwe's land problem and the social relations of land dependent household reproduction. Communal Area households, defined as a set of family members living together and sharing the same hearth, were found to have an average size of six persons, with minimum and maximum household sizes of three and 20 respectively, representing a total sample population of 5,470 people. The sex-age structure of the household sample revealed an equal proportion of males and females in the overall population, while those below 15 years and above 65 years of age constituted 44% and 4% respectively (Table 5.2). Thus approximately 48% of the sample population were economically dependent on the active labour force of just over half the population.

TABLE 5.2: POPULATION DISTRIBUTION BY AGE AND SEX

MALES			FEMALES		
AGE GROUP	NUMBER	% TOTAL	NUMBER	% TOTAL	TOTAL %
0-4	295	51	285	49	100
5-9	420	51	408	49	100
10-14	442	50	437	50	100
15-19	388	52	357	48	100
20-24	268	53	238	47	100
25-29	150	45	183	55	100
30-34	124	44	160	56	100
35-39	86	45	103	55	100
40-44	64	39	101	61	100
45-49	74	46	85	54	100
50-54	81	48	89	52	100
55-59	71	56	56	44	100
60-64	65	50	64	50	100
65-69	59	59	41	41	100
70-74	26	54	22	46	100

75+	17	50	18	50	100
TOTAL	2 630	50	2 647	50	100

Source: Household Survey 1989. N = 759 Households.

Percentages are row percentages

Females, however, dominated the middle aged population grouping given that 34% of the households were female-headed. Of these 16% were de jure female-headed households based on separation, divorce or being widowed, while 18% were de facto female-headed largely due to male migration in search of employment (see Tables 5.3, 5.4, 5.5). Thus the bulk of the households had family compositions dominated by children and women, given also that most divorcees and the widowed residing in the Communal Areas were women, and that only a handful of households were polygamous. The data suggest that the Communal Area labour force remains heavily female based and tasked with the responsibility of maintaining relatively high proportions of dependent and infirm peoples. (In addition, as many as 32% of the male households spent less than three months at home).

TABLE 5.3: HOUSEHOLD SIZES

HOUSEHOLD SIZES	NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS	PERCENTAGE
1	18	2
2	35	5
3- 5	220	29
6- 7	181	24
8- 9	132	17
10-11	80	11
12-13	52	7
14-15	26	3
16+	13	2
TOTAL	757	100

Source: Household Survey 1989 N = 759.

TABLE 5.4: CIVIL STATUS

STATUS	PERCENTAGE
Single	65
Married	31
Divorced/Separated	1
Widowed	2
Other	0

Source: Household Survey 1989 N = 759.

TABLE 5.5: HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION

RELATION	% OF CASES
Head	11%
Spouse	14%
Son	33%{ 3 children
Daughter	28%
Other	14%
TOTAL	100%

Source: Household Survey 1989 N = 759.

More than 35% of the youth were found to be at school, while 12% were in pre-schools, and the rest had either left or never been to school (Tables 5.6 and 5.7). As many as 33% of the sample of household heads were found to be illiterate, while over 72% of the school-going population had been to school for over 5 years.

TABLE 5.6: EDUCATIONAL STATUS

	PERCENTAGE
At School	35
Left School	34
Never Been	18
Pre-School	12

Source: Household Survey 1989

N = 759

TABLE 5.7: EDUCATIONAL LEVELS

LEVEL ACHIEVED	PERCENTAGE
Grade 1-4	31
Grade 5-7	41
Form 1-2	16
Form 3-4	11
Form 5-6	1
Degree	0

Source: Household Survey 1989

Very few of the households had members who had completed secondary schooling, let alone attended tertiary education. The Communal Area population was therefore disadvantaged in terms of education and skills training, a factor found also to restrict their up-take of formal extension messages. Taken together, the demographic characteristics outlined above suggest that land requirements over the next 10 to 15 years will bulge as the youthful population matures, while the substantial female land tenure requirements should manifest growing incompatibility with the male-oriented land allocation procedures found in Communal Areas. Indeed, the role of women in farming is expected to grow as migration grows, as marital status moves towards a tendency for more single women and as the dependency ratio remains high. Thus a broad use-value attached to land, principally for the basic social reproduction needs (food, school fees etc) of households, is indicated by the above demographic structure.

Household Land Resources and their Maintenance

Communal Area households gain access to land usufruct rights in commonly held grazing areas, to arable land fields allocated to them previously by chiefs and currently by district councils, as well as to small plots for homesteads and vegetable gardens. The arable fields and plots held by households are exclusively utilized by the given households and, in practice, these are inheritable by the male progeny. Fields and plots are customarily transferable to other households if and only when they have been abandoned by the given households for numerous years. Such transfers, sanctioned by local councillors and chiefs, usually involve the consent of the household with use rights to the fields and plots, except where the latter are not contactable for extended numbers of years. It was also reported by various households and key informants that increasingly some household heads exact compensation for "developments" such as huts, sheds, granaries, wooden fencing and sometimes trees, on the plots and fields, when these are transferred to other community members with local land usufruct rights, or to other outsiders seeking access to arable land.

Given that approximately 45% of the Communal Area households are estimated not to possess or have access to cattle "kept" for non-resident urban relatives (Cousins, 1990), and that grazing lands are increasingly being converted for cultivation, access to arable fields is more and more the key resource around which households and farming are reproduced. Yet a growing number of Communal Area households confront increasing land shortages associated with absolute declines in available land and sub-division of arable fields, both associated with demographic growth. The survey data revealed that as many as 70% of the

households had access to less than 2.5 hectares (or 6 acres) of arable land, while 33% actually held less than one and a half hectares. Only 30% of these households had 2.5 to 3.7 hectare fields of arable lands, with a mere 13% of them holding rights to more than 3.7 hectares, (Table 5.8).

TABLE 5.8: HOUSEHOLD ARABLE LAND SIZE DISTRIBUTION

LANDHOLDING SIZE (HECTARES)	NO. OF RESPONDENTS	%
0,4047-1,2141	246	33
>1,2141-2,4282	277	37
>2,4282-3,6423	123	17
>3,6423	99	13
TOTAL	745	100

Source: ZIDS National Household Survey

It will be recalled that the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951, which had provided for the individual control of land allocation and utilisation, and which had required "natives" to perform labour towards conserving natural resources to ensure efficient land use and husbandry, had intended to give households fixed land tenure rights to average land holdings of 6 acres. Such a land holding size was deemed adequate for the "subsistence" requirements of Communal Area households. Indeed, Agritex land use planning models still work on the 6 acre landholding threshold in their current Communal Area Land Use Re-organisation Programme, even though the planners recognise the unavailability of land to meet the said threshold, as shown by the survey data.

When we examine household arable land holdings according to the agro-ecological potential of the land, as indicated by its distribution among the Natural Regions (Table 5.9), it becomes evident that Communal Area households are predominantly

TABLE 5.9: LAND DISTRIBUTION BY NATURAL REGION (PERCENTAGE)

NATURAL REGION	>1.2	1.2-2.4	2.41-3.6	>3.6
I	5%	2%	1%	1%
II	10%	17%	21%	22%
III	19%	21%	20%	17%
IV	40%	45%	39%	40%
V	20%	14%	20%	19%

TOTAL NUMBER	250	277	123	99
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Source: ZIDS Household Survey N - 745 Households

cultivating marginal land. On average, considering all land holding sizes, 60% of Communal Area households cultivate fields located in Natural Regions IV and V, while less than 23% cultivate fields in Natural Regions I and II. These figures correspond to the skewed national level distribution of Communal Areas among the natural regions. However the data emphasize the fact that less than 25% of Communal Area households are engaged in stable farming enterprises given the reliance of the majority on rainfed cropping.

The bulk of households are confronted with erratic rainfall, which suggests a highly risky farming system, given also that close to half of the households have no livestock to sustain them or complement their cropping enterprises.

The data also shows the widespread variety and heterogeneous farming and land access conditions within Communal Areas. Indeed, as land shortages grow, most local communities reportedly face increasing conflicts among households based on both the intra-Communal Area inequities in land access, in terms of selection for access to resettlement lands. But, importantly, the data show that around 50% of the households could be deemed near landless or land hungry, while approximately 25% of the households are essentially landless, given also the poor quality of their small-sized arable fields.

To supplement household arable holdings, which tend to be used for major crops such as maize, cotton, sunflower and small grains, women in many Communal Areas tend to be allocated small garden plots in their individual capacity. Indeed Government and NGO food security and nutrition programmes have tended to encourage female dominated gardening on small individual and group plots. The latter tend to be promoted in conjunction with water development projects based on wells, boreholes and other small-scale irrigation works.

Less than 10% of the households reported membership in group gardens, while as many as 23% of the households reported having special plots, averaging 0.8 hectares each in size, for their use as individual women household members. Less than 5% of the households reported having between 2 and 4 hectares of special land allotments for women, and these were mainly in Natural Regions IV and V where such plots are used for extensive cropping. These supplementary plots were found to be predominantly allocated to food crops such as groundnuts for peanut butter, various types of beans and potatoes, vegetables, and, in some

cases, maize, sunflower and small grains. Supplementary plots when added to the main household field plots, however, still amounted to a low average household arable land holding of less than 3 hectares.

Given the small amounts of land available to households, the maintenance of soil fertility is critical to production in a situation where land fallowing is increasingly unattainable. The more accessible form of soil fertility maintenance in Communal Areas tends to be the use of cow dung every three to four years. The data survey reveal that this practice has become less common given that on average only 35% of the households reported that they regularly manured their fields (Table 5.10).

TABLE 5.10: MANURE USE BY AGRO-ECOLOGICAL REGION

NATURAL REGION	% OF FARMERS USING MANURE	% OF FARMERS WITHOUT MANURE
All Natural Regions	35	65
I	55	45
IIa	15	85
IIb	12	88
III	47	53
IV	49	51
V	24	76

Source: ZIDS Household Survey N = 759

Interestingly the manuring of fields was most common (55%) among those households in Natural Regions I, III and IV. The extremely erratic rainfall of Natural Region V explains the tendency for fewer households to manure, while the generally lower number of household cattle holdings in Natural Region II also explain the lower rate of field manuring there. It was confirmed by some households that since those in Natural Region I tend to have smaller arable fields, higher yield potentials and a greater land potential to produce high value crops, they also tended to invest more in the maintenance of soils through manuring and that volumes of manure required were also smaller.

Yet among households in Natural Region I only 27% fertilized their soils with purchased inorganic materials, while those in Natural Regions IV and V were less inclined (10%) to use

fertilizers (Table 5.11). Because the risks associated with crop failure increase where fertilizer use is met with inadequate rainfall, farmers in the worse natural regions rely more on organic matter to maintain their fields. Local knowledge suggests that organic matter poses fewer risks to crop. But those farmers in Natural Regions I, II and III, wherein the bulk of Zimbabwe's maize and cotton production occurs, registered the highest fertilizer application levels. This reflects a combination of reasons, including rainfall reliability, better soil fertility and higher availability of agricultural services particularly in Natural Region II areas, which tend to border LSCF area and benefit from infrastructure meant to service the latter.

TABLE 5.11: HOUSEHOLD FERTILIZER USE BY REGION

NATURAL REGIONS	% FARMERS WHO APPLY FERTILIZER	% FARMERS NOT USING FERTILIZER
I	27%	73%
IIa	48%	52%
IIb	31%	68%
III	25%	75%
IV	9%	91%
V	10%	90%

Source: ZIDS Household Survey N = 759

Yet, in general, many Communal Area households appear, from the data, to be increasingly unable to invest in the maintenance of their land through both organic and inorganic fertilization methods. Clearly a trend towards increased commoditization of soil fertilization through the purchase of inorganic materials is evident in the wetter regions, where crop sales and farm incomes tend to be higher. The effects of both social and regional differentiation among households in terms of access to arable land holdings, incomes and cattle, are reflected in the above diverse patterns of soil maintenance, characterised by a growing proportion of households unable to invest in land improvement. The emerging character and the correlated aspects of this rural differentiation are discussed further later. Here we need to emphasize that the quantity and quality of land available to Communal Area households are both declining, and a large number of households are unable to maintain land quality or intensify land use through soil fertility measures. This is reflected in the production outcomes discussed below. But first we discuss the pattern of livestock ownership as a means of assessing the use-value of land, beyond its cropping

potential.

Household Livestock Resources

The utility of livestock in Communal Areas is diverse. Cattle are a key livestock because households derive various benefits from them including: organic matter for soil maintenance, draught power, meat and milk, collateral for borrowing and cash incomes from sales. Livestock also have culturally respected benefit streams such as their use for *lobola* in marriages, as the currency for civil compensations associated with various societal transgressions, their use in spiritual functions, and as a measure of wealth. Ownership of livestock is therefore critical for a wide range of household reproduction and exchange functions. But the ownership of cattle in particular has been central to the mixed farming system of the majority of Communal households, especially because cattle are essential to land maintenance and ploughing. Land allocation traditions and current planning models have always catered for livestock grazing, as a key input for both land development and household reproduction.

Yet only 43% of the households surveyed owned cattle, while 59% owned goats, with cattle ownership in terms of numbers per household and ownership per se, increasing in the drier Natural Regions (see Table 5.12).

Most of those owning cattle had cows and oxen, with few households owning bulls, heifers and steers. Less than 20% of the households owned donkeys, which, together with oxen ownership, reflected an imbalance in draught power ownership.

TABLE 5.12: LIVESTOCK OWNERSHIP - REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION

TYPE OF LIVESTOCK	NRI	NRIIa	NRIIb	NRIII	NRIV	NRV	AVERAGE
Cattle:							
Bulls	36	9	15	16	21	9	18
Cows	27	44	55	57	43	30	43
Oxen	18	46	45	50	31	16	34
Heifers	9	26	24	28	19	10	19
Steers	9	24	21	20	15	8	16
Calves	0	17	23	28	25	10	17
Donkeys	9	0	0	3	28	23	11
Goats	73	19	45	48	54	64	51
Sheep	5	0	5	6	4	7	5

Pigs	5	4	9	3	5	9	6
Chickens	82	87	84	84	79	82	83
Ducks	14	2	13	3	3	5	7
Rabbits	9	9	9	2	1	4	6
Others	0	0	0	1	0	2	0

Source: Household Survey N = 759

As many as 59% of the households indicated that they did not own their own draught power. As many as 298 households (96% of this sub-group) therefore resorted to hiring, borrowing and getting assistance from relatives for their ploughing and local transportation needs. Interestingly, more of those in the drier regions (45%) reported draught power shortages than those in wetter regions (35%). Larger land holdings in dry regions and growing tractor hire services in the wetter maize belt areas explain this pattern.

Judging from the data in Table 5.12, it is evident that livestock ownership in Communal Areas is tilted more towards small stock such as chickens (83% of the households), followed by goats and then the different types of cattle. Over 75% of all the livestock held were thus small animals, while cattle constituted 17% of gross livestock numbers. Donkeys (15%) were most common in the Matebeleland provinces, particularly in Natural Region IV (Table 6.12). Most households valued their autonomous ownership of bulls. For instance, the bull to cow ratio within the cattle population stood at 1:5 compared to the officially recommended ratio of 1:50. Yet the general stock of Communal Area bulls is regarded to be of inferior quality.

Altogether, livestock ownership was extremely skewed among households, reinforcing the expectation that Communal Area households increasingly confront growing differentiation and inadequate means for their social reproduction. This particularly suggested a contradictory tendency for many households to face difficulties in effectively managing the little land available to them. Furthermore, a sizeable number of households are incorporated into the market place to secure basic land maintenance and ploughing services, as they lack autonomous means to avail themselves of these services.

Moreover, although women headed a sizeable proportion of the households and were predominant in the older age categories, less than 20% of them owned livestock in their own right, with most of them owning mainly chickens and small ruminants. While women-headed households have access to male owned cattle resources, their

decision-making powers in various transactions involving livestock are restricted. Given their crucial role in the farming and household reproduction system, this resource ownership pattern constrains their land management strategies and access to other economic opportunities.

Farm Technologies and Labour Management Practises

The adoption of a variety of farm technologies by peasants in Southern Africa, particularly the ox-drawn plough, and high-yielding seed varieties of staple crops, are a distinctive feature of the agrarian transformation of those societies (Mafeje 1989 and Rorhbach 1988). As shown below, adoption of the plough and high yielding are high, while the adoption of inorganic fertilizers in our sample was relatively low. However, most farm equipment is individually owned by few Communal Area households. A total of 67% of the households surveyed owned a plough and 63% owned yokes (Table 5.13). Most of the remaining households borrowed or hired ploughing services, especially of an ox-drawn nature. As many as 98% of the households used hybrid maize and cotton seeds.

TABLE 5.13: HOUSEHOLD OWNERSHIP OF SELECTED ASSETS

ASSETS	% SAMPLE	AVE. NO. OWNED
Ploughs	67	1
Yokes	63	3
Bicycles	36	1
Wheelbarrows	36	1
Scotch-carts	32	1
Ventilated Toilets	32	1
Cultivators	27	1
Harrows	18	1
Spraying Equip.	11	2
Radios	25	1
Water Carts	3	1
Maize Sheller	0,5	3
Hoes	96	5
Planters	3	3

Source: ZIDS Household Survey

Beyond the plough, very few households owned planters (3%), while only 27% owned cultivators, 18% owned harrows, and 11% owned spray equipment. A larger proportion of around 33% owned transport equipment such as scotch-carts, bicycles and wheelbarrows.

Therefore, the bulk of farm tasks such as planting, weeding, cultivation and on-farm and local transportation, are performed through manual labour by most Communal Area households. The shelling of the maize staple crop and the fetching of water and wood are also predominantly labour intensive tasks.

Less than one quarter of households own radios, which means that essential information on farming and a wider range of matters related to a market-led economy are inaccessible to most households. With little print media available in Communal Areas, and with high illiteracy rates, person-to-person communications are the norm. Again such communication requires human movements with all its associated monetary and time costs.

Yet the data suggests that approximately 25% of the Communal Area households are now dependent on the market for farming equipment, and many more for their ploughing, seed and transportation requirements. However, there is clearly a shallow degree of technological change, capitalization and commoditisation of the majority of farm tasks. Indeed, the old age of most equipment (averaging 12 years) is indicative of a somewhat hesitant dependence on markets for the tools of labour (Table 5.14), given that income levels are generally low, as discussed later.

TABLE 5.14: AGES OF SELECTED EQUIPMENT

ASSET	AVERAGE AGE (YRS)
Ploughs	14
Cultivators	15
Harrows	12
Hoes	9
Scotch-Carts	11
Radios	9

Source: ZIDS Household Survey

Yet up to 37% of the households reported that they had experienced severe labour shortages, especially for the cash crop maize (45%), for groundnuts (11%), sorghum (13%) and cotton (12%). As Tables 5.15 and 5.16 show, these crops are subject to labour bottlenecks particularly in weeding, which was reported as the task for which most households (48%) hired labour, followed by harvesting (24%) and ploughing. As many as 75% of the households reported hiring small amounts of labour.

While most households facing labour bottlenecks could pay small amounts in cash or kind for small amounts of hired labour, many households still cited labour bottlenecks as a critical farming constraint, especially for women. The actual allocation of hired labour reveals the nature of the bottlenecks faced by households, most of which lack adequate farm equipment.

TABLE 5.15: HOUSEHOLDS REPORTING LABOUR SHORTAGES BY CROP

CROP	%
Maize	45
Mhunga	6
Groundnuts	11
Sorghum	13
Rapoko	4
Cotton	12
Sunflower seed	6
Other	3

Source: ZIDS Household Survey

TABLE 5.16: ACTIVITIES DEMANDING HIRED LABOUR

TASK	HOUSEHOLD HIRING
Weeding	48%

Harvesting	24%
Ploughing	13%
Planting	7%
Other	8%

Source: ZIDS Household Survey

To better appreciate the nature of the Communal Area farming system's technological and labour mix, it is necessary to examine the broad cropping and land use patterns as well as the labour intensive nature of farm practices. Maize (88%), groundnuts and sorghum were the main food crops grown, while cotton (17%) maize (14%) and sunflower seed (20%) were the key cash crops as reported by the households (Table 5.17). Households cropped an average of 3.8 hectares, of which over 81% of the area was allocated to food crops.

TABLE 5.17: DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD AND CASH CROPPING

FOOD CROP				CASH CROP			
	% H/Hold	% Area	Cropped		% H/Hold	Average	Area
							(Acres)
Maize	88	46		Cotton	17	3.6	
Groundnuts	34	19		Maize	14	3.6	
Sorghum	34	18		Groundnuts	3	3.7	
Mhunga	16	9		Sunflower	20	2.4	
Rapoko	15	8		Sorghum	2	3.7	

Source: ZIDS Household Survey

Linking this data with land holding distribution, it was clear that about 30% of the households cropped large areas, particularly in the drier regions, while some households cropped land which was essentially allocated to grazing. Therefore some households increasingly required hired labour to supplement family labour.

Among the 235 households (30% of the sample) who reported critical labour bottlenecks,

170 (22% of the total sample) had hired short term labour, while the rest had resorted to working longer hours or participating in labour exchange activities with neighbours. But a total of 2,192 persons or an average of five persons per household had been engaged for a few days during the year by the 413 hiring households (Table 5.18).

TABLE 5.18: TOTAL SHORT-TERM HIRED LABOUR BY CROP

CROP	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE	AVERAGE
Maize	966	44	5
Mhunga	182	8	7
Groundnuts	244	11	5
Sorghum	341	16	6
Rapoko	37	2	2
Cotton	230	10	5
Sunflower seed	192	9	7
TOTAL	2 192	100	5

Source: Household Survey

The bulk of the labour had been allocated to food crops (maize, sorghum and groundnuts), which are also sold in local markets and to the state's Grain Marketing Board. The majority of those hired were women (67%), reflecting the female dominated demographic structure and their need for supplementary incomes for their household reproduction challenges. This pattern of labour commoditisation in relation to labour bottlenecks for the performance of critical farm tasks tended to be backed up mainly by child and female labour (Tables 5.19 and 5.20). Female and child labour on average dominated the planting, weeding, fertilization, cultivation and crop processing farm tasks (Table 5.19). These tasks absorbed most of the family and hired labour. The most labour intensive crops were the small grains, [sorghum, mhunga (millet) and rapoko (finger millet)], as well as cotton and groundnuts (Table 5.20).

TABLE 5.19: LABOUR UTILIZATION FOR ALL CROPS CONSIDERED TOGETHER

ACTIVITY	LABOUR HRS PER DAY	NO. OF DAYS PER OPERATION	MALE LABOUR	FEMALE LABOUR	CHILD LABOUR
Ploughing	6	9	2	1	2
Discing	6	3	1	1	3

Planting	6	8	2	2	3
Weeding	7	18	2	2	3
Fertilization	6	3	2	2	3
Cultivation	7	13	2	2	3
Harvesting/Picking	7	16	2	2	3
Spraying	6	13	1	2	2
Shelling	6	10	2	2	3
Grading	6	12	2	2	3
Packing	6	8	2	2	3
Transportation	6	6	1	2	2
AVERAGE	6	10	2	2	3

Source: Household Survey 1989 N = 638

TABLE 5.20: LABOUR UTILIZATION FOR DIFFERENT MAJOR CROPS

MAJOR CROP	LABOUR HRS PER DAY	NO. OF DAYS PER CROP	MALE LABOUR	FEMALE LABOUR	CHILD LABOUR
Maize	6	9	2	2	3
Sorghum	6	13	1	1	3
Cotton	7	12	1	2	2
Mhunga	6	11	3	2	2
Rapoko	6	10	1	1	2
Groundnuts	10	8	2	2	3
Edible Dry Beans	2	3	2	2	2
AVERAGE FOR ALL CROPS	6	10	2	2	3

Source: Household Survey 1989 N = 638

Household labour requirements tended to be higher for those crops which were planted using high yielding varieties (HYV) or certified seeds. As many as 98% of maize plantings used HYV's while cotton and sunflower seed were the only other crops which households planted using HYV's. As already mentioned, less than half of the sample used fertilizers for maize and cotton, while 85% of those growing cotton and 50% of those growing maize reported the use of pesticides. Therefore maize and cotton absorbed the bulk of the total labour requirements, and production for cash tended also to necessitate labour hiring during

those periods when the timely performance of particular farm tasks was critical; namely planting and harvesting.

Thus, there was a shift of the goals of Communal Area land use away from home consumption or self provisioning towards market-led uses. This is reflected not only in the commoditization of household labour and farm technological or knowledge processes, but also in the commitment of increasing amounts of land towards market led crop production. Indeed, some of the land reportedly allocated to maize for home consumption is also devoted to the market, as even those households which do not consider maize to be a cash crop, sell small amounts for their petty cash requirements.

This gradual conversion of the use value of land towards cash income-oriented goals seems to heighten the problems of land shortages and inequitable access to land. Thus some households deploy various sources of labour and income towards the application of technologies which maximize their land usufruct rights through an expanding capacity to effectively use larger tracts of land.

The effective deployment of labour towards the maintenance of land and use rights by households can also be traced through various other agronomic practices. Very few households (less than 30%) had adopted recommended livestock management practices such as the use of various veterinary medicines, improved breeding and feeding supplementation. A sizeable proportion followed officially recommended agronomic practices such as winter ploughing (52%), planting with the first rain (76%), stagger planting (53%), and crop rotation (25%), or applied anthill soils (19%) to improve soil fertility. But these recommended land maintenance strategies all required additional labour.

Given the labour bottlenecks faced by many households, those with diverse sources of income stood a better chance of mobilizing adequate labour to invest in land improvements and to effectively produce cash crops. Yet 75% of the households relied mainly on their own savings from farm operations for future farm investments (Table 5.21).

TABLE 5.21: FINANCIAL SOURCES OF HOUSEHOLDS

SOURCE	% SAMPLE
Credit	6
Own Cash	75
Remittances	16
Other	4

Source: ZIDS Household Survey

Remittances and credit were the other important financial sources. The minor role played by credit among the financial sources relied upon by the households (6%), suggests that Communal Area households tend to prioritize autonomous reproduction strategies, albeit relying to some degree (16%) on cash remittances from urban areas. Indeed communal households tend to view the main officially available financial institution, the state lending Agricultural Finance Corporation, as a usurious and unsympathetic organisation. This is because the interest charges (albeit at subsidized rates) and the insistence on repayment schedules in spite of frequent droughts, are seen to be heavy handed. For instance, while AFC lending to Communal Area households had risen from about 3,000 in 1980 to 90,000 households by 1986, lending fell to approximately 40,000 households by 1990 (Kidd, 1991). As repayment rates fell below 40%, the AFC, between 1991-1994, went all out on a campaign to impound the farm equipment of those in arrears.

Sources of income for wider household reproduction were quite diverse (Table 5.22). Households reported a reliance on: crop and livestock sales (74%), remittances (31%), wages and salaries from local employment (19%), crafts and beer sales (36%).

While non-farm income-generation strategies are important sources for household reproduction needs, farm sales were predominant. Yet the dependence by households on agricultural incomes suggests an unstable basis for household reproduction given the relatively poor land quality and land holdings, and the erratic rainfalls confronting most of them. Land maintenance strategies used by households also tend to be risky, especially where labour is hired and large proportions of farm inputs are purchased. Crop failure and low yields in such circumstances imply dramatic losses and the incapacitation of the key household reproduction strategy.

TABLE 5.22: SOURCES OF INCOME FOR COMMUNAL FARMERS

SOURCE	RESPONDENTS	% OF SAMPLE
Crop Sales	365	48
Livestock Sales	201	26
Remittances	234	31
Wages & Salaries	145	19
Craft Sales	137	18
Credit	54	7

Beer Sales	136	18
Other	242	32

Source: Household Survey N = 759

The quality of land thus plays a critical role in income sources among households. As shown below, (Table 5.23), larger proportions of households in Natural Regions II and III (approximately 80%) reported crop sales as their critical source of income, while many in regions IV and V (approximately 30%) cited livestock sales as their critical sources of income. Other sources of income were less influenced by land potential, although there was a tendency for larger proportions of households in drier regions to use the sale of beer and crafts to augment their incomes.

TABLE 5.23: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME SOURCES (%)

SOURCE	NRI	IIa	IIb	III	IV	V
Crop Sales	23	80	89	76	34	19
Livestock Sales	18	19	21	25	27	34
Remittances	17	33	23	31	36	24
Wages & Salaries	14	15	9	22	20	21
Sale of Crafts	32	9	15	14	22	15
Credit	14	9	6	6	7	9
Beer Sales	14	17	19	19	19	23
Other	32	28	34	34	34	41

Source: ZIDS Household Survey

Crop Outputs and Food Security

Given the importance of agricultural sales to household reproduction, the instability of current Communal Area household reproduction could be traced through the productivity of land and food availability. On average, the yields per hectare of the Communal Area household sample for all the crops were two to three times lower than yields found in the LSCF areas, especially where the use of HYV's and adequate farm inputs are applied in situations where rainfall is reliable or irrigation is applied to production in the LSCF. Maize yields were 3.4 tonnes per hectare compared to LSCF averages of 5 tonnes per hectare.

Yet, historically, this maize yield level marks an improvement on average Communal Area

yields of approximately 0.7 tonnes per hectare. This yield growth is attributable to the intensification of household crop land use through the application of fertilizers and HYV's.

TABLE 5.24: ESTIMATED AVERAGE CROP OUTPUT AMONG HOUSEHOLDS

CROP	AVE. AREA (ACRES)	AVE. OUTPUT (BAGS)	YIELD (BAGS/ACRE)	YIELD (KG/HA.)
Maize	4	24	6	3 413
Mhunga	4	4	1	230
Rice	3	1	0,5	
Groundnuts	4	5	1	200
Edible Beans	3	3	1	
Sweet Potatoes	1	5	5	
Sorghum	4	4	1	230
Rapoko	4	4	1	230
Cotton	4	12 bales	3	
Sunflower seed	2	14	7	962,5
Nyimo	3	3	1	
Nyemba	4	2	0,5	

Source: ZIDS Household Survey N = 759

Generally, households reported that they retained, on average, about 1 tonne of maize for home consumption, as opposed to the officially recommended retention levels of about 1.5 tonnes per household. This suggests that they combined the maize staple with small grains and beans to realize adequate calories, although the overall amounts of the latter crops produced were not high (Table 6.24). Households retained an average of one bag each of small grains and beans.

Interestingly, the sample households were selling close to 50% of their maize, small grain, beans and groundnut outputs. This suggests a trade-off between dependence on self-provisioning and the allocation of cash incomes from sale to other foods (sugar, tea, bread, etc.) and social reproduction needs (school fees, transportation, health etc.). However, the reported value of crops sold was estimated to be lower than could be realised if officially controlled and parallel market prices had been realised by households. For all crops sold, prices realised by households were below the official prices by 33% for maize, 50% for mhunga, 85% for groundnuts and 53% for sunflower seed. With the current

liberalisation it is estimated that some households may be realising as little as 50% for the major crop maize, while cotton prices remain favourable to households due to the tighter marketing controls and the limited number of users of cotton lint.

Therefore, in spite of the relatively poor prices realised by Communal Area households, they had developed a high tendency to sell substantial proportions of their output. This reflected a growing dependency on local markets to secure the basic household reproduction needs. Yet, 47% of the households reported that they considered their food production to be inadequate. Large proportions of farmers in Natural Regions IV (55%) and V (82%) reported food shortages, reflecting the restrictions posed by poor land quality.

Among those who were food-short, the majority had to purchase their food (77%), while remittances, borrowing from relatives and drought relief were other less important options available to households (Table 5.25).

TABLE 5.25: FOOD SUPPLY OPTIONS OF FOOD SHORT HOUSEHOLDS

OPTIONS	NRI	NRIIa	NRIIb	NRIII	NRIV	NRV	TOTAL
Borrow	10%	0%	5%	3%	3%	4%	4
Purchase	80%	80%	76%	91%	73%	79%	77
Remittance	5%	0%	0%	6%	8%	9%	7
Drought Relief	0%	10%	5%	0%	7%	2%	5
Other	5%	10%	14%	0%	6%	1%	5

Source: ZIDS Household Survey

Thus, a good proportion of household incomes was allocated to food purchasing. Food crops were also supplemented with food from livestock products. As many as 528 households (70%) reported some livestock sales. While 39% of the absolute number of animals sold were cattle, these contributed 55% of the total livestock sales value realised by the households (Table 5.26). By contrast, 51% of the animals sold were goats, while they only realised 35% of the total sales values. Sheep and pigs were less traded, although piggeries are increasingly being developed by some Communal Area households.

TABLE 5.26: LIVESTOCK TRADING NUMBERS AND VALUES

VOLUME OF LIVESTOCK SALES

+-----+					
TYPES OF	RECORDS	NUMBER OF	PERCENTAGE	AVERAGE	
LIVESTOCK		LIVESTOCK		SALES	
+-----+					
Cattle	230	432	39	2	
Pigs	15	35	3	2	
Goats	254	551	51	2	
Sheep	29	66	6	2	
+-----+					
TOTAL		1 084	100		
+-----+					
VALUE OF LIVESTOCK SALES					
+-----+					
LIVESTOCK	TOTAL VALUE	PERCENTAGE	AVERAGE PRICE		
+-----+					
Cattle	53 166	55	123		
Pigs	2 620	3	75		
Goats	34 034	35	62		
Sheep	6 194	6	94		
+-----+					
TOTAL	96 014	100			
+-----+					

Source: ZIDS Household Survey

As many as 1,205 animals were slaughtered for home consumption, amounting to less than two beasts per household over one year. Fifty three per cent of these were goats and 37% were cattle. But only 70% of the households reported slaughterings, suggesting that this group of households had access to approximately 2.5 beasts for meat each year. The rest relied mainly on chickens for meat. Thus, up to 30% of the households had to rely on the crops they produced and purchased to realise a broadly based food diet. Indeed, access to milk could have been restricted only to that half of the households which owned cattle.

In order to further understand the above precarious food security patterns among households in Communal Areas, it is necessary to examine the relationships between household access to land and other socio-economic factors characterizing the sample. In pursuing this, it will also be critical to examine the nature of household social differentiation,

in order to identify those elements which improve the prospects for households to reproduce themselves.

Social Differentiation of Communal Area Households

An examination of the data in search of those factors which distinguish the capacity of households to reproduce themselves revealed that landholding size, the ownership of various farm equipment and assets, income sources and the age of household heads were critical factors.

Clearly arable landholdings tend to be largest in the drier regions. But those household heads who had got land allocated to them during the colonial era were the majority of those with access to arable landholdings in Communal Areas. For instance, about half of those who held land (291 households) were over 50 years of age (Table 5.27), having retained access over 30 years ago. Only 5% of the landholders were under 21 years, and only 22% of the landholders were younger than 36 in spite of the predominance of younger people in the sample.

TABLE 5.27(a): AGE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD HEADS BY SIZE OF LAND (%)

LAND SIZE (HECTARES)	<21 YRS	=>21<36	=>36<=50	>50	TOTAL NUMBER
0-3	5%	19%	29%	47%	217
>3-<=6	5	15	35	45	223
>6-<=9	7	19	28	46	102
>9	5	15	28	53	80
TOTAL NUMBER	33	106	192	291	622

*Row percentages

TABLE 5.27(b): AGE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD HEADS (%)

LAND SIZE (ACRES)	<21 YRS	=>21<36	=>36<=50	>50	TOTAL NUMBER
0-3	5%	19%	29%	47%	217
>3-<=6	5	15	35	45	223
>6-<=9	7	19	28	46	102
>9	5	15	28	53	80
TOTAL	33	106	192	291	622

*Row percentages

Source: ZIDS Household Survey

This reinforces the suggestion that younger households were increasingly failing to gain access to arable land, hence their tendency also to migrate to towns in search of employment. When we relate access to arable landholdings to household sources of income (Table 5.28), we find that those with larger holdings (above 2.4 hectares) were the majority of those realising incomes from crop, livestock and beer sales. The receipt of remittances, credit, wages and other income sources were of equal importance for the financial requirements of those with arable holdings below and above 2.4 hectares.

TABLE 5.28: SOURCE OF INCOME AND LAND HOLDING SIZE

SOURCE	<2.4 HECTARES	>2.4 HECTARES
Crop Sales	37	65
Livestock Sales	22	34
Remittances	30	32
Wages from Salary	19	20
Craft Sales	19	18
Credit	8	6
Beer Sales	22	34
Other	31	34

Source: ZIDS National n=465 n=294

Household Survey

The ownership of field ploughs was not closely associated with arable landholding sizes. For instance, 77% of those who did not own a single plough held less than 2.4 hectares of arable land, with most of these holding below 1.5 hectares of arable land. Yet, about 70% of those who owned two ploughs and more also had smaller holdings. This pattern reflected the fact that ploughs are basic to the farming system, having become integrated into Communal Area farming systems for many decades, and with 70% of the households owning at least one.

TABLE 5.29(a): NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH PLOUGHS BY LAND-SIZE

NUMBER OWNED

LAND SIZE (ACRES)	0	1	2	>2	TOTAL H/H
0-3	107	171	26	7	311
>3-<=6	86	127	30	3	246
>6-<=9	32	63	14	4	113
>9	26	55	8	0	89
TOTAL	251	416	78	14	759

TABLE 5.29(b): % OF HOUSEHOLDS OWNING PLOUGHS BY LAND-SIZE

NUMBER OWNED

LAND SIZE (ACRES)	0	1	2	>2	TOTAL %
0-3	34	55	8	3	100
>3-<=6	35	52	12	31	100
>6-<=9	28	56	12	4	100
>9	29	62	9	0	100
AVERAGE	33	55	10	2	100

*Row percentages

TABLE 5.29(c): % OF HOUSEHOLDS OWNING PLOUGHS BY LAND-SIZE

NUMBER OWNED

LAND SIZE (ACRES)	0	1	2	>2
0-3	42	41	33	50
>3-<=6	35	31	39	21
>6-<=9	13	15	18	29
>9	10	13	10	0
TOTAL %	100%	100%	100%	100%

*Column percentages

Source: ZIDS Household Survey

TABLE 5.30(a): DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH CULTIVATORS BY SIZE OF LAND

NUMBER OWNED

LAND SIZE (ACRES)	0	1	2	>2	TOTAL H/H
0-3	251	56	4	0	311
>3-<=6	169	75	1	1	246
>6-<=9	75	36	2	0	113
>9	62	26	1	0	89
TOTAL	557	193	8	1	759

TABLE 5.30(b): % DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH CULTIVATORS BY SIZE OF LAND

NUMBER OWNED

LAND SIZE (ACRES)	0	1	2	>2	TOTAL %
0-3	81	18	1	0	100
>3-<=6	69	31	0,5	0,5	100
>6-<=9	66	32	2	0	100
>9	70	29	1	0	100
AVERAGE	73	26	1	0	100

*Row percentages

TABLE 5.30(c): % DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH CULTIVATORS BY SIZE OF LAND

NUMBER OWNED

LAND SIZE (ACRES)	0	1	2	>2
0-3	45	29	50	0
>3-<=6	30	39	13	100
>6-<=9	14	19	25	0
>9	11	13	13	0
TOTAL %	100%	100%	100%	100%

*Column percentages

Source: ZIDS Household Survey

TABLE 5.31(a): DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH HARROWS BY SIZE OF LAND

NUMBER OWNED

LAND SIZE (ACRES)	0	1	2	>2	TOTAL H/H
0-3	256	51	1	3	311
>3-<=6	202	41	1	2	246
>6-<=9	89	23	0	1	113
>9	72	16	1	0	89
TOTAL	619	131	3	6	759

TABLE 5.31(b): % DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD HARROWS BY SIZE OF LAND

NUMBER OWNED

LAND SIZE (ACRES)	0	1	2	>2	TOTAL %
0-3	82	16,5	0,5	1	100
>3-<=6	82	17	0,5	1	100
>6-<=9	79	20	0	1	100
>9	81	18	1	0	100
AVERAGE	82	17	0,5	1	100

*Row percentages

TABLE 5.31(c): % DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD HARROWS BY SIZE OF LAND

NUMBER OWNED

LAND SIZE (ACRES)	0	1	2	>2
0-3	41	39	33	50
>3-<=6	33	31	33	33
>6-<=9	14	18	0	17
>9	12	12	33	0
TOTAL %	100%	100%	100%	100%

*Column percentages

Source: ZIDS Household Survey

Yet, out of the 202 households (27%) of the whole sample who owned cultivators, most

(70%) held arable land above 1.5 hectares (Table 5.30). Similarly, of the 22 households who owned planters, 64% of them held more than 1.5 hectares. One hundred and forty households owned harrows and the majority of non-owners held less than 2.4 hectares of arable. The majority of those who owned harrows (61%) held more than 1.4 hectares (Table 5.31).

The sample of Communal Area households was therefore differentiated in terms of equipment ownership and land. Those who held less than 1.4 hectares of arable land tended to own less equipment while those who held more arable land held more equipment. Indeed, the larger hectares tended to require greater capitalization, although a sizeable number of those who held larger hectares ended up relying on labour for planting and cultivation purposes.

Similarly, in terms of scotch-cart ownership, those holding more than 1.4 hectares of arable land constituted the majority of owners (61%), even though those who did not own scotch-carts were proportionately equally represented within the various arable landholding groups of households (Tables 5.32). A similar association between bicycle and radio ownership and land holdings also prevailed among the households. This evidence suggests that the stabilisation of household reproduction, in terms of means of production, such as farm assets, tended to occur among those households with arable landholdings above 1.4 hectares.

TABLE 5.32(a): DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH SCOTCH-CARTS BY SIZE OF LAND

NUMBER OWNED					
LAND SIZE (ACRES)	0	1	2	>2	TOTAL H/H
0-3	216	93	2	0	311
>3-<=6	164	78	3	1	246
>6-<=9	80	33	0	0	113
>9	57	31	1	0	89
TOTAL	517	235	6	1	759

TABLE 5.32(b): % DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD WITH SCOTCH-CARTS BY SIZE OF LAND

NUMBER OWNED					
LAND SIZE (ACRES)	0	1	2	>2	TOTAL %
0-3	69	30	1	0	100

>3-<=6	67	32	1	0,5	100
>6-<=9	71	29	0	0	100
>9	64	35	1	0	100
AVERAGE	68	31	1	0	100

*Row percentages

TABLE 5.32(c): % DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD OWNING SCOTCH-CARTS BY SIZE OF LAND

N U M B E R O W N E D

LAND SIZE (ACRES)	0	1	2	>2
0-3	42	40	33	0
>3-<=6	32	33	50	100
>6-<=9	15	14	0	0
>9	11	13	17	0
TOTAL %	100%	100%	100%	100%

*Column percentages

Source: ZIDS Household Survey

Looking also at the demographic profiles of the households, the bulk of those holding above 1.4 hectares tended to be among those above 36 years of age. Thus middle-aged household heads with relatively larger arable landholdings tended to have more chances of having accumulated essential farm assets for effective crop production.

An examination of the combined ownership of various household and farm assets revealed an interesting clustering of household profiles (Table 5.33). For instance, only 31% of the households owned both ploughs and scotch-carts, the most fundamental tools of labour, given the intensity of the labour requirements of household tasks associated with these two assets. Eighteen per cent of the households concurrently owned ploughs, carts and cultivators. Combined ownership of the plough, a cart, cultivators and harrows tended to be less common, (10% of the households). Bicycles and planters were less commonly held with other assets.

These asset ownership clusterings suggest that approximately 20% of the total Communal Area households are well endowed with labour-saving technologies. The data tallies with the high incidence of labour shortages and dependence on labour hiring reported earlier.

Therefore the accumulation of basic capital among households tends to be partial and restricted to a few.

TABLE 5.33: OWNERSHIP OF EQUIPMENT

EQUIPMENT OWNED	% OWNING EQUIPMENT
Plough & Cart	31
Plough, Cart & Cultivator	18
Plough, Cart & Planter	2
Plough, Bicycle & Wheelbarrow	3
Plough, Cart, Cultivator & Planter	2
Plough, Cart, Cultivator, Planter and Wheelbarrow	1
Plough, Cart, Cultivator, Planter & Bicycle	18
Plough, Cart & Harrow	13
Plough, Cart, Cultivator & Harrow	10
Plough, Cart, Cultivator, Harrow & Bicycle	5

N = 759

Source: ZIDS Household Survey

Assessing the combined ownership of assets in direct relationship to arable landholding size revealed, consistently, that those holding above 2.4 hectares constituted the majority among the multiple asset holders (Table 5.34). Thus, twice as many of those who owned a plough and a cart held more than 2.4 hectares, while in the case of other asset combinations the proportion rose by a factor of three and more in a few cases (Table 5.34). Therefore, access to or the control of larger landholdings within Communal Areas generally played a critical role in capital accumulation. Specifically, less than 20% of the overall households managed to combine sizeable arable holdings with adequate labour-saving technologies. Hence also the tendency for fewer households to adopt various labour intensive practices such as cash cropping and recommended agronomic practices.

TABLE 5.34: OWNERSHIP OF EQUIPMENT FOR LAND LT6 ACRES AND GT OR EQ TO 6 ACRES

EQUIPMENT OWNED	<6	>=6
Plough & Cart	22	44
Plough, Cart & Cultivator	10	31
Plough, Cart & Planter	2	3
Plough, Bicycle & Wheelbarrow	12	21

Plough, Cart, Cultivator & Planter	1	3
Plough, Cart, Cultivator, Planter and Wheelbarrow	1	2
Plough, Cart, Cultivator, Planter & Bicycle	10	31
Plough, Cart & Harrow	8	20
Plough, Cart, Cultivator & Harrow	5	17
Plough, Cart, Cultivator, Harrow & Bicycle	3	10

n=465 n=294

Source: ZIDS Household Survey

Thus, with these patterns of asset ownership, very few households could plausibly combine the cropping of over 2.5 hectares, if these were available, based on higher value but labour intensive crops such as cotton and groundnuts, together with adequate and timeous fertilization, cultivation, weeding and various soil conservation works. Therefore access to land was found to be highly skewed and restrictive for the majority of younger household heads. Their inability to secure labour-saving technologies tended also to restrict their capacity to bid for larger land usufruct rights and to defend such rights through effective land utilization.

Yet the income sources available to households tended to influence the propensity of households to embark on the accumulation of various forms of farm equipment and technology. The analysis (Table 5.35) shows that those households which concurrently owned a plough and a scotch-cart, together with another item such as a cultivator or a planter and/or a bicycle, tended to be well represented amongst those for whom agricultural sales were a critical source of income.

Adding the incidence of beer sales as a source of income for those who own multiple sets of assets, we can infer that the products of land, both cropping and livestock tend to be the critical basis upon which household capital accumulation rests.

TABLE 5.35: PROPORTION OF HOUSEHOLDS OWNING EQUIPMENT BY SOURCE OF INCOME

EQUIPMENT OWNED	CROP SALES	L/STOCK SALES	REMIT-TA NCES	WAGES	CRAFT SALES	CREDIT	BEER SALES	OTHER
Plough & scotch-cart	43	45	32	34	30	22	22	28
Plough, s/cart & cultivator	29	27	18	21	18	17	10	15
Plough, s/cart & planter	3	4	1	1	4	2	0	2

Plough, bicycle & w/barrow	19	23	22	20	21	6	10	14
Plough, s/cart, cultivator & planter	3	4	1	1	2	2	0	2
Plough, s/cart, cultivator, planter & w/barrow	2	4	1	1	1	2	0	2
Plough, s/cart, cultivator, planter & bicycle								
Plough, s/cart & harrow	29	27	18	21	18	17	10	15
Plough, s/cart, cultivator & harrow								
Plough, s/cart, cultivator, harrow & bicycle	19	20	15	14	14	15	7	10
	16	17	12	13	12	13	4	7
	8	11	7	8	7	6	3	4
TOTAL	365	200	235	145	137	54	136	242

Source: ZIDS Household Survey

Therefore, a dialectical process of interactive relationships among factors such as gaining access to larger units of arable land, livestock ownership, asset accumulation and incomes realised, are critical to the selection by households of suitable strategies for the effective control and management of land and labour resources. As indicated earlier, the growing reliance by households on the market place for inputs and additional labour for their farming are also contingent upon reliable income sources. Most households, however, rely on the products of land to realise basic incomes which are supplemented by remittances and short-term wages sought locally. Thus, while access to land is the critical factor in household reproduction, very few households are able to capitalise on it for their increased crop and livestock outputs. Hence land productivity (yields) and volumes of crop and livestock sales remain low, with the latter dominated by less than half of the households.

Equally, the use of various investment or work strategies to improve upon the quality of land is restricted by the poor land potential that most households face. Moreover, the paucity of irrigation projects, and the inability of most households to purchase the inputs and extra labour required by such investments, limits the degree to which land improvement and intensification can be pursued by the majority of households.

As the absolute shortages of arable lands increases, particularly for those below 30 years, and as grazing lands are increasingly being allocated to new families, more households depend increasingly on marginal lands. This limits further the potential capacity for many households to reproduce themselves. Future land allocations within Communal Areas will

have to depend on access to land sub-divisions among numerous heirs, further degrading the capacity of households to reproduce themselves. Without access to resettlement land, most Communal Areas could experience an increased number of conflicts over land, and human degradation.

Land Grievances and Conflicts in Communal Areas

The survey data has shown how close to 30% of the households are near landless, and that many more have to struggle to reproduce their households based on farming. While many young men are shown by the demographic data to pursue out-migration from Communal Areas into towns as a survival strategy, many more remain dependent on land for their survival. With unemployment soaring above 30% of the national labour force, migration to urban areas is not a sustainable option for many Communal households. Indeed, while the role of remittances and local wage incomes were found to be important, they were not cited as critical sources of household incomes and farm investment. Yet, apart from young men, single, separated and de facto women heads of household increasingly constitute a major category of those in need of land. In fact incomes derived from the effective use of land seemed most critical to women, given their responsibility for the care and well-being of children. In this context, women require and demand access to land in their own right, whatever their civil status.

The above analysis and opinions garnered from various rural households indicate that land grievances are increasing in Communal Areas, particularly among younger households and women. Various parliamentarians, Government Ministers and some analysts have recently cited fears of a rural backlash and a third "Chimurenga" (liberation war). For this reason, the government's attempts to provide land and widespread drought relief (food), and drought recovery assistance (free seeds, fertilizers and some tractor ploughing) in the Communal Areas for two years after the 1992 drought, seem to be important palliatives for the land hungry. Yet critics see this simply in terms of vote buying for the 1995 elections. However, the vulnerability of Communal Area households, as shown above, is such that the capacity of most of them to build sustainable and stable livelihoods is uncertain.

Growing and politically organized land grievances in Communal Areas expressed by chiefs, local politicians, some communities, "squatters", ex-combatants and other concerned citizens are a sign that land policy must recognize the diverse land problems that face Communal Area households. The heterogeneity of land problems requires that local circumstances be examined further, as in chapter 7 and 8 below. The growing social differentiation identified throughout this chapter shows the multiple points of cleavage that Communal Areas potentially face, and the variety of solutions to be sought in terms of

access to land, technological change and various investment needs.

As elaborated further in later chapters, land occupations (referred to as 'squatting' in Zimbabwe), trespassing on LSCF properties to gain access to woodfuel, grass, grazing, water and other forest products, as well as trans-migration among Communal Areas in search of land, are key strategies adopted by households to resolve their individual problems. In the media, local politicians, chiefs and even public officials increasingly sound parochial as they opt for exclusivity, whereby ethnic groups or clans from other provinces and areas than their own are restricted from settling in their Communal Lands or nearby Resettlement Schemes.

Even some Communal Area communities, which in the past welcomed migrants bidding for access to land usufruct rights for their household reproduction only, increasingly blame outsiders for difficulties associated with land, nature conservation and even erratic rainfalls. Such parochialism and antagonism are fundamentally related to the unresolved land question within Communal Areas. Chapter nine will discuss the wider legal and administrative problems associated with land in Communal Areas. But apart from the subjective perspectives that are emerging on the land problem in Communal Areas, there is ample evidence that household reproduction there is constrained by, among other elements, land shortages.

Conclusion

The land problems facing Communal Area households are grounded in the inadequacy of available land, the problems of land inequities, and the instability and lack of resilience in the farming system, due to a host of socio-economic constraints. The restricted resource base limits the spontaneity and efficiency required for sustainable development at the household level. These problems are translated into a growing dependence on land resources utilized on an extensive basis, while household and agricultural reproduction are less and less guaranteed for the average household. The gradual incorporation of households into various markets reflects their growing external dependency. The socio-economic heterogeneity or diversity found among farming households in Communal Areas is thus structured into sets of household strategies aimed at maintaining their basic reproduction needs, and reducing their dependence on risky markets. Only a narrow segment of the differentiated households exhibit signs of agricultural growth and guaranteed reproduction.

Our analysis of the land problems at the level of Communal Areas suggests that a heterodox policy framework is required. Policies need to address household access to land, especially

among the younger households and among females; access to technologies that enhance the effective utilization of land and labour; water development to improve the prospects of land intensification in drier regions, and special incentives for the improved efficiency of those who already hold adequate land and own the essential labour-saving technologies. Local land control and effective land administration systems are also implied in the above.

The national level household survey has led to the realisation that demands for land reform need to be conceptualised in terms of their heterogeneity, based on variations in land by regional features such as agro-ecology and land use systems, and in terms of social differences related to age, sex, current levels of access to land, and the distribution of technology.

This chapter has however not addressed the more detailed socio-political problems and actual economic processes which underlie the land problems of Communal Areas. Such an analysis is necessary to understand the specific ways in which local communities and officials attempt to resolve their land problems. It is through such detailed local knowledge that macro-level land policy processes can best be understood. The next chapter pursues these aspects through a case study of a selected ward in Zimbabwe's Communal Areas. The ward is examined within the context of a district and other land tenure categories found in Zimbabwe, in order to provide a local mirror of the wider setting of the land question at the national level.

CHAPTER SIX

THE LAND QUESTION AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: THE CASE OF MHEZI WARD

Introduction

The last three chapters examined Zimbabwe's land question -- including land reform policies and redistribution experiences -- at the national level, and the regional level effects of agrarian change on the land question in Communal Areas. The conclusion was that post-1980 agricultural change, and a political transition leaning towards a market ideology, had influenced theoretical and public debate on land policy towards an emphasis on capitalist farming. This had sidelined social welfare considerations in land reform while the state maintained a dominant role in land market acquisitions and their administration.

Sub-national level demand for land in Communal Areas, at the household level, exhibited a heterogeneous matrix of demand profiles, based on regional variations in agro-ecology or natural resource endowment and economic infrastructure. The latter reflected the broader process of social differentiation among Communal Areas.

While this sub-national scale of analysis enabled us to identify and explore the broad reasons for differing demands for land, some of the elements which explain qualitative and quantitative differences in such demands have not been adequately assessed. There remains a gap in our understanding of the specific manifestation of household land access, land use and resource management problems. Indeed, the perception by peasants of such land problems, as well as the nature of local peasant and official agency in articulating and negotiating demands for land, require further analysis.

This chapter extends the investigation of demands for land by Zimbabwe's rural households. It examines the specific socio-political resource base, economic and institutional situation as well as processes of land demand at the micro-spatial level. The specific questions addressed are:

- What is the qualitative and quantitative nature of land problems facing households? How do land requirements and uses affect peasant household reproduction?
- What land bidding strategies are adopted by individual households and groups of households in pursuance of their reproduction?
- What processes of institutional mediation over land problems have emerged at the local level?

Conceptualising the land Problem at the Local Level

Most rural research on Zimbabwe which addresses issues of land, environmental sustainability, natural resources management, and governance has tended to neglect local conceptualisations of demands for land and other resources, because their methodologies exclude local histories, socio-political process and issues of institutional change. The few district case studies (Ranger 1985, Lan 1985, Kriger 1992, Alexander 1991), focusing on local politics with an interest in land, have demonstrated a marginal interest in natural resources access issues, conceptualised in the context of the land problem. Research on Zimbabwe's local socio-political and institutional process has tended to focus more on the liberation war, (Lan 1985), cultural nationalism (Ranger 1995), and the institutional and short-term material gains derived by rural peoples as a result of their participation in party politics (Kriger 1992). Local level research on agricultural and environmental issues has tended to neglect the specific socio-political and institutional processes which underlie local controls of land and natural resources, in spite of a declared interest in popular participation and local level decentralisation.

Kriger (1990) identifies the neglect of peasant views as arising from methodologies which do not consult local people but instead speak for them, of research motivated mainly by explaining the goals of liberation movements and the state. While it is now recognised that research needs to develop a deeper understanding of local knowledge, participation and control, there is little agreement on the methodological directions appropriate for such research, on the factors which explain neglect in the research and on the processes which determine local agency. Kriger implicitly argues that the triumphalist epistemology which underlies most rural research, particularly among proponents of the "radicalisation thesis", has been the key problem. But she extends her critique into a populist call for peasant consultation without defining a suitably verifiable data collection approach.

It is true that most research tends to be structured around large scale or major events and historical "periods", such as the major draconian colonial legislation, the emergence of nationalist parties, the guerilla war, and national formal policy and ideological movements. Peasants tend only to be consulted post-facto about their "resistance" experience rather than on their pro-active agency. However, Kriger denies the wider roles that the colonial states'

land alienation process and nationalist mobilisation played in motivating local unity and agency on issues such as the land question. Research in Makoni District suggests that complex grievances related to the land problem and state controls over natural resources, for instance, are more critical grievances shared by rural people than their resentment of general external interventions by the state and NGOs. The introduction of soil conservation works and peasant resistance to these is a case in point.

Research on interest group influences on land policy, with a few exceptions, also tends generally to miss the influences and relevance of local institutions in policy formulation, since their formal national impact is not apparent, particularly in the media.

For instance, the role that chiefs, spirit mediums and local belief and knowledge systems played in land and natural resources control in the past has received some recent attention (e.g. Lan 1985, Nhira and Fortman 1993, ZIRCON 1992, Gumbo 1991 and Matowanyika 1991). Yet such research lacks depth in explaining how changes in the socio-political, institutional and resource setting reduce the effectiveness of local controls. Nor do they discuss how new economic processes generate different trends in the management of land and natural resources. Their most common weakness, however, is that their analyses treat the state as a homogeneous, all powerful, external bureaucratic organisational unit, operating on and controlling over-simplified and homogeneous local systems of governance, using uniform controls over land and natural resources.

The Mhezi Natural Resource Base and Socio-Demography

The above issues were examined in Mhezi Ward, where the centrality of land problems and agrarian changes reveals the dynamics of demand for land. Mhezi, one of the most densely populated wards in Zimbabwe, is one of 10 administrative wards in the Chiduku Communal Lands, established in 1923 after drastic land alienations. Chiduku Communal Lands. Its one of five communal lands in the Makoni District of Manicaland Province (see Map 7). Mhezi is situated within varied land tenure units. To its south is the bulk of Chiduku Communal Lands, its north-east has Resettlement Areas of both the cooperative and individual farming type, while in the north are two LSCF areas and one SSCF area called Dowa (see Map 8). The district centre serving Mhezi and its environs is Rusape, located between 20 and 40 kilometres from the nearest and farthest points in Mhezi Ward.

Map 7

Mhezi Ward itself was more recently subdivided into two wards, Mhezi and Pasipanodya, although their administrative and functional separation is incomplete. The wider socio-economic context of Mhezi is also of interest, for it demonstrates the dwindling "elbow room" for the redistribution of land in the area.

Manicaland Province is 34 870 km² in area and is characterised by wide variations in relief, rainfall, temperature, soils and natural farming regions. These characteristics present diverse problems and potentials in the various localities (see Maps 9, 10 and 11). The Eastern Highlands of Manicaland rise from 1 200m to 2 592m above sea level (at Mountain Inyangani), forming the main watershed of rivers such as Odzi, Pungwe, Honde, Gairezi, Odzani, Mpudzi, Rusitu and Nyahode. The main river valleys of the Sabi, Odzi, Rwenya, Honde and Pungwe form the lowest lying areas of the province, and they drain most of the province, but serve mostly LSCF areas with reliable water. Mhezi lies within the edges of the Zambara mountains and the Macheke and Mhezi rivers.

Because of the diverse relief and climate conditions in the province, soils and vegetation are also very diverse. Red, loamy, sandy and clay soils are predominant. The type and quality of vegetation in Manicaland varies with the natural ecological regions (Table 7.1). In Natural Region I, in Nyanga, Vumba, Cashel, Chimanimani and Chipinge, forests and grassland are predominant. In Natural Region IIb, around Headlands and Rusape, grasslands and woodland typifying savannah vegetation are dominant. Woodlands are dominant in Natural Regions IIa and III, while in Natural Region IV and V the vegetation consists of sparse grass mingled with scattered trees. Most commercial farmland in Manicaland is in the high veld, in regions I, II and III, while most of the communal lands are in the middle-veld and low-veld, in regions IV and V. Approximately 57% of all the farmland is Communal Land while 15.2% is Resettlement Land,

Map 8

located in the Makoni, Tsungwezi and Mutare Rural Council Areas. Makoni District, one of the seven districts of Manicaland, is also characterised by varying relief, rainfall, temperature, soils and natural farming regions. The north, east and south of the district has broken terrain while the central and western part is fairly flat. Red soils of the arthoferrallitic groups are predominant in the Headlands area, while loamy soils of the paraferallitic groups cover most of the district but are more common in Chinyika Resettlement Area, Chiduku and Makoni communal lands. Although most of the natural cover has been removed, there are still grasslands and woodlands that show that the natural vegetation is savannah. Makoni district has three natural regions (Table 6.2), with the bulk of the area in Natural Region IIb (454,243 hectares or 56.6% of the area) and Natural Region III (331,986 hectares or 41%).

The types and sources of information used in this chapter include household socio-demographic characteristics, land and resource use data, from observation, surveys and map interpretation, soil and resource inventory surveys, and the views of peasant households, officials, local leaders, and key informants during interviews. Data collection details are provided in the annexed questionnaires, interviewee lists, sampling frames, maps and methodological notes (see Annex 1).

The rest of the chapter addresses six interrelated themes: the physical and social demographic resource base of Mhezi households; the socio-economic and institutional history of the area; land and natural resources use processes in the area; the economic context and processes of household reproduction, natural resources commodification and land bidding; and the nature of conflicts over land and the mediation of land problems. The quantity and quality of land available to households in Mhezi is critical to the households' social reproduction because of the wide range of use and exchange values they derive from land.

Map 9

TABLE 6.1: DISTRIBUTION OF NATURAL FARMING REGIONS IN MANICALAND (1990-95)

RURAL & DISTRICT COUNCIL AREA	REGION I (ha) (%)		REGION IIa (ha) (%)		REGION IIb (ha) (%)		REGION III (ha) (%)		REGION IV (ha) (%)		REGION V (ha) (%)		TOTAL AREA PER DISTRICT (ha)
Mutare	78 458	12	-		61 508	9	265 225	40.5	183 302	28	66 507	10	655 000
Nyanga	165 650	29	54 000	9.6	79 000	14	110 000	19.5	145 000	25.7	10 000	1.8	563 650
Buhera	-		-		-		171 732	32	181 824	34	182 844	34	536 400
Chipinge/ Chimanimani	329 662	38	-		86 157	10	77 161	9	157 783	18	206 387	24	857 150
Chitepo	80 492	54	7 880	5	55 161	37	5 317	3.6	-		-		148 850
Maungwe	19 112	2	-		511 296	58.7	190 274	21.9	149 754	17.2	-		870 436
TOTAL	673 374	18.5	61 880	1.7	793 122	21.8	819 709	22.6	817 663	22.5	465 738	12.8	3 631 486

Source: Manicaland Development Plan (1991)

TABLE 6.2: DISTRIBUTION OF NATURAL FARMING REGIONS IN MAKONI DISTRICT

Rural & District Council Area	<u>R I</u> (ha)	%	<u>R II(a)</u> (ha)	%	<u>R II(b)</u> (ha)	%	<u>R III</u> (ha)	%	<u>R IV</u> (ha)	%	<u>R V</u> (ha)	%	Total Area Per District
Maungwe (Makoni)	19 112	2	-	-	511 296	58.7	190 274	21.9	149 754	17.2	-	-	870 436
Total (All Council Areas)	673 374	18.5	61 880	1.7	793 122	21.8	819 709	22.6	817 663	22.5	465 738	12.8	3 631 486

Source: Manicaland Development Plan (1991)

Map 10

The primary use of land in Mhezi was agricultural crop and livestock production, while the secondary but fundamental utility of land is its storage of a variety of natural resources required by households for their basic domestic, infrastructural and services needs. The degree of control over and access to a variety of land resources, in the sense of their offering different use values, and in some cases exchange values, is therefore central to understanding the nature of household reproduction. The utility of land within Mhezi varies relatively widely in relation to the area's physical, geographic, infrastructural and socio-demographic heterogeneity. Land resources also gain varied economic significance for Mhezi households, beyond their existing "natural" properties, due to the uneven utilisation of available technology. Nevertheless, the wider regional economy of Mhezi dictates the opportunities and constraints derived from its land and natural resources.

Thus, the conceptual framework established from evidence in Mhezi is that land and natural resources are continuously restructured over time and space through human agency. The quality and utility of these resources are dynamic. They change depending on available technology, demographic shifts and economic change. The perceptions of officials, scientists and the local population of the quality of the land and natural resource base, their utility and degradation, differ because of the complex differences in their knowledge of such natural resources and the changing demands placed on them. Most official accounts of the Mhezi resource situation exclude the local peasants' understanding of this resource base and its use value, despite the weaknesses of existing official data on the Mhezi land and natural resource base. Resource inventory work was thus necessary to supplement official land resource data and to assess the disparity between local and official perceptions of the adequacy of available resources.

Map 11

The Mhezi resource base differs from that of the rest of district in a variety of ways. Its land slopes southwards from the highlands in Headlands where the highest point, Zambara, is 1 793.7 metres high to the Macheke River at 1 000 metres. Other mountains in Mhezi, including the Sable Range, Rusambo, Zambazi, Tsanzaturu, Chikowa, Chironga and Mhanga, are between 1 500 and 1 600 metres high. The ward is littered by smaller granitic hills and most of the land gently slopes towards the Mhezi and Macheke rivers and their tributaries. Official soil classification identifies mostly moderately deep to deep greyish brown coarse grained sands, pale loamy sands, sandy loams, yellowish red sandy clay loams and sandy clays as common soil resources in the area. These granitic soils, of relatively low fertility, have some agricultural importance, particularly within higher rainfall areas of Mhezi area, and are locally termed the best "tobacco soils", especially in the commercial farms. Official agronomists also consider the soils ideal for groundnuts and useful for maize production and natural veld ranching. Peasants concur with these evaluations, especially for the production of groundnuts and maize which they crop extensively. However, extension officials advise that the application of nitrogen and phosphate fertilizers are necessary, while potassium is often not critical since the granitic soils are rich in potassium feldspars. For some crops in some areas, moderate applications of lime are essential. However officials regard the Mhezi soils to be mostly "tired".

Mhezi households held distinctive functional perspectives of the nature of their soil resources and classified them according to their direct utility, not their particle structures. According to the ZERO Resource Inventory, Mhezi households tended to differentiate soils into nine categories based largely on their agronomic potential, drainage, clay characteristics and coloration (Chimonyo, 1993). Thus soils were valued for their sustainability in relation to different types of crops, while low potential or degraded soils were known and valued less.

The dominant tree species in Mhezi include the *Brachystegia spiciformis* (musasa) and *julbernardia globiflora* (mutondo), while rocky slopes have trees such as *Albizia amara* (muora/mugunduzi), *Combretum zeyheri* (muruka), and the sandy or well drained soils commonly have *Peltophorum africanum* (muzeze) and *Parinari curatellifolios* (muchakata) tree species. Dominant waterpogan species, *Laudedia simplex* and their associates, are found in and around vleis (Map 6).

Mhezi is in Natural Region IIb, which receives an average rainfall of 800mm per season and is subject either to rather frequent and severe dry spells during the rainy season and the

occurrence of relatively short rainy seasons between October and April. For instance, Mhezi and Chiduku Communal Lands had little rainfall, in spite of the fact that rainfall was plentiful in the rest of the country, during the 1992/93 seasons. Indeed the ward tends to have less rainfall than all the other parts of the district. Low yields tend to be realised due to the capriciousness of the rainfall in this area. Yet, despite this rainfall insecurity, land utilisation in Mhezi remains based on intensive systems of crop farming, given the demographic character of the entire province.

Manicaland province had a total population of 1.5 million people in 1992, of which 91% lived in rural areas, compared to the national average of 80%. The average population density of the province is 42 persons per km². The average Communal Lands population density is 45 persons per km². The Makoni and Mutasa Districts, which are predominantly Communal Lands, have the highest average population densities, of 52 and 63 persons per km² respectively, while Nyanga District with mainly private and state lands has the lowest average density at 21 persons per km² (Table 6.3). Communal areas account for 70 percent of the province's population, while 18 percent live in Large Scale Commercial Farming areas (LSCF), 3 percent in Small Scale Farming Areas (SSCF) and 8 percent in Resettlement areas. The highest population density for LSCF areas is in Chipinge, at 31 persons per km², while in the SSCF the population density ranges from 20 to 94 persons per km² in Mutasa and Chipinge Districts respectively (see Maps 12 and 13).

TABLE 6.3: LAND DISTRIBUTION: MAKONI DISTRICT

SECTOR	AREA (KM ²)	POPULATION	DENSITY/KM ²
Communal Lands	2 713	170 000	62,7
Resettlement	3 000	47 000	15,0
SSCFA	286	800	16,6
LSCFA	2 000	24 000	12,0
Urban	20	12 000	600,0

Source: Second Five Year Development Plan: Makoni District (1992)

Fifty percent of Makoni District's population of 331,969 is below the age of 15, while females comprise slightly more than half of the population (Tables 6.4 and 6.5). The demographic features of Chiduku and Mhezi are the most marked. For instance, Chiduku Communal Lands

has a population density of 70 persons per km², compared to the Communal Area average of 63/km² and the lower 16/km² of the commercial and resettlement tenure regions (Table 7.3). This reflects the predominant reliance of most of Makoni's population on small farm land-holdings in the Communal Lands. For instance, over 60 percent of the Makoni population derives its main incomes from agriculture, with the average household incomes from agriculture being about \$5 000 per annum.

The average arable holding of Communal Area households is 2 hectares, while SSCF farm holdings average 100 hectares and the LSCF average holding is over 15 000 hectares. Resettlement farmers in Model A have access to 5 hectares arable lands, and more land for residential and grazing purposes. Collective cooperative resettlement members have on average over 60 hectares per household.

Map 12

The five Communal Lands of Makoni district occupy 2 713 square kilometres of land under "communal" title. Officially, that land cannot be alienated and usufruct rights can only be privately passed on to heirs. Land parcels with physical assets such as housing and planted trees are the most contested parcels in the inheritance proceedings of Communal Areas.

TABLE 6.4: POPULATION DISTRIBUTION: MAKONI DISTRICT 1990

AREA	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
Chiduku Communal Lands	56 715	65 825	122 538
Chikore C.L.	3 081	3 438	6 519
Makoni C.L.	15 790	19 356	35 146
Tanda C.L.	8 287	10 203	18 490
Weya C.L.	5 254	6 367	11 621
Dope SSCF	17	236	253
Dowa SSCF	1 203	1 332	2 535
St. Faith SSCF	634	636	1 270
Epiphany SSCF	487	569	1 056
Tanda SSCF	576	606	1 183
Zonga SSCF	1 202	1 403	2 605
Makoni LSCF	21 027	20 226	41 253
Tsungwesi LSCF	24 298	23 004	48 202
Rusape Town	5 759	5 458	11 217
TOTALS	144 500	159 558	304 058

Source: Second Five Year District Development Plan: Makoni (1991)

Map 13

TABLE 6.5: POPULATION IN MAKONI COMMUNAL LANDS: 1982

DISTRICT	POPULATION	LAND AREA	POPULATION DENSITY/KM
Buhera	168 520	5 364	31.4
Mutasa	90 638	1 441	62.8
Chipinge	121 310	3 044	39.8
Chimanimani	55 539	1 211	45.8
Makoni	140 968	2 713	51.9
Mutare	121 728	2 610	46.6
Nyanga	69 260	3 231	21.4

Source: Second Five Year Development Plan, Manicaland Province (1991)

Chiduku Communal Lands have a human carrying capacity considered by officials to have been exceeded in the early 1980s, such that today it is one of the most crowded Communal Areas compared to the national average Communal Lands density of 28 persons/km². The Chiduku households are predominantly small dryland mixed farmers, with eight to eleven members who crop an average of less than three hectares, and have access to declining communal grazing land. Officials consider Chiduku to be overstocked, and believe that human and livestock pressure has led to land degradation through soil erosion, limiting agricultural development.

Because of such land pressure, in addition to the relatively more intense effects of the war in the area which led to LSCF farm abandonment and then squatting, Makoni district has the largest resettlement area (254,073 hectares) and settlers (7 241 hectares) in Manicaland, with seven Model A Schemes and ten Model B Schemes (Table 6.6). Mhezi Ward is contiguous to Shangwe (Model A) and Zingondi (Model B) Resettlement areas, which have 155 and 45 households, and 3 436 and 700 hectares respectively. Less than 40 of the households in the two resettlement schemes were, however, from Mhezi because the official settler selection used formal criteria focused on the displaced and destitute, and not the near-landless. During the 1930s, Chiduku and Mhezi area households, together with others from Manicaland and elsewhere, had gained access to the nearby African Purchase Area, now called Dowa SSCF area. Out of the 140 SSCF farmers, with between 40 and 100 hectares each, less than 50 Mhezi households had gained access to those lands. These developments led to the emergence of

complex tenurial arrangements in the Mhezi environs, and specific patterns of land problems.

TABLE 6.6: MANICALAND: MODEL A RESETTLEMENT SCHEMES

SCHEME	DISTRICT	AREA	NO. OF SETTLERS
Shinja I	Chimanimani	34 770	348
Shinja II	"	5 082	404
Gata	"	350	70
Nyagadza	Chipinge	4 924	156
Vergnoeg	"	1 250	40
Muzilizwe	"	13 799	1 063
Chinyika	Makoni	121 275	4 031
Mayo	"	73 762	1 353
Mufusire	"	1 209	78
Mutanda III	"	17 296	289
Gwindingwi	"	11 303	423
Chirimutsitu	"	6 703	179
Shangwe	"	3 436	155
Mpudzi I	Mutare	20 462	230
Mpudzi II	"	27 556	393
Murare	"	9 928	135
Mutanda I	"	45 030	686
Mutanda II	"	30 545	534
Nyagundi	"	8 928	184
Nyamazura	"	12 398	398
Chidazembe	Mutasa	4 443	313
Nyajezi	Nyanga	11 927	191
Nyanga South	"	45 331	1 462
Gairezi Main	"	17 558	754
Gairezi Extension	"	4 175	193
TOTALS		533 440	14 064

Source: DERUDE: Mutare Records (1993)

The Local Land Problem

Evidence from household interviews, records and observations confirms a local perception that various changes in policy, legislation and actual controls associated with land had the deepest impact on household reproduction during the last sixty- seven years of Mhezi's existence. Mhezi had experienced regular and, at times, contradictory changes in its social and economic relations with land because of a variety of administrative and legislative processes affecting land and natural resources use, land administration and allocation, land quality maintenance and institutional development promotional activities (see Fig 7.1 and 7.2).

The various laws which reportedly had particular impact on Mhezi households included: the Land Husbandry Act, the Natural Resources Board Act, the Communal Areas and Tribal Trust Lands Act, the Forestry Commission Act, and various other local Government regulations.

Figures 6.1 and 6.2 provide a historical overview of the key legislative and administrative changes introduced into the Mhezi Area, based on discussions held with some households and on official information. The specific land related issues imposed on the households, and a demographic framework of household experiences based on age, is elaborated in the two tables which deal with the pre-independence and post-independence periods respectively.

Figure 6.1: THE MHEZI LAND HISTORY: 1920-1979

TIME	LEGAL FRAME	LAND ISSUES	EXPERIENCE FRAME
Pre 1920s	Land Alienation	Land and mining rights expropriated: Land markets created.	
1926	Chiduku Tribal Trust Land Created	Population Densification	+60 years
1929	Western Agronomy Extension enforced	Farm extension and conservation unit focus on land protection.	
1930	Maize Control Acts	Sets aside more land for whites, controls maize marketing and creates black freehold.	+60 years
1936	Land Apportionment Act Dowa Purchase Area		+50 years
1941-4	Natural Resources Act (amended, 1975, 1981): NRB created/ Compulsory de-stocking.	Native Trade and Production Commission: found chiefs "impediment" to improved agriculture. Control on natural resources use.	+50 years
1951-9	1951: Native Land Husbandry Act. Land use centralisation, 1956: 5 Year Plan.	Land husbandry centralisation: 1952, LSCF subsidies for NRA Conservation Works Act enforces conservation of natural resources by further restricting access.	+40 years
1969-70	Tribal Trust Lands Act	Successor to Native Land Husbandry Act; land sizes (2.4 ha.) remain. Chiefs' power "restored".	+20 years

Source: Interviews, Records and Legislation

The older Mhezi household heads had experienced in their lifetime wide-ranging changes in land policy. These spanned the creation of the Mhezi Communal Land, land alienation during the 1920s, land use controls under the 1930 legislation restricting communal farmers' access to maize markets, environmental land use controls in the 1950s, such as conservation measures which prescribed land and resources management practices, the fixing of land holding sizes and, later, the legislative establishment of a variety of land tenure and administrative regions within the area. Mhezi dwellers also experienced the emergence of state parks and forest areas in

the vicinity, followed by the creation of an adjacent African Purchase Area and new LSCF areas. More recently, cooperative and individual household Resettlement Areas, surrounding the dwindling Mhezi land and natural resources base, were created.

TABLE 6.7: MODEL A RESETTLEMENT SCHEMES IN MAKONI DISTRICT

SCHEME	NR II	NR III	NR IV	AREA (HA)	SETTLERS
Chinyika	63 893	43 917	12 465	121 275	4 031
Mayo	18 190	29 816	25 756	73 762	1 355
Mufusire	1 209	-	-	1 209	78
Mutanda III	-	17 296	-	17 296	289
Gwindingwi	11 303	-	-	11 303	423
Chirimutsitu	5 529	1 174	-	6 703	179
Shangwe	3 436	-	-	3 436	155
Nyanga South	19 089	-	-	19 089	731
TOTAL	122 649	92 203	39 221	254 073	7 241

Source: Department of Rural Development (DERUDE), 1993 Records

In terms of micro-level economic, social and land use planning, it is evident that most households experienced frequent and drastic alterations in their planning and resource use parameters. This entailed the frequent recreation of new social structures and varying degrees of local social security. Indeed, between the 1920s and 1970s, the taxation of local households and forced labour recruitment, remembered by many of the older households, together with the changing land situation, had exerted critical pressure on their capacity to develop durable land use and social reproduction systems.

Institutional and legislative changes led to a reduction of the land area available to Mhezi and to its households. Such changes had also introduced limited access to land in the vicinity of Mhezi to a few selected master farmers from the 1930s to 1960s, and then to a few selected poor households, displaced persons, ex-combatants and ex-farm workers, in resettlement areas during the 1980 to 1992 period. Since 1992, "capable" farmers in the area have been awaiting

access to new resettlement lands. Such changes generated varied internal and external relocations of households, the structure of their land holdings, and patterns of agronomic land use decision-making.

Figure 6.2: POST-INDEPENDENCE LAND HISTORY OF MHEZI: 1980-1993

TIME	LEGAL FRAME	LAND ISSUES	EXPERIENCE FARMS
1977-78	Land Tenure Act "Protected Villages" created.	Subdivided land: state land, CAs and commercial land (SSCFA and LSCFA). 1978: Dept. of Agricultural Development (DEVAG) charged with conservation and extension in CAs. People restricted to "keeps", widespread squatting on abandoned farms.	14 years
1980-85	1982: Communal Lands Act (repealed the TTL Act). 1981: AGRITEX created	Gives District Councils power to control occupation and the use of CAs. Responsibilities: a) Resettlement; b) Land Occupation c) Free Flow Land; d) Allocations e) Villagisation Act prevents outsiders from gaining access to timber and removing it from CAs to promote extension.	12 years
1990-93	1992: Land Acquisition Act.	Government to designate privately owned farms for resettlement: repeal willing-seller-willing-buyer basis.	3 years

Source: Interviews, Records and Legislation

These legislative changes, taken together, had been introduced to establish an officially desired size of community and organisation of land use by area, and influenced agricultural micro-economic or enterprise decisions on land use which officials had targeted for the local stabilisation of society. Certain land sites and areas, and various quantities of land, were restricted for use in livestocking and cropping, while water resources use (stream banks and vleis), the use of trees and the exploitation of other resources (soils, plants) were prohibited in Mhezi. These changes diminished the private individual and group decision-making space of households, in contrast to the greater land and natural resources decision-making space made available to freehold landowners in the LSCF and SSCF areas.

The National Land Husbandry Act -- imposed as a land reform exercise by the settler state under its centralisation policy of linear settlements, land use zoning and fixed land allocations -- was used to rationalise and legitimize central state intervention in local land control and access. In effect, state intervention tended to reduce the intensity areas of land and natural resources

legitimately usable and exploitable, in order to justify continuing settler land alienation and, purportedly, to minimize the perceived crisis of natural resources degradation in Communal Areas. By the 1960s, the quantity and quality of land and natural resources available to Mhezi households had diminished drastically, due to new systems of land control, the enforcement of new regulations, and the penalisation of those transgressing the official land and natural resource use norms. Elder households emphasized the rapid growth of land shortages during the 1940s to 1960s period.

The spatial diminution of the Mhezi land resource base was thus achieved by re-organizing patterns of land access and by reducing the quantity of natural resources exploited through low intensity and prohibitive use regulations, associated with live-stocking, cropping and harvesting of natural resources. New legislation and institutional arrangements also changed land administration responsibilities in Mhezi a number of times, from traditional and appointed community elders to the colonial state officials and back, and then to elected community leaders working in conjunction with the post-independence state. Thus, local grievances had evolved around diminished control and access to land and, most critically, over water sources for household food gardens. Land use had been re-organised such that households were removed or restricted from combining land and water resources for their effective use in achieving food security.

Most households regard their territory and local governance structures to have been overturned so frequently that order and stability were difficult to maintain. In particular, the socio-political structures presiding over land and resource use controls were considered not durable, leading to complex changes in social relations of production, especially in relation to land. Relations between households and their resource base, among households and between households and their internal social structures of governance and power, were reported to be brittle and insecure. The evolution of changing forms of land control were regarded to be a key point of stress in the Mhezi community.

Moreover, this area had experienced intensive mobilisation for guerrilla warfare and had seen relative changes in land control during the war, in addition to earlier attempts by the colonial state to restrict local land controls. It is reported by locals that during the period of intensified armed struggle, between 1976 and 1979, for instance, ZANU-PF successfully recruited the support of chiefs such as Makoni and Tangwena from the wider Mhezi environs. This was part

of ZANU-PF policy, which encouraged the participation of local powers, such as chiefs, headmen and spirit mediums, in the war, leading to increased control by elders and 'traditional leaders over local land resources for a while. ZANU(PF)s "Two-Line Policy" during the war had required flexibility, pragmatism and broad participation in the struggle, if its short and long term objectives were to be achieved (Lan 1985). The short term objectives were control of the countryside and a nationalist victory, while the long term objective was a revolutionary transformation of the countryside. This period saw unofficial changes in land administration and allocation, as Mhezi households used the war situation to procure land more freely. Widespread squatting on LSCF areas grew and some people were forced by the Rhodesian government, into "protected villages" or "keeps" for security reasons.

The sidelining in 1982 of chiefs in land and judicial administration by the new Government, purportedly for "selling out" to the colonial regimes, reversed the brief institutional tradition of land administration set up during the war in the Mhezi Environs. However, some village party committees which had been established in the late 1970s were carried into the early 1980s. Such committees had performed the role of translators of party and state policy and the role of overseers of land allocation and village development works, (Lan, 1985). It is these structures which were then replaced in 1980 by elected district councils, representing the business and educated rural classes, and the VIDCOS and WADCOs which were set up around 1985. The relevance of the party branch in Mhezi decision-making, particularly on land administration issues, has become nebulous, as areas of overlap, cooperation and conflict between party, VIDCO and other new local institutions emerge.

Over time, numerous diverse state institutions, including various Government Ministries involved in land administration and controls, agriculture and natural resources management and health issues, were introduced to Mhezi (Table 6.8). Equally, new NGOs entered Mhezi and new local community based organisations (CBO) were established, ostensibly in response to new community and development needs associated with the perceived need for land development and the reorganisation of its use, due to the demographic intensification of Mhezi. Indeed, land-household relationships had changed in Mhezi as the area experienced rapid demographic and land demand shifts.

The overall quality of land available and the proportions of available land to households were rapidly changing. Procedures of land allocation were thus affected by both changes in

demography and local land administration systems. Households reported that the quality of land had changed due to various forms of degradation, including soil erosion and soil fertility decline and vegetation (plants and trees) losses. The latter led also to the declining availability of natural soil fertilisation materials such as termite mounds, humus, mulches, and livestock manure, some of which resulted from de-stocking and frequent cattle losses due to drought. Increasingly, the availability of the highly valued small pockets of land suitable for gardening (vleis etc.) also declined, due to their exhaustion and restricted use in Mhezi. Of course, some households retained control over some of the land suitable for gardening.

TABLE 6.8: RURAL INSTITUTIONAL PRESENCE IN MHEZI, MAKONI DISTRICT (1992)

STATE INSTITUTIONS			NON-Governmental ORGANISATIONS			COMMUNITY			TRADITIONAL		
NAME	YEAR	PRINCIPLE FOCUS	NAME	YEAR	PRINCIPLE FOCUS	NAME	YEAR	PRINCIPLE FOCUS	NAME	YEAR	PRINCIPLE FOCUS
MLGRUD	1980	Land control & access supervision	Af. 2000	1990	Conservation	VIDCOs	1985	Integrated Rural Dev.	Traditional Healers	Old	Medicinal use of resources
Agritex	AGA 1980	Land use	SSRP	1989	Watershed Rehabilitation	Savings Clubs	pre-1980	Agricultural Investment	Spirit Mediums	Old	Protection of resources
CAC	1989	Natural Resources	SNV	Mid 1980s	Planning	Farmers Clubs	pre-1980	Farm Innovation	Chiefs	Old	Overall governance
DVS	1986	Animal husbandry practices	SCF USA	Late 1980s	Farming Credit	Women's Clubs	pre-1980	Gardens and other projects	Headmen	Old	Land use labour
MDC	1982/3	Nat. res. coordination	FANS	1991	Land use	Zanu (PF)	1980	Political	Nhimbe	Old	Livestock keeping
Forestry	Mid 1980s	Afforestation	MOSL	1988	Marketing	WARDCO		Local Govt.	Ronzera	Old	
UZ/RUP	Late 1980	Research	ZERO	1989	Environmental Research	"Committees"		Water, Wildlife & Grazing			
Dept. Nat. Res	1980s	Land res. supervision	LWF	Mid 1980s	Agric. Funding	Woodlot Group		Afforestation			
NPWLM	1980s	Wildlife protection	ENDA	Late 1980s	Environmental Research	Schools		Gardens & Trees			
DERUDE		Resettlement	SHDF	1980s	Savings	Co-ops		Farm Markets			
			CADEC	1980s	Agric. Projects	Cattle Groups		Fattenning Market			
			CSF	1980s	Social Welfare						
			RCU	1980s	Agric. Marketing						
			WCTL	1980s	Agric. Training						
			Inter-consu It	1980s	Water Research						

Source: ZERO LLNRM Project - "The Institutional Legal Framework for Natural Resource Management; Lue-Mbizvo and Mohamad, and Permaculture Association (1993)

KEY: MLGRUD - Ministry of Local Government, Rural & Urban Development Af. 2000 - Africa 2000
 AGRITEX - Department of Agricultural, Technical & Extension Services SNV - Netherlands Development Organisation
 CAC - Conservation Advisory Committee SRRP - Save River Rehabilitation Programme

DVS - Department of Veterinary Services
MDC - Maungwe District Council
UZ - University of Zimbabwe/Rural & Urban Planning
Nat. Res. - Natural Resources
NPWLM - National Parks & Wildlife Management
CADEC - Catholic Development Commission
DERUDE - Department of Rural Development
LWF - Lutheran World Federation

SCF USA - Save the Children Fund
ZERO - Zimbabwe Environmental Research Organisation
SHDF - Self Help Development Foundation
VIDCO - Village Development Committee
ENDA - Environment Development Activities
RCU - Rusape Co-operative Union
MOSL - Mosliv
WCTC - Weya Community Training Centre

Ecological changes associated with intensified soil resource use in the absence of adequate organic and inorganic soil maintenance resources were the most critical. The fundamental shift arose from the declining scope for land rotation practices around the 1960s. This was associated with reduced man-land ratios and the agricultural extension philosophy which promoted the stabilisation of land cultivation under decreasing household entitlements to arable land, now set at a maximum of 2.5 hectares. Some Mhezi households captured the essence of this process in the colloquialism: "nyika yaparara" (the land or territory is expired).

Land allocation procedures also changed dramatically during the 1970s, due to the combined effects of colonial policies, demographic growth, (natural and immigratory), the political power acquired by various land bidders during the liberation war and the temporary period of an "open" land policy from 1980 to 1983. Squatters and "illegal" land allocations had increased, while the prospects for external resettlement between 1980 and 1993 slightly improved land access options. But only a few Mhezi residents gained access to resettlement. Land allocation qualifications and procedures also shifted over time, as each institution brought its own allocation criteria: the chiefs, local leaders, district commissioners, local guerilla commanders, party committees, elected district councils and then ward and village development committees, each emphasized different values and administrative attention in land allocation.

Different criteria for land allocation evolved also as new factors emerged to influence household land bidding. All this generated complex processes and patterns of land allocation and therefore social relations of production in Mhezi. From the mid-1980s, the increase in Mhezi of external development agencies - NGOs and local interest groups - also generated new processes of "group" land demands for project implementation (see Table 7.8). This widened land allocation and access patterns and led to new social relations of land use and land bidding: These included group project land bids, various private household land bidding, "communal" grazing land bidding, community nature preserves, state developmental land bidding, state land "reserves" and immigrant land bidding.

The institutional promotion of specific "improved" land uses and practices, and "internal reform", also led to dramatic changes in Mhezi over the last 10 years, escalating in the mid-1980s as a "development" ideology became grounded in Communal Areas. Various state and NGO organisations began to promote land use intensification and crop production for markets. Notably, this included: the adoption of HYV maize seeds and fertilizers, increasing the production of high nutrition crops through natural and irrigated gardens, and land management practices for cattle breeding both as a means of commercializing livestock

production (using pen feeding and other fattening schemes) and of reducing livestock pressure on land and resources (grazing schemes). Furthermore, reafforestation schemes through group and private woodlots, and individual tree planting became a regular development activity promoted in Mhezi as elsewhere. The conservation of vegetation, soil and water resources, particularly stream banks, was promoted by most organisations in Mhezi, using "persuasion" approaches, and attempts at involving the local community in enforcing the contravention of regulations.

Thus, land use promotional work during the 1980s tended to continue the colonial state's compulsory land management demands on the community. But new local power structures were evolving to enhance the persuasion approach now peddled. A shift in social relations surrounding land use, access and control was thus thrust upon Mhezi households. The purpose was to promote sustainable land based "development" as opposed, purportedly, to the colonial interest in mainly ensuring labour reproduction in the dormitory reserves of Communal Areas. While the colonial state had also used a community development ideology as framework for legitimising its land management designs, its lack of political legitimacy, use of a narrow traditional power base, and the absence of economic incentives for most households had made its efforts ineffective, according to Mhezi informants.

In spite of the "development" rhetoric espoused by post-independence Government and other institutions in the area, a total onslaught on changing land management practices in Mhezi was the apparent preoccupation. The development promoted by local organisations was intended to intensify the use of external inputs in land production; to reduce extensive land cultivation practices, particularly in those areas classified as marginal, to reduce the exploitation of selected, fragile, ecological land segments and to control the rate of natural resource harvesting so as to control soil erosion.

The Mhezi peasantry thus experienced major shifts in the use value of their land and natural resources, in external support for land use change, in local institutional administration of land and in household land uses. Thus land and land use policy, as well as legislative and administrative changes, generated new pressures on household reproduction. New strategies were adopted to ensure household survival, as households turned to both internal and external resources and social mobilisation processes to master their reproduction. As elaborated in chapter eight, the institutional setting of Mhezi increasingly reflects new socio-political processes and strategies that had emerged, particularly to enhance community land bidding and the search for material benefits by households, in a situation where land scarcity was escalating. These processes thus express themselves in the

unfolding of specific patterns and mechanisms of land use and management, as discussed below.

Household Land Demand and Use

The above history of land problems situate the wider scope and context of current land problems experienced at the local and household level. The demand for land in Mhezi Ward, as determined by household land requirements, access and uses, was assessed both within the Mhezi area and in respect of land access bidding in the surrounding LSCF, SSCF and Resettlement Areas. This section focuses on land demands as expressed by intra-Mhezi land bidding processes. The questionnaire survey of 120 households, and further informal interviews with over 30 households and numerous officials representing various organisations, broadly revealed that Mhezi households were land-short and that the Mhezi area faced severe stress from human and livestock pressure on land and natural resources utilisation. Details of these findings are presented below while additional tables are presented in the annexes.

Land Access and Requirements

Survey and Central Statistic Office census estimates indicate that Mhezi's 7 955 hectares hold over 800 households in 6 villages, and close to 11 000 domestic animals, dominated by cattle during 1992. Land population densities were estimated at about 180 persons per square kilometre or 1 person to 1.2 hectares. This translated into gross land availability rates of around eight households to every 100 hectares or about 12 hectares per household. This level of general household access to land includes land available for household residential use, agricultural use (cropping and livestocking) and other uses such as local infrastructure, woodlands, rocky outcrops and hills, sacred areas, and special locally protected natural resource sanctuaries used for specific community purposes. Yet, the Mhezi population was estimated to be growing at 2.8% per year, while the area had experienced a net population gain from in-migration of people in the 1980s, especially from the drought-prone neighbouring Buhera district. Thirteen percent of the Mhezi population comprised immigrants.

This demographic profile suggests that additional land requirements in Mhezi will remain high for years. Although 24% of the Mhezi household sample were over 60 years of age (Table 7.9(a)), the absence of social care programmes for the old indicates that they will continue to rely on access to land for their survival, indicating growing effective demand for land in the next 15 years. Almost 20% of the heads of the households interviewed were

below 30 years of age, indicating increased future demand for land as family and livestock herd sizes grow. Migrant heads of household amounted to only 13%, although females accounted for 56% of the Mhezi sample population. But, because the sample's distribution of those below 16 years of age in relation to those older than this stood at a ratio of 399:439 (0.9:1), projections of future land demand from this younger generation is expected to be high.

TABLE 6.9(a): DISTRIBUTION OF AGE GROUPS IN THE SAMPLE

AGE GROUP (YRS)	NUMBER	%
<30	23	19.2
31-40	23	19.2
41-50	21	17.5
51-60	24	20.0
61-70	17	14.2
>70	10	8.3
Age not known	2	1.7
TOTAL	120	100.0

Source: ZERO Survey, 1991

TABLE 6.9(b): CATEGORIES OF RESPONDENTS BY OCCUPATION

OCCUPATION	RESPONDENTS	%
Unemployed	30	25.0
Peasant farmers	80	66.7
Tertiary education students	1	0.8
Other occupations	9	7.5
TOTAL	120	100.0

Source: ZERO Survey, 1991

Thus, within 10 years, an estimated 300 new households may be seeking land in the area, since less than 10% of the Mhezi population was found to be engaged in non-agricultural occupations (Table 6.9b). Moreover, close to 25% of the sample considered themselves to be unemployed, since they were seeking employment and considered themselves to have

inadequate land to pursue gainful peasant farming. Meanwhile, some Government land use specialists in the Mhezi area estimated that close to 30% of the adult population of Mhezi could be considered landless. Given that household size averaged seven persons, of whom about three were able-bodied persons, existing access to land is restrictive and will worsen within a short planning horizon of 10 years.

Regarding educational levels, 46% of out-of-school respondents had some primary school education, while just over 40% had one to four years of secondary schooling. A smaller proportion had received some form of vocational training, while close to 10% had never attended school (Table 6.6c).

TABLE 6.9(c): EDUCATION LEVELS OF OUT-OF-SCHOOL POPULATION

EDUCATION LEVEL	OUT-OF-SCHOOL NO.	%
Grade 4 or below	29	6.7
Grade 5 to 6	46	10.6
Grade 7	123	28.5
Form 1 to 2	109	25.2
Form 3 to 4	66	15.3
Informal Agric. Training	4	0.9
Teachers' College	8	1.9
Farmers' College	5	1.2
Never Attended School	42	9.7
TOTAL	432	100.0

Source: ZERO Survey, 1991

Indeed, 70 percent of the households sampled said that they cultivated 1.6 hectares or less (below six acres - Table 7.10a). Almost 17 percent of the sampled households cultivated less than half a hectare, while 30% of them cropped over 1.6 hectares. Not surprisingly, less than 45 households (36% of the sample) could afford to place their cropping lands under fallow (Table 6.10b). In fact, the majority (over 60 percent) of those who practised land fallowing did so on extremely small parcels of land, averaging less than 0.4 hectares, and for short periods, such as one year only.

TABLE 6.10a: ACREAGES UNDER CULTIVATION BY HOUSEHOLDS

ACREAGE	NO. OF HOUSEHOLDS	%
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<1	12	10.0
1	8	6.7
2-4	64	53.3
>4	36	30.0
TOTAL	120	100.0

Source: ZERO Survey, 1991

TABLE 6.10b: DISTRIBUTION OF FALLOW PRACTICES

PERIOD OF FALLOW (YRS)	NO. OF HOUSEHOLDS	%
1	28	62.2
2	10	22.2
3	7	15.6
TOTAL	45	100.0

Source: ZERO Survey, 1991

The pattern of access to cropping lands suggests that the majority of households could not realise harvests of more than 3 tonnes of grain (or 30 bags of maize), under present levels of productivity in the area. Indeed, less than 35 percent of the households reported that they were able to sell any grain at all, while less than 5 percent of the households had managed to sell 1 to 5 bags of groundnuts and 15 percent had sold 1 to 10 bags of sunflower seeds, during the pre-drought season in 1991. Those who managed to sell crops were mostly found among those who had more than 1.6 hectares of arable land cropped, while it was mostly the same households who managed to sell more than one crop. Therefore, levels of access to land determined the level of cash incomes for various social reproduction needs, while the average potential yields realisable from available cropping lands placed most of the Mhezi households below the officially recognised threshold of household food security.

Access to grazing lands in Mhezi was also restricted by the extent of the available grazing area and the skewed patterns of livestock ownership. As may as 21% of the sample had no cattle, while 37% had less than 4 cattle (Table 6.11a). Therefore, close to 60% of the households gained a limited use-value from, or access to, the Mhezi grazing lands through their lack of cattle. Since cattle provide multiple products to households, including manure,

milk, meat, draught power and "savings", most Mhezi households did not have adequate access to the basic means for social reproduction that these provide. Two to three cattle are required, for instance, to manure one hectare every three years (4 tonnes).

TABLE 6.11a: DISTRIBUTION OF CATTLE OWNERSHIP IN THE HOUSEHOLD

NO. OF CATTLE	NO. OF HOUSEHOLDS	%
0	25	20.8
2-4	44	36.7
5-8	30	25.0
9-12	16	13.3
13-23	5	4.2
TOTAL	120	100.0

TABLE 6.11b: LIVESTOCK OWNERSHIP AMONG HOUSEHOLDS

TYPE OF LIVESTOCK	NO. OF HOUSEHOLDS	%
Cattle	95	79.2
Goats	56	36.7
Sheep	5	4.2
Pigs	2	1.7
Donkeys	0	0.0
TOTAL	158	100.0

Source: ZERO Survey, 1991

Yet 42 percent of the households dominated the use of the grazing lands for their cattle, while half of the sample population had small livestock, mostly goats (Table 6.11b). On average, therefore, Mhezi had a livestocking rate of one animal unit per hectare, compared to the officially recommended stocking rates of one livestock unit per four (to eight) hectares. Given that the natural growth rate of the cattle population in the Mhezi area is estimated to be 10 percent for every six years, and that annually 48% of the cattle population is "brought in" as well as that the off-take is low (Ndlovu 1992), land demand for livestock is escalating in the Mhezi area. The "bringing in" of cattle tends to reflect investments on livestock within Mhezi area, by relatives based in urban areas, in a system

which generates variable proportions of livestock yields to Mhezi households from the off-spring of such cattle. At the very least, such cattle have use-value to the "keeper" households.

Moreover, given that those households without cattle actively seek access to cattle, and indeed enlarge their herds by "keeping" cattle for non-resident relatives, land pressure from cattle during future wet seasons is likely to increase. The Mhezi survey revealed that less than 2 percent of the households grazed their livestock on their individual arable plots. They relied on "communal" grazing lands, which the majority (63%) perceived to be "short", mostly because the "demarcated" grazing areas had been allocated by community leaders to new households for cropping purposes. In general, the Mhezi households regarded the quality of their grazing lands to be degrading, having forced most of the households (73%) to increasingly turn to supplementary feeding, based mainly on maize stover.

Broadly, over 70% of the Mhezi households had difficulties accessing adequate land for their cropping needs. These problems included outright landlessness, miniscule cropping land plots, diminished access to and use of grazing lands, and deteriorating land quality. Some households openly lamented the problem of inequitable access to the limited land available, suggesting that a minority of households tended to dominate access to cropping and grazing lands. Indeed, a small group of the households did not report shortages of grazing or cropping lands. Similarly, close to 30% of the households had an advantageous position with respect to land access as demonstrated by their ability to produce crop surpluses for sale and to hold viable livestock herds, which together guaranteed their access to cash incomes, adequate food, adequate draught power and reasonably sufficient quantities of manure.

Access to natural resources for domestic requirements, such as woodfuel and thatch, tended to be defined by the pattern of access to individual croplands, the quality of the "communal" woodlands areas available to households, and specific circumstances surrounding household sourcing of such resources. For instance, whereas most of the sample households predominantly used woodfuel for domestic purposes, only about 3% of them relied mainly upon their own "private woodlots" of trees in and around their fields and homesteads (Table 7.12). Among the rest who relied upon non-private woodfuel sources, 61% relied upon "communal woodland areas", while 18% increasingly used communal woodlots planted by groups of households. Interestingly, another 18% of the households depended on legal and illegal "poaching" of woodfuel on state woodlots (1.7%), LSCF lands (9.2%) and Resettlement lands (6.7%) in the vicinity (Table 6.12a). Thus close to 40% of the sample could not meet their woodfuel demands from legal sources within the Communal Areas.

TABLE 6.12b: SOURCES OF FIREWOOD UTILISED BY HOUSEHOLDS

FIREWOOD SOURCE	No. OF HOUSEHOLDS	%
Common Lands	73	60.8
Communal Woodlots	22	18.3
State Forests*/Woodlots	2	1.7
LSC Farm**/Woodlots	11	9.2
Individual Woodlots	4	3.3
Resettlement Areas	8	6.7
	120	100.0

*These could probably be district council woodlots,

since there are no state forests/woodlots in Mhezi.

** LSC farm = Large Scale Commercial Farm.

TABLE 6.12b: TIME SPENT COLLECTING FIREWOOD IN MHEZI WARD

TIME (HOURS)	NO. OF HOUSEHOLDS	%
<1	42	35.0
2	46	38.3
3	28	23.3
>3	4	3.3
TOTAL	120	100.0

These households increasingly depend on planted woodlands, promoted by various government agencies. The latter demand that land be set aside for allocation to tree-planting. Where such land was unavailable, households resorted to woodfuel sources on land outside Mhezi itself. Fifty seven percent of the households had planted

mainly exotic trees, with most reporting a variety of other constraints to planting. Eighteen percent of the Mhezi households were supplementing their woodfuel needs with alternatives such as paraffin, dung and coal. Over 65% of the households reported that it took them two to three hours to fetch wood because they had to walk to distant areas (Table 6.12b). In fact, 28% of the households reported that woodfuel sales by some households had emerged in the area, suggesting that scarcities had tended to enhance a wood commodification process. Indeed, 16% of the households cited land access or land inadequacy as a constraint to their desire to plant trees, while the related problem of access to water and that the livestock damage were cited as constraints by another 24% of the households.

Household vulnerability in relation to access to land, and the natural resources contained therein, is also starkly reflected in the nature of building materials that Mhezi households depended upon. Most of the Mhezi huts, including bedrooms, kitchens and storage places, were constructed with clay, poles and grass thatching. Seventy-three percent of the households used mud, mainly from anthills, for walling, while 93% used mainly local thatch for roofing and 88% of them used poles from communal woodlands, especially the hilly areas. But an increasing percentage of the households, ranging between 17% and 75% of the sample, had paid traders for their last supplies of poles and grass. These natural resource scarcities reflected both increasing demographic pressure on the particular natural resources, and the increasing conversion of land use away from communal grazing and woodlands uses to private cropping land uses.

Similarly, household access to small patches of land for vegetable gardens was reported by many households to be declining. Access to well watered areas had diminished in relation to the increase in households in need of them, the deterioration of well watered land patches, and, to a lesser extent, the restrictions imposed by pre-independence Government officials on the use of vleis and those areas within 30 metres of river or stream banks. Indeed, most of the village settlements in Mhezi reported that they had, over the last 30 years, gradually tended to align their settlements with most of the rivers and spring zones surrounding the hills and mountains to gain access to watered lands. Pre-independence official expectations that villages would avoid rivers and realign themselves to roads for accessibility were not realised, due to the importance attached by households to access to land for the basic vegetable diet which accompanies their mainly grain cropping practices. Indeed, up to 40% of the Mhezi households depended on shallow wells and streams for their potable water in contrast to the rest who used deep boreholes sunk at officially sanctioned sites by the state and donors (Table 6.13a). Almost 75% of respondents cited drought as the reason for declining quantities of water available, while the remainder cited population

increase and the damming of rivers by commercial farmers (Table 6.13b).

TABLE 6.13a: SOURCES OF WATER RELIED UPON BY HOUSEHOLDS IN MHEZI

SOURCE OF WATER	No. OF HOUSEHOLDS	%
Communal borehole	72	60.0
Communal well	22	18.3
Family well/dam	16	13.3
River/stream water	10	8.4
TOTAL	120	100.0

Source: ZERO Survey, 1991

TABLE 6.13b: REASONS CITED FOR THE DECREASE IN WATER QUANTITY

REASON	No. OF RESPONDENTS	%
Drought		74.6
Population increase		12.7
Damming of river by commercial farmers		12.7
TOTAL		100.0

Source: ZERO Survey, 1991

Land Use Patterns

The history of land use in Mhezi is characterised by increasing human and livestock requirements regarding access to a relatively degrading land resource base. The productivity of natural and domestic plant life was considered by locals to be deteriorating due to the intensified use of soils in a context of declining household capabilities to maintain soil fertility. Elder households in Mhezi recall the pre-1945 period as the era of relatively sustainable land management, in the sense that crop productivity, access to biomass and

land availability were felt to have been adequate, while biomass regeneration was considered effective. Following this period, forced official land use re-organisation during the 1950s and 1960s, and the later effects of the liberation struggle, led to increased land management conflicts. During the 1980s, the dwindling land resource base, now used more intensively in response to post-independence agricultural market incentives and the need for cash to gain access to other social services, became more and more difficult to manage sustainably. Local people explain the growing problems of soil erosion, declining soil fertility, the falling water table, incessantly low crop yields and vegetation resource depletion, in terms of a variety of institutional processes, within the framework of the above periodisation of causality. These processes included the changing spiritual values of a community increasingly moving towards Christianity and the cash economy, increased population growth and in-migration leading to changing social norms, ineffective traditional leadership, the disinterest among younger households in sustaining local community values, and the fragile legitimacy of new local institutions.

Mhezi oral traditions suggest that during the pre-1945 period, land use was controlled through the chiefs (Chief Chingaira), lineage elders and the spirit mediums (called *Chandembuya*), in a community consisting of mostly internal lineage members of the community. Various natural resource sanctuaries such as water sites, termite mounds and woodlands were utilised sparingly and protected as symbols of respect of ancestral spirits, such that the vegetation density was relatively high. The community practised land rotation or fallow over periods ranging from five to ten years. Colonial land use reorganisation, intended to protect watersheds, vleis and local riverine ecosystems, led to the clearance of new lands and the abandonment of older fields. The period between 1930 and 1980 saw the intensive promotion of the plough, mono-cropping of fields, and specified row spacing of domestic crops, increasingly dominated by maize. A growing town demand for maize-meal, now seen as the most convenient food for mine and urban workers, and extension advice, led to the expansion of maize production in Mhezi.

The promotion by Government extension officials of continuous land cultivation on the six acres allocated by colonial Government authorities, of eucalyptus tree planting, and of concentrated linear settlement patterns are believed to have led to the deteriorating quality of land. Population growth saw the increasing sub-division of the six acre plots among heirs and the extension of cropping into grazing areas. These processes escalated during the 1980s, and were exacerbated by the institutional malaise in local governance which prevailed. During the 1970s, land pressure intensified when farm worker retrenchment in the Mhezi environs led to the increased reoccupation of fallowed lands, and when livestock herds grew rapidly as stocking controls became ineffective during the war.

As a result, agricultural land use in Mhezi is dominated by maize cropping on small household outfields, cattle grazing in "communal grazing areas", smaller homestead fields with multiple crops and vegetable garden patches in vleis, streambank areas and spring areas around sloping mountain foothills. Agritex officials, assuming that households cultivate 2.5 hectares each on average, report average household land use patterns to consist of: maize, 1 hectare; groundnuts, 0.5 hectares; sunflower, 0.5 hectares; pepper 0.2, hectares; with other mainly vegetable crops put at 0.3 hectares (ZERO Survey, Shamu and Chigwada, 1993).

The ZERO household survey confirms that 93% of the households grew maize, under rainfed conditions, as their major crop, while 37% grew sorghum as their second major crop, and most households grew small patches of the crops listed above. A small number of households grew peppers on contract with the owner of an adjacent LSCF who produces and processes chillies for local and export markets. Agritex estimates crop yields per hectare in Mhezi to be below agronomic potentials by 33% to 62% for most crops, due to inadequate crop rotation and fertilizer use.

Households reported a decreasing utilisation in terms of quantity and frequency of manure as more of them (94%) turned to the application of small quantities of fertilizers, mainly for their maize and sunflower crops. A few households (8%) applied fertilizer only once in two years because of costs, while 12% reported that they did not apply manure any more because of its unavailability, and 88% reported the application of scanty amounts of manure and crop residues to fertilize their land. Up to 88% of the Mhezi sample practised limited crop rotation which also entailed the intercropping of maize with legumes on small parts of their outfields. Thirty-five percent of the households, mainly those with larger cropping hectarages, reported that they practised land rotation or land fallow of up to three years, while the ZERO resource inventory identified a handful of fields which had been fallowed for over 10 years. These latter fields had, however, been invaded by certain shrubs considered by local people to reflect extreme soil impoverishment.

TABLE 6.14: HARVEST PATTERNS IN MHEZI WARD PRIOR TO THE 1990-91 DROUGHT

HARVEST	NO. OF HOUSEHOLDS	%
Decreasing	77	
Increasing	26	
Static	17	

TOTAL	120	
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Source: ZERO Survey, 1991

These frugal land management practices during the last two decades translated themselves into relatively static or marginal increases in land productivity levels in Mhezi. Yet low and unreliable rainfalls and frequent droughts also explain much of the low levels of productivity as observed by some community members. Indeed, the majority of households (64%) had experienced declining yields during the 1980's, while the rest had realised stable and slightly increased crop yields (Table 7.14). As many as 84% of the households were aware of the need to improve their soil management practices, and in fact wished to do so, but were constrained by limited access to cash or credit. Only a handful of households had access to credit and most of them had faced repayment difficulties. Moreover, up to 29% (35) of the households had to regularly use their annual savings to hire draught power or borrow it for services in kind, while another 4% of the households had to hire tractors. Thus, both the maintenance of draught animals and the hiring of draught power tended to draw down on the use of savings which could have been used for fertilizer and the application of other inputs.

While the majority of households used hybrid seeds, very few households could afford pesticides. Indeed, over 52% of the households reported that they could not save money annually, hence their limited investment into land management improvements. Most households relied upon labour intensive land management practices to improve their production potentials. Over 87% of the households regularly built land contours to improve water retention and restrict soil erosion in fields, while the rest practised land terracing, gully reclamation and the planting of trees in crops as soil conservation measures (Table 6.15). Indeed labour shortages during the peak cropping season were cited by some households, while conservation works drew excessive labour time in other periods.

TABLE 6.15: MEASURES PRACTISED BY HOUSEHOLDS IN MHEZI WARD TO COMBAT SOIL EROSION

ANTI-EROSION PRACTICE	NO. OF HOUSEHOLDS	%
Contours	105	
Terracing	5	
Gully reclamation	5	
Planting of trees with crops	5	

Source: ZERO Survey, 1991

Therefore, land use for cropping purposes dominated the Mhezi households' livelihoods in terms of land, labour and cash allocations. Yet only 43% of the households realised meaningful amounts of income from crop sales. Household incomes averaged below Z\$350 per year, from all sources of income, with 68% of the households reporting cash incomes of \$100 (Table 7.16). Indeed, significantly, only one-third of households reported depending on remittances for their social reproduction, inclusive of procuring cropping inputs, food and other needs. It may be that declining real wages in urban areas tended to restrict remittances. Only 6% of the households realised total incomes above Z\$900 per annum, while less than 13% of the households sold absolutely no agricultural produce at all. Thus, up to 53% of the households had to depend on off-farm enterprises for their income, although most of these activities depended on land outputs and natural resources for their raw materials. Poultry and beer-brewing were dominant off-farm enterprises, while a number of households carved wood, made pottery, sold cooked food and made bricks for their additional incomes (Table 6.17). Only 18 households (15%) had off-farm enterprises which did not depend on local raw materials: these were mainly textiles and blacksmithing works on a small scale. The role of biomass resources in the development of non-farm enterprises was thus critical.

TABLE 6.16: INCOME LEVELS OF HOUSEHOLDS

INCOME LEVEL (Z\$)	No. OF HOUSEHOLDS	%
< 100	81	67.5
101-200	10	8.3
201-300	8	6.7
301-400	6	5.0
401-500	4	3.3
501-600	2	1.7
601-700	1	0.8
> 700	8	6.7
TOTAL	120	100.0

Source: ZERO Survey, 1991

TABLE 6.17: INCOME GENERATING ACTIVITIES ENGAGED BY HOUSEHOLDS

ACTIVITY	NO. OF HOUSEHOLDS	%
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Small-scale poultry farming	21	17.5
Beer-brewing	15	12.5
Sewing	8	6.7
Building/Brick-making	6	5.0
Tailoring	6	5.0
Selling cooked food	4	3.3
Pottery	3	2.5
Wood-carving	3	2.5
Black-smithing	1	0.8

Source: ZERO Survey, 1991

While most households (90%) owned a plough, less than half of the households owned significant assets procured externally (Table 6.18). These include: 35% of the households which owned bicycles, 39% who owned cultivators, 36% who owned scotch carts and 33% who owned radios. The households which owned such valuable assets tended to be that minority which could use these "tools of labour" to use more effectively the land which they had access to.

In essence, social differentiation in Mhezi tended to emerge from the patterns of access to land, cattle ownership and the farm assets base. A wide range, 20% to 40% of the households, were favourably positioned in terms of ownership or access to these resources, and this was reflected in their realisation of larger crop sales and incomes. Remittance incomes played a useful role in enabling some households to maintain their livelihoods, but were not the key factor influencing patterns of social differentiation.

Table 6.18: HOUSEHOLD OWNERSHIP OF ASSETS

ASSET	NO. OF HOUSEHOLDS	%
Plough	108	90.0
Bicycle	42	35.0
Motor vehicle	7	5.8
Cultivator	47	39.2
Planter	2	1.7
Radio	39	32.5
Scotch-cart	43	35.8
Sledge	10	8.3

Tractor	1	0.8
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Source: ZERO Survey, 1991

The better-off households depended more on cropping larger hectares, using their savings and access to manure to enlarge their land productivity. Local interviews emphasized the fact that access to land was a critical factor. Essentially, those with access to larger and better quality land tended also to accumulate assets and livestock, based not on current access to remittance incomes but on past opportunities from wage increases, remittances, inheritance and farm outputs.

Indeed, up to 42% of the Mhezi households suggested they could afford to buy their landholdings if they had the opportunity to pay for their right to freehold ownership. The rest clearly stated that they could not afford to pay for land at any price. The low level of cash savings and ownership of cattle reported among households also confirms that around 60% of the Mhezi households hovered below the subsistence level. Most of these households explained their poverty in terms of problems of access to good quality land and cash incomes. Incomes were too low to allow households to practise intensive land management. The restricted access to good land, and the ineffective use of available land, thus dominated official and local understanding of the causes of the growing problems of social reproduction and environmental degradation reported in Mhezi.

Land and Natural Resources Markets and Conflicts

The growth of population, emergence of market-orientated land uses, the emergence of markets of various natural resources, and the scarcity of land and biomass resources, within a framework of the uneven distribution of various resources among households, have led to a variety of household reproduction strategies and competition for available land and natural resources. A critical problem is that local and official perspectives on the appropriate systems for the management of such resources, including legal and customary rules of control and access, as well as the enforcement of regulations, tended to diverge. Although the Mhezi area is not an "open access" property regime -- even though the grazing, woodlands, mountain and streambank zones are commonly used by the community -- competition for these resources has increased the potential and actual conflicts in the area. It appears that the Mhezi area faces a transitional period, whereby new rules of natural resource management and distribution are being negotiated. The actors include various groups of households, the various state institutions and intermediary organisations such as NGOs and local leaders. But the nature of the evolving markets and conflict is fairly

complex as discussed further below.

Given the pervasive dependence among Mhezi households on increasingly scarce land and natural resources for their survival, the dominant emerging social and economic tendency in the area revolved around the competition for access to land and related resources. Competing interests over these resources manifest themselves in the growth of markets for natural resources, divergent social values surrounding land and resource conservation practices, and direct conflicts of access to and use of given pieces of land and natural resources. While official data focuses mainly on matters related to the conservation of natural resources, survey data and field observation revealed the growing commodification of natural resources and intensifying conflicts over them, reflecting the unequal distribution of land ownership, control over land and access to lands with such resources. Even conservation practices varied according to the forms of control governing the lands exploited for natural resources.

Most households reported the growth of sales of woodfuel, timber poles, and thatch grass within Mhezi, and in respect of households purchasing these in nearby markets or selling these to "outsiders" at local markets or roadsides (Table 7.19). These natural resources were sold in variable quantities ranging from small bundles to scotch-cart loads, while payments varied from cash payments to labour services provided in kind. Mud was sold or exchanged for labour services provided by households in control of mud-patches to procuring households.

Roughly 40% of the households relied on purchasing timber poles locally, while up to 10% of the households relied for their income upon selling products made from wood or clay (carving, brick-making and pottery). Another 13% of the households practised off-farm enterprises which depended heavily upon ample woodfuel supplies (beer-brewing, black-smithery and brick-making) increasing their dependence upon wood markets. Indeed, wood was the most commoditised of the natural resources, followed by thatch and other products such as clay, ant-hill soils and cow dung. Furthermore, the commoditisation of most of the natural resources tended to be compounded by costs incurred from charges on transport and labour services provided to buyers. Actual monetary values entailed in the commodification were difficult to compute within the scope of work undertaken so far.

The commodification of anthill soils and animal manure reflected the increasing demand for cheaper sources of soil maintenance resources in the face of land degradation and the increasing demand for and costs of fertilizer in relation to declining incomes and deteriorating land productivity.

TABLE 6.19: NATURAL COMMODIFICATION TENDENCIES IN MHEZI

RESOURCE CATEGORY	COST	REMARKS
1. Thatch	\$2.50/bundle	Cost of grass variable; sometimes exchanged in return for labour, firewood etc. Cost also dependent on availability.
2. Firewood	\$15.00/cord*	Cost dependent on species e.g. those that leave good charcoal are more expensive.
3. Poles	\$1.50/pole (69.2% acquire poles free)	Cost variable (e.g. poles for roofing are more expensive than poles for fencing. Only costed when hired labour is used.
4. Mud	Free	

*1 Cord = 1 x 100kg air-dry mass.

Source: ZERO Survey, 1992

Indeed, draught power, normally assumed to be a "natural" element of the Communal Area household economy, had also increasingly become commoditised. In effect, very few of the essential household "tools of labour" or inputs to the household economy had escaped the market process by 1993, even if most households could still derive significant proportions of these "commodities" without recourse to cash payments (that is through the exchange of labour).

Direct payment for access to land for agricultural purposes tended not to be openly reported by Mhezi households, although it occurs. But it was revealed that "keeper" livestock for relatives outside Mhezi was regarded as a form of land rental and labour service, for which payments were made to "keeping" households, through a combination of access to some of the livestock's offspring and through remittances in cash and kind. Indeed, during the drought of 1992, some urban based livestock owners had tended to buy supplementary feeds and hay for their relatives in Mhezi, or to pay for grass collection in the Mhezi environs. Some households which "kept" cattle for relatives, regarded remuneration for such services as not only essential for their social reproduction, but as critical to their motivation to resist regular official or community threats against those deemed to be overstocking or "keeping" externally owned cattle.

Payments for arable land were reportedly rare, particularly among those returning migrants of Mhezi origin, although some outsiders "who had migrated into Mhezi" reported having paid for land, especially land regarded to have been "developed". Such development included land clearance, trees-planting, construction of out-buildings and livestock units. "Gifts" were commonly paid by "outsiders" for mere access to local traditional leaders who would then process requests for access to land, through specified procedures, which they had influence over. Furthermore, land "borrowing" or renting occurred in Mhezi and within Shangwe Resettlement Scheme. Therefore land bidding by various people was a growing and varied process, which entailed elements of an evolving land market. However, only some households benefited materially from these land bidding processes.

As a result of land and natural resource scarcities, the Mhezi community increasingly experienced social conflicts and differences over the access to and use of such resources. An interesting observation is that the community rarely reported such conflicts or differences to officials. Apparently a combination of local political unity in relation to Government officials, and fear of local reprisals (including, reportedly, through witchcraft), tended to foster internal solidarity in the resolution of such conflicts. Yet conflicts with adjacent LSCF owners did get reported to officials, as in the case of about seven incidents of natural resource use contraventions within Mhezi itself. But some of those households, who admitted to "illegally" hunting, fishing or trapping, believed it was their natural or moral right to exploit natural resources in the area, whether in Mhezi or in neighbouring LSCF areas. The poaching of these resources and illegal cattle grazing on LSCF lands was common, leading to frequent impoundments of cattle and the imposition of fines by the LSCF owners. However, few police arrests occurred over these processes.

Other lines of social cleavage arose from age differences, the associated changes of values and the imperative of younger households to establish themselves in farming and other enterprises. Most elder male household heads felt that the youth were disrespectful of sacred places which protected springs, watering sites, woodland patches, anthills and special clays. This "disrespect" took the form of "excessive" quantities of the natural resources being harvested, the exploitation of the resources for sale, the use of inappropriate instruments to cut plants, the poor selection of plant species harvested, and the transgression of age-sex based restrictions on the persons procuring such resources. Inequitable access to cropping lands, to garden sites, to the use of grazing lands by owners of large livestock herds, and the allocation of grazing lands to some households, was articulated by some households.

Such local differences regarding the use of land and natural resources were reflected in different levels of access to resources as well as in differences in resource conservation practices. For instance, up to 22% of the households reportedly were not able to adequately explain the utility of land contouring in relation to moisture retention and soil erosion, while around 30% of the households did not agree that most of the Mhezi resources were significantly degrading. Thus, as many as 26% of the households reportedly did not practise any water conservation measures because they did not see the need or lacked know-how. Very few households believed in the destocking of cattle for purposes of natural resources conservation, while on average, around 20% of the households did not undertake effective organic soil maintenance activities such as manuring and mulching, and up to 25% did not rotate land or crops. Grass conservation, around field contours, for instance, was not practised by 46% of the households. Such conservation was practised mainly by those who owned larger cattle herds. As many as 42% of the households did not follow any particular tree conservation measures, such as the selective and restrictive felling of trees.

It is in the explanation of the reasons for the non-adoption of the above land and natural resources practices, that major ideological differences emerged in Mhezi. For some people, land shortage was the key problem which explained the household poverty cycle and, therefore their inability to undertake certain land and resource management measures. In contrast, the majority of officials and some Mhezi households believed that education levels, ignorance of good husbandry and some form of "household delinquency" explained the non-adoption of conservation measures. Elder Mhezi household heads believed that the erosion of their traditional powers and institutions were the main problem. All these factors, indeed, played a part in varying degrees, within the different household circumstances found in Mhezi, in explaining resource degradation. But, some people believe that recommended conservation practices are themselves not suitable to the local ecological circumstances. Hence they did not adopt practices, because they disagreed with them. An interesting element associated with natural resource degradation, among most actors, remains the concern over uneven access to land, its deteriorating productivity and the concentration of surplus output among a few households.

Conclusion

Land pressure in Mhezi can therefore be gauged from the overall dependence of most households on land and natural resources for various basic needs. The use values of land include the fragmented but intense cropping practises, high levels of livestock, the use of natural resources to make farm implements, for housing materials and other domestic and

enterprise activities. Yet differential access to land and natural resources meant that some social groups were increasingly marginalised.

Local people expressed concern that if most households, particularly those headed by women and the young, could increasingly not meet their basic subsistence needs, they would turn to greater despoilation of the Mhezi land and natural resource base, and increasingly to land occupations and resource poaching in adjacent LSCF and Resettlement Areas. We now look at the nature of access by Mhezi households to land and natural resources in these adjacent tenorial regimes, and assess in greater depth the various processes of institutionalised mediation of various land problems in the area.

CHAPTER SEVEN

LOCAL POLITICS OF RESETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES

A central expectation among land short households and those hoping to expand their agricultural enterprises is to gain access to resettlement lands. But some of the Mhezi households gain formal access to land while others use unofficial strategies to access land and resources bordering the Communal Area. Therefore resettlement, various community initiatives and government and NGO rural development programmes are critical elements in dealing with local level land problems. The politics, programmes and strategies of tackling local land problems are discussed in this chapter.

Land Access in Resettlement Schemes and Commercial Farming Areas

The main official method for relieving land pressure and improving household access to land in the Mhezi environs is through the government resettlement schemes. All the Resettlement land in Makoni District had been procured by 1986. While 48% of the 254 073 hectares of resettlement land is in natural region II, 36% and 16% are in natural regions III and IV respectively. Only Chinyika and Mayo resettlement scheme have some land in natural region IV, while the Mufusire, Gwindingwi and Shangwe schemes are entirely in natural region II. While the quality of previously acquired Resettlement land in the area was considered to be reasonable by local people, its quantity was felt to be inadequate. No new Resettlement lands were added to the district even after the 1992 Land Acquisition Act, except for that acquired to resettle those households displaced by the Osborne Dam, as shown in detail later in this chapter.

Yet, the Makoni district resettlement schemes accommodated more people from other districts. For instance, about 33% of the then 5 849 settlers had come from other districts, with Nyanga and Buhera contributing the most settlers (Derude, 1992). Equally, on an individual scheme basis, settler recruitment from other districts was high. Thus Nyanga and Buhera districts contributed 11% and 10% of the Chinyika settlers respectively, while 3% of the Chinyika settlers came from Harare. Four families came from as far as Insiza district in Matebeleland and ten from Mt. Darwin district in Mashonaland Central. Local people and farming households in Mhezi, as elsewhere, increasingly believe that adjacent lands acquired for Resettlement should accrue to them, rather than to "foreigners". Politicians, including the President of Zimbabwe,

seem to have accepted these demands, hence an emerging policy orientation of enlarging existing Communal Areas and maintaining socio-cultural cohesion by recruiting settlers locally only.

Adjacent to Mhezi, Shangwe resettlement scheme has 156 settler households and a total of 1 142 people, settled in six villages (Table 8.3), carved out of four small LSCF farms on 3 436 hectares. The new settler households each have 5 hectares arable land, 20 hectares grazing land, 0.2 hectares for residential purposes and 0.25 and 0.09 hectares for a woodlot and garden respectively. Agritex expected settlers to grow maize (2 hectares), sorghum (0.5 hectares) and groundnuts (0.5 hectares). Over 390 hectares were allocated to settlers to hold 5 livestock units each at 4 units per hectare, amounting to 760 cattle and some other animals.

It was assumed that each family would bring to the resettlement scheme at least one ox, one cow, a 1-2 year old heifer, one calf and one 2-3 year old steer and that by the fifth year, the target herd would comprise two oxen, one calf, one 1-2 year old heifer and one 2-3 year old steer. In practice, the settlers had only cropped 222 hectares (47%) out of the total expected by 1991 and their cropping pattern was more diverse than expected (Table 7.1 and 7.2). The staple food, maize, was predominantly grown by 126 households (81% of the settlers) on an average of 1.2 hectares each, while none grew the drought tolerant crop, sorghum. The preferred cash crop was sunflower seeds, grown by 44 households (28%) on 23 hectares (5% of the arable area), followed by groundnuts (also consumed by households), grown by 40% of the 610 settlers. Rapoko (finger millet), cropped for brewing beer for sale, was grown by 11% of the settlers (17 households). Thus, less than 40% of the Shangwe households grew cash crops, with about half of the households dominating the sunflower and groundnut crops, and a few growing tobacco and castor as cash crops.

Household land productivity (yields per hectare) achieved were also less than 40% of the potential yields in similar natural regions, particularly in the LSCF, while arable land utilisation was also below 40% of the potential. Actual livestock held by 1991 amounted to 674 cattle, which reflects 7% more than the minimum target set (630 cattle) and 54% less than the maximum potential (1 248 cattle) expected by DERUDE officials. But this pattern of livestock reflects the broader Communal Area cattle ownership patterns, whereby close to 50% of the households are without cattle. Thus overall resource utilisation at Shangwe resettlement scheme, was well below its potential, in juxtaposition to overcrowding and land shortage in

Mhezi. Some of the Shangwe land were "illegally" or informally "lent" out to some Mhezi households.

The Manicaland Resettlement Programme had started in 1981 at Nyagundi Resettlement Scheme of Mutare District with 182 families on 8 928 hectares. Since then 14 064 families have been allocated 533 440 hectares in 20 Model A Schemes and 744 individuals are members of 18 Model B Schemes that occupy 30 564 hectares (Table 6.6 and 6.7). This pace of resettlement was not adequate to meet the type of land demands experienced in numerous wards such as Mhezi in the Manicaland province.

TABLE 7.1: SHANGWE RESETTLEMENT: CROPPING PATTERN

CROP	(1) PLANNED AREA (HA)	(2) USED AREA (HA)	(3) 2 AS % OF 1	(4) 2 AS % OF TOTAL AREA USED	(5) 3 AS % OF TOTAL PLANNED AREA
Maize	312	145	47	65	31,0
Millet	-	1	-	0,45	0,2
Rapoko	-	5	-	2,25	1,1
B. Tobacco	-	3,1	-	1,4	0,7
Groundnuts	78	25,3	32	11,4	5,4
Sunflower	-	23,26	-	10,45	5,0
Cast Beans	-	3,6	-	1,62	0,8
Nyimo	-	1,1	-	0,50	0,2
ED. Beans	-	2,6	-	1,17	0,6
TOTALS	668	206,4			

Source: DERUDE, Mutare, 1993

TABLE 7.2: SHANGWE RESETTLEMENT SCHEME: CROPPING PATTERN (1992)

CROP	NO. OF FARMERS	AREA	INPUT COSTS (\$)	TOTAL YIELD (T)	AVERAGE (TONS) YIELD/FARMER	AVERAGE (TONS) YIELD/HA.	SALES TONS	VALUE OF SALES
Maize	126	145	34702	285,00	2,23	1.97	149,15	44298
Millet	2	1	82	0,73	0,37	0,73	-	-
Rapoko	17	5	414	3,69	0,22	0,74	0,36	240
B. Tobacco	7	3	629	4,58	0,65	1,48	4,21	1575
Groundnuts	60	25	2532	19,52	0,32	0,77	10,68	4752
Sunflower	44	23	2016	16,50	0,38	0,71	14,98	6666
Castor Beans	1	2	193	0,91	0,91	0,57	0,91	3322

Nyimo	3	1	116	0,55	0,18	496	0,18	150
ED. Beans	2	3	234	2,09	1,05	805	1,64	4920
TOTALS	262	208	40918					65923

Source: DERUDE, 1993

Thus resettlement played a marginal role in relieving land pressure in Mhezi, although it did provide an outlet for some households.

TABLE 7.3: SHANGWE RESETTLEMENT SCHEME: SETTLEMENT PATTERN

VILLAGE	SETTLED FAMILIES	POPULATION
Deme	42	308
Mutsirwa	18	152
Gurupirwa	25	186
Chirambakubaira	13	118
Gundi	28	213
Arrarat	30	165
TOTAL	156	1 142

Source: DERUDE, Mutare, 1993

Alternatively, Mhezi households and others in Chiduku Communal Area had had the opportunity to bid for land in nearby SSCF lands, through legal and informal approaches. The Dowa small-scale commercial farming area, formerly an African Purchase Area, was created in 1936, less than 10 kilometres from North-Eastern Mhezi. Officially, Dowa accommodates 40 households on farms sizes averaging about 100 hectares. These farms, originally sold on lease-to-buy terms to male household heads from Communal Areas, with Master Farmers certificates, are currently held mostly by male heirs and a few original owners in their late seventies and eighties.

Because the majority of the farm heirs did not have to be Master Farmers, and most of them are reportedly in urban areas, the farms are actually occupied mainly by relatives of owners and farm "caretakers". As a result, Dowa small-scale farms are actually characterised by numerous household plots of around five cropped hectares, growing maize, groundnuts, sorghum, rapoko, and sunflower. Most households have small livestock holdings of not more than 10 animals. Essentially, these SSCF farms have been converted into peasant household farm sub-divisions.

Therefore, farm technology and the farming system in Dowa are similar to that found in Mhezi. However, a handful of the households in Dowa owned tractors which were also hired out for

ploughing in surrounding areas. Dowa yields for the mainly bulky staple grain crops are below 50% of the agronomic potential, as reported by resettlement officials. Only a few of the farm owners and "illegal" farming households of Dowa came from Mhezi. Thus land access for Mhezi households there was also limited. But some of the households in Mhezi perceived Dowa residents to be unfairly privileged in their land-holdings. Some of the Mhezi households particularly resented the land under-utilisation in Dowa and the fact that most of the "illegal" occupants of Dowa SSCF hailed from distant districts. Yet Dowa was located too far away for Mhezi residents to actively pursue natural resource poaching strategies to complement their internal resources. Occasionally, a few such cases were reported by Dowa farm owners to local Government officials.

The more accessible farming area for the additional land bidding initiatives of the Mhezi residents were the Shangwe Resettlement Scheme and two adjacent LSCF farms. Activities include: natural resource poaching, the legally sanctioned procurement of natural resources under strict permits from farm owners, the supply of seasonal, casual and permanent labour to the farms, the contractual supply of cash crops such as pepper to the LSCF for further processing and marketing, technical advice provided by LSCF farmers to Mhezi households, the provision by LSCF farmers of hired tractor ploughing services, shopping and drinking centres, and so forth (see also Box 7.1).

The freehold large-scale commercial farms (LSCF) adjacent to Mhezi were established after the creation of Chiduku Communal Lands about 70 years ago. Lesbury, the Willows, Recondite and Harrisonville are the LSCF farms closest to Chiduku communal lands and Shangwe Resettlement Scheme, in Makoni Rural Council area. The farms focus on tobacco, followed by cattle ranching and maize mainly for livestock feed. Harrisonville farm, adjacent to Shangwe Resettlement Scheme, borders the north-eastern Mhezi area of Pasipanodya (Box 7.1), while Lesbury farm borders the north-central Mhezi. These farms have faced regular poaching from Mhezi households. Some of these cases have been reported to the police, while cattle from Mhezi are frequently impounded for trespassing.

BOX 7.1: PROFILE OF AN LSCF NEIGHBOUR OF MHEZI

Mr K Ziehl of Harrisonville farm, is a graduate of the Tobacco Training Institute. He concentrates on tobacco, using cultivators recommended by the Tobacco Research Board. The TRB samples the leaf yearly, for pre-selling season styles and qualities. District 10 rotational crops are grown to enhance soil fertility and prevent disease build-up: these include tobacco, maize, grass, on a 4-5 year rotational basis. Cattle are then grazed on strategic paddocks and non-arable land.

HARRISONVILLE FARM CROPPING PROGRAMME (ACRES)

YEAR	IRRIGATED TOBACCO	DRYLAND TOBACCO	MAIZE	COVE GRASS
1988	65	50	120	115
1989	50	60	40	110
1990	70	50	-	120
1991	65	40	-	100
1992	60	40	-	100
1993	-	120	100	150

Harrisonville has 37 permanent residents workers, and 114 seasonal contract workers, from Communal and Resettlement Areas.

HARRISONVILLE FARM TOBACCO INCOME

YEAR	YIELD (kg/ha.)	SALES (kg)	PRICE (\$/kg)	TOTAL VALUE (Z\$)
1991	2 400	98 000	11.00	1 119 000
1992	2 000	120 000	8.00	1 056 000
1993	2 400	140 000	10.00	1 400 000

Mr Ziehl says his relationship with communal and resettlement farmers is good: he allows their cattle to graze his land periodically, assists the resettled with ploughing, allows Communal households to collect thatching grass and advises resettled farmers on tobacco growing.

Source: Interviews with Mr. Ziehl, Harrisonville Farm, 1993

Again only a handful of Mhezi households tended to gain legal access to the harvesting of natural resources on the LSCF farms, while the two farms refused to permit temporary cattle grazing on their farms, except during the severe drought of 1991/2. Labour services, especially of the seasonal type, tended to benefit more households from Mhezi, as the combined short-term labourers hired on the two farms reached over 500 persons. Lesbury farm, which engaged in cultivation of tobacco, maize, pepper and various horticultural products under irrigation, absorbed fairly large numbers (600) of permanent and casual labourers.

Therefore, legal access to SSCF, LSCF and Resettlement lands by Mhezi households was rather limited, although illegal land bidding initiatives occurred. Labour hire was the more common legal and functional relationship between Mhezi and the LSCF, while contract ploughing services

and peasant crop marketing to the LSCF appear to be an emerging relationship of potential importance. Yet resettlement lands could offer greater access to land-short households in Mhezi, given that few of the current settlers managed to fully utilize their lands (see Box 8.2). In general, while land redistribution in Manicaland embraced larger numbers of households and areas compared to other provinces, it was still inadequate to meet the demand for land from the Communal households.

In Mhezi and its environs, the main official problem associated with existing and required resettlement lands is firstly, that over and above the land shortages and squatting in the area, there is a pressing need to rehabilitate people displaced by new infrastructure such as dams, schools and the Feruka pipeline. Secondly, officials are concerned about land under-utilisation in existing Resettlement schemes. Lastly, local officials are anxious to re-settle officially recognised "squatters", even though such households are not prioritised by the land policy of central Government.

Therefore, the new Land Acquisition Act of 1992 has so far not been used to cater for the growing officially recorded demand for resettlement land in Makoni District (see Table 7.8). This act was used in 1992 in the area following the construction of the Osborne dam, which started in 1991 and displaced numerous families resident

BOX 7.2: The Successful Resettlement Farmer

Mr L Madziwa is a "successful" farmer in Chirambakubaira village of Shangwe Resettlement Scheme, and VIDCO Chairman of the scheme; considered equivalent to a Communal village. Mr Madziwa was resettled in 1987 when Chirambakubaira and Gundi villages were established. Other villages, Deme, Mutsirwa and Gundi were established in 1983. The exception, Arrarat village, was created in 1991 when the scheme was expanded.

Most of the 42 settlers in Deme village came from Chironga village in Mhezi Ward, because their land had been "designated" for the Chironga School site. The settlers of Mutsirwa and Gurupirwa villages were also "displaced" from their home in the Tandri area of Pasipanodya/Mhezi area by a clinic. Chirambakubaira and Gundi villages settled people from Rukweza, Zingondi and Devedzo, the most crowded parts of Chiduku Communal lands. Most settlers in Shamva are from Chiduku, and only one village has a "foreign" majority: Arrarat. Many settlers are former "squatters" in resettlement areas and commercial farms, especially from Buhera District.

Mr Madziwa is one of two farmers in Chirambakubaira village who have grown both burley and virginia tobacco since 1989. His five arable hectares are not large enough to practise the necessary rotation for tobacco: Mr Madziwa "borrows" 3 hectares from neighbours to grow 2 hectares of tobacco annually and 3 hectares in some seasons. Other settlers mainly grow maize, sunflower, rapoko and sorghum and most can only cultivate 2 hectares of their arable plot. According to Mr Madziwa the relatively low productivity among many settlers is because of lack of interest in farming, absentee men, lack of farming implements and lack of draught power. Mr Madziwa has had an AFC loan several times but the majority of resettlement farmers in Shangwe only had the loan twice: In 1983 some settlers received \$400 and in 1984 others received \$600. They were unable to pay back and since then loans have been terminated.

Unlike other settlers, who rely on family labour, Mr. Madziwa, whose family members are young, hires labour: 6 youth worked his tobacco plot for six months at a wage of \$165 per month each in 1993, and he hired casual labour at \$8 per day.

About 50% of the resettled have 2 to 15 cattle which were mostly bought after joining the scheme: Mr Madziwa has 14. Mr Madziwa's owns a scotch-cart, two small tobacco barns and a bale tying machine. He hopes to buy more equipment from the sale of 28 bales of burley tobacco and 100 bales of virginia tobacco this year.

Source: Interviews with Derude and Shangwe Households, 1993

in the dam's basin (Table 7.4). Their resettlement has been a priority task for the province since then. By June 1992, 75 families displaced by the dam had been resettled (Table 8.4), while more farms were acquired and 295 households settled by December 1992 (Table 7.7).

TABLE 7.4: RESETTLEMENT: OSBORNE DAM DISPLACED FAMILIES

FARM	DISTRICT	AREA (HA)	NO. OF FAMILIES
Fairfield Farm 21	Makoni	1 181,9	27
Makoni Kop	"	712,4	17
Devils Pass	"	1 174,0	8
Ruthbeg	"	1 150,0	23
TOTAL		4 218,3	75

Source: DERUDE, Mutare, 1993

District and provincial Government officials have increasingly turned towards Resettlement schemes in their search for land for the land-hungry and displaced persons, rather than purchasing more lands, because a consensus is emerging among them that such lands are underutilised. Apparently, it was only the urgent need to resettle the 325 Osborne dam families which drew the Provincial Administrative authorities' attention to the under-utilisation of Model B schemes, even though officials of DERUDE, in Manicaland area considered them to be a failure. The collective cooperative farms are considered to be under-utilised, or not used on a commercial basis, due to their low levels of arable land use and their lower than officially targeted membership. Zingondi cooperative, adjacent, to Mhezi is thus also a subject of controversy, given the pressing land requirements in the area (Box 8.3). Among the 18 registered cooperatives, seven were identified by the Osborne Dam Task Force Committee as being the worst and deserving de-registration (Table 8.5). These collective farms were being

considered for replanning as Model A schemes that could be used to accommodate the displaced Osborne dam families, existing cooperative members and other households registered for resettlement.

At the practical level therefore, while Manicaland also experienced the greatest number of collective cooperative land redistribution schemes, local and individual demand for access to resettlement lands has led Government officials to focus on the potential of using "decollectivisation" as a strategy for enhancing access to land for more households. Thus, a larger constituency of household land demands had tended to outweigh arguments for land reform schemes that optimise scale economies and socialised ownership such as the collective cooperatives.

BOX 7.3: MODEL B RESETTLEMENT SCHEME

Two farms adjacent to Rusape, on 707 hectares, were acquired in 1982 for Model B Resettlement, and allocated to the Rusape Farm Cooperative Society later called Zingondi Cooperative Society. The farm is in Natural Region IIb and is 30% arable, with deep greyish brown coarse grained sands over pale loamy sands to similar sandy loams over yellowish red sandy clay loams or occasionally sandy clay soils. Previous enterprises were tobacco and dairy, farming, as well as fruit, fish, timber and maize for tobacco rotations and livestock feed. Wheat and groundnuts can be grown.

GoZ planners recommended dairy and fruit as the main enterprise, with maize for livestock, at a carrying capacity of 233 levels, to be increased with permanent pastures. Pigs could be introduced later. The cooperative was to initially concentrate on fruit farming, market gardening and maize production. Winter wheat was to be introduced when irrigation infrastructure had been installed. Dairying was to start as soon as pastures were established: 150 hectares of maize would be grown for the dairy. The 34 hectare orchard of peaches and apricots and the 1,4 hectare vineyard was to be revived and maintained. Yield targets were: maize 4.4 tons/ha., wheat 3.4 tons/ha and peaches 16.4 tons/ha, but these have never been achieved. Less than half of these targets were achieved for maize.

LAND USE: ZINGONDI COOPERATIVE

+-----+					
[CROP	AREA PLANTED	PROD.	YIELD	TONS	VALUE OF]
	(HA)	(TONS)	(KG/HA)	SOLD	SALES(\$)] -----
Maize	22.0	48.0	2182	46	
Vir. Tobacco	2.0	5.07	2535	5.07	
Potatoes	4.0	22.5	5625	22.5	
Grape Fruit	20.0	75.57	1574.4	29.5	+-----+

The cooperative only used 2.29% of the farm land or 7.6% of the arable land until 1991/92. However, 224 cattle acquired recently brings to nearly full utilisation the grazing capacity of the farm. The cooperative should have 113 households but in 1993 it had only 45, after a peak of 55. Members are from Chiduku communal lands, while ex-farm labourers are in the majority.

Source: Field Surveys 1986, Interviews 1993 and Derude 1993

Nevertheless, only one of these "condemned" cooperatives, Chioneso, has so far been actually

de-registered and handed back to the Department of Rural Development to prepare it for settling the Osborne dam families on a Model A basis. This case is thus the first formal move by the GoZ to officially de-register some collective farms, and convert them to individual household enterprises, signalling a further official rejection of the Government's erstwhile socialist ideological orientation, and disappointment with the performance of collectives.

TABLE 7.5: UNDER-UTILISED MODEL B FARMS IN MHEZI ENVIRONS

COOPERATIVE	FARM NAME	AREA (HA)	PLANNED MEMBERSHIP	ACTUAL
Bethel	Fairfield 7 & 8	1 624	100	43
Tanhi	Silversdale	886	105	26
Kuedzamasimba	Fairfield	1 512	80	34
Chioneso	Amberwell	1 053	47	23
Rugogo	Nhahambe	1 158	60	24
Zingondi	Lesapi Falls	2 095	113	45
Ruwaka	Bulls Lum	4 657	85	23
TOTALS		26 595	590	218

Source: DERUDE

The need to resettle the Osborne dam families also meant that Manicaland Province was the first to use the new land Acquisition Act of 1992. The Osborne Task Force Committee initially recommended to the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development that nine farms (Table 7.6) be designated for resettlement. The owners of Cynara Estate, Alderberry, Leicester and Lee farms contested the designation and won their cases leading to the un-designation of their farms, while Koodoosberg Estate and Kingsley Estate were designated on the basis of the under-utilisation of their lands. Wilderness Estate was designated on the basis of having a non-resident owner and that a Mr Thompson used it on a lease-hold basis.

Thus, it is noteworthy that officially generated land requirements based on the displacement of peoples by development of infrastructures have played a critical role in the government initiative to use and test its new powers to acquire land. It is the local demands also which have spurred the move towards de-collectivisation. This demonstrates that it is mainly local demands for land that provide a specific context to the land distribution exercise, and also that local political pressure for land can be influential in the quest for a land reform strategy.

TABLE 7.6: DESIGNATED FARMS (BY 1993)

FARM	DISTRICT	OWNER	AREA (HA)
Koodoosberg Estate	Mutasa	Ziva Zano Church Society	1 635,09
Kingsley Estate	"	Mangenje Brothers	856,79
Cynara Estate	"	R R Bennet	614,54
Alderberry	"	R R Bennet	230,17
Leicester	"	Holstrin Stud	316,33
Quovadis	"	Fene Cons of Zimbabwe	363,43
Lot 1 of Wilderness Estate	Makoni	N T Thompson	1 068,78
R/E of Wilderness Estate	"	N T Thompson	1 168,27
Lee Farm	"	S M Ballance	2 971,95
TOTAL			9 225,35

Source: DERUDE, Mutare, 1993

Indeed, local officials of Government have attempted to move the central Government towards settler selection criteria focusing on the displaced, squatters and previously existing waiting lists for resettlement. They also complain that central Government directives for land designation tend to be hard to implement effectively. For instance, the acquisition of designated properties is considered by Derude officials in the province to be a long and cumbersome process, since many of the properties designated in 1992 have yet to be fully owned by the government. New farms are urgently needed to resettle 325 more Osborne dam displaced families by late 1993, since the dam was due to start holding water in November 1993. Difficulties have also emerged over the protracted legal contestations by owners, such as the

Ziva Zano Church Society, of Koodoosberg farm, who are in legal conflict with the government over the designation of their farm. It appears that the government in late 1993 agreed to un-designate that farm, since the church owners had been recipients of aid monies now used to construct social service and agricultural infrastructure on the farm. The church owners also agreed to accommodate non-member settlers on the farm; a compromise which fulfilled Government's objective to intensify land occupancy rates on LSCFs within this land-short area.

TABLE 7.7: FARMS PURCHASED FOR RESETTLEMENT (JUNE 1992)

FARM	DISTRICT	AREA (HA)	NO. OF FAMILIES
Nootigedacht	Makoni	607,4	19
Robyn	"	471,8	15
Gibraltar	"	328,1	10
Lot 1 of Riverside	"	500,7	25
Lot A of Riverside	"	648,9	15
R/E of Souldrop	Mutasa	232,3	150
R/E of "B" Mr Ruinji	"	348,5	150
Lot 1 of Charity	"	89,2	150
Lot 1 of Mr Ruinji	"	318,1	150

Source: DERUDE, 1992

Officials also see problems arising from compulsory land acquisition because some of the designated farms already fully accommodate labourers. Technically, such workers have a right to be resettled, although workers from Malawi are threatened with repatriation. But the acquisition of some farms which have large numbers of workers renders the land transfer exercise as merely a tenancy switching exercise, rather than as a provision for the relief envisaged under land acquisition. For instance, Wilderness Estate, which has a capacity to accommodate 70 families, already houses 50 labourers and their families, suggesting that the net improvement in land access by local households would be based on 20 families, unless the workers are sent off the farm too.

One of the criterion used in the designation process is farm land under-utilisation. Some Government officials in the province consider most of those Government officials tasked with the identification of under-utilised farms to be insufficiently familiar with large scale commercial farming to be able to effectively identify under-utilised farms. Yet, the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) has generally been unwilling to identify under-utilised farms for the government in the Manicaland Area. Since officials have no detailed land use data on most LSCF farms, they have to literally visit farms and use observation and indirect methods of assessing land utilisation. Currently central Government guidelines for assessing land underutilisation include: actual cropped or grazed lands in relation to available lands, with 50% use being the cut-off point; the number of employees in relation to potential numbers of resettled households; viability, measured as net incomes per farm of \$10,000 per year; developed irrigation potential; and infrastructure and viable plans. The actual mix of these criteria in defining underutilisation remains unclear to local officials. Other local criteria, such as degrees of land pressure and demand in Communal Areas near LSCF's, are not, however, listed as criteria for land designation. Yet the government generally seems to have moved towards acquiring lands nearest to Communal lands during 1993. In fact both the President and Lands, Agriculture and Water Development Minister Kangai have publicly stated that proximity to Communal Lands is a factor to be considered in land designation, without having signalled a shift in the overall criteria. Other criteria such as absentee farm ownership, were also obscured by limited data available to the government officials in Manicaland and by the non-compliance of the local CFU branch. However, in November 1993 Minister Kangai, reported that LSCF members are increasingly assisting Government in this process.

Official assessments of demand for land through the Resettlement Programme in Manicaland are based on formal criteria and records of "waiting lists", comprising those formally identified by the Local Government Ministry's machinery as needing resettlement, formally acknowledged "squatters" and "displaced" peoples (Table 8.8). This excludes those peasant land demands which did not fit the social criteria established before 1990. However, the Manicaland list of families in need of land also contradicts the new settler selection criteria based on the economic qualifications of settlers, as well as the settler selection procedures, which require detailed household data including age, family size and education, on questionnaires not used in the past.

For instance, Manicaland officials recognise 12 656 households as requiring resettlement.

Seventy-nine percent of this demand was established through the older selection criteria, which focus on the poorest, destitute and officially landless. Squatters constituted 1 431 households (11% of the "waiting" list of landless households), while those displaced by the Osborne dam now amount to 1 225 (10% of the official list). Altogether, the total number of households recognised in the official Government "waiting" lists, would require 632,000 hectares, of which 20% would have to be arable to meet present minimum target of 5 hectares per household. Most officials are not optimistic about the chances of securing such land in this province to meet existing official land demand lists, since they have been struggling to meet their priority demand among the "displaced" households.

In the context of this official "backlog" of demand for land, DERUDE officials in Manicaland Province have not been able to use the post-1990 land policy criteria to select potential settlers. Displaced people, such as the Osborne dam households, were not subjected to a selection process because they did not apply for resettlement and because they were moved against their wishes.

TABLE 7.8: MANICALAND OFFICIALLY RECORDED DEMAND FOR RESETTLEMENT: 1992

DEMAND ISSUE/BASIS	DISTRICT	FAMILIES TO BE SETTLED	LAND NEEDED (HA)
Osborne Dam Displaced People	Mutasa & Makoni	325	16 250
Osborne Dam Recreational Park	"	900	45 000
Summerfield Transit Camp	Mutasa	120	6 000
Daisy Hill Transit Camp	Chipinge	201	10 050
Mutanda I Squatters	Makoni	700	35 000
Mutanda II Squatters	Mutare	25	1 250
Mutanda III Squatters	Makoni	100	5 000
Mpudzi Squatters	Mutare	35	1 750
Nyahode Valley Squatters	Chimanimani	250	12 500

Provincial Waiting List (Resettlement)	All	10 000	500 000
TOTALS		12 656	632 800

Source: DERUDE, Mutare, 1993

Those displaced in transit camps were promised resettlement in the mid-1980s, while squatters were not selected for resettlement but simply occupied alienated or state lands. Thus the very nature of officially recognised demands for resettlement, such as the displaced and selected "squatters", makes it very difficult for the government to use its new official policy on settler selection, because the economic criteria now preferred require the identification of only "proven" farmers.

Some officials thus expect that in Manicaland, the pre-1980 settler selection criteria will reign for some years. This of course suggests that unofficial or non-registered demand for land, such as that identified in Mhezi, will continue to be met through independent local agency, including so-called squatting, unless the implementation of force to control the latter by state is somewhat stepped up. Nevertheless, officials appear to admit to their inability to quash most so-called squatting, while the growth of land demand as a result of "displacement" is expected to continue to add to the overall demand to land as infrastructure investments are made in Communal Areas.

Therefore, the use of squatting as a land access strategy, in place of state controlled bureaucratic criteria and patterns of resettlement, has been partially successful as a household land bidding initiative. Other examples of this exist in other provinces, although by and large the state has been able to evict the majority of squatters. As stated by the Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development in a November 1993 Press Conference, the Government is only "firm not cruel" about illegal land settlements.

An interesting issue concerning displacement of peasant households is that most of the resettled, or those yet to be resettled, argue that the government consultation process on their displacement from land for infrastructural construction, and the levels or rates of compensation they receive for their losses on displacement are unsatisfactory. Yet legislation on the land rights and compensation for displaced Communal dwellers is inadequate and tilted against

peasants, since it does not specify their rights in cases of Government land expropriation, especially the levels of adequate compensation. Little public interest, local and international, has been directed at these peasant rights, including both their present displacement or past land alienation. While the Communal Lands Act gives the Government immense powers to acquire land in Communal Areas without any detailed protection of peasant rights, Zimbabwe's land debates have centred almost exclusively on the rights of LSCF owners displaced by compulsory land acquisition. Local households were quick to remind us of this imbalance, thereby querying the fairness and justification of the lengthy procedures required in what is perceived to be a cumbersome Land Acquisition Act, vis-a-vis the legal powers of the state in Communal Areas.

The evidence of land hunger, grievances and demands within the Mhezi environs, and the apparent inadequacy of official channels in accessing land to peasant households, means that unofficial land bidding strategies and natural resource management practices tend to be gaining currency in the area. As discussed earlier, various Governmental, NGO and local organisations have intervened in Communal Areas, such as in Mhezi, in order to ameliorate various problems faced by households in relation to the land question. We now look at the approaches used by such organisations to mediate the land problem, and some local responses to both land problems and external interventions.

The Local Politics of Land Conflict Mediation

Existing legal instruments for the control and regulation of land use and tenure tend to be ineffective because of problems surrounding their legitimacy, the capacity to enforce them, and the effectiveness of strategies used by households to avoid such centrally derived controls and policy. Thus, a variety of local institutions have resorted to intensive and varied initiatives to persuade households to move towards specified land use practices, and to provide a framework for developing alternative means of sustenance to households within legally acceptable spheres of land access and use. These institutional interventions represent an emerging political and ideological praxis focused on redefining the land question, which also contributes towards the evolving land policy of central Government, albeit in a gradual and remote manner.

The complex institutional matrix of intervention which has evolved in Mhezi thus reflects various local level responses, by internal and externally based organisations and groups of

households, to national policy and legislative changes affecting land, and the situational changes in the land problems of Mhezi. Evidence from interviews with informants in Mhezi suggests that the institutional objectives related to land management and work by Government and NGO institutions operating locally, were focused on mitigating the perceived declining land and related resource base, to ameliorate the emerging household reproduction crisis, to "modernise" and improve land productivity, and to reduce human pressure on land through direct and indirect techniques and procedures. The different types of institutions used different approaches to the land problem, within a framework of changing roles and mechanisms adopted by the Government of Zimbabwe. The state approach included cooptative and punitive strategies in addressing land management. It used different forms and levels of local participation in decision-making and implementation of these new land management activities. The attempt to gain legitimacy and hegemony by state institutions involved in addressing these land problems is discussed further in later sections. However, the desperate nature of the government's search for solutions to the perceived land problems at the local level is well reflected in the variety of institutional strategies utilised and promoted by Government to intervene in Mhezi's land situation.

Four institutional formats were used to organise Mhezi households into groups dealing primarily with land management and related issues. These were: Government, NGOs, local community organisations and traditional institutions. The state was represented by eleven arms of Government, including central ministries, two local Government branches and two parastatals, (Table 7.8 and 8.8). Some Government personnel were stationed in Mhezi and others in Rusape, from where frequent visits were paid to organise households. Other state institutions worked through local committees, of which there were at least five, which the state regularly communicated with and guided. The former Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement had two departments in the Mhezi environs, one associated with agricultural extension services and the other with livestock support services. The other ministries, including Local Government, Rural and Urban Development, and Environment and Tourism, had five and three departments respectively serving Mhezi regularly, but at a low level of intensity in terms of personal contacts with household members. In addition, six VIDCO's and one WADCO, working in association with the Ministry of Local Government, serviced the Mhezi area, through the coordination of local development, particularly in land administration issues.

There were 15 NGOs engaged in promoting land management and related activities, with a

physical or regular presence in Mhezi (see Tables 7.8 and 8.8). These ranged from indigenous Zimbabwean environmental organisations (four, to an international environmental network with a United Nations Development Programme origin and to training NGOs (one plus), marketing NGOs (two), one foreign consulting company and six broadly based projects development NGOs. Of all these NGOs, a total of six were internationally linked and mainly of European origin: Most of these worked through local household groupings focused on single projects, which directly or indirectly promoted land use management.

For instance, the community and traditional organisations combined included over ten types of institutions (see Table 8.9) engaged in land matters. Three of these were inter-linked "traditional" institutions - traditional healers, spirit mediums and the lineage leadership centred on headmen and chiefs: They were purported to play a role in land and environmental management issues, through the regulations of natural resources use at sacred sites (springs, cemetery areas, mountains), using local mythology and various rules intended to limit the full scale exploitation of such resources. The other two types of traditional organisation or groups were based on family cooperation and exchange, namely *nhimbe* for farm labour exchanges and *ronzero* for livestock exchanges: both these institutions were focused on land use practices.

The remaining five community based organisations (CBO's), were somewhat autonomous household groupings grounded locally, which had been triggered off by the promotional work of NGOs and Government ministries - particularly those responsible for agriculture, (farmer groups), environment (conservation groups) and community development (women's groups and cooperatives). The savings clubs and garden groups had been promoted by NGOs, while woodlot groups had been promoted by the Forestry Commission, a parastatal. The three "committees" working on land issues in association with Government included grazing committees, wildlife committees and water committees. Furthermore, the government had sponsored the formation of two "service committees" for education and health, with the added responsibility of providing agronomic and environmental projects with extension, training and information support.

In addition, school committees, located in Government or mission schools, had parent-teacher associations with a broader development function, which included a focus on land related projects, such as gardens, woodlots and, during the drought, supplementary child feeding schemes. Therefore a variety of key community organisations had institutionalised the

promotion of various land management practices for the benefit of environmental sustainability and community access to basic needs.

According to various persons involved in these institutions, most of the organisations promoted "development", aiming to enhance the material and social reproduction of Mhezi households. This occurred through direct project intervention, awareness building and training on a variety of land related issues, improving community networking to exchange information and resources, and enhancing a consensual spirit through the group approach. Some officials claimed an interest in developing resource co-management systems between the state and local communities, and among households, particularly focusing on improving the ecological status of land and natural resources in Mhezi.

Our findings are that the majority of the institutions tended to be preoccupied with land and natural resources conservation, while other activities such as improving access to woodfuel, and raising levels of nutrition and the incomes of local groups were also of secondary importance to land as incentives for participation in land use practices being promoted. Institutional investment in Mhezi, through personnel, financial and material inputs for project development, was extremely low. Thus institutions concentrated their efforts on persuading and teaching households to minimize negative impacts on land and natural resources. Again, while there was continuity in the land management practices promoted by external agencies in colonial and post-independence institutional interventions, the major difference between these two periods was the large increase in numbers and sources of institutional interventions after independence, as well as a larger involvement of local groups and

TABLE 7.9: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES FOR LAND MANAGEMENT IN MHEZI (1992/3)

NGOs	Government STRUCTURES	SCHOOLS/MISSIONS	TRADITIONAL/COMMUNITY
<p>Africa 2000</p> <p>Save River Rehabilitation Programme</p> <p>ENDA</p> <p>Fambidzanai</p> <p>MOLISV Periodic Markets Pilot Project</p> <p>Lutheran World Federation</p> <p>Christian Care</p> <p>Self-Help Development Foundation</p> <p>Interconsult</p> <p>Save The Children (USA)</p> <p>Catholic Development Commission (CADEC)</p> <p>ZERO</p> <p>Weya Community Training Centre (WCTC)</p> <p>Child Survival Foundation</p> <p>Rusape Cooperative Union</p>	<p><u>District Level:</u></p> <p>Conservation Advisory Committee (CAC)</p> <p>Agritex</p> <p>Natural Resources Board</p> <p>Dept. of National Parks and Wildlife Management</p> <p>Maungwe District Council</p> <p>DERUDE, Min. of Local Govt., R & U Development</p> <p>Lands Inspectorate, Dept. of Natural Resources</p> <p>Department of State Forestry</p> <p>Chiwetu Training Centre, Forestry Commission</p> <p>UDICORP</p> <p>Department of Veterinary Services</p> <p><u>Ward Level:</u></p> <p>WADCO</p> <p>Grazing Committees</p> <p>Health Committees</p> <p>Wildlife Committees</p> <p>Education Committees</p> <p><u>Village Level:</u></p> <p>VIDCO</p>	<p>St. Theresa Mis. Sec.</p> <p>Chikore School</p> <p>Mubvurungwa Pri. Sch.</p> <p>Chitsva Primary Sch.</p> <p>Chitsva Sec. School</p> <p>St. Benedict Mission</p>	<p>Traditional Healers</p> <p>Spirit Mediums</p> <p>Chiefs and Headmen</p> <p>Woodlot Groups</p> <p>Women's Groups</p> <p>Farmers Groups</p> <p>Cooperatives</p> <p>Shungudzemoyo Savings Club</p> <p>Conservation Groups</p> <p>Nhimbe</p> <p>Ronzero</p> <p>Gardens Groups</p> <p>Water Committees</p>

Source: ZERO Field Research and Interviews, 1992 and 1993

(Key : See Table 6.8 for most abbreviated terms. Additionally : UDICORP = Urban Development Corporation)

international organisations in land management activities, and the attempt to incorporate pedagogic approaches and economic incentives into intervention strategies. The post-independence state and ruling party's search for rural legitimisation are key aspects of such new approaches to land management, despite their centrist origins.

Thus, the majority of the organisations, excluding the traditional institutions, had begun operating in Mhezi during the 1980s, in particular after 1985. At least one principal activity of most organisations was directly or indirectly targeted at land and natural resources management (Table 6.8). A minority of organisations were engaged in financial services and social welfare projects. Three were interested in investment such as irrigation, market infrastructure and inputs procurement. A closer examination of the promotional activities of these organisations in Mhezi (Table 7.8) indicates that the majority were providing extension services pertaining to recommended land use planning and natural resources conservation, farm inputs procurement for use in land intensification, and improved incentives from farm produce marketing. This focus particularly fitted the government's policy framework of land use, control and regulations, as discussed later.

Furthermore, the second most frequent institutional intervention found in the area, namely income generation projects, also involved land management intensification or conservation through woodlots, gardens and cattle schemes. These activities were promoted by most of the NGOs and the Government-promoted community based groups. Social, business and other investment projects had the least institutional support from the state and others, except for two NGOs. Moreover, most investment projects were in growth points or rural services centres, while business investments at the rural centres were dominated by "outsiders": people from other areas outside Chiduku or Mhezi. Large irrigation investment schemes, defined in the area as including small and medium sized dams, were only being discussed during 1992 as a result of the severe drought, although a major dam - Osborne Dam - was under construction in Makoni District, over 60 kilometre from Mhezi, principally for downstream irrigation use by large LSCF estates, as well as recreational enterprises.

Analysis of the approaches applied by state and NGO organisations engaged in land management activities, suggests that because of the limited funding available, their strategy was to focus on relatively low cost activities such as extension, education and training on land and resources management issues, rather than on investment in, for instance, irrigation. Officials acknowledged that their emphasis was on persuasion to reduce human and physical pressure on land and natural resources, because the physical enforcement of Government and even traditional conservation regulations had been ineffective, and because they had

little to offer households as material alternatives to their land based livelihoods. This perspective was confirmed by many households.

Thus, Mhezi households were mainly being asked to reduce their livestock numbers, avoid the use of land in vleis and stream banks, and to reduce their off-take of wood and plant resources in selected areas. Yet, the households were also being asked to expand their labour resources deployment for increasing woodfuel supplies, through woodlot and tree-planting work, to reclaim gullies, and protect or develop suitable water sources. A peculiar brand of an agricultural system was thus being promoted. It combined the reduction of available land resources and private household adoption of farm practices intended to intensify land cultivation, through improved seeds, fertilizer application, cattle fattening and various agronomic practices intended to improve soil fertility and prevent erosion. This broad approach conveniently coincided with the government's recommended agricultural land use planning approach, focusing on spatially re-organising land access and use, in replication of colonial efforts, even though numerous NGOs were involved in local interventions. Regulations were intended to enforce such land use planning, while institutions attempted to develop a consensus among the households on the rationality of recommended land use norms. However, since the actual use of organic fertilizers and livestock feeds was well below recommended targets of scientific farming, as noted by agricultural extension officers, the land management system promoted tended in practice to entail the combination of a low-input and reduced land use strategy.

Some local officials admitted that the above approach, broadly representing a shared state and NGO perspective, was ineffective because land pressure arising from demographic growth had diminished its chances of success. A few of them now believed that without the adoption of external options such as land resettlement and large scale investment in land development, such as irrigation, there was little hope of resolving the land problems of Mhezi. But some officials believed that resettlement was not the issue, since sufficient land was not in any case on offer. They perceived household ignorance of appropriate land and natural resource management practices to be the main problem, a view with which most households interviewed differed.

In spite of the wide variation in the types of institutions promoting land "development", the evidence from Mhezi suggests that the official development "discourse" (philosophy and ideology) entailed in the above approaches, and the use of available technical and material resources, were orchestrated through the emerging coordination of local organisations in the Mhezi community. This suggests that a post-colonial hegemonic ideological tendency surrounding land management issues was evolving in Mhezi. Although there were conflicts

of interest and a low level of effective coordination among the government and NGOs working among groups of households subscribing to the land management agenda reflected in the available programmes (see also chapter seven), some unity of perspective and action had emerged at different levels of organisation in Mhezi, particularly over tackling the land question. A perspective centred on the reduction of land use pressure without substantial alternatives was widely held among most formal organisations, notwithstanding their differences in specific approaches. But the Mhezi situation had spurred striking divergences of opinion on the land issue, especially among peasant households. This was reflected also in the level of local participation in the "development" activities of most formal institutions represented in Mhezi.

In spite of the presence of over 30 development organisations in Mhezi, less than 200 of the 800-plus households, or 25% of the community, were directly involved in projects run by Government and NGO institutions. Only the traditional institutions have a wide coverage in the Mhezi community because of their organic and historical grounding. Indeed, even extension services have a low community coverage, with extension officers to household ratios for Agritex, the Forestry Commission and Veterinary Services averaging around 1:1 000, and considering the fact that the responsibilities of these offices extend beyond Mhezi Ward. Few of the Government and NGO organisations in Mhezi had group membership or regular physical contact with more than 50 households each (see Table 7.10). The extension agent had an effective household coverage rate of reportedly below 50% of the households, and visits were infrequent at that. In reality, therefore, the extant land use ideology purveyed by formal development institutions, when measured in terms of direct contact with households and influence over land administration and use, tended to be received by a thin layer of the local community's households. The reliance of formal institutions in Mhezi on voluntary cooperation, and on the cooptation of a narrow segment of the Mhezi society, however, was an improvement on the predominantly coercive approaches used by the colonial state during the pre-1977 decades. Yet even post-independence institutions, entailing locally elected persons, such as the VIDCOs, were not considered by many households to provide regular contact or services to them. The ward council (WARDCO), and in particular the elected District Councillor of Mhezi, were reportedly the most remote of the local democratic institutions in terms of addressing various local problems including those related to land. The lack of finance for the administration of these organisations, given that they do not levy taxes or receive Government grants, was reported to explain their poor capacity to effectively address village level problems.

However, the state and NGO strategies to coopt and persuade Mhezi households into specific land management practices needs to be examined further. For, it appears that the

strategy adopted was to concentrate on a few households and use these to build new power structures sympathetic to the land management agenda promoted by external agencies. Many households (around 100, or 12%), seemed to have multiple participation rates among the Mhezi institutions. For instance, leadership of community organisations and government promoted committees was dominated decisively by the same few household heads. Some officials suggested that this derived from a "natural" selection process, whereby the motivated, natural leaders and "innovative" households tended to have interest in participating in the formal institutional programmes available.

Such limited participation rates among households in institutional activities seems to have more to do with the growing social differentiation in Mhezi, based on both material accumulation of resources, and the effectiveness of the new state based sources of power. Indeed some officials conceded that the overlapping of leadership in various community groups, WARDCOs, party committees and local Government committees, reflected a tendency to rely on those who believed in official policy and those who had resources to use for their effective participation. This suggested that a few household members, traditional leaders and mainly men, tended to have influential roles in processes such as land allocation, as most of those institutions also dealt with land use and access control and land allocation for "projects".

TABLE 7.10: GROUP COVERAGE LEVELS OF COMMUNITY ORGANISATIONS

TYPE	ACTIVITY	MEMBERS COVERED (AVE)
1. Farmer's Groups	Most common/mens Women credit, cash. Pool resource buying inputs	10-30/groups
2. Savings Clubs: Shungudzemoyo Savings Club (1957 broke up and 1985)	Common - mostly female combined in IGP (uniforms, poultry, bricks and woodlots, bread, gardening)	23 members (5 men)
3. Women's Groups (Clubs): a. Women's League IGP b. Sewing Cooperative	IGP groups of women. Training. *ZANU-PF (knitting, crochet)	12 members
4. Nhimbe/Working Associations (Cattle Ownership)	Share labor/ draught (women/ children planting labour)	Widespread
5. Linage/Ronzero Family Exchange	Family cattle loan/leaving cows	Over 200 households

6. VIDCO	Community mobilisation	General
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Source: ZERO Field Research and Personal Interviews, 1993

But this institutional selectivity of household participation in projects and group leadership also demonstrated a particular process whereby the interventions of formal development institutions tended to cultivate divergences among community members in terms of their views, and material aspirations for access to land, and their real prospects for social reproduction. The post-1980 period thus witnessed a state-led social mobilisation process involving the promotion of local organisation focused on centrally developed land management designs, that was substantially different from that generated by the liberation war and the colonial attempts at "community development" and tribal trust lands reservation. A more complex process of establishing hegemony and legitimacy in the control over land was evolving, even though the community resisted much of the content imposed therefrom. Thus, there was continuity with change, in the state's mediation of the land question during the 1980s.

The change in the state's approach to land control during the 1980s was effected through a combination of institutions, NGOs and household groups, particularly in the late 1980s, which had developed a more complex appreciation of the land question. However, a variety of approaches used could not address the problem of land effectively, although the state showed greater tolerance for household demands for land, and had minimum recourse to prosecution for transgressions associated with land and natural resources (see Table 7.11).

TABLE 7.11: NATURAL RESOURCES: LEGAL TRANSGRESSION AND JURIDICAL PROCESS

AUTHORITY DEALING	REPORTING	CASES	TIME PERIOD	NO. OF CASES
a. Police cases (involves DAs)	Agritex:	a. Fishing b. Stream bank c. Cultivation d. Hunting	8 mths 1991/92	16 11
b. VIDCO cases Headman cases	Locals	Land use related	5 yrs 1989/92	7
c. Chiefs cases	Locals	Land use related		3

d. "Svikiro" Mediums (Mhondoro)	Locals	Land use related	-	Few
e. Unreported cases	Numerous: Need further Research to Quantify These			

Source: ZERO Field Research, Police Report and Interviews

While the nature of household articulation of various demands for land requires further research, it is interesting to note that official views diverged over how to resolve the land question and associated problems. Local officials and households share a common understanding that land and natural resource degradation are a key threat to the social reproduction of households. Nevertheless, differences among officials, and between them and households, on the causes of land resource degradation, are a fundamental basis of increasing local conflicts over land. This is why land gains importance as an instrument of official and private social organisation in Mhezi. Yet, the official perspectives and institutional interventions have in general had little impact on alleviating household reproduction problems among many households in Mhezi, hence the increasing importance attached to private household land bidding and reproduction strategies, as discussed in chapter seven and the initial sections of this chapter.

Officials and Mhezi household members alike, commenting on the appropriateness of existing institutional arrangements for resolving land problems, suggest that there is growing confusion over institutional responsibilities for land control and the enforcement of related regulations. Many consider that the reduction of traditional powers of control, arising from the side-lining of chiefs and headmen from land and natural resources administration was the key problem, and a few officials agreed with this. Indeed, the impending reinstatement of judicial powers on local matters to chiefs and headmen, and proposals for their involvement as ex-officio members in development committees, groups and projects, were expected, by both officials and some household members, to improve the situation. But most officials still regarded formal land use re-planning as the critical requirement of the area. A few officials felt that the reinstatement of strong traditional powers over land use and allocation was not necessary to improve land management, and that resettlement, for that matter, was an adequate solution.

Interestingly, the Conservation Advisory Committee (C.A.C), an inter-organisational coordinating committee for natural resources management, had at least begun to consider involving headmen in the enforcement of natural resource and land use regulations, and in

receiving benefits from the income raised from fines and fees. The police apparently found natural resources control beyond their means. Many households believed that a strong chief or headman, and the return of a recognised role for spirit mediums, was critical, in addition to increased access to alienated lands in the vicinity or elsewhere.

But few of the NGOs directly present in Mhezi had a significant role in articulating the need for resettlement land. They had not been involved in the 1992-1993 land designation process, except in the generalised identification of problems of squatters and potential settlers in the area. Generally, Zimbabwean NGOs have not developed positions, policies and campaigns for land redistribution. This suggests that they towed a conservative political line on land reform. In fact Mhezi households suggest that their additional land and natural resource needs, and the resolution of their conflicts with the neighbouring LSCF properties, tended to be ignored by district officials or resolved in favour of the LSCF farmers. The households have thus developed their own "invisible" institutional and socio-political framework for accessing external resources, and mediating conflicts which may arise from this.

Some of the conflicts over land and resources are evidently a product of the institutional difficulties of evolving a rural Local Government system. Because, Mhezi has had a volatile land tenure and settlement history, its Local Government structures tend to be complicated. For instance, Manicaland has seven district councils, eight rural councils and one urban council, and a provincial development council overseeing 16 council areas in seven districts (Table 8.12). Since the creation of Communal and Commercial Areas, separate administrative units for them have been maintained, with Communal Areas today managed by district councils, and the LSCF by rural councils. The Rural District Councils Act of 1988 enables the District and Rural Councils to amalgamate into single Rural District Councils. In Zimbabwe as a whole, less than 40% of these segregated councils have been amalgamated, although the process has been sped up since late 1992. The amalgamation process of Makoni councils is yet to be completed and has brought to the foreground the wide disparity in resource endowments of the two councils. Rural Council's annual budgets and expenditures are financed from local rates and taxes, as well as from grants and loans from Central Government. They have relatively stable incomes from revenue sourced from rates and unit taxing of the land owned by commercial farmers for service overhead costs.

TABLE 7.12: MANICALAND: LOCAL Government ADMINISTRATION

DISTRICT	RURAL	URBAN
COUNCIL - DISTRICT	COUNCIL -DISTRICT	COUNCIL -DISTRICT

Nyanga - Nyanga	Nyanga - Nyanga	Mutare - Mutare
Chitepo - Mutasa	Makoni - Makoni	Rusape - Makoni
Maungwe - Makoni	Tsungwezi - Makoni	
Mabvazuva- Chimanimani	Macheke - Makoni	
Gazaland - Chipinge	Cashel - Chimanimani	
Buhera - Buhera	Chipinga - Chipinga	
Mutare - Mutare	Chimanimani- Chimanimani	
	Mutare - Mutare	

Source: Second Five Year Provincial Development Plan: Manicaland, 1991

District councils rely heavily on Central Government grants and loans gained through the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development and its implementation wing, the District Development Fund. District councils have no land taxation base and the Communal Lands Act, which governs their administration, does not empower the local authorities to levy land tax. However, the Act gives councils considerable powers over those who inhabit and use land and natural resources, while land and property taxes are permitted in a few designated and development areas. Colonial head-taxes, transformed after 1980 into development levies, have mostly been abandoned by most District Councils. Instead education development fund contributions in cash and labour have been mobilised from time to time for specific projects, such as the construction of schools, clinics, feeder roads and a few small dams.

This local governance malaise thus leaves most households dependent on a few selected households to mediate the land and natural resources problems of Mhezi, as can be gleaned from the representational processes and low project participation rates identified earlier. In one respect, however, this indicates that the state has developed a subtle mechanism to contain potential conflicts over land, using persuasion, extension, cooptation, cooperation and rewards. This also indicates that its powers to enforce regulations is a supplementary but marginal element, due to the state's limited administrative capacity in rural areas and the problems of hegemonic politics. Therefore, "development" tends to be offered as a smokescreen for reinforcing state power and off-setting claims of political nature, such as poverty, land imbalances and other resource allocations.

Conclusion

The state in Mhezi and its environs is thus neither homogeneous nor strong, although its presence is felt through multiple organs with minor, but critical differences of philosophy and approach. Its capacity to implement internal land reforms or provide internal alternatives to a land-based livelihood, and its present record of providing external land and natural resource options for household access, has so far been extremely limited. However, the state is a changing matrix of institutional interventions, whose specific interest and approaches are slowly shifting, even though on the whole the state remains focused on dealing with the land problem.

Land damage control is the visible product of state efforts, which attain relative success because of the state's ability to coopt new power groups in Mhezi, to retain social favour among traditional leadership and power structures, and to selectively provide material benefits to a few households. It appears that it is not state power, or the existence of legislative means that mediates or slackens the pace and processes of land degradation and of land conflicts, but the legitimization that those households benefiting from state and NGO programmes provide which is critical. This maintains a degree of social stability in the face of increasing land shortages and the household reproduction difficulties experienced in Communal Areas such as Mhezi.

However, the fact that the institutional system of Mhezi has an apparently limited capacity to implement even limited internal land reforms, land management and natural resources controls articulated by the state is also interesting: it suggests that land and natural resources policy, legislation and land-based development programmes available to Mhezi are not attuned to the specific land problem of Mhezi. The Mhezi households have their own ideas and agenda for their social reproduction, based on particular land and natural resource bidding practices and uses, and the response to economic processes, markets and broader opportunities experienced in the area. Essentially, their strategy is to occupy and use land and natural resources in a sporadic and flexible manner within the alternative land tenure regimes existing in their vicinity, and within sites regarded by tradition and state as sacred and therefore to be protected. These illegal forms of land access, including squatting and poaching, are thus basic socio-economic processes and idioms of local household social reproduction.

CHAPTER EIGHT

UNDERSTANDING NEW NATIONAL LAND POLICY DIRECTIONS

Towards A New Liberal Land Policy: 1990-1993

The last three chapters discussed the nature of land and resource access of Communal at the locality level and locality level and the roles of different agencies in addressing the land problem. Local and regional variations and complexities of the land problem inform a new debate on land policy. This renewed debate on land reform in Zimbabwe is based on technical issues, and is prompted by the failure of a decade of land redistribution, new political concerns and the expiry of the sunset clauses enshrined in the Lancaster House Constitution. The trend is to produce a more liberal land reform programme to meet the needs of local peasant households and the demands of the elite.

This second phase of land reform in Zimbabwe was ushered in 1990 by constitutional amendments removing restrictions on land acquisition and compensation, by a new land policy statement in 1990, and by the Land Acquisition Act of 1992, which laid out the principles and procedures to be followed in land acquisition. The now repealed Land Acquisition Act (1985) had empowered the government to repossess lands given to white farmers under grants. It gave the government the "right of first refusal" on all land sales, and established a Derelict Lands Board, which allowed Government to acquire derelict lands without compensation. Legislation in the 1990s further enhanced state powers over the land acquisition process.

The government was now only obliged to pay compensation in local currency. It could compulsorily acquire for public good, not only underutilised lands, but also used lands. Further, the Government could now pay a "fair price" within a "reasonable period" rather than paying promptly and at market-determined prices. Most critically, the government was enabled by these legal changes to fix the compensation for land acquired, through a committee of six appointed persons, using set valuation guidelines. Disputes over the amounts of compensation can only be settled through appeals to an Administrative Court, which however, could not rule against the Government on grounds that compensation is not "fair". However, the Minister of Agriculture, Kumbirayi Kangai, publicly emphasized that compensation would be based on the commercial valuation of the replacement value of land development and on land price histories.

These legal changes were backed by a land policy statement announced in 1990, in the form of listing of specific non-connected actions to be undertaken over an unspecified time frame.

The new land policy focused on 5 issues:

- it set a target to acquire 5 million more hectares in land blocks to resettle 110,000 more households;
- it intended to review the land tenure situation in Communal, Resettlement and SSCF areas;
- the selection of settlers and land use models in resettlement areas were to be reviewed towards emphasizing economic rather than social or subsistence criteria;
- it intended to promote blacks in capitalist farming through training and agricultural support services; and
- it intended to introduce a land tax. Ancillary aspects of the new policy, as outlined (Table 8.1) below, included the increased supervision and regulation of land use, the reduction of foreign and absentee land ownership in agriculture, the reduction of multiple and company farm ownerships, the de-regulation of sub-divisions, the retention of capital gains taxes by farmers selling land but reinvestment into agriculture, and the setting of farm size maxima and minima for the different agricultural sub-sectors in relation to agro-ecological potentials (Minister W. Mangwende, 1990).

This new land policy statement attempted to provide a comprehensive or inclusive position on various land policy concerns and problems resulting from the first phase of land reform. It encompassed moral, normative, technical, economic, administrative, political and macro-economic objectives, through the various specific actions proposed (Table 8.1). But the issues were not actually linked together in terms of a coherent rational, logical implementation sequence.

TABLE 8.1: ZIMBABWE'S NEW LAND POLICY PROPOSALS (1990)

ISSUES	POLICY AREA	SPECIFIC POLICY PROPOSALS
IMoral and Equity Concerns		a) Constitutional Amendments b) Land Transfer Approval c) Amount of land required (No.in need) a) Maximum b) Minimum farm size c) Number of farms per farmer a) No absentee landlords b) No foreign company owners c) Promote large black farms
II Land Resource Use Efficiency		a) Inspect under-utilisation b) Amount of land available; unused a) Mixed tenure: indiv, state, co-op; extend freehold into CAs? b) Administration - decentralised allocation (excluding chiefs?)
III Land Markets Efficiency		a) Setting land prices b) Institute a land tax c) Capital gains taxation d) Sub-division encouraged
IVSocio-Political Balancing		a) Skilled small-scale farmers b) Create Black LSCF c) Women's access to land
VImplementation Efficacy	ttlement Models"	a) Designation of blocks b) LSCF sub-division(?) a) Subsistence orientation vs. commercial (high-value) crops b) Mixed crop-livestock vs. change from livestock to specialised crop(?) c) Wildlife models in LSCF vs. peasant farmers d) Sub-divisions
VI Macro-Economic Policy Aspects		a) Settler purchase of land

The interactive influences of land policy measures on various problems was only implied. Nor was there any national consultative process to determine public opinion on the policy.

Only the land tenure review was to be opened to public debate, through a Land Tenure Commission, appointed in October 1993. A Land Taxation Bill, following the principles discussed earlier, was also being formulated by the Ministry of Agriculture with little public debate. A policy paper on promoting black capitalist farmers was also under review by Cabinet members, farm unionists, parliamentarians and bureaucrats. The main area of the new policy on which the government had acted decisively was the land acquisition aspect, implemented through the policy of "designating" land for compulsory purchase of set prices.

Land Policy Rationale

The growing interest among black Zimbabweans to engage in commercial agriculture, increasing unemployment and expectations that expanded commercial farming could absorb growing unemployment, and the vulnerability of black agriculture due to droughts and the location on marginal lands, produced social pressure during the 1980s for a definitive resolution of land ownership imbalances and to improve the use of agricultural land. Apparently, the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 is intended to enable the Government to plan for and target the type, location and scale of land required for a new land reform programme. This is expected to increase access to prime lands for new settlers, to broaden the scope of agricultural enterprises in the resettlement areas, and to improve the efficiency of prime lands utilisation.

The increased use of prime lands for land redistribution has more recently been justified by the fact that numerous rural households were food insecure during the drought, while some urban food and industrial crops such as oilseeds have not been reliably supplied by large farmers (Kangai, 1993). A growing black economic nationalist lobby sees intensified arable land use done through resettlement to be justified for the primary objectives of food security, domestic industrial expansion and expanded exports which have increased black participation in their production (ZFU, 1992).

The Land Acquisition Act of 1992 elaborately lays out the principles and procedures of acquiring land for redistribution (GoZ, 1992). Land designation is the procedure whereby Government technicians, farmers' interest groups and policy makers identify land for acquisition. Designated

farm lands are gazetted as notice to the landowners, who are given thirty days to write in objection if they so wish. Reasonable objections are accepted through the un-designation of some farms. Designated farms are processed for valuation and compensation. Compensation is done through regular specified valuation procedures for assessing the commercial costs of the replacement of land developments and fixed assets.

This is believed by Government officials to restrict the speculative valuation normally included in market prices, especially where there is a desperate buyer, such as has been the case at certain periods with the Government of Zimbabwe. This land acquisition procedure, which exists to a limited degree in most sovereign states, provides the state with rights to "eminent domains", in relation to their responsibility to pursue the public good. This right was restricted earlier in Zimbabwe by the constitutional bill of rights. Indeed, President Mugabe publicly declared that he would not tolerate being taken to court by settlers (meaning LSCF holders) in his defense of the state's and indigenous people's land rights.

By the end of 1993 ninety farms had been "designated". In 1992 the government designated and acquired 13 farms in the wake of its desire to resettle over 900 peasant households displaced by the state developed Osborne Dam. In April 1993 the government further designated "Churu Farm", owned by the leader of a small opposition party, following its illegal conversion from farmland to an urban settlement with an unsanctioned housing tenancy, also deemed to be a risk to public health. Then in May 1993, the government began in earnest its land acquisition programme for planned redistribution by designating 70 LSCF farms, with more being reported to be in the process of designation. Another four farms were designated in the Kwekwe area to make room for urban expansion. Acquisition follows the processing of appeals by farmers dissatisfied with the designations, and the due process of price setting and adjudication of possible disagreements over prices offered by the state.

The Commercial Farmers Union and other observers, making use of the local press, have lobbied against the recent spate of land designations, because they believe it was undermining existing productive capacity in the LSCF sector. But an analysis of the quality of land designated, its geographic location, the range of farm sizes designated, the potential land uses of designated farms and the number of farms accounting for the bulk of designated land provides evidence to the contrary (Table 8.2). By far the largest proportion of land so far designated was in the more marginal regions suitable for extensive ranching and lower value crops. The designations also

focused on a few large farms from the bulk of the land identified for transfer.

Designated lands were concentrated in the southern provinces which have a lower density of agricultural infrastructure, and from which a low proportion of Zimbabwe's present agricultural output is derived. Furthermore, using district level data on arable land utilisation in the prime lands in Mashonaland

TABLE 8.2: Government LAND ACQUISITION PATTERNS SINCE 1992

PROVINCE	DISTRICT	NUMBER OF FARMS DESIGNATED	PERCENT BLACKS	DESIGNATED HECTARAGE	REMARKS
Mashonaland East 17,010 8%	Marondera Wedza Harare Charter	4 2 5 4	100% 0% 80% 50%	3,886 4,274 3,845 5,005	Includes Churu Farm
Mashonaland Central 19,225 9%	Centenary Bindura Shamva	6 1 3	0% 0% 0%	12,088 880 6,257	
Mashonaland West 13,730 7%	Hurungwe Chegutu Guruve Kadoma	2 6 5 1	50% 0% 20% 0%	2,512 3,710 6,492 1,016	
Midlands 28,000 13%	Kwekwe Shurugwi Mberengwa Gweru	6 1 1 1	 0% 0% 0%	3,987 1,057 1,963 2,569	4 for urban expansion (12 more designated as of December 1993)
Masvingo 62,542 30%	Chiredzi Gutu Mwenezi	3 4 2	0% 25% 0%	41,596 4,482 16,464	Extremely large marginal farm lands
Manicaland 11,567 6%	Chimanimani Chipinge Makoni	1 2 13	100% 50% 40%	248 3,319 8,000	Farms displaced by Osborne Dam
Matebeleland South 30,424 15%	Bulilimangwe	8	0%	30,424	a) Two persons owned over 21,000 ha on 5 ranches b) Solusi and Figtree

Matebeleleland North	Bulawayo	5	0%	15,321	
27,516	Nyamandlovu	2	0%	4,027	
13%	Bubi	1	0%	8,168	
TOTALS =				210,014	4% of 5 million or 3,5% of 6 million

Source: Various issues of *The Herald*, May 1993

Province, it can be seen that land designation tended to avoid the more productive land areas. For instance, only Centenary District, which registers a high land utilisation percentage, (43%) and which has 14,000 hectares of net arable land unused, had 12,000 hectares of both arable and non-arable land designated (Table 8.3). Otherwise in most of the Mashonaland districts, which have less than 40 percent of their net arable lands cropped, an extremely low proportion of these lands were designated. Thus, only 6 percent of the 886,051 uncropped hectares in Mashonaland were designated. If we consider that the designated lands include both arable and non-arable lands, then a rather low amount of productive or potentially productive land was designated. Hence, districts such as Chegutu, Lomagundi, Mazowe, Marondera and Harare, which together have over 645,929 hectares of net arable land uncropped, experienced the least land designation.

Only 11,441 hectares, amounting to 2 percent of their uncropped lands, were designated there. So far, land designations since the passing of the 1992 Land Acquisition Act have targeted only 49,965 hectares of land in the prime lands of Zimbabwe. Only 24 percent of the land designated was therefore in Mashonaland, indicating a rather cautious Government approach towards prime lands. Even in Mashonaland, the bulk of the designated lands were in the peripheral areas of the high production regions, nearer high density Communal Lands and on lands whose quality borders onto Natural Region 3. Clearly, the government has avoided the tobacco region, especially around Marondera, and the high value cropping districts of Lomagundi and Mazowe. This cautious approach to land designation can be seen in better perspective when we examine the geographic locations and farm sizes of lands designated.

The relatively large numbers of farms designated during 1993 conceal the fact that less than one fifth of the farms account for most of the land designated. The majority of farms designated for acquisition by May 1993 were extremely large. Thus, 84,000 hectares or 51% of the land designated came from 13 farms. Seventy six percent of the designated land was from 33 farms of over 2 000 hectares. Only 29 of the designated farms were below 1 000 hectares in size, while only 6 of the designated farms were below 300 hectares. The bulk of the extremely large farms designated were in Masvingo, Matebeleland North and South, and Midlands. Therefore, only 33 of the designated farms accounted for over 78% of the recent designations. Evidently, these large farms operate extensive livestock ranching enterprises.

TABLE 8.3: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAND DESIGNATION AND LAND UTILISATION IN MASHONALAND LSCF PRIME LANDS

Districts	Total Area (Ha)	Uncropped Net Arable Land (Ha)	% Arable Area Cropped	Designated Area (ha.)
MASH. W.				0,0
Lomagundi Chegutu	944,911	187,327	39.1	3,710
Hurungwe	494,286 359,779	126,006	29.8	2,512
Kadoma	454,991	49,926	38.9	1,016
Guruve		30,426	38.2	6,492
MASH. C.				
Bindura	153,170 403,698	19,206	55.2	0,880
Mazowe	63,676	63,300	51.7	0,0
Mt. Darwin	21,655 103,810	7,034	42.1	0,0
Centenary		13,881	43.3	12,088
Shamva		19,556	36.5	6,257
MASH. E.				
Marondera	456,718 179,771	139,741	14.6	3,886
Goromonzi	114,905	50,036	34.1	0,0
Mrewa	68,545 386,446	19,771	23.7	0,0
Mtoko		10,286	11.7	0,0
Harare		129,555	23.8	3,845
Wedza				4,274
Charter				5,005
TOTALS		886,051		49,965

Sources: a) Weiner et al (1985);

b) Government Gazettes (1993)

Altogether, the data reveals that more than 58% of the land designated is in natural regions IV and V, while the percentage of land within natural regions III to V is as high as 71% of the designated lands. This is accounted for by land designations in Masvingo, Matebeleland North and South, and Midlands. If we examine closely those lands designated in Mashonaland Central, another 10,000 hectares of land designated there borders on natural

region III and IV, bringing the proportion of lower quality land designated to over 75%. Thus, much of the land designated so far is mostly suitable, under rainfed conditions, for livestock, maize, cotton and groundnut enterprises.

TABLE 8.4: FARM SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF LAND DESIGNATION

Farm Size Range	Absolute Number Designated	Cumulative Number	Hectarage	Cumulative Hectarage	Absolute %
Below 150	2	2	229	229	0.1
151-300	4	6	938	1,167	0.5
301-500	8	14	3,033	4,200	1.6
501-1000	15	29	11,067	15,267	5.7
1001-2000	22	51	29,554	44,821	15.3
2001-3000	20	71	50,084	94,905	26.0
3001-5000	4	75	13,698	108,600	7.1
5001-10,000	4	79	21,808	130,408	11.3
10,001-15,000	4	83	46,566	176,974	24.1
15,001-50,000	1	84	16,298	193,272	8.4
TOTALS	84		210,014		100%

Source: *The Herald*, Various Issues 1992, 1993

An examination of other socio-political aspects surrounding the relationship between land ownership and land designation also reveals some interesting results. For instance, as little as 18% of the designated farms were registered as company farms, most of which included the larger ranches of between 10,000 and 17,000 hectares each. Among the 100 farms designated, six individuals or companies owned about 15 of the farms on over 30% of the designated land. These owners held two to four farms on individual or company title.

Up to 17 percent of the farms designated were owned by black large-scale commercial farmers. This appeared to be proportionally congruent with the fact that blacks presently hold less than 15% of the total number of LSCF farms. Most of the black farms designated were larger farms within natural region III, with about five of them being small farms of less than 300 hectares in natural region II. A political analysis of land designation based on

specific party membership, reveals that less than 4% of the designated farms are owned by opposition party members, comprising mostly blacks and notably figures among them such as James Chikerema of the Forum Party and Ndabaningi Sithole of Zanu Ndonga. Equally, close to 5% of the designated farms were owned by black Zanu PF stalwarts, including one Member of Parliament. Thus, unless the remaining majority of white large farmers are undeclared members of the opposition parties, it is doubtful whether the argument that the government is using land to settle political scores can generally be sustained.

However, the government, rural people and some academics (Moyo, Jonathan, 1993) believe that farmers who abuse rural folk should have their lands expropriated. For instance, Henry Elsworth, a former Rhodesian M.P. alleged to have forced women gathering firewood on his land to strip naked, had his farm designated. And, peasants demand that specific underused farms be designated.

The fact that some derelict or underutilised LSCF farms owned by some cabinet members escaped the acquisition or designation exercise has been interpreted by some as a result of their political influence. Interestingly, a number of opposition members' underutilised farms survived the designation, as did the farm of the architect of UDI, Ian Smith. In response to the demands that black farms be designated, the government in late 1993, un-designated 36 of the 70 farms designated, of which the majority were owned by blacks. It is now argued that "emergent" farmers (namely blacks) will be accorded more time to develop their farms.

The political motive for land designation needs, however, to be examined in terms of the provincial distribution of land designated, the procedures currently adopted by the government in identifying land for designation and in the identification of the would-be beneficiaries of land transfer. As evident in Table 8.5, the bulk of land designated was in four provinces, namely in, Masvingo, Midlands and the two Matebeleland provinces. During the 1980 to 1990 period, Manicaland experienced the largest land transfers. This leaves the three Mashonaland Provinces as the least targeted areas for land transfer.

Yet the targetting of poorer lands for acquisition, in spite of the legal latitude available to the Government, reflects not only its cautiousness with LSCF production in prime lands. It also reflects Government preoccupation with expanding land available to existing Communal Lands, even though they are located on the margins of Zimbabwe's prime agricultural lands. Such acquisitions are also an attempt to ensure that land is made available for distribution in all provinces, reflecting the emerging "provincialised" character of land demands during the 1990s. But this protects the interests of the most highly valued large farmers concentrated in

Mashonaland. The provincial spread of LSCF land designation coincides with the concentration of ailing large farms and ranches in the lowveld in Masvingo and Matebeleland. The immense size of LSCF farms in these provinces has tended to constrain the capacity of individual or corporate farmers to fully capitalise and manage them, under irrigation or livestock, given the existing rate of return to agricultural investment, even among the most liquid LSCF farmers.

The tendency on these farms, therefore, has been to invest in wildlife ranching, which, while requiring less capital outlay than cattle ranching and irrigated cropping, has provided attractive returns to capital at the enterprise level and in foreign currency. But the allocation of land for wildlife and tourism, in the face of land hunger among peasants and black capitalists, has fuelled political tension. Such use of land raises moral questions about the appropriateness of the white community's commitment to wildlife and tourism, as animals and foreign currency appear to be more valued than Zimbabwean's human population.

At any rate, barring the provision of extremely cheap credit to such large farms, distributing these marginal farm lands to a larger number of smaller investors for livestocking is the only sensible option. But designating this type of land does not provide the key demand for cropping lands among the food insecure peasantry, unless the Government intends to provide land for those who already possess cattle or for those with money so that they venture into ranching or invest in irrigation infrastructure in these areas. It is around these issues that the politics of land reform has begun to shift.

Therefore, local variation in demand for land based on issues of agro-ecological potential, rural differentiation, environmental degradation, food security and declining biomass energy resources are critical in determining the nature and quantities of lands to be designated for acquisition and redistribution. The problem is that local demands for land are not adequately catered for in the present provincial and central Government structures used in the land designation process. Indeed, regional and locality level variations in land problems confronting households (as presented in earlier chapters), being the reality rather than a theoretical issue, require that legitimate local level Government and political structures play a more central role in land acquisition.

The Politics of Land Demand

But, when progress on land reform is examined carefully, it is apparent that the government

is moving rather slowly under its present land policy regime. Public opinion and emerging conflicts over land designation procedures reflect tactical differences which conceal real policy differences, based on whether or not to meet demands for speedy land redistribution to resolve the growing unemployment problems and other economic hardships facing rural peoples as a result of ESAP. In his November 1993 state of the Nation Address in Parliament, President Mugabe noted that the Government had acquired, during 1993, 34,300 hectares of land at a cost of Z\$12.8 million, bringing to 3,740,000 hectares of land acquired since independence at a total cost of Z\$116.9 million (about US\$17.2 million at December 1993 exchange rates). At the present rate of land designation, just over 200,000 hectares will have actually been acquired within three years of the constitutional and policy changes of 1990. To achieve the targeted transfer of 5 million hectares, it would appear that, unless land purchase and personnel budgets are substantially increased, the government will need close to 20 years to complete the designation process.

A slow pace of land redistribution suits those interests which believe that only the white large-scale farmers can sustain the country's largely agrarian economy or that land transfers should only occur through market forces. Yet the evolving land policy framework has also been slow in developing market based strategies of land transfer to complement the currently state led land transfer process. For instance, the demand for and pace of voluntary land transfers to small and large black capitalist farmers, willing to purchase intermediately sized commercial farms, could be simultaneously met by using land taxation as an incentive for increased land sales, particularly in a context of liberal regulations on rural land subdivision. This would require a shift in the perceptions of government bureaucrats, from a conception that viable land reform always requires Government implementation and large blocks of land per resettlement scheme.

Indeed, while the government has adopted a provincial perspective towards land designation, it has yet to decentralise land reform administration. Responsibility for smaller scale land transfers, particularly where land underutilisation rates are variable within and among small groups of farms suitable for sub-divided acquisition, could be implemented at the district level. Such an approach, mooted by some NGOs and district councils, would not only facilitate the capacity of black capitalist farmers to acquire smaller subdivided farms, but also reduce the need to acquire whole farms by focusing on underutilised parts of farms. It could also ensure, as the public seems to wish, that capitalist farmers meet some of the costs of land acquisition by paying local authorities for land transfers.

Moreover the above pattern of land transfer suggests that genuine political demands for

land have been addressed in a manner that constrains the prospects of future settlers or new black capitalists to engage in high value farming. Distributing poor quality land, unless backed by serious financial allocations for water development and infrastructure, can only continue to relegate black farming to the margins of the agricultural sector. Otherwise, these land transfers reduce land policy to a basic, albeit relevant, conception: the restoration of physical and territorial control over land, as an object, to blacks.

Yet the Government is expected to address the essence of land reform, namely to improve the prospects for gainful enterprise and incomes distribution among the majority. This requires redistributing better quality land and investments which add value to land. The new land policy was intended to correct such limitations on land acquisition.

Those arguing for increased land redistribution are today also calling for better land and a financial investment strategy which will ensure the development of black farming. It is in the formulation of such a land policy and in the growing struggles for equitable access to the expected new land and agricultural resources for developing black agriculture, that the politics of land reform are situated. The focus has shifted to demand issues, defined more in terms of which social classes and interests gain access to resource transfers, rather than focusing on a technically defined land demand picture.

Zimbabwe's present land policy tends, however, to be formulated at the central Government level, with limited popular and scientific consultation. The Government releases piecemeal information on its treatment of various intricately interrelated problems which define the land question. For instance, it took the government three years, after the expiry of Lancaster House Constitutional clauses in early 1990, to legislate and begin acquiring new land. The other land policy elements on tenure, land tax, land sub-division and settler selection and finance are still being formulated with little apparent public and scientific input. But the government tends to consult only the formally recognised farm unions at the central level and, to a lesser degree, at the provincial level. Peasants are said by politicians to be consulted by parliamentarians during their regular weekend visits to their Communal Area constituencies (Kangai, 1993). The state led process of privately formulating land policy, or the lack of transparency on land policy, seems to always result in negative public opinion about the government and its leadership's intentions, in spite of the broad based support that the land reform objective has.

TABLE 8.5: PROVINCIAL DISTRIBUTION OF DESIGNATED LANDS BY 1993

Province	Hectares	Number of Farms	Percent
Mashonaland West	13,730	14	7%
Mashonaland East	17,010	15	8%
Mashonaland Central	19,225	10	9%
Midlands	28,000	9	13%
Manicaland	11,567	16	6%
Masvingo	62,542	9	30%
Matebeleland South	30,424	8	15%
Matebeleland North	27,516	8	13%
Totals	210,014		

Source: GoZ Gazette, 1992 and 1993

For instance, recent public debate on land acquisition leans towards unsubstantiable convictions that the government has used political rather than technical criteria in selecting lands to be designated for acquisition. A variety of criticisms, some true, others unsubstantiated, has been levelled at the land policy. Criticisms include the purported absence of skilled land use assessors, the lack of adequate involvement of farmers representatives at the local level, the "over-involvement" of politicians, and the growing pressure to exercise political patronage through the delivery of land in the different provinces. The designation of Churu Farm, whose owner could have been disciplined for illegal land use conversion through a variety of legal and administrative measures other than the Land Acquisition Act, brought attention to the probable use of partisan political motivation in land designation, since its owner is an opposition party leader.

The first land designation efforts, applied to the Osborne dam area, also brought into sharp focus the ascendancy of political over technical criteria in land acquisition. For, whereas one minister oversaw the designation of certain farms, his replacement from a cabinet reshuffle un-designated a number of those farms, suggesting that land use assessments had been done subjectively. The tendency by the government to act clandestinely in land policy specification and implementation, and to withhold information on this sensitive

subject, provides scope for negative public perceptions of state action on land reform. One perception is that the ZANU-PF leadership wants both to co-opt votes in advance of the 1995 elections, and to enhance its accumulation base through provincialised land transfers.

But the "provincialised" land designation and settler placement approach, now apparently favoured by the government, poses other intricate problems considering that a truly national land policy is the desired outcome. On the one hand, it is essential that existing provincial administrative arrangements be utilised in promoting the consultation of local farmers, peasants, officials, and other interest groups. These people know best the local land problems, the demand for land, and the land supply options. Yet, meeting local demands for land cannot sensibly be done by land supplies internal to each province or district. For, some provinces -- notably Manicaland, Masvingo and Matebeleland South -- do not have adequate suitable LSCF lands, agro-climatically and quantitatively, to meet the localised land pressure they face. Land will need to be sourced outside those localities, and be complemented by alternative land intensification strategies, such as irrigation development within the Communal and State lands of those provinces.

On the other hand, it seems that the "provincialisation" of the land problem, when not transparently adjudicated by national technical, political and consultative structures, widens the scope for the use of parochial, ethnicist and other dubious criteria in land designation and settler selection procedures. In some situations, provincial and local elites seem to compete for political limelight through the land designation exercise, while it has been suggested that in other local areas, political elites are using land designation to settle scores. Other politicians threaten to restrict the trans-provincial settlement of Zimbabwean peoples in need of land. The trajectory of such incipient political struggles transcend the white factor, foreboding the decay of national unity and the concept of nation-state. Indeed, the government has yet to openly discuss the nature of the nationalist economic agenda which it intends to promote through resolving the land question.

But, it is questionable to argue, as would the CFU, that Zimbabwe's land problem is not or should not be a political issue, and that land designation requires only technical procedures for it to be acceptable. While, there is need to use technical procedures to determine land underutilisation, it seems necessary that the government also attends to the real, not contrived, political pressures for land distribution. Public concern is based on the fear that the present political considerations focus mainly on the competing interests of the ruling and economic elite. However, little public concern seems to be expressed about the land requirements of the rural poor. CFU spokesmen insist that the agrarian needs of the rural poor are used by the government merely as a ploy to gain mass votes for the ruling party.

Yet if the government recognises such land requirements, then the ruling party is merely acknowledging the truly popular character of demands for land reform.

However, the land designation exercise seems to seek both the political support of fractions of the black middle classes and elites by meeting their demands for land, and the land needs of the peasantry. Yet so far, the government has been unwilling to openly specify which of these two classes it intends to prioritise in the land redistribution programme and to provide a political rationale for its emphasis.

The preliminary thinking of the government on the promotion of black large-scale farming suggests a slow but costly venture (Ministry of Agriculture, 1993). The objectives are to "perpetuate" large scale farming by improving the productivity of existing "emergent indigenous commercial farmers" and establishing another 200 new farmers over a ten year period. Thus a total of approximately 700 black LSCF farmers would receive state support ranging from rescheduling presently held loans, reduced interest rates on credit, low interest finance for irrigation development, the provision of land on lease for purchase after a 5 year grace period and training in farm management. This will initially require close to \$250 million in addition to the cost of purchasing designated lands.

Such support could amount to \$2 million per farmer over a few years and cover the costs for land, working capital and management support. The farm land use models designed for these black capitalist farmers require average hectares of approximately 300 per farmer, inclusive of land rotation requirements, while livestocking hectares are pegged around 1500 hectares each. The major crops to be promoted among them are tobacco, maize, cotton and groundnuts, suggesting a balance between export and domestic output objectives. Therefore, this programme alone could require 200,000 hectares, most of which would be acquired eventually by the farmers on freehold terms.

Some of the farms will be established on existing state leasehold land and land currently held by the Cold Storage Commission (CSC) and ADA. Official thinking on support for the existing small-scale black commercial farmers is yet to be formally presented to the public as studies are still underway.

It thus seems that the government considers the demand side of land redistribution to be the area of focus for the future, given that the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 provides it with the space to tackle land supply as it wishes. The politics of land access, however, remains enigmatic. The clarification the demand side objectives of land policy, for instance, tends to have been hindered in the past by land supply strategies faithful to maintaining the level of all LSCF crop outputs. Indeed, even current land acquisition for resettlement has been

justified on this basis, hence the focus on underutilised lands and on redistributing land only to "capable" small and large farmers. But in turn, this has raised public concern on the price to be paid by such farmers for access to land, within a strategy which neglects the subsistence, income and survival requirements of the rural poor.

Indeed, recent debates on land transfer, arguing for the selection of the "capable" full-time farmers, have also suggested that the resettlement programme be utilised to build upon private property rights in all rural areas. The growth of this market-oriented perspective on the demand side of the land redistribution agenda, and the waning of concern for the rural poor, merely reflects the ideological and political shifts that Zimbabwe has experienced in the last few years.

The decline of public and government enthusiasm for socialism and social equity issues during the second half of the 1980s culminated in the adoption in 1990 of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). ESAP formally signalled the government's commitment to liberalising the previously state-controlled agrarian economy of Zimbabwe and move it towards market driven economic management. But the government land policy of 1990 was bi-polar in that it promised to increase state intervention in land markets and, at the same time, to reorient land distribution towards market criteria. It promised that existing social criteria for settler selection would be replaced by an economic orientation of land redistribution, such that priority would not be accorded to the needy *per se* but to those proven to be "good" farmers. This marked the official policy switch away from redistributing land to the landless, those congested in marginal and degraded lands, and the rural poor, in spite of the ubiquitous demand for land by such peoples.

In effect, the state intends to buy land at "reasonable" prices and transfer it at little cost to small and large black capitalists. Past government practice provided settlers with land free of charge, while presently there is no commitment, by either the government or the black farmer interest groups lobbying for land, to set a price to be paid, if any, by the new breed of settlers. In a liberal market economy, an interventionist land policy is justified on historical grounds and by market failures such as speculative land market tendencies. But the government and aspiring capitalist land holders have been challenged by some public commentators to explain the grounds on which they are preferentially entitled to free access to land, in preference over numerous other capable aspirants. Moreover, those blacks who purchased land at market prices prior to 1992, though sharing the same heritage of land dispossession with their counterparts now aspiring for land, justifiably query why latter day black capitalist farmers should gain access to land at almost no cost.

Yet the formal economic rationale of the new land policy notwithstanding, the rural poor continue to lay moral claim to land, based on their historical deprivation, current economic marginalisation and dependence on land for survival. The land demands of the rural poor are politically significant, as evidenced by the fact that the state in its public pronouncements seems unable to ignore them. The build-up to elections, and the consequences of land shortages such as vulnerability to drought and water scarcity, all exert pressure on the government to respond to the land demands of Communal peoples.

Legitimacy of State Land Control and Economic Nationalism

Interestingly, in spite of these competing claims for land, and differences of opinion over the need to build up private property in rural lands, few black capitalist farmers have seriously questioned the legitimacy or right of the state to ownership and custodianship of the various lands it controls. It appears that only the CFU and the peasants have sporadically challenged this right. Peasants directly challenged the legitimacy of state land control through their frequent entry to the scattered state lands in forest and park areas to gain access to resources such as grazing land, grass, woodfuel, water and wildlife. Black capitalist farmer interest groups, instead, seem to place hopes for the future development of their farming on further state intervention; through land acquisition and subsidised finance. A growing nationalist "indigenisation" ideology among the black middle classes, now couched in economic nationalist terms, rationalises these demands. Indeed, their failure to accumulate the capital required to independently break into white dominated land markets has tended to foment this economic nationalist ideology. The ideology is based on a dependence on state intervention in various agrarian markets to "level the playing field" for black entry into different forms and levels of capitalist farming. Indeed many critiques of the government's performance in land and agrarian reform agree that state support to black agriculture until today was narrow, particularly in terms of government support through credit, irrigation, infrastructure and technical services for the different types of black farmers. The fact that the state holds land and controls various agricultural resources, through policy, budgets, equity and various state properties, provides such lobbies with a material basis for their demands.

Yet the extent to which the state can justifiably hold on to large tracts of land for various uses, for instance, has only partially been challenged by the CFU in respect of state farming, and by the ZFC through its calls for freehold tenure in Communal Areas. The latter argue that it is not efficient for the state to play a dominant role in Resettlement and Communal land administration, after transferring such lands to new holders. Indeed the present land policy does not clearly define the objectives for state land control within the context of ESAP.

It tends to be assumed that the current variety of land management roles played by the state will continue. For instance, the state is one of the land users in the sense of directly exploiting land for various productive income earning activities. It is the main conservator of land and associated natural resources, and the regulator of land use in non-freehold areas. The state is a large landlord, through its various schemes which lease land or provide permits to different land users, and it is the big real estate agent which facilitates land transfers. It is also the dominant land administrator in Communal Areas through its powers over local Governments, which play a critical role in land allocation.

Some observers doubt that a state can play all these roles efficiently (World Bank, 1993). They argue that having promoted some land transfers the state should take a back seat and play a merely regulatory role over land use, through policies which provide incentives for efficient land use (Bojo, 1993). The government indeed currently plays a dominant role in land administration. By 1993, those lands owned and controlled by the state had increased to over approximately 75% of the land in Zimbabwe. The state held over 5 million hectares of land under forestry and nature park uses and under various other Government agencies. These either directly exploit natural resources or lease usufruct rights to private tourist operators, timber concessionaires and tourists. The state held on to over half a million hectares for farming, and leased land to some LSCF farmers. In resettlement areas, the state directly holds 3 million hectares which settlers use under loose permits. And in Communal Areas, the state controls *de jure* 16 million hectares through the powers held by the President, ministers, officials and local authorities over land allocation, land use and natural resource use controls. The rural private land market extends over approximately 14 million hectares, of which more than 2.5 million hectares are held by 8,000 black freeholders and leases, and 11.4 million by LSCF holders. Should the government acquire an additional 5 million hectares as is planned and unless it changes the land tenure system in Communal and Resettlement Areas, it will then be in control of over 85% of the land. Whether the government intends to move its land tenure policy towards national leasehold tenure structures, given its dominance of land markets, is a matter of conjecture.

State control of land, through direct land holding and use, and through indirect administrative measures, was justified during the early 1980s, in particular, by the Socialist aspirations of the ruling party and its stated land policy objectives to foster equitable land distribution, to promote increased smallholder agricultural production and rural development. The government was then anxious to improve its autonomy and ability to acquire and redistribute suitable land. It was also anxious to maintain orderly land transfers in the face of incessant "squattling" and natural resource conflicts between

peasants and other land holders. Changes in local Government structures were intended to guarantee a more democratic process of land allocation in Communal Areas through elected local authorities, rather than relying upon the erstwhile colonially sanctioned "traditional" controllers of the presumed "communally" held lands. Equity, legality and order were the apparent concerns which justified state expansion of its control over land. Also, the state had assumed full responsibility for resolving the land grievances of the Zimbabwean peoples, in spite of the constraints posed by the Lancaster House Constitution. The government, which had rejected direct land restitution through land claims, pursued a strategy of increased control over land, as a means of maintaining balance in land access and use. Resolving the land problem thus increasingly depended on central state autonomy and political commitment to land reform.

The present land policy, by retaining the overriding state powers and control over land, based on the dominant ideology of the 1980's, contradicts the state's current economic liberalisation ideology, espoused through ESAP. Therefore it denies the importance of locality and the complex problems of land demand at lower levels. It contradicts the growing land privatisation demands of the black lobbies which have emerged in response to ESAP. Black capitalist farming interests now lobby for a state programme to finance black farming, as colonial Governments had done for white settlers, so as to guarantee their efficient but private use of land. Existing black large farmers now strangled by rising inflation and interest rates on loans used to purchase farms, due to the liberalisation of the financial sector and ESAP in general, demand state intervention as the key route to black agricultural development. Yet the government, anxious to keep its ESAP targets, is caught in a financial squeeze. It not only seems to have limited funds for land acquisition, but it also has to justify, to international donors and local interest groups, financial allocations such as cheap credit to white and black LSCF interests. It appears that the provision of free or cheap land to the influential black farming capitalist lobbies is the only promising instrument that the government retains.

The evolution of Zimbabwe's land policy therefore reflects a changing alignment of interests at central and local Government levels, as various groups pursue a variety of demands for land, and as economic management objectives change.

Although beyond the scope of this study, it is worthy to note that there are structural processes surrounding the role of the state which arise from Zimbabwe's land reform experiences. According to O'Connor, (1973), the state as an entity performs three functions which maintain its legitimacy: It attempts to provide and improve public welfare; it legitimates private accumulation and it reproduces itself. Since the 1980s, the government

has pursued the above three objectives in three phases of land reform, contingent upon Zimbabwe's changing economic performance, policy framework and political situation (see Figure 8.1).

During 1980 and 1986, the government was able to pursue the bulk of the land redistribution, with land perceived as a welfare function, as the economy initially expanded through a post sanctions boom and expanded consumption base following massive growth of the civil service. The overall ratio of classes was kept relatively constant as less than 5% of rural households benefited from land redistribution, the number of LSCF holders was slightly reduced from below 6 000 in 1980 to 4 600 in 1986, while landlessness averaged around 20%, although the black middle class expanded sharply. The government gained increasing control of the state and politics then. During 1986 and 1989, as the world recession, local droughts and low levels of investment set in a fiscal crisis of increased government budget deficits, the state opted for the status quo in land reform. The contraction of budgets in real terms led generally to reduced Government activity, including the expansion of state farms and land redistribution, except in defense and educational expenditures. These latter contracted in real terms. This period also saw the gradual emergence of opposition politics, although the state guaranteed its own reproduction through increased centralisation of various powers.

During the 1990s, the state thus began to reconsider the allocation of agricultural resources, particularly land in the context of ESAP and a liberalised political environment. Land reform is now envisioned to provide some welfare to blacks, both peasants and capitalist farmers, and the state allows LSCF and black accumulation from land to ensue. The liberalized agricultural commodity markets, and the calls for further parastatal privatisations and general decentralisation, contribute to a weakening state. The strength of the state matters less for most black elites as long as they are set into the accumulation process.

FIGURE 8.1 LAND REFORM AND THE FISCAL CRISIS OF THE STATE

PHASE 1 (1980-1986)	TRENDS		
	ECONOMIC	POLITICAL	LAND REFORM
	1. Economic Growth High initially (8%) and later averaging 3.5% of GDP. 2. Increased Demand.	1. South African Destabilisation 2. ZANU/ZAPU Conflict 3. Socialist Philosophy	1. Active Transfers of Land 2. Investment on Resettlement Schemes. 3. State Farm Growth.

	3. Increased Capacity Utilisation 4. Socio-economic Rehabilitation. 5. Expanded Social Services.	(Cooperativisation) 4. Nation Building	
PHASE II (1986-1989)	1. Stagnating Growth Rate (below 2% of GDP). 2. Low Foreign Investment. 3. Increased Deficits. 4. Growing Debt/Service Ratio. 5. Middle Class Squeeze.	1. Unity of Liberation Movements. 2. Emergence of New Opposition Parties. 3. Greater Centralisation of Power. 4. Negotiating ESAP.	1. Status Quo. 2. Little Land Redistribution. 3. Promotion of LSCF Exports Growth.
PHASE III (1990-1993)	1. Growing Unemployment. 2. Inflation (35%). 3. Trade and Monetary Reforms. 4. Fiscal Restraint in Real Terms. 5. Support to Indigenous Enterprises.	1. Weakened State. 2. Increased Opposition Politics. 3. Student and Labour Strikes, increased. 4. Black Economic Lobby.	1. New Land Policy. 2. Focus on black Capitalists and Capable Farmers. 3. Addressing the Landless. 4. Privatised Agricultural Markets.

Source: Compiled by the Author from Broad Trends Observed

The use of land access as an instrument of assuaging black economic nationalist demands for equitable participation in capitalist farming, and to broaden the contribution of small farmers to commercial outputs is also a key policy issue for the Zimbabwe Farmers Union, which represents blacks. It supports this in so far as capable farmers are the beneficiaries and freehold tenure can be broadened among blacks (ZFU, 1993). Thus, the impending redistribution of 5 million hectares of land under the new land reform programme has focused wider public interest on the need for an appropriate land tenure policy. Besides the question regarding the ultimate role to be played by the state in land control, public anxiety over land tenure in resettlement and Communal Areas has also been growing (Herald, 1993), as discussed later.

The present land policy formulation process thus seems to be based on centralist tendencies, whereby provincial committees deliver national or central Government laws and orders on land acquisition and land tenure. For the new land policy to gain credence and legitimacy, and for the effective implementation of reforms, there is need for local Government structures at the district and provincial levels themselves, rather than central Government, to assume a more determining role in the land acquisition, land tenure and land administration processes. Currently, the legitimacy of the political process of land policy

formulation centres on members of parliament, who bring to the centre a strong local flavour of land problems to the central national debates, thereby legitimising local demands for land. Such parliamentarians, however, act as patrons of local communities rather than act as analysts of specific land demands arising from local state structures. Thus instead of local demands for land being systematically fed upwards and defining national policy, national structures seem to promote a uniform land policy framework and uniform ways of addressing the land problem. Such a process not only dampens local demands, but also provides unworkable state responses, since land demands vary across regions and localities.

Land Tenure Reforms

One of the most enigmatic issues surrounding African nationalism, including Zimbabwe's own brand of it, is the unspecified nature of land tenure patterns envisioned for the future. In spite of the numerous critiques of African land policy, which forewarn of either the emergence of "the tragedy of the commons" or the widespread commoditisation of land, African Governments have been unwilling to formally declare private land tenure systems or to merely legalise these where they seem to have emerged illegally. However, the attitude of most Governments seems to have been to turn a blind eye to the emerging informal land privatisation processes. The African state seems torn between its nationalist obligation to ensure land access to all and its desire to avoid responsibility for anticipated land alienation that follows legal land privatisation on a national scale. Yet to survive politically, the state tends to have to satisfy the private land-owning aspirations of the emerging black bourgeoisie.

Similarly, the government of Zimbabwe land policy retains an ambiguity over land tenure. This reflects both the ambiguity of the agrarian objectives of the state and the multiple expectations of the citizenry of state land ownership, land use regulation and agricultural support. For instance, the black community demands state support to improve their access to LSCF land markets, protection against the alienation of their land rights in Communal Lands, and increasingly they demand private tenure in Communal Areas, Resettlement Areas, Purchase Areas and Growth Points. The demand for freehold tenure reflects the growing dissatisfaction with land permits, leases or communal land usufruct rights because these are deemed to be disadvantageous in securing loan collateral for rural investments. Exclusive land use rights are increasingly sought where the current usufruct rights of landholders are

socially insecure.

Yet in Communal Areas, it is commonly held that the only land presently held communally is the fast dwindling grazing areas and those smaller areas under Campfire and other community projects. Thus the bulk of Communal lands are in practice held under a *de facto* private property regime, whereby families have established full control over land and its transfer. Land control, land transfers and bidding for land within the cropping areas occurs through various measures such as inheritance, "informal sales" of land, farm infrastructure developments which enclose land and the borrowing or lending of plots. The state has generally turned a blind eye to these land bidding and market processes.

Even local leaders responsible for land allocation are known to derive material benefits from land allocation services. And, it is increasingly commonplace for "communal" lands to be allocated to non-members of communities by local leaders and householders alike. Thus, incipient land markets are emerging in Communal and occasionally Resettlement lands, not only because of the decay of Communal land ideology or the intrinsic capitalist tendencies among blacks, but also because of the dynamics of political, economic and demographic change experienced over the last few decades. Previously closed land bidding systems are increasingly opening up to changing land demands and commoditisation of the rural economies. As a result, the custodianship of traditional leaders or local authorities, enshrined in the various legislations governing those areas, let alone that of the distant central Government powers, are fast losing their relevance and legitimacy.

The extent to which urban residents may retain access to land and land use rights in Communal Areas is also a central problem for future land tenure policy. Going beyond those who may be considered "genuine migrant workers" - a rather inclusive concept - there is growing and continued reliance among urban residents on the direct use of Communal Area plots for farm enterprises and for residences ("kumusha"). There is similar demand for land for indirect investments in livestock "kept" by family and friends, for burial and for retirement purposes, given the lack of social security for most people in urban areas. Therefore, the land policy has to resolve the structure of land rights in the country at large in relation to land rights in Communal Areas. Yet the government needs to address those social and economic policies which, by foreclosing black social security and avenues for the investment of their savings, induce extreme dependence on land. Such a holistic policy orientation seems essential if the basic and widespread demand for land access in a variety of tenure arrangements is to be tackled.

Thus the current land tenure debates, which suggest either the return of land control to

traditional powers or the promotion of land privatisation in Communal Areas, tend to oversimplify an otherwise complex and dynamic process of land administration and land market development. Without a large scale national consultation on land rights, including migrant workers and other urban contenders for land rights in Communal Areas, the nature of the land tenure, administration and market structure suitable for Zimbabwe, under changing macro-economic conditions, remains elusive. Yet, such consultation has been glaringly lacking in land policy formulation, making it difficult to gauge the legitimacy and relevance of the new land policy. The government's objectives for its new Land Tenure Commission suggest a quick-and-dirty perspective on land tenure: Four months of consultations by experts with a narrow ideological, intellectual and interest base are expected to yield solutions to the complex land tenure problem. Indeed, the state perspective on land tenure in Communal Areas emphasizes central controls, which goes against the grain of pressure for local level land control and autonomy in local level governance.

For instance, while the Land Designation debate focuses on "forced" LSCF lands expropriation and non-market compensation, little public concern among elites has been expressed over state expropriation of land and land use rights in Communal Areas. The land requirements for state development programmes tend to override peoples' land rights in Communal Areas. As an example, in 1992 the Osborne Dam construction "displaced" 600 families and an additional 300 are yet to be displaced. Those displaced households received less than Z\$500 each as compensation and access to resettlement land. Urban sprawl elsewhere also tends to displace Communal residents without public debate over their compensation rights. Villageisation, growth points, grazing schemes, conservation works, roads and pipelines continue to displace peasants from their lands in isolated but significant proportions when these lands are aggregated.

Perhaps, because no official statistics on these processes are kept and no monetary value is attached to the Communal Lands, resettlement is the only compensation guaranteed to the displaced. Yet, in provinces such as Manicaland, displaced households currently dominate the demand for land redistribution. Additionally, numerous Communal Lands, in close to 25 out of 50 districts, have embarked upon Campfire programmes, which are converting large parts of Communal lands into wildlife management schemes. This restricts the land available for household agricultural land uses, where there are land shortages. Ostensibly, the Campfire programme consults villagers and compensates them through earnings from wildlife exploitation. But villagers complain that consultation is minimal, while their annual earnings of below \$500 are inadequate compensation for their loss of access to land. One interpretation is that peasants now have to surrender land to the Campfire programme in

order for them to benefit from access to state investments in schools, clinics etc, since some of these remote districts have little hope of receiving state funding for such services.

Meanwhile, the local Government administrations, rather than communities, are the main beneficiaries from rents and rates charged to business people now occupying Communal lands appropriated for the creation of "Growth Points" and similar rural centres. The peasants thrown off these lands receive compensation indirectly through meagre social services. Indeed, the related issues of land rights, rights to adequate consultation and rights to fair compensation do not evoke much emotion in the urban dominated debate on land reform. The state's legal jurisdiction over Communal Lands allows the government to move peasants at will, in the name of development, and to restrict peasant utilisation of certain land resources (dambos, vleis, etc) and other natural resources, without significant legal recourse or means available for those objecting to this form of land designation or the paltry levels of compensation.

Future Land Demand

Land tenure is thus a major source of future conflict among various social classes and sectoral interests seeking access to land. The political forces competing for land include: new industrialists, working class home-seekers, old and new (white and black) large and small scale farmers, peasants, various disadvantaged women (widows, divorcees, single women), the aged, migrant farm workers, young rural families, environmentalists, an emerging black business community and various state institutions which hold land. Insecurity of tenure among various landholders is currently a perceived and an actually growing threat, as state landed institutions, large farmers and some Communal Farm Areas, face direct demands for and illegal occupation or use of their lands.

When policy on access to land is circumscribed by criteria which emphasize current capability to use the land intensively, as is argued by some in the land tenure debate, the rural poor are bound to suffer most. For, in reality, since the LSCF and state land users dominate the means of production (finance, capital, inputs and expertise), due to either imperfect capital markets or direct state financial subsidies, these two land users have a "comparative advantage" in land management and in land use dynamism. Communal Areas development is corollarily constrained by the weak infrastructure and capital markets, resulting in restricted land use development. The failure to capture this dynamism has resulted in the design of Communal Area land tenure policies and plan based on static land use modelling.

Since independence, the changing political relationships arising from new forms of local Government and central state controls or regulations, dictate new tenurial contradictions within all the land tenure categories of Zimbabwe. But the role of local Government in land tenure, in relation to the issue of decentralisation and participatory development, is in fact a contested terrain as is shown in chapter six. Local autonomy (sovereignty) in allocating land to external aspirants or in determining the land rights of their migrant kin, has become a growing political pressure. Some chiefs and local leaders have seized de facto authority on land allocations, due to the ineffectual capacity of the central state to implement its powers of land control (Chief Mutasa, 1993).

Land policy confronts a heterogeneity of land problems based on geographic and social class differences in Communal Areas. Land tenure is characterised by extreme variation in the kinds of problems arising within the 170 Communal Areas and their multiple land sub-categories, such as grazing areas, croplands, spiritual sites and woodlands. Different land problems face different classes of land holders and those aspiring to hold land. For example, based on field interviews, thirteen different social classes can be identified as contenders for land redistribution and land access in Communal Areas (see Box 8.1).

BOX 8.1: LAND DEMAND CATEGORIES IN ZIMBABWE

- i) the landless mainly young households seeking Communal Area land allocations;
- ii) those established groups of households with diminishing or small crop lands (below 2 hectares), especially in dryland areas (Natural Regions II, IV and V), defending their landholdings;
- iii) communities with access to diminished grazing lands, due to crop or household and expansion and hence facing livestock pressures;
- iv) groups of households demanding or aspiring for, and/or competing for those small land areas which are irrigated, irrigable, serviced by dams, stream-banks and boreholes;
- v) established "kulaks" (better-off peasants) seeking crop and/or grazing lands for the expansion of production;
- vi) groups of kulaks, communities and individuals looking for title to agricultural and residential lands in some Communal Areas;
- vii) black urban and rural-based elites, black institutions (e.g. trusts), formal black business enterprises and formal white-owned business concerns (e.g. the various supermarkets), seeking freehold title to land in Growth Point;

- viii) District councils, and WARDCO's and NGOs seeking land tenure rights for community income-generating projects (e.g. dams, Campfire, irrigation, woodlots), services (e.g. schools) and for environmental preservation;
- ix) state institutions seeking land for national development, services and environmental projects;
- x) migrant peasants seeking new agricultural sites in land-surplus Communal Areas;
- xi) migrant workers in urban towns, mines and LSCF farms, seeking to retain land rights for agricultural use, directly through split-household based farming or indirectly through de facto grazing rights secured through the extended family;
- xii) retiring urban, mine and LSCF workers seeking social security in Communal Areas farming;
- xiii) "foreign" migrant workers seeking homes for retirement and social security.

Source: Field Surveys and Moyo S. (1993) "Land Tenure Issues in Zimbabwe".

Apart from generalised and "inarticulate" demands for access to LSCF lands, one of the most vocal land demands is currently focused on access to freehold title in Growth Points in Communal Areas by black business elites and influential "notables" at the district and provincial levels. Backed by the current ESAP free market ideology, the economic nationalist campaigns for the development of black entrepreneurs have targeted land access as a key solution to the problem of access to loans. Given the escalation of land prices in both LSCF lands and "urban" areas, black business interests have resorted to rapid land acquisition in the Communal Areas. Apparently, it is only the shortage of surveyors which remains the key bottleneck to land market developments at rural centres or growth points.

Yet, there is also pressure from chiefs and other local leaders to ensure that benefits from (or payments for) land transfers at such centres should accrue directly to local communities (and/or chiefs) rather than to district councils. Indeed chiefs and other local leaders demand control over the whole process of rural land allocation. It remains unclear to what extent ordinary peasants will benefit from these new land market processes. Thus, insecurity of tenure tends to be experienced by various classes or social groups in Zimbabwe. This takes various forms such as the unclear nature of title, competition over land access rights, diminishing land quality, ambiguity over the control of the land allocation process and land use regulations by various state institutions.

Fundamentally, the absence of local level acceptance of central land tenure and use regulations is indicative of the perverse land tenure interventionism inherited by the government. Land held by the communities is seen to be restricted from them in terms of its use and rights of exploitation. Yet land is crucial to community survival or reproduction. Where land is short and alternatives to land are unavailable, state land control is seen as an infringement of basic rights to survival and to community property. Conflicts between state and community, and the outright rejection of land use regulations reflect the inadequacy or irrelevance of the present land use administration and regulation system.

But "informal" allocation of Communal Area lands by chiefs, local leaders or local councils to migrants external to the communities (e.g. in Gokwe and other Communal Areas), as well as in state resettlement schemes in Communal Areas (e.g. the Mid-Zambezi Resettlement Scheme), seem to generate different forms of Communal Area tenurial insecurity. Conflicts over which authority, among various central state organs, local councils, traditional leaders and WARDCOS, has legitimate control over such land allocations abound. These are compounded by the role and interests of local political and business leadership. Local land insecurity arises over the nature of land rights reserved for community offsprings, current rights of first refusal to preferred land plots, the social incohesion of land use management arising from migrants, and the right to material compensation and payments for communal land "expropriation" by the state and "outsiders".

These future land demands, the problem of state legitimacy in land policy formulation, clarification of the land tenure policy and most critically the importance of regional and local variation in the politics and demands for land, are critical to the formulation of a viable land policy for Zimbabwe. We conclude the study in the next chapter.

CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSIONS

This study examined Zimbabwe's land problem and reform experiences between 1980 and 1993. Zimbabwe was found to experience an increasingly inegalitarian agrarian structure as the slow pace of land redistribution and heightened socio-economic and agricultural differentiation in Communal Areas was coupled by a crisis of household social reproduction among the bulk of the families in the Communal Areas. Fifteen years of land reform had not only led to the retention of extremely large estates with underutilised lands, but had seen near-landlessness grow due to demographic expansion. The study suggests that social and regional differentiation processes have a critical impact on land policy formulation, both in terms of providing a disaggregated perspective on land demands, but also in terms of the socio-political influences on policy making. Thus in addressing land reform there is need to capture the land control and use processes operative at various decision-making levels, so as to understand the land demands of peasant households in relation to wider institutional processes linking households within communities and regions to central macro-level processes of policy-making and institutional control. Because of its fundamental utility land reform was found to be a complex policy arena influenced by the heterogeneity, variability and uncertainties found in a changing rural society.

While land reform had not been adequately addressed in Zimbabwe, it will remain critical because of the specific Zimbabwean historical experience of settler land expropriation, the culturally specific demands for land, the history of struggle for land and the contemporary economic hardships facing rural and urban people. The Zimbabwean peasant households' crisis of social reproduction amidst a social differentiation process which had ensured surplus production among a few, as elsewhere, needs to be resolved not through the romanticisation of indigenous and local practices or an over-emphasis on market led land reforms, but through interventions which address the land use and reproduction needs of households. Land reform should address not only the static macro-economic scope and market outcomes of Zimbabwe's existing land and agrarian structures, but also the local and regional land and agrarian problems which affect household reproduction. This way, the national land policy formulation process could examine the wider problems of effective rural demand, which are associated with social and land deprivation, in order to develop an appropriate macro-economic framework for land reform.

The multi-level approach to the study of Zimbabwe's land question, using household data on land availability and access in relation to demographic and socio-economic questions which affect land and natural resources use, and various institutional tendencies at the local and

regional levels is an important methodological departure from existing approaches to the analysis of the land question. It captures the socio-political processes surrounding Zimbabwe's land problems, especially how household social reproduction and rural differentiation in Communal Areas determine land demands within the national context of Zimbabwe's land distribution, utilisation and legislation. The politics and social pressures for land redistribution at various levels, and their influence on the evolution and implementation of land policy, are in this study framework, critical analytic components of any assessment of the rationality of the land policy formulation process.

Yet, Zimbabwe's formal land reform approach had been dominated by aggregate, economistic and statist approaches prescribed by a market-led strategy, to the exclusion of the local socio-economic and socio-political processes which contested the land reform agenda. It had entailed the balancing of political, social, economic and technical considerations espoused by a narrow social elite, while claiming commitment to the changing of the inherited landholding structures and land laws, in order to improve access to land for the majority of blacks. Because the Government had faithfully pursued a market-based strategy of land acquisition agreed upon at the independence settlement of 1979, the ensuing conservative approach to land reform had required the repression of popular attempts to seize land. This approach to land reform appears to find roots in the other erstwhile settler economies of Namibia and South Africa. Meanwhile, bi-modal agrarian structures combining extremely large and small scale farmers seem to attract other countries in Southern Africa, because of the apparent success of both large-scale and small-holder agriculture in Zimbabwe, within a bi-model agrarian structure.

The conservative approach to land reform had been justified and rationalised through qualitatively changing, albeit inadequate, scientific and policy debate. During the 1980s land debates had shifted their emphasis from moral and historical grievances as the rationale for land redistribution, to technical considerations of the relative efficiency in land use and productivity of farmers in LSCF, Communal and Resettlement Areas. Such debates had at once down-played the political rationale for land reform, and wrongly concluded that there was no economic rationality in land redistribution. While they had tended to over-estimate the productive role of large farmers, through evidence of their dominant contributions to national agricultural markets and foreign currency earnings, within the current macro-economic strategy, they had underplayed the underutilisation of land by large scale farmers and the increasing land productivity among peasants and resettled farmers. Debates had also sidelined the national importance of the Communal Area economy. The search for widely based micro-economic efficiency in agriculture and sustainable social and environmental reproduction, and thus larger macro-economic benefits, emphasize the need

for a land redistribution programme based on improving the small-holder economy. Because small farmers increasingly play a larger role in national agricultural output, inspite of the distortion of economic incentives against them and a development strategy which relies on large farmers, national debates have slowly begun to recognise the need for a comprehensive land reform programme.

An important constraint to the evolution of an appropriate land reform policy is the continued dominance of the state in the policy process and land control. Through central Government agencies, which had retained and expanded the role of the state since 1980 in land management, land ownership, and land transfer systems enshrined in various legislation, the state had expanded its control over land. Because government is a major player in large-scale farming, in land acquisition and in the implementation of the Resettlement Programme, and in the management of parks, forests and Communal Area woodlands, the land policy and reform strategy are dominated by a few officials in some central Government positions and institutions. Although formal consultation processes on land tenure and land acquisition have been introduced, these processes are restricted, especially in respect of assessing land demand. Instead, officials tend to focus their bureaucratic energies on the land supply concerns of selected elite interest groups.

Widespread demands for land at various local and regional levels, and the socio-economic consequences of the land problem are, thus, not systematically incorporated in the formulation of Zimbabwe's current land reform programme. The narrow statist approach to land reform, coupled with the earlier market based land acquisition strategy, had merely reinforced the protection of the interests of existing large white and black farming elites, and the tautological ideology of their significance in the existing macro-economic structure. The post-independence state had thus been too cautious not to change the basic inherited consumption structure, the inherited macro-economic framework and development strategy of Zimbabwe, even though the expansion of the state's economic role and black control of the state were indeed significant political changes. In agriculture, especially on the land question, this translated into a highly uneven but state dominated economy, whose output structure had only slightly changed towards increased exports. Hence resettlement areas and new small black LSCF enterprises, as well as the majority of Communal Area households, had not received adequate state resource support towards improving their production. With the advent of the economic structural adjustment and black economic nationalism, the issue of supporting black agriculture was being taken up by the state during the 1990s. But such a new approach tended to be biased in favour of large capitalist black farmers.

Thus, the extent and specific results of Zimbabwe's land reform were neither radical nor

simply egalitarian. While close to 20% of the LSCF land area, including about one half of a million of Government owned lease-hold lands, had been acquired for resettlement, amounting to 3.3 million hectares during the 1980s, less than 200,000 hectares had been acquired in the first 4 years of the 1990s. Less than 8% of the growing number of Communal Area households were beneficiaries of land redistribution. Meanwhile as much as 40% of the remaining LSCF lands, including prime lands, remained underutilized. Resettlement had emphasized peasant household style individual cropping, with communal grazing and consolidated village settlements. Individual settlers, with access to arable land of 5 hectares and above, plus grazing land of over 10 hectares for each household, thus gained access to about twice the amount of agricultural land available on average to Communal farming households. Meanwhile, landlessness or near-landlessness in the Communal Areas conceivably stands at about 40% of the households.

Moreover, the bulk of the redistributed land was in the marginal agro-ecological potential areas. However, productivity among individual settlers was on average better than that found in Communal Areas.

Land reform, originally thrust in a socialist framework, had not succeeded in developing agricultural collective cooperatives. Collectives had recruited only 3,000 families, or less than one half of a percent of the peasantry, and their performance in terms of land utilisation was poor. State farms had grown from a mere handful prior to independence to over 21 estates, while the planned development of outgrower settlers as a means of land redistribution had equally failed to recruit half a percent of Zimbabwe peasantry around a few estates. State farming and outgrowers had been underfunded, while this programme increasingly depended on foreign shareholder investments such as the Commonwealth Development Corporation.

The emphasis on resettling individual households from among the poor, the displaced, unemployed and ex-combatants, with little infrastructural and investment support from the state, had limited the productive potential of the resettlement programme. Furthermore, the land tenure rights of resettled people were insecure as the state retained ownership of their lands and allocated them usufruct permits which gave greater powers of control over the settlers and such lands to the state than to the settlers.

In general terms, while resettlement had improved the lives of settlers and increased output therefrom, the land reform experience was felt to be unsatisfactory by various interest groups. The Government had admitted to this not only by changing its legal powers to acquire suitable land at "fair" prices, but also in rationalising a change of settler selection

criteria from a focus on poorer households towards choosing "more capable farmers". This new phase of land reform had emerged during the 1990s as a result of economic liberalisation through a structural adjustment programme, coupled with the expiration of entrenched constitutional sunset clauses which had restricted the land acquisition process to market modalities. The growth of elite economic nationalist demands for land, and local pressure for access to land for survival in the face of growing unemployment, were critical factors in the formulation of the new land reform policy, as the 1995 elections drew nearer to test the government's respect for its predominately rural constituency. The new policy focused on compulsory rural land acquisition was based, however, on commercially valued compensation for land acquired. The Zimbabwe Farmers Union had increased its formal policy influence since 1980, resulting in the rural elite being given priority in land redistribution, while large black capitalist farmers had also secured greater policy attention in terms of access to land and other state support.

While the new policy threatened to neglect the poorer rural households' land needs, because its implementation was based partially on acquiring lands adjacent to Communal Areas, it appears that rural land hunger would be used as a complementary criterion for land redistribution. The fear that black political party opponents of the ruling party would fall victim to the new land acquisition policy had in general not materialised. The expectation that only party favourites would gain access to land as rewards seemed to be realised, although the ruling party and the President appeared to publicly oppose such a trend. Thus, less than 300 large farms had been directly allocated to state and party officials, and some non-party notables, out of over 4 500 large farms in the country. Altogether, adding those blacks who had bought their own farms to those who had gained state held farms, there were now about 800 large-scale black capitalist farmers in Zimbabwe. Adding the small-scale commercial farmers, and numerous free-hold peri-urban plots held by blacks to the large-scale farms, Zimbabwe had by 1994 accommodated close to 12 000 small and large black capitalist farmers. Furthermore, up to 200 blacks had acquired rural plots for cottages and other tourist purposes. Hence a veritable black rural bourgeoisie had emerged in spite of the land reform agenda. This black capitalist land acquisition trend had a dynamic impact on the land policy process which threatened to marginalise the rural poor, and which increased intra-black conflicts over land, especially among those elites and middle-classes which aspired to gain rural land and had been excluded.

Yet it was mostly the marginal and extremely large scale ranchlands owned by whites which had been designated for acquisition since 1992. Indeed, large black farmers who had bought their own farms since 1980 were spared compulsory land designation, to allow them time to optimise land use, while the Government had tended to "un-designate" numerous

white owned lands targeted for acquisition, upon an assessment that such farms were, or could, in the near future, be productive. The emerging land policy, aiming to transfer 50% of the remaining farmlands owned by large white farmers to black farmers of various sizes, thus focuses on transferring the periphery of the large-scale farm lands. Moreover, such transfers are currently perceived to be focused on providing broadly based patronage, through land and state credit, to a black business elite. The latter's economic nationalist ideology provides political space for improving the electoral success of the ruling party in both rural and urban areas.

Therefore, the fundamental problem with Zimbabwe's land policy framework throughout the years is that it has de-emphasized the need for an egalitarian land reform programme, and the economic development strategy that the latter programme implies. The income distribution structure based on the narrow consumption base of below 10% of the people in urban areas and owners of large farms, thus remains a key constraint to Zimbabwe's development, given the restricted internal and effective demand. By providing for improved agricultural incomes through land distribution, peasant households could, however, constitute a potential basis for increasing internal demand for local industry. The present policy misses this logic. Instead, the macro-level policy and its implementation have tended to side-line the economic development potentials of the small-holder farm sector and Communal Areas. Land policy under-represents the growing economic pressures and demands made by rural households, and their needs for increased access to land and natural resources.

As the local study shows, a heterogeneous set of Communal Area land users in different agro-ecological regions demands increased access to and control over land and associated resources. These demands are validated by the direct local evidence available on land underutilisation in the large-scale commercial farming areas. Such demands for land, based on the social reproduction needs of rural households, differ from the economic nationalistic demands espoused by political and economic elites. Scattered day to day struggles over land, including illegal occupations, by peasant households, of lands owned by large farmers and the state, and their "poaching" of natural resources, as well as direct demands for land redistribution are however growing signals of the need for an egalitarian land reform programme. The policy gap is to translate such demands into a positive agenda for macro-economic change.

The dynamic and diverse nature of demands for land in Zimbabwe in general, particularly in Communal Areas, pose particular challenges in planning land reform. Such demands range in character from those related to the immediate need for physical access to land for

agricultural, residential and natural resource exploitation, and to the issue of individual and local level control over land allocation, use and ownership processes. A variety of social classes and groups of people bid for different types of access to land in different types of localities. Most of the demands for land in Communal Areas entail the demand for increased local powers of governance, and a rationalisation of the role of the state in land management within a transparent land reform process. Regional demands, emanating from the provinces, suggest that Zimbabwe's land problem during the 1990s, may assume a sharper manipulation of ethnicity, through which land policy and redistribution can be used for political patronage among the elite and vital local constituencies. Aggregate approaches to land reform are thus still to address adequately and judiciously the land demand side of the problem.

Furthermore, the statist approaches to land management within Communal Areas, as well as the limited agricultural gains realised from agrarian policy changes since 1980, had failed to address the land problems facing rural households. For instance, household reproduction within Communal Areas was found to depend heavily on a quantitatively and physically declining land and natural resource base, due to demographic and livestock growth pressure, and relative environmental degradation. The marginal quality of these lands, as well as crop failures due to the regular droughts, restricted the scope for household reproduction, given also the inadequacy of irrigation infrastructures in these areas. While land productivity in Communal and Resettlement areas had improved since 1980, the fact remains that these areas had not achieved their output potential due to the limited agricultural technology packages currently available to small holder farmers. Social differentiation in the Communal Areas had meant that less than 30% of the households were clear beneficiaries of state policies on land management and agriculture, in terms of access to land, adequate levels of inputs for farm production and output markets.

Post-independence agrarian policies had thus promoted the emergence in Communal Areas of an elite or "kulak" class, based on differential access to arable land and livestock holdings, ownership of labour-saving farm implements and other assets, the use of high yielding seeds and agro-chemicals. This differentiation was evident in varied output levels and sales, and a varying capacity of households to maintain themselves and their soils. Many households increasingly depended on the market place for farm inputs, food, labour and draught power, while some relied on urban wage remittances, wage-labour incomes and micro-scale non-farm productive enterprises for their social reproduction needs. Less than twenty percent of the households had adequate land, assets and incomes with which to guarantee their families a stable livelihood. Social differentiation thus underlay different strategies for gaining access to land within Communal Areas and in neighbouring land tenure regimes.

The expanding socio-demographic profile of Communal Areas within a dwindling natural resource base, especially the land and water resources, thus establish the structure of demand for and supply of land, natural resources and labour. The emerging pattern is one where land control, access and use are dominated by a minority, through social differentiation processes, and selective access to benefits derived from local development institutions, available infrastructures, markets and government administrative structures. For instance, Mhezi Ward exhibited an increased commoditisation of the local economy, reduced land availability and land and natural resources degradation, leading to growing problems of household sustainability. But, there was a divergence of views between peasants and officials over the nature of local land problems and natural resources degradation in the area. Officials emphasized the conservation of land and natural resources, leading to a contest over the validity and legitimacy of various controls over the use of certain proscribed lands and resources in Mhezi. Local spiritual, domestic and agricultural use values derived from land were also threatened by the resource degradation process, while local internal powers to regulate resource use, together with government regulations, had been undermined by emerging local political-economic processes. This demonstrated the complexity of local social relations of control over land, the production process, community labour resources. It also showed that there was an emergence of a crisis in the current state-dominated regime of socio-economic and resources regulation.

The dynamic socio-political and institutional processes underlying the reproduction of the peasant household economy and control over land and its use are therefore a critical element which has to be considered in the emerging land policy formulation process. Household bidding for land and natural resources in those areas which are restricted by private tenure and land management regulations, and emerging patterns of land use and rural differentiation, have formented a variety of local perspectives on the land and natural resource problems of Communal Areas. The commoditisation of the household economy and the local resource base, and various economic strategies adopted by households for their survival suggest a growing local agency and demand for land redistribution. Because these processes are neglected by the existing and past Government land policy, the land reform programme lacks resilience and relevance to the local land problem.

Numerous Government and non-governmental organisations tended to intervene at the local level in Communal Areas, with a focus on promoting land use changes such as intensified cash and food cropping, rural afforestation, natural resources conservation and management systems, and other group-based strategies of income generation. Traditional lineage based local leadership structures, including spiritual and medical power structures,

were found to have limited powers over land allocation and natural resources management, as both Government and NGOs promoted new elective voluntary community based organisations to take charge over these functions. Yet, diminished access to land and the natural resources essential for household food, energy, housing, medicinal and other use values, had increased pressure on these resources, and led to growing pressure on private lands.

Intensive official and NGO efforts to mediate local land problems and conflicts were inadequate because they did not address the wider local community needs. These institutions used different approaches to mediating land problems, combining persuasion through extension activities, regulation through relatively ineffective sanctions and cooptation based on rewards such as access to various development project inputs. While up to 25% of the communities gained some access to these externally derived developmental supports, the majority sought private strategies to gain access to land and natural resources, and to gain incomes from the increasing commoditisation of these resources. Thus, national land and environmental policy directives and legislation implemented locally at the behest of central governmental and NGO officials tended to face limited relevance and success. This emphasized the need to recognise the diverse and dynamic nature of the demands for land and natural resources in Communal Areas.

Local demands for land are intended to at least ensure household reproduction, based on both internal and external socio-economic forces which influence land uses and needs within the peasant community and its territory. External development organisations are preoccupied with local land management controls, using approaches which neglect the history of land alienation, the current dynamics of land occupation and use, and the agricultural economic incorporation of the area into wider markets. They promote "development" without recognising the land and economic constraints facing local populations. The expansion of land resettlement schemes, small and large scale commercial farming processes in the Mhezi area, for instance, had led to the development of markets, class and power relations which challenge the existing rural and land administration of the area. These internal social forces and structures thus influence the development of local strategies for the use and control of land and natural resources for household survival and reproduction as well as for market production, in new and local organisational frameworks which the state and NGOs have yet to comprehend and accept. Based upon objective and subjective spatially and historically determined constraints, the local conceptualisation and articulation of the land question is however mostly focused on the problem of sustainable household reproduction.

The wide range of development institutions concerned with land management at the local level, operating in Mhezi for instance, had achieved varied but low levels of household participation in their programmes. While the development interventions of these institutions had focused on sustaining land and natural resources control structures, through an elite and new local power and regulatory structures, most households instead intended to focus on their own strategies of land and natural resource use, and bidding for access to land. The variety of social, political and economic resource mobilisation initiatives thus pursued generated problems and conflicts over land, which state mediation could not handle effectively. This essentially reflected an emerging local struggle and effective demand for land reform. Differences between the official and peasant perspectives over land management authority and rules underlie the failure of central government administrative imperatives for land reform, because their objectives are not focused on improving household livelihoods from land. Local land politics and ideology thus reflect a wider social and political struggle for control over land.

The politics of land at the local level are governed by a complex, heterogeneous and dynamically changing institutional situation. Increasing inter-relationships among state, NGO and community institutions reflect an evolving local mediation process, directed at resolving the intensifying conflicts among various landholders, land users and land administrators. Land control and use, together with the regulation of natural resource use, are the key organising element of power and institutional relations at the local level. These new institutional developments embody a differentiating local perception of the land question. Various groups of local households use these institutions to gain access to specific material benefits for their varied social reproduction needs among other things. Household participation in institutionally promoted land-based development projects, as reflected in the changing uses of household land, creates a new basis and new forms of social differentiation, and new types of local conflicts. Traditional symbols of power and their structures are, with mixed success, increasingly manipulated or used by the state, NGOs and local people to transform relations of land control and land use at the local level. Such local socio-political struggles for land control, which are evident in different degrees throughout the nation, are not adequately recognized in the national policy formulation processes.

Instead, the macro-level political concerns which dominate land debates focus on intra-elite struggles over land. It had been expected, for instance, that Government would succumb to using political criteria to target land for designation by focusing on its opponents. While

this was not evident, some elements in government had indeed seemed to seek favour from loyalists by granting some elites government owned land. Yet at the level of rhetoric, the government seemed to recognise, in general political terms, the swelling demand for land among peasants and black capitalists, hence its insistence that the national question remained unresolved as long as land inequities remained. The changing macro-economic policy context and nationalist perspectives however seemed to direct land policy towards increased land transfers to large black farmers, neglecting the increasing degradation of human and natural resources, and the salient popular agency for access to land.

The state had suprisingly used the new legislation to acquire mainly large estates in marginal regions, inspite of the powers contained therein to acquire prime lands. Because the acquisition of land tended to be provincialised, in order to advance local leaders' political interests, land acquisition had initially followed an ad hoc system responding to central government level directions that land be designated in each province. The system of land acquisition which had a focus on underutilised lands nearest to Communal Areas facing land pressure had led to the designation of mostly marginal lands. Such lands are unsuitable for rainfed farming and for meeting the food security needs of peasants.

While this was intended to protect farms within the prime agricultural areas, up to 3 million underutilised hectares could have been acquired without affecting LSCF outputs. Furthermore, local demands for land were not being systematically incorporated in the land designation procedures, which were dominated by extension officials and small and large commercial farmers' representatives. Local Government and community articulations of land requirements thus tended to be only generally recognised, while the specific demand patterns were not well understood or processed at the central level.

Therefore, the existing centralised and hierarchical framework of decision-making, has negatively affected land policy analysis and land reform, particularly because of the lack of vertical consistency and adequate horizontal coverage in the understanding of the nature of peasant household demands for land. Because of the wide-ranging and disparate national socio-economic and political considerations and imperatives governing land policy formulation, there is an incoherent conceptualisation, at the central level, of the nature and direction of peasant household land requirements. The peasant household economy, elucidates the broad basis of land pressure and demands in Communal Areas. An understanding of agrarian change in Communal Areas is essential not only to situate the significant micro-economic role of land in household socio-economic reproduction, but also in understanding the macro-economic constraints upon development imposed by present land and agricultural resources allocations.

Increasing future demands for land among the peasantry are predicated in this study on the assumption that young householders, women, local leaders, chiefs and political representatives, lacking other economic alternatives, will increasingly demand greater local control over land and associated resources. Such interest groups also increasingly demand that the state begins to decentralise the taxation, allocation and administration of land and various other resources to the district level. Regional and local variations in land requirements and the politics of land demands and land tenure, as well as the neglect of the land needs of the poor, are key problems of the new land policy formulation process. A new but vague brand of economic nationalism threatens to marginalise the land concerns of the poor in Communal Lands and increases the prospects for conflict over land there. The appropriateness of the present extent of state control over land in Communal Areas and its role in the adjudication of competing demands for land among state enterprises, black capitalists, local rural leaders and the poorer peasants is an aspect which requires further policy attention.

Yet the immediate task for the land policy is to address the specific problems of land and social reproduction in Communal Areas. An understanding of the land problem at the meso-scale, and at the locality level, by desegregating Zimbabwe's land problem, can provide the specific direction for future land reform. A focus on the socio-economic basis of the actual demand for land in Zimbabwe, rather than on the technical basis, has been the key gap in macro-level dominated land reform policy formulation. This suggests that land policy formulation should be structurally decentralised.

Resolving the problem of land in Zimbabwe requires a new policy formulation process whereby the objectives of reform are clearly specified. In particular, the policy needs to define the macro-economic objectives which will be enhanced by land reform. These should include household reproduction or social security, employment development, domestic output growth, export growth, as well as promoting social and regional equity in agricultural production. None of these targets have been openly debated. Land acquisition should entail the identification of land suitable for those productive activities that enhance the envisioned agricultural output structure, employment growth, technologies to be promoted, and the regional balances desired. Although the actual land supply options for redistribution may be proscribed by the policy of protecting existing output in the LSCF and relieving land pressure in given Communal Areas, a comprehensive land use plan is necessary to guide future production in all agricultural sub-sectors in relation to available land quality, potential irrigable capacity and other rural enterprises. Concerted effort is necessary to improve production in existing Communal, Resettlement,

SSCF and new settlement areas. Supply of land should accrue from suitable LSCF and resettlement areas, as well as from state and communal lands for a variety of productive enterprises ranging from cropping to livestock and wildlife.

The new land policy will depend for its success on a carefully balanced demand driven strategy, which identifies the appropriate beneficiary groups targeted for land distribution. An openly debated plan which defines the numbers, types and location of black agricultural enterprises that should gain land, in terms of various farm sizes, from small and medium to larger farms, is critical. Such a plan would identify quantities of land to be transferred to the rural poor, to the "capable communal farmers", to existing rural squatters, to master farmer type farmers, to trained agriculturalists, to women, young families and new medium-to-large scale black capitalist farmers. Regional equity in access to the land transferred will be necessary for the balancing of demand and to guide land use planning in relation to the development of water, infrastructure and technologies required for the improved utilisation of land across all farming systems.

A financial plan to meet the agricultural development requirements of all types of land distribution beneficiaries in various agro-ecological regions and provinces then needs to be openly debated. Such a plan should also finance land development in existing Communal Areas, focusing on irrigation, infrastructure and the development of agro-industry and services in these neglected regions. Urban demand for land for low-cost housing, to be met from farm lands in the urban-rural fringe, also needs to be addressed. This requires political commitment to reallocate budgets towards Land Reform.

The potential of using a variety of land supply options, complementary to land designation, also needs to be explored. A land tax that takes into account land use potential should be instituted on LSCF lands and all types of state land in order to ensure that land managers optimise land use, or make land available for redistribution. Land sub-division for agricultural purposes should also be encouraged, through tax and other incentives, in order to encourage private sales, particularly to meet the growing demand for land among small black capitalist farmers.

Land tenure policy for existing Communal and Resettlement Areas should move towards popular consultations on the possibility of providing qualified leasehold title to present landholders, particularly on their arable and residential plots. Where there is clear demand for freehold title, this could be experimented with, on a selective basis, through pilot schemes. The demand for freehold land will require that new landholders, especially among the better off farmers seeking land, pay rentals for or purchase such land. But this

requires an open consultative framework and the monitoring of beneficiaries, costs and the distribution of benefits. Even government land using institutions will need to pay land taxes to ensure that they use land optimally and to transfer incomes to the poor who are deprived of land by the state's search for foreign currency and the minimisation of environmental externalities.

The Government will also have to take a stand on how far it is prepared to go to expose both the LSCF farmers and established inputs supply and agricultural monopolies to a more openly competitive economic environment. These groups have been protected under ESAP through gradual trade liberalisation based on the restricted opening up of the Open General Import Licensing (OGIL), slow deregulation of the business environment, inherent bias in export promotion schemes, and the distortion of capital markets which favour their access to credit. During this decade, the Government will have to nurture black agricultural development through targeted subsidy programmes, especially on the inputs supply side, and incentives which lead to the rationalisation of the private inputs supply process and marketing of agricultural output. An agricultural policy which evens out prospects for entry into high value farm production by black farmers is the key to a successful land reform programme.

Yet the Government should produce transparent inventories of the different types of settlers (small, medium and large scale) derived from among Communal Areas, agriculture graduates and potential urban based farm investors, in order that access to land is seen to be based on credible criteria and procedures. Farmers' organisations, agricultural colleges, local councils, NGOs and other related farming interest groups should be mobilised to contribute to the inventories of potential land holders. These interest groups together with the agricultural and technical ministries, in consultation with settlers and experts, should develop credible plans indicating the resources required to enable the new land holders to farm efficiently. Furthermore, inventories of the residential land needs of the urban homeless should be worked out according to the suitability of different locations such as cities, towns, growth points, service centres and other village sites. Plans and budgets to implement a programme for access to residential land should be produced and debated.

Most critically, the Government needs to commit finance to land reform, and involve local expertise and various interest groups in a forum which can produce a credible plan for land reform. Widespread consultation on the land needs and tenure preferences of rural and urban dwellers, and public debates on the land reform plan will be essential if the Government is to retain the popular support that a land redistribution policy can enjoy. The land question needs a resolution based on an infusion of new and broadly based ideas,

rather than conservative strategies of land redistribution.

Such a policy requires that special institutional arrangements for land reform be set up. For instance, a permanent land commission which advises Government and the public on the specific objectives, procedures and requirements for implementing a new land policy, based on diverse indigenous expertise, and addressing the multi-sectoral character of the land question, would be essential for success (see box).

BOX 9.1: INSTITUTIONAL ARENA FOR LAND POLICY PROCESS

the technical consideration of land use, normally dealt with by Agritex should also involve farmers groups and various scientists;

) the agricultural-economic aspects dealt with by the main organs of the Ministry of Land, Agriculture and Water Development and farmers groups should also include various scientists and those business interests which service the sector in terms of inputs, infrastructure, markets and extension;

) the macro-economic policy incentives for land use, currently dealt with vaguely by a combination of organisations, should include the Reserve Bank, the Ministry of Finance, the National Planning Agency, and the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Commerce, which handles trade liberalisation. Additionally indigenous businesspeople, farmers groups and experts will need to be consulted.

) the political considerations surrounding settler selection, squatting, etc, normally dealt with by numerous GoZ and ZANU-PF units, including the Ministry of Local Government, Provincial Powers, the Cabinet, and territorial branches of ZANU-PF. This will need to involve other interest groups, political parties and NGOs.

) the social welfare problems associated with destitution, landlessness and malnutrition, involving the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare and the Social Welfare Department;

) the environmental problems associated with natural resource utilisation, involving the Ministry of Environment and its agencies, as well as NGOs;

ii) the local organisation of communities for resettlement should include the various departments of community development and local Government promotion, and the numerous NGOs engaged in land related development activities.

The above action framework to develop the new land policy, as well as earlier identified patterns of land use value among peasant households, and the key macro-economic objectives that ESAP dictates for agriculture, suggest that the main land issue for the future is not so much its ownership but the provision of secure land access to optimal land users, through a lease-hold system based on a comprehensive land use policy and plan. Since most debates on the land policy have neglected land use, particularly at the local level, the

future focus should be to gradually decentralise land control and planning, so as to capture the local practices and use values of land, and to promote their development.

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ANNEX: METHODOLOGICAL NOTES

The National Household Survey

Out of 759 households interviewed through a structured questionnaire, a total of 75 per cent valid responses were secured from Zimbabwe's eight provinces. Thus just below 1 per cent of Zimbabwe's peasantry were covered by this survey. Provincial distribution of the household responses ranged from 10 to 19 per cent of the sample with the highest response rates recorded in Manicaland (19 per cent), Midlands (14 per cent) and the two Matebeleland Provinces (13 per cent each) (Moyo et al, 1990, p.6).

The respondents were selected from nine out of 55 districts, with each province fielding one district each, except for Manicaland for which two survey districts were selected. These districts and the respective Communal Areas in which household questionnaires were undertaken are listed in Figure 1:

Figure 1: SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY

PROVINCE	DISTRICT	COMMUNAL AREAS
1. Mashonaland East	Murewa	Mangwenda and Uzumba
2. Mashonaland Central	Mount Darwin	Kandeya
3. Mashonaland West	Kariba	Omay
4. Manicaland	a) Makoni b) Chipinge	a) Tanda, Makoni & Chiduku b) Tamandayi & Musikavanhu
5. Midlands	Kwekwe	Zhombe and Silobela
6. Masvingo	Mwenezi	Mathibi I and Maranda
7. Matebeleland North	Bubi	Inkositazi Ntabazindana and Inyathi
8. Matebeleland South	Matobo	Khumalo East and West

(ZIDS Survey, 1989/90)

Map 5

The spatial pattern of household respondents also varied according to broad agro-ecological regions, defined in Zimbabwe in five categories of descending levels of potential for intensive agricultural crop production, under existing technological arrangements (Figure 2).

In keeping with the proportional spatial distribution of Communal Areas among the various agro-ecological regions, the sample covered the largest number of households in regions IV and V, at 59 per cent, and the fewest households in region I (Figure 3).

Thus up to 80 per cent of the households surveyed were in the lower agro-potential regions, with a historically determined spatial bias picked up in the sampling. Two of the Communal Areas surveyed, Musikavanhu in Manicaland Province and Maranda in Masvingo province, were unique in that Government intervention had led to the establishment of an irrigation and villagisation project respectively within them.

Figure 2: HOUSEHOLD SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION BY AGRO-ECOLOGICAL REGION

NATURAL REGION	NO OF RESPONDENTS	% OF SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS	% OF COMMUNAL AREA
1. (Highest Potential)	22		1
2. NR IIa	54		8
NR IIb	80		
3.	154		17
4.	313		45
5. (Lowest Potential)	136		29
TOTALS	759	100	100

(ZIDS Survey, 1989/90)

Map 6

The actual data solicited by the questionnaire included: socio-economic and demographic features of the households, their physical resource base, their asset base, labour processes, agricultural production, financial and income data, livestock and draught power data, farm practices and extension services data. Univariate analysis of this data was undertaken, revealing interesting trends particularly when assessed for differences along the provincial and spatial categories presented above. Further analysis of various relationships based on cross-tabulation of variables was also undertaken.

The Site-Level Household Survey: Mhezi Ward

The local site-level data collection at the broad secondary and appraisal level began in late 1990, while questionnaire survey work was done between October 1991 and January 1992. Other interview work was carried out during 1992 and was completed by June 1993.

Manicaland Province, particularly Makoni District and Mhezi Ward, were selected for the detailed site-specific study for various reasons. This area represents one of the few spatial zones combining a cross-section of agro-ecological conditions under which peasants reside. The Communal Lands in this district traverse Natural Regions II and III and combine varied terrain as shown in the table below.

In addition, the study area is characterised by high population density which has for long been considered a high environmental stress area (Whitson Foundation, 1983), and is considered by historians (Ranger, 1985) and other scholars (Moyo, 1986) to be a hive of political resistance and struggle, particularly in respect of land.

The 1992 census (CSO, 1992) put Zimbabwe's population at 10.4 million, with an average growth rate of 3.13 per cent and average household size of 4.80 and population density of 26.62/km². Makoni district has 242,611 people, 49,867 households and an average household size of 4.9 persons. Makoni district and Mhezi ward are also compactly located within the vicinity of LSCF areas, state lands, resettlement areas and small scale commercial farming (SSCF) areas. This presents a unique socio-economic and political context for a variety of processes including out-migration, seasonal labour movements, technology transfers, resource and land conflicts and access to given infrastructural resources meant to service the LSCF and tourist regions in the vicinity at Nyanga district.

Mhezi district thus provides a variety of potential external alternatives for household

reproduction in the face of a variety of environmental circumstances which are recognised to be relatively stressed. (Mhezi wards population totals 5,817 of which 3,182 are female).

The household questionnaire covered 120 families within Mhezi Ward and solicited a wide range of data, with special focus on the use of natural resources for household reproduction. Thus out of a total of 1,209 households in Mhezi (CSO, 1992), the survey covered close to 10 per cent of households in that ward.

The population distribution of sampled households among the six villages of Mhezi wards and some of the varied ecological characteristics of the villages studied, are presented in Figure 3.

No surveys were undertaken at business centres as this survey concentrated on households. In terms of actual population represented by the sample, this ranged from 14 per cent to 20 per cent of the various villages. The above figures indicate that the sample's average household sizes were consistently above that of the ward's average of 4.8 as reported in the 1992 census. The data served a wider purpose, and were completed by wider information sources as detailed next.

Figure 3: LOCAL LEVEL HOUSEHOLD SAMPLING FRAME: MHEZI-MAKONI DISTRICT

VILLAGE	ECOLOGICAL ZONE	MALES <16 YRS	FEMALES <16 YRS	MALES >16 YRS	FEMALES >16 YRS	NO. OF PERSONS PER HOUSEHOLD	TOTAL POPULA TION	* % OF WARD
Chitora	Scattered hills with undulating land	39	40	42	40	8.1	161	19.7
Chikowa	Undulating but sloping in the east and south towards Mhezi Rivers.	37	36	32	44	7.5	149	18.2
Mahande	Generally undulating with ranges of hills	22	24	37	35	5.9	118	14.4
Gundi	Generally flat with bare rock outcrops.	29	28	40	36	6.7	133	16.2
Chipara	Sloping in the east towards Mhezi River scattered rock outcrops.	28	29	35	37	6.5	129	15.8

Nhendere	Rocky terrain; land generally of highest altitude in Mhezi.	31	34	27	37	6.5	129	15.8
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*Percentage Figures may not add to 100 per cent because of rounding up of figures.

Communal Area Data Sources: Issues and Approaches

This study needs to be viewed in the broader context of research development in Zimbabwe, and in terms of the evolution of rural research methodologies in social service. The purpose of this work was thus to provide a basis for improving the local research base. In this connection this study also aimed to contribute further data and information towards building knowledge on the previously neglected status of agrarian developments in Communal Areas. As observed by Rohrbach (1988), the first serious attempt to systematically develop a data bank on Communal Areas was undertaken in 1977 by the Whitsun Foundation. They collated various isolated data sources as a contribution towards the planning efforts of the transitional Government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia (Whitsun Foundation, 1978). During the 1980s, various efforts by Government agricultural and statistical agencies, researchers and donor agencies sought to build and improve upon the quality of data on Communal Areas.

Numerous surveys referenced in this study are testimony to this effort to fill an important gap in our understanding of the workings of the peasant farming system, land problems and social reproduction. Various Government agencies were thus a critical source of data for this study. These agencies included: the Central Statistics Office (CSO), the Agricultural Marketing Authority, various commodity marketing boards, the Agricultural Extension and Technical Services Department (Agritex) of the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development, the Department of Rural Development (DERUDE) in the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development, which is charged with the physical resettlement of people, the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA). Furthermore, private sector information on inputs sales and packages complemented the information from the secondary and primary sources used in this study.

Yet, a key problem remains that the quality of Communal Area data on agricultural outputs, sales, household crop retentions and incomes tends to exhibit inconsistencies and incomplete coverage of Communal Area households (Rohrbach). In spite of efforts by the

CSO, Agritex and United Nations agencies to coordinate and improve such data, existing national Communal Area data remains weak. Even local questionnaire survey data, as those used in this study, face typical problems of reliability, particularly in the incomes and crop outputs data. Such data are to be treated with caution, as they are used in this work more to provide broad indications of the situation confronting Communal Area households. However, household surveys such as the one used here and in other studies are useful in the broader context of improving Zimbabwean knowledge on agrarian change at national and local levels.

Given the above data problems, this study also benefited from the research background of the author which began in 1983 and involved numerous field interviews, household questionnaire surveys, investigation of various rural development institutions, attendance at various rural political and development meetings, and numerous discussions with rural officials and community leaders. These past research efforts in Communal Areas allowed the author to investigate a variety of issues of relevance to this study, including aspects such as rural energy problems, the development of cooperatives, the role of agricultural extension workers in Communal Areas, the work of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), rural labour issues and water development issues. Pure research and consultancy work were combined to gather considerable data, which complement the survey work reported here (see Figure 4).

As a Zimbabwean national, regular visits to rural areas allowed the author to pursue a variety of informal interviews with officials and locals, to organise and participate in rural workshops, and to attend public meetings in Communal Areas. These sources of information have been used to obtain a wide range of views and opinions on agrarian change, policy formulation and the rural development implementation issues surrounding Communal, Resettlement, Small-Scale and Large-Scale farming areas, as well as forest and parks areas. Thus, policy processes and attitudes were examined through this process. The local case study was in turn used to systematize the collection of various views, opinions, household data, and information on local practices in agrarian development, while focusing on land and natural resources issues.

Figure 4: DATA SOURCES AND RESEARCH PROGRAMME LEADING TO BOOK

YEAR	ISSUES	METHODS
1984	1. Rural Household Energy	Questionnaires, interviews
	2. Rehabilitation of Ex-combatants in rural Masvingo	Interviews, questionnaire and secondary data
	3. National land use efficiency and	Official and form data, inter-views and records.

1985	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Agricultural Co-op. and Agrarian Reform 2. The Organisation of Collective 3. Rural Water Delivery in Communal Areas 	<p>Interviews, secondary data and data-check lists.</p> <p>" " "</p> <p>" " "</p>
1986	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Appraisal of Land Reform and Needs 2. Peasant Household and Cooperative Inputs 3. Foreign Aid to Agriculture in 	<p>National records and data, policy review, interviews and literature review.</p> <p>Surveys</p> <p>Official records, interviews and data</p>
1987	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Rural Energy Institution and Needs in SADC region Woodfuel shortages and stores in Zimbabwe 2. Vulnerable labour segments of Zimbabwe 3. 	<p>Secondary data and interviews.</p> <p>Questionnaires, workshops, interviews and secondary data.</p> <p>Secondary data and interviews.</p>
1988	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Zimbabwe's Environmental Dilemma & Profile Rural and Agricultural Employment 2. Pilot study on Women Farmers & Extension 3. 	<p>Secondary data, literature and interviews.</p> <p>Questionnaires and secondary data.</p> <p>Survey questionnaire and interviews.</p>
1989	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Piloting of Surveys and Sampling 2. National Level Household Production System Rural Industries Energy and Technology 3. Land Policy and Reforms 4. 	<p>Field testing and records selections.</p> <p>759 questionnaires (Baseline Survey)</p> <p>Interviews, measurement and survey.</p> <p>Secondary data, literature and interviews.</p>
1990	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Research Site Establishment and Linkage 2. District and Ward Secondary Data 3. Local Organisational Arrangements 4. Natural Resource Use and Markets 	<p>Discussions, map and records collection.</p> <p>Literature and statistics compilation.</p> <p>Participation on local committees.</p> <p>Observation, interviews, counting and records.</p>
1991	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. District Institutional and Physical Data 2. Ward Landuse and Resource Management 3. Rural NGOs in Zimbabwe 4. Ward Household Data: Makoni 5. Drought and Public Works Programmes 6. The impact of ESAP on Agriculture 	<p>Interviews, measurement and rapid appraisal.</p> <p>" " "</p> <p>Secondary data, records and interviews.</p> <p>250 Questionnaires</p> <p>Secondary data and local questionnaires.</p> <p>Secondary data and interviews.</p>
1992	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ward Household Data: Makoni Ward 2. Ward Institutional and Legal Process 3. Physical Resource Inventories 	<p>120 Questionnaires and rapid appraisal.</p> <p>Interviews, records and observation.</p> <p>Observation, mapping, measurement</p>

	4. Local Perceptions on Resources	Interviews, discussions and recording
	5. Land Taxation and tenure policy issues	Secondary data, literature & interviews.
1993	1. Small Scale Enterprises & Rural Dev	Rapid appraisals.
	2. Local Resource Management & Conflicts	Interviews and rapid appraisals.
	3. Land Reform, Agrarian Change and Agency	Writing-up.

While the case study provides an opportunity to pursue in depth knowledge of socio-political, institutional and local practices, the generalizability of such data for the numerous Communal Area wards is necessarily limited by their heterogeneity, which this study argues needs to be further understood. The case study's focus on one ward only in this work was conditioned by the usual resource limitations faced by local research institutions.

In addition to the household survey data, interviews and other secondary data sources utilized in this work, the study also benefited from media sources of information. Press cuttings on various events, speeches and problems associated with land use, conflicts, acquisition, resettlement, and other local problems, and opinions of experts, officials and farm union leaders, were collected over the years.

These cuttings provided insights into official, local, parliamentary and scientific debates, grievances and strategies adopted by various actors in response to the evolving land problem and policy in Zimbabwe. Insights from media sources thus complemented formal policy statements in the sense of identifying divergences and differences among numerous groups interested in the land question, as well as in recording land conflicts that have gained a national profile over the years. Given that the specific evolution of Zimbabwe's land policy has been relatively fluid especially during the last few years, and that local pressure on land has tended to be sporadic in time and space, media sources of information were useful in tracking subtle land policy shifts and events which could be pursued for further analysis.

Therefore, the typical limitations faced in household surveys, such as the concealment of intra-household differences, gender issues and local structural questions surrounding power and the decision-making process, were addressed through the use of complementary formal and informal interviews with various people at the national and local level, the use of key informants, the use of media sources and the use of group meetings in a variety of platforms. Indeed, further research would need to examine in greater detail intra-household grievances

over land, as well as explore more specific details of local land allocation and land market issues, that are evolving in Communal Areas. This work could not delve into as much empirical detail as desired on political processes relating to local influences on policy formulation. However, the study approach allowed us to capture the broad scope and direction of socio-political processes which impinge on policy formulation. This weakness was more than off-set by the analysis of policy-making at the macro-level, in conjunction with the examination of land problems at the meso-scale, across various Communal Areas.

Another study limitation recognised here is that this work does not pursue in great detail historical and legislative data sources, which could have been used to elaborate particular nuances of Zimbabwe's land policy process more satisfactorily. It was decided not to pursue such sources because numerous studies in the past, which are cited in this work (see the various references to Ranger, Palmer, Phimister, Lan and others), as well as parallel works recently completed (see references to Alexander, Schmidt, Herbst, Skalness and others), have paid relatively adequate attention to these issues. In this work, some of the broader historical insights and legal issues raised by these authors have been utilized to contextualise the evolving policy prior to 1980 and its implications for present struggles over land.

The above limitations and the approaches used to address the data requirements of this study, were also countervailed by the effective use of various research resources created by and available to the author. The author, as the head of agrarian research at ZIDS for eight years, and a Co-Director of ZERO for seven years, was provided a useful framework by these two institutions to pursue inter-disciplinary debates on various aspects of the land and environment question. Research colleagues and assistants were also useful in the collection of various data, and its processing, the testing of views, and the elaboration of various ideas proposed by the author. Thus, institutional research resources and contracts developed over time were useful in the development of this study.

Summary of Methodology

Given the research gap in treating structure and agency, the synthesis of the above data and their environmental contextualisation is expected to form part of an original contribution to our understanding of various types of pressure for land reform and approaches to rural household sustainability. The purpose is to develop a new geography of sustainable household reproduction in rural areas of the developing world, using a case study of Zimbabwe with particular reference to one ward in Makoni District. After a review of the literature, the project presents an analysis of the macro-level experience of land reform in Zimbabwe. Two chapters devoted to this describe the physical and institutional context of

land reform, changes in the agrarian structure, land transfers and land use shifts, the changing legal and socio-political framework for land reform, and the macro-impacts of land transfer. Relevant agricultural and environmental policy shifts, and the broad political economy of post-independence transition are then discussed in the penultimate chapter, to further our understanding of the macro-process of change.

The research core is thus an analysis of a national rural household baseline survey undertaken during 1989, based on a stratified household sample of 756 Communal Area households. The data analyzed includes the socio-demographic features of these households, their farm and non-farm asset base, farm production and technology features and their inter-linkages to extension and other services. This data is analyzed according to the provincial and agro-ecological location and characteristics, in order to identify the nature of regional differentiation among the households. Broader social differentiation is assessed in terms of selected critical features of the sample, including land and other behavioral characteristics. Resource use and incomes are further analyzed to assess the effectiveness of household reproduction, and to define its broad sustainability. This national household data is further utilised to derive a broad indication of the environmental sustainability of the peasant farming system, and to gauge patterns of demand for land reform.

Following this national level analysis, the study analyses site level data based on a ZERO project on local level natural resources management. Data from a 120 household survey from Mhezi Ward of Makoni District are analyzed. Other data collected from this ward and the district which are analyzed include rapid rural appraisal data on land use, the physical resource base, livestock practices, local institutional and legal arrangements for natural resources utilisation, and local resource management practices. These and various secondary data are utilised to undertake a community level assessment of social reproduction, environmental sustainability and demands for land reform. Such data are of particular interest because they pursue similar questions as those considered in the national survey, and go into further detail on the use of land, incomes and natural resources for household reproduction. Greater depth is sought beyond the agricultural context of social reproduction.

The local level research thus complements a variety of data sources at the household, community and institutional levels, in order that the social structures identified can be further analyzed in terms of the processes and directions of change in the community. Here the study also examines the broad levels of project intervention from Governmental and NGO sources.

Chapters 4 to 9 rest on empirical analysis based on a statistical assessment of household production and consumption at the national level, complemented by a district level survey and a deeper study of behaviour at the site level in Makoni District. This allows for a deeper qualitative investigation of peasant resource management behaviour in six villages, observation and mapping of local land uses and resource conflicts, interviews and assessments of institutional and legal processes obtaining in the villages, and a study of the qualitative assessments by households of their resource base and access issues.

Provision was also made for an in-depth discussion of macro-level changes in the agrarian structure, related policy changes and national responses to the existing policy and institutional framework on land reform. This contextualisation is intended to draw out the inter-linkages of processes, over time and space, at the macro and micro levels. As the literature review identified the absence of inter-linkage as a particular gap, such analysis led towards raising new questions on the appropriateness of present theoretic assumptions and policy rationalisation, as well as providing a sharper focus in explaining local level actions related to land and resource use and access.

The main task of this work is to broaden the research methods and data analysis techniques, from the statistical and quantitative to greater use of qualitative methods based on a variety of techniques, such as use of key informants, personal interviews, long interviews, oral historical recordings, rapid rural appraisals of resource uses, and the study of local institutional records.

The policy analysis and contextualisation of land reform also required more in-depth analysis of policy documents, secondary data from official and academic sources, media reports and other relevant institutional data. An effective assessment of such information sources required access to key players in the rural economy.